Prime Ministers and Public Expectations: A Study of Institutional Change by Ie, Kenny William
Western University 
Scholarship@Western 
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 
11-7-2017 1:00 PM 
Prime Ministers and Public Expectations: A Study of Institutional 
Change 
Kenny William Ie 
The University of Western Ontario 
Supervisor 
Cristine de Clercy 
The University of Western Ontario 
Graduate Program in Political Science 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of 
Philosophy 
© Kenny William Ie 2017 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd 
 Part of the Comparative Politics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ie, Kenny William, "Prime Ministers and Public Expectations: A Study of Institutional Change" (2017). 
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 5130. 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/5130 
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca. 
  
i 
 
Abstract 
 This study concerns the institutional bases of prime ministerial power and 
leadership. Specifically, it investigates institutional development in the prime ministerial 
civil service organizations in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, 
from the 1970s to the present. The study asks two basic questions. First, to what extent, 
and how, have the institutional bases of prime ministerial power grown? Second, what 
explanations can account for the institutional change observed?  
 The study is framed theoretically in two ways. In terms of general approach, the 
study adopts the lens of historical institutionalism, and especially Mahoney and Thelen’s 
(2010) characterization of patterns of change over time. In terms of specific empirical 
theory, I construct and test an original theory called the Theory of Public Expectations. 
This theory locates the impetus for institutional change in the gradual but transformative 
shift in public values since the 1970s, captured in the notion of “assertive citizenship”. 
Assertive citizenship generates increased public expectations of leaders which, in turn, 
incentivize prime ministers to centralize power through institutional enhancement. 
Methodologically, the study employs an innovative mixed methods approach to testing 
this theory, including quantitative modelling and qualitative case-study analysis.    
  Overall, the analysis demonstrates that, where the assumptions of both increasing 
assertive citizenship and institutional centralization are met, the Theory of Public 
Expectations receives some support. Thus, the study reveals the crucial role of the public 
in shaping prime ministerial leadership. As importantly, though, the study finds that the 
centralization of power in the prime ministership, at least vis-à-vis institutional 
development, is not a universal, consistent phenomenon. Contrary to prevailing accounts, 
it varies greatly across cases and over time, and is often contingent on the agency of 
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leaders. The study significantly advances the theoretical robustness and methodological 
rigour of the prime ministerial literature and vividly demonstrates the relationship 
between the public and prime ministerial power.     
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Chapter 1 
Prime Ministers and Modern Politics 
I make no apology for having a strong centre... in today's world there is a lot more that 
needs to be done at the prime ministerial level. I am saying this is the right thing to do.   
Tony Blair, 2002 
This study is about institutional change in prime ministerial organizations in four 
Westminster countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. It 
focuses on the centre of government bureaucracies that advise and support prime 
ministers in their role as chief executives: the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
in Australia and New Zealand, the Privy Council Office in Canada, and the Cabinet 
Office in the United Kingdom. A key focus concerns how these institutions have 
responded to the transformations of modern democratic politics.  
The study is motivated by the broader question of how institutional change 
reflects change in the nature of prime ministerial leadership. Prime ministers are the 
central figures in modern politics; what they do matters a great deal. This centrality is a 
good reason to care about the enhancement of prime ministerial leadership as suggested 
in the epigraph above. Prime Minister Blair’s candid defence of centralization reflects a 
common assessment that prime ministerial power has grown significantly in recent years. 
If this claim is accurate, what is driving these changes? My answer in this study is 
predicated on four key suppositions that are neatly captured in Blair’s argument.   
The first supposition is that the “job description” of prime ministers has changed 
in recent decades. Prime ministers face more difficult tasks and obligations than ever 
before. Policy issues are more complex and policy problems are more intractable. 
Traditional levers of power are often ineffective in bringing about change. Governments 
deal with problems that are often not amenable to direct state intervention. They face the 
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scrutiny of an aggressive media and sceptical public. In these headwinds, the 
effectiveness of prime ministers depends greatly on the institutional resources at their 
command. The idiosyncratic personal qualities of prime ministers - leadership skills, 
personality traits, experiences, and so on – always partly determine success and failure. 
However, institutional capacity can increase opportunities for leadership success. Such 
capacity is relatively stable and enduring, and it is passed to successive prime ministers. 
Thus, one response to the changing job description facing modern leaders is to build the 
capacity of organizations that support them. This makes an incredibly difficult job 
somewhat more manageable.    
The second supposition posits that change in the prime ministerial job description 
is a reflection and consequence of the politics of “today's world”. First, politics has never 
been as inclusive, in a sense, as it is now. Although the democratic bona fides of modern 
politics are more open to question than ever before, the number and the intensity of 
voices in the political discourse are greater than ever before. Moreover, this inclusivity is 
accompanied by an ‘individuation’ of politics: group political identities are more fluid 
and groups themselves, as a channeling and filtering factor between citizens and elites, 
have lost much of their authority. Thus, prime ministers face a cacophony of 
heterogeneous opinion, creating extraordinary, yet diffused, demands on leaders. The 
inclusivity and individuation of modern politics is aided and abetted by dramatic 
innovations in media and communications technologies, such as the rise of the 
continuous news cycle and, more recently, social media. 
A second characteristic of modern politics that has transformed the prime 
ministerial job description is the structural change within national economies. Since 
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World War II, national economies have undergone profound shifts and dislocations 
associated with the rise of the welfare state and globalization. Modern economies are 
more dependent on each other and on international financial flows. This has generated 
great wealth and raised standards of living, but it has also ‘hollowed out’ entire economic 
sectors and regions as well as the state’s capacity to intervene in the economy.1 At the 
same time, post-war prosperity and the expanded role of government in ensuring 
economic stability and ‘cradle to grave’ social safety nets generate greater expectations 
for what government can and should do. However, governments often may not have 
access to the tools or capacities necessary to meet those expectations. These economic 
changes make the prime minister’s job of driving meaningful change more resource-
intensive, the tools for doing that job less effective, and the prospects for success less 
certain.                    
The third supposition in Prime Minister Blair’s remarks is that the prime minister, 
uniquely among other contending actors, needs “to do a lot more” than was the case 
heretofore. This disruption in traditional arrangements of power vis-à-vis actors such as 
political parties, cabinets, legislatures, and the civil service is troubling to democrats who 
value restraints on power and collective decision-making. As prime ministers do more, 
other actors not only do less but expect to do less, and are perceived as doing less: the 
norms and expectations of actor behaviour change.  
This is most evident in concerns about the concentration of power and the shift 
from cabinet government to ‘prime ministerial’ government. Cabinet government was the 
byword of Westminster government: in Walter Bagehot’s famous expression, cabinet was 
                                                 
1 There is, of course, a voluminous literature on globalization and serious disagreements about its positive 
and negative effects. I give only the broad characterization here and do not necessarily endorse the validity 
of any particular effect.  
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“the buckle that fastens” the legislative power to the executive power. The prime 
minister’s role in this system was to constitute cabinets and oversee the cabinet decision-
making process. Some prime ministers, such as Mackenzie King or Robert Menzies, led 
through consensus or expertise, while leaders like David Lloyd George in Great Britain 
or R.B. Bennett in Canada were perceived as autocratic and domineering. However, the 
language and practice of government was collective, and cabinet had a central role in 
decision-making. Legislatures and the civil service also played important roles. In 
addition to policy-making itself, these other actors played representative and 
informational roles. They were the primary means by which the opinions of diverse 
societal interests could be aggregated and communicated to the political executive. As 
tasks are moved to “the prime ministerial level”, however, the importance of cabinet and 
other actors in policy-making, representation, and informational support has declined.   
Against this decline stands the fourth supposition: the normative case for a 
“strong centre”. Rather than seeing a strong centre as an understandable but undesirable 
outgrowth of modern politics, it should be seen as a positive development. A strong 
centre is conducive to effective, responsible, and responsive governance, while a weaker 
centre undermines it. Governments should be able to generate and implement a policy 
agenda that addresses public needs, for which they can be held accountable. Doing so in 
the face of the centrifugal forces of modern politics is extraordinarily burdensome. In this 
view, the concentration of power in the prime minister and the centre is a way to counter 
these tendencies and enable greater policy coordination, oversight, and active 
intervention. It does not guarantee good governance but it makes ineffective governance 
less likely. A rational prime minister should thus seek to centralize power where they can. 
6 
 
Not seeking out these means is an abdication of responsibility for which the prime 
minister, most of all, will be blamed.  
These four suppositions form the backdrop of ideas upon which I paint a portrait 
of the prime ministerships in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. 
This study comparatively examines institutional change in these prime ministerships, and 
investigates two simple questions. First, to what extent have these institutions changed? 
Second, what systematic factors of modern politics account for change in prime 
ministerships?    
 To answer these questions feasibly within this study, I narrow its scope in two 
ways. First, I limit the concept of the prime ministership by focusing on what I call the 
“prime ministerial branch”, an explicit analog with the concept of the “executive branch” 
in the United States. This choice of term is deliberate: it directs our attention away from 
the prime minister as an individual and towards the institutional extensions of the prime 
minister. These are what Anne Tiernan calls prime ministers’ “deep structure” of support 
and advice (2006, 311): organizations surrounding prime ministers which are directly 
subordinate to them and which support them predominantly, if not exclusively.  
 This “deep structure” includes both political and bureaucratic extensions of the 
prime minister. The former refers to an office, generically referred to as the Prime 
Minister’s Office (PMO), which is staffed mostly by partisan advisors, chosen by the 
prime minister and not subject to merit appointment. The PMO’s primary role is to 
support the prime minister in her political capacity: much of its work involves political 
strategizing and issues management. Where it deals with public policy, its role is to 
provide “policy-sensitive” political advice. The bureaucratic extension of the prime 
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minister is the civil service office that provides administrative and policy support to the 
prime minister. It serves the prime minister in her executive capacity: it provides advice 
on and management of the machinery of government and policy-making support. Career 
civil servants mostly staff these offices. Although political neutrality of civil servants is a 
strong Westminster convention, the fact that civil servants in the prime ministerial branch 
serve a political master means that they must account for political considerations: they 
are said to provide “politically-sensitive” policy advice.  
 In this study, the “prime ministerial branch” refers almost exclusively to 
bureaucratic extensions of prime ministers, specifically, the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) in Australia and New Zealand, the Privy Council Office 
(PCO) in Canada, and the Cabinet Office (CO) in the UK. In practice, this is justified 
methodologically, as explained later in chapter four, but is also reasonable conceptually. 
As Lee et al. note in the case of the UK Cabinet Office, these organizations are “the 
prime minister’s instrument for enabling government to reach collective decisions” 
(1998, 37). They are central to how prime ministers govern, if not central to how they 
campaign. Thus, while this study is about prime ministers and political leadership 
broadly, its empirical scope is more focused. It is a study of the prime ministerial branch, 
not of particular prime ministers, decisions, or leadership styles: it is about the ship, not 
just the captain. Within that scope, it focuses on the bureaucratic engines of prime 
ministerial power, that is, the civil service offices that support them, rather than their 
political support.   
 Second, the analytical scope is narrowed in terms of the kind of change it 
examines. My focus is on concrete institutional change, structured around the concept of 
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institutionalization. In its original sociological guise, institutionalization explained the 
persistence of social institutions as effective responses to a collectively perceived need. 
Samuel Huntington imported the concept to characterize large-scale processes of political 
development, defining it as “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire 
value and stability” (1965, 394). Huntington elaborated the concept without the 
structural-functionalism embedded in its sociological origins. Political 
institutionalization, in this view, is deeply subject to contestation and choice, and thus is 
not inevitable or irreversible. Political context and actors’ preferences matter. This is 
embedded in the perspective of this study that institutionalization is a rational choice of 
individuals, namely, prime ministers.  
 Thus, the study conceives of centralization and intensification of prime ministerial 
power in terms of the bureaucratic institutional capacity attached to the prime minister’s 
position. This is a very well-established, if debatable, notion in the literature. Heffernan 
(2003) and Bennister (2007) make this argument adroitly in their discussion of the actual 
exercise of prime ministerial power being related to the effective combination of 
‘personal’ and ‘institutional’ power resources. Clearly, institutional capacity is not the be-
all and end-all of prime ministerial power, but the effect that an institutionalized base of 
support can have on a leader’s ability to project power should not be underestimated. 
Institutional resources can allow an ‘unassuming’, personally passive prime minister to 
strengthen their grip on the levers of power. Moreover, when such resources are directly 
associated with prime ministers rather than other, perhaps rival, power centres, they 
inherently strengthen the hand of the prime minister against competing actors.  
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 Finally, the concern that institutional change in the prime ministerial branches 
reflects not centralization in the prime ministership but bureaucratic aegis is, in my view, 
unfounded. If there is evidence that bureaucrats in the prime ministerial branches are 
systematically enlarging their ‘empires’ without regard to prime ministerial intentions, 
this study does not uncover it. Rather, this study shows that prime ministers have used 
their bureaucratic offices intentionally and explicitly to pursue their substantive and 
governance goals as a regular matter of course. Moreover, I would argue that senior 
officials in prime ministerial branches, as a rule, do not face the same kinds of incentives 
that the typical bureaucrat in the ‘budget-maximizing’ mold face. They do not administer 
spending programs to any significant degree, and as “centre of government” actors they 
are already at the apex of ‘status’ and ‘prestige’ that the ‘budget-maximizing’ model 
suggests are reasons for bureaucratic empire-building. In my view, bureaucrats in prime 
ministerial branches are as close to ideal agents for prime ministerial principals as is 
likely to be achieved in government.    
The study’s second overarching question elucidates the factors that foster 
institutionalization in the prime ministerial branches. As its starting point, it takes James 
Simeon’s claim that “[t]he rise of the welfare state and the commensurate growth in the 
size and scope of government, coupled with growing public demands and expectations 
facilitated the emergence of the political executive as the dominating force in 
government” (1991, 559). Simeon identifies two key factors: growth in government 
activity and public attitudes. This study builds a robust theory around the second of these 
factors. In chapter three I develop a Theory of Public Expectations that arises from the 
observation of two seemingly opposite, yet contemporaneous, transformations: in the 
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advanced democratic political culture where modern citizens are more critical, 
dissatisfied, and elite-challenging; and in the growing institutional concentration of 
power in centres of government. I argue that a shift from “allegiant” to “assertive” 
citizenship increases expectations about what government can deliver, and how it should 
do so. This causes prime ministers to respond by strengthening their own institutional 
capacity.  
As well, this study also considers alternative explanations to the main theory. The 
first looks to the significant economic transformations in post-war advanced economies, 
owing notably to globalization and the social welfare state, which have markedly 
increased the role of governments in national economic activity. In different ways, both 
trends generate incentives for prime ministers to bolster the centres of government in 
pursuit of greater control over policy-making. The second alternative emphasizes short-
term variation in political contexts. It looks to political factors, such as legislative support 
and ideology, as potentially enabling or constraining the decision space for prime 
ministers, thus conditioning their institutionalization choices. 
1.1 Contributions of the Study 
Within this broad analytical scope, this study systematically compares prime 
ministerial branch institutionalization in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom. In doing so, it makes four notable contributions. The existing literature is 
impressive in many ways, but it is largely anecdotal and focused on single cases. 
Comparisons are synthetic and impressionistic. There is a richness of information, but a 
lack of rigorous comparative investigation. We do not have robust answers to address 
how these prime ministerships have changed, and why. In taking on these questions, my 
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dissertation informs some trenchant theoretical and methodological gaps in the literature 
and contributes grounded knowledge to public discourse about fundamental issues such 
as the operation of executive power, the expectations democratic citizens have of leaders, 
and the institutional consequences of contemporary democratic behaviour.    
My first contribution is theoretical. The study contributes to the theorization of 
prime ministerships at the conceptual level by treating institutional change in prime 
ministerships as general phenomena with general causes. In addressing the possibility of 
systematic effects, I treat these prime ministerships not as unique but as cross-cultural 
phenomena that can be studied comparatively. We begin from the premise that the 
Westminster prime minsterships are essentially similar, not just in form but in function, 
and that they are all subject to comparable cultural, economic, and political forces and so 
change in similar ways. While this perspective is not entirely new, this study takes more 
seriously the notion that executives in different national contexts are not sui generis. 
While the extant literature tends to begin from the premise that national contexts are 
unique and then proceeds to find shared elements of comparability, this study proceeds in 
the reverse order. 
In terms of theoretical paradigms, my elaboration of a cultural explanation for 
institutional change also locates the study at the intersection of two different lines of 
inquiry. Scholars of value and attitude change in publics have generally not engaged 
questions of how such changes bear on institutional outcomes, focusing instead on other 
effects. In the other camp, institutional theorists have struggled to explain institutional 
change, which is challenging because most institutional theories expect institutional 
stability. It has been difficult for institutional theory to capture the kind of diffuse, 
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contextual impact that long-term changes in political culture represent. These theories 
have missed an opportunity to have a useful conversation, especially considering the 
meaningful, sustained links between citizen and elite behaviour in democracies.    
This study also makes a significant contribution to existing knowledge with 
regard to methodology and research objectives. This involves three specific elements. 
First, the “custom built” datasets constructed for this project are themselves valuable to 
future researchers studying executives, political leadership, and the effects of executive 
power on other political outcomes. Specifically, chapters five and six are based on a 
dataset containing yearly observations of budget appropriations and staff resources in 
each country, along with relevant explanatory variables. Chapters seven and eight are 
based on both qualitative and quantitative data tracking internal organizational changes 
within prime ministerships. These datasets do not presently exist in an organized, 
coherent form. The hope is that, in addition to their use here, they will be used to advance 
the comparative analysis of prime ministerships in future research.  
As well, the specific relationships examined in this study provide benchmarks for 
elaboration, refutation and replication using other data. The field lacks a coherent 
research agenda with a clear set of research questions, so the identification and 
assessment of clearly testable hypotheses is ideal fodder for building such an agenda. In 
this way, it builds a foundation for tying together the disparate literatures on executive 
governance, modern public management and democratic leadership. Finally, the 
methodological ambition of this study also contributes to the literature by expanding the 
scope and standards for future work. The research design invokes a ‘mixed-methods’ 
strategy of using different but complementary methodological approaches in one study. 
13 
 
My particular innovation is to employ serious quantitative methods to the comparative 
study of prime ministerships, which results in new kinds of knowledge in the field. This 
is a substantial contribution to the literature on prime ministers and prime ministerial 
power, which is overly dominated by qualitative methodologies.       
The third area in which my study contributes is in its concrete empirical results. 
The study goes beyond simple descriptive arguments about institutional change in prime 
ministerships to identify and test specific theories of the causes of change: the Theory of 
Public Expectations and its alternatives. Finally, the study contributes to the broader 
public discourse about prime ministerial power and the practice of political leadership in 
modern politics. It draws attention to the ways in which modern politics has transformed 
how prime ministers do their job. It invites discussion about how citizen expectations and 
the broader political culture shape institutions and motivate political leaders. My study 
urges a broader consideration of the role that citizens play in conditioning how leaders 
behave: the kinds of demands and expectations we place upon leaders and what kinds of 
political leadership these pressures produce. The contributions of this study are manifold 
and significant.  
1.2 Plan of the Study 
The study is organized in three main parts, and nine individual chapters.  This 
introduction and the next three chapters constitute Part I, which set out the context and 
theory of the work. Chapter two reviews the historical and institutional context of the 
Westminster prime ministership and the relevant literature. The first two sections of the 
chapter trace the evolution of the prime ministership in the United Kingdom historically, 
and identify the major roles played by prime ministers in Westminster systems. I then 
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highlight major themes in the broader literature on prime ministers and executives and 
review work on prime ministerships in the four Westminster cases. Finally, since my 
primary theoretical explanation, the Theory of Public Expectations, is premised on 
theories of social and cultural change, particularly the rise of post-materialism and shift 
from “allegiant” to “assertive” citizens, in this chapter I review the literature which 
describes these trends and identifies their effects.  
Chapters three and four set out the theory and methodology of the study. In 
chapter three, I elaborate the key theoretical aspects. First, I discuss institutionalization in 
greater depth, and the study’s framing of institutional change, which adapts Streeck and 
Thelen’s (2005) typology of incremental change. Second, the Theory of Public 
Expectations is introduced. I trace its theoretical antecedents, narrative logic, and 
implications. Finally, the chapter discusses alternative theories of prime ministerial 
institutionalization. In chapter four, I discuss the methodology of the study: the overall 
research design, data sources and variable construction, and the analytical techniques of 
the empirics in subsequent chapters. In summary, Part I of the study sets out the 
theoretical and analytical foundations for the rest of the work.  
Part II of this study, chapters five through eight, empirically assesses the theories 
discussed in Part I. These chapters investigate two dimensions of institutional change in 
prime ministerial branches: institutional autonomy and complexity. Chapters five and six 
examine autonomy. I measure autonomy using the budgetary resources (chapter five) and 
the staff resources (chapter six) of the prime ministerial branches, two measures that 
accurately reflect institutional capacity. This capacity is a crucial component of the 
growing independence of prime ministers from other political actors. The chapters use 
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both descriptive statistics and time series regression to investigate the particular 
hypotheses.  
Chapters seven and eight continue empirical assessment of the theories of prime 
ministerial branch institutionalization. They do so by examining the institutional 
complexity of the prime ministerial branches, and tracing changes in the organizational 
structures of the branches over time, in a series of small case studies. Chapter seven 
examines the two branches where change has been least evident: New Zealand and 
Canada.  Chapter eight examines the more robust change found in the United Kingdom 
and Australia. My approach here is to identify trends in the proliferation and 
specialization of units within these branches and qualitatively analyze the relationships 
between the theoretical factors and these measures of institutional complexity. Thus, 
chapters five through eight offer an analytically varied and mixed-methods study of how 
and why prime ministerial branches have changed over time.  
 In Part III I summarize the results.  Chapter nine summarizes and discusses the 
findings of the empirical chapters, and presents an overall evaluation of the core theory 
and its alternatives. After the sustained theoretical and empirical explorations of the first 
two parts of the study, the concluding chapter returns to some of the broader themes 
discussed in this introduction. I discuss the more general implications of my study’s 
arguments and findings for studying public discourse and political leadership. I reiterate 
the contributions of the study to the literature and acknowledge several issues in the 
study’s design and analysis. Lastly, some promising avenues for future research are 
discussed. Turning now to the next chapter, Two, I review the historical and institutional 
contexts of the Westminster prime ministership and the scholarly literature.   
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Chapter 2  
Context and Literature 
 
The executive power is the moving force of a government. It represents in the political 
system that mysterious principle which, in moral man, unites action to the will... [T]he 
adjustments of its limits, and the accurate adaptation of its means to its end, offer to the 
human mind one of the most comprehensive subjects of reflection. 
Jacques Necker, Chief Minister and Director General of Finance to Louis XVI 
(1792) 
 
The study’s comparative analysis of the prime ministerships in Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom is situated in deep historical and analytical 
contexts. The chapter sets out these contexts in three ways. First, it sets out the historical 
and institutional foundations of the Westminster prime ministership. It gives a brief 
account of its long evolution in the United Kingdom and its adaptation to colonial 
contexts. The section also describes the institutional roles that prime ministers play 
within these systems. In the second section of the chapter, I explicate the literature 
pertaining to prime ministerial power and institutional growth. Two central themes in the 
broader prime ministerial literature - the core executive, and the concept of 
presidentialization - are discussed.  Building on these concepts, I review work on the 
prime ministerships in the four countries. 
The third way in which this chapter elaborates the study’s context is a discussion 
of the shift towards more “assertive” political cultures evident in many modern advanced 
democracies. This shift is the basis for the study’s primary theoretical explanation for 
institutional change in prime ministerial branches: the Theory of Public Expectations. 
This theory, explicated at length in chapter three, begins with the premise that there has 
been a transformation in the values and attitudes of democratic citizens, one that has been 
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well-documented by scholars such as Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris, Neil Nevitte, and 
Russell Dalton. I discuss this literature generally and, more specifically, Dalton and 
Welzel’s (2014) characterization of “allegiant” versus “assertive” citizens. I explicate 
these fundamentally different notions of democratic citizenship and their wide-ranging 
effects on political behaviour in modern advanced democracies. The contribution of the 
Theory of Public Expectations is to extend the scope of these effects to include 
institutional change in the Westminster prime ministerships, to which we now turn.    
2.1 A Primer on Westminster and the Westminster Prime Ministership 
This section explores the rich historical and institutional context of the 
Westminster prime ministership, giving an account of its evolution and its various roles 
within these political systems. First, however, it would be well to explicate the terms 
Westminster and prime ministership. Each involves a deep set of cultural traditions, 
understandings, and practices. Westminster systems are a subset of parliamentary systems 
and specifically refer to institutional arrangements modelled on British conventions and 
traditions, exported to the British colonies.2 The classification of political systems into 
presidential and parliamentary types is based on the relationship between the legislative 
and executive powers. In presidential systems, legislative and executive members are 
elected separately to fixed terms. In parliamentary systems, only the legislature is directly 
elected; the executive is then selected from and by the legislature. Terms are not fixed: 
because the legislature chooses the executive, it can also withdraw its support, resulting 
in either a change of government or an election. The most salient aspect of this distinction 
is that its implications for heads of government (that is, presidents or prime ministers) are 
                                                 
2 The term ‘Westminster’ itself is a metonym, referring to the Palace of Westminster, where the UK 
Parliament meets, within the city of Westminster, an area of London.  
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different. Presidential systems create separation between the executive and legislative 
branches and induce conflict between them; presidential power is primarily a reflection of 
this relationship. Parliamentary systems create a fusion between the branches and induce 
conflict between government and opposition, and between prime ministers and other 
political executive actors.     
Westminster’s defining characteristics are surprisingly elusive. The term delimits 
a set of countries which are culturally and institutionally similar to each other, and 
dissimilar to other countries with parliamentary systems. Used in this way it is a common 
basis for comparison in a diverse set of studies.3 Rhodes et al. (2009) identify five very 
different senses of ‘Westminster’: 1) a “narrative” arising from a common heritage which 
provides precedent for action and a source for nostalgic appeal, 2) a political instrument 
for defending oneself and denigrating opponents, 3) a set of norms and practices which 
legitimate the roles and powers of actors, 4) a cluster of institutional arrangements, and 5) 
a byword for efficient, decisive government (222-232). As a set of institutional 
arrangements, Arend Lijphart equates the Westminster model with majoritarian 
democracy, as opposed to consensus democracy, and produces a set of ten characteristics 
which differentiate the two forms (2012, 9).4 Palmer and Palmer associate it with Walter 
Bagehot’s “efficient secret of the English Constitution”: the near complete fusion of 
                                                 
3 For example, Kam (2009) looks at determinants of legislative dissent while Aucoin (2012) examines 
changing relationships between ministers and public servants. It serves as a scope-defining term in non-
institutional work as well: for instance, Ailsa Henderson’s (2008) work on citizen satisfaction with 
democracy and Sawer et al.’s (2006) volume on women’s legislative representation. In other studies, one of 
these countries is taken as an exemplar of the model, with the implication that findings extend to the other 
Westminster cases (e.g., Eichbaum and Shaw 2008, Goodyear-Grant and Croskill 2011). Finally, Weller’s 
(1985) seminal work on prime ministerships also uses Westminster to define its comparative context.  
4 Concentration of executive power in a one-party cabinet, cabinet dominance over parliament, a two-party 
system, a single member plurality electoral system, interest group pluralism (vs. corporatism), a unitary 
government (vs. federal), unicameralism, constitutional flexibility, i.e., an unwritten or largely conventional 
constitutional framework, parliamentary sovereignty, and a central bank controlled by the political 
executive. 
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executive and legislative power in the cabinet (2004, 9). At other times, it is equated 
simply with broad traditions of parliamentary sovereignty.    
However, institutional divergences among the Westminster countries also are 
significant. Australia and Canada are federal states, while New Zealand is a unitary state. 
The United Kingdom is also a unitary state although recent governments have 
increasingly devolved power to its constituent countries. One reason for this difference is 
that Australia and Canada are much larger and diverse in area than New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom, and have different founding histories.5 Canada and the United 
Kingdom have strictly adhered to the single member plurality electoral system to select 
their lower houses, the House of Commons, and have retained appointed upper houses 
(the Senate and the House of Lords, respectively). In contrast, Australia and New Zealand 
have moved to forms of proportional representation. Australia’s House of Representatives 
has single member districts but uses preferential balloting, while its Senate is elected 
under a single transferable vote system. After significant electoral reform in 1993, New 
Zealand’s unicameral legislature now employs a mixed member proportional system.         
So, to employ the term ‘Westminster’ to denote a coherent cluster of institutions is 
problematic. What separates Australia, Canada, and New Zealand from other Westminster 
systems such as India and South Africa? Rhodes et al. (2009) argue that the crucial 
difference is whether the system was “transplanted” or “implanted” (11). The 
transplanted Westminster systems are those in which British-originating settler societies 
deliberately adopted British institutions and conventions. Implanted systems were 
imposed by the British as colonizers on a non-British population. Australia, Canada, and 
                                                 
5 In both Australia and Canada, the country’s constitutional union was a result of agreement among pre-
existing, self-governing colonies (Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick in Canada, all six 
current states in Australia).  
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New Zealand belong to the first type as predominantly English-speaking settler societies 
with relatively long and stable democratic traditions and cultural understandings inherited 
from the United Kingdom. India and many of the other commonwealth countries belong 
to the second type. Although Rhodes et al. consider South Africa to be a case of 
transplantation, its comparability with the other transplanted cases is suspect. On a host 
of dimensions from levels of economic and democratic development to demography, 
South Africa is simply too different to provide any reasonable basis for comparison.     
The Westminster prime ministership historically and constitutionally is rooted in 
the absolute power of the British crown, an often forgotten fact in our more democratic 
age. The place of the prime ministership in the constitutional order is in historical terms 
an outcome of a democratizing process in which the unbounded authority of an unelected 
monarch gradually passed to elected persons responsible to Parliament. Walter Bagehot 
proclaimed in 1867 that the monarch was the “dignified” element of the executive while 
the prime minister was the head of the “efficient” element (1867, 80). This was not 
always the case. The monarch ruled absolutely until parliamentarians challenged this 
authority, leading to the English Civil War (1642-1651). The parliamentarian victory 
ultimately secured the right of Parliament to be consulted and its consent, particularly in 
financial matters such as the raising of revenue through taxation, was required. These 
parliamentary gains were cemented in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the passage 
of the Bill of Rights in 1689.6 
Notwithstanding this shifting of power towards parliament, executive power was 
retained by the monarch prior to the 18th century. The monarch would employ ministers 
                                                 
6 The basis for much of this historical discussion is the chapter “Historical Development of the Office of 
Prime Minister” in Carter (1956, 13-41). The historical outline is necessarily condensed and simplified.  
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as their agents and advisors for as long as they retained their confidence (Hughes 1976, 
3). However, at times the monarch was simply too young or weak to effectively govern, 
allowing ministers the opportunity for greater influence. On occasion, monarchs and 
particularly favoured advisors would form mutually beneficial relationships of counsel 
and trust, as with Elizabeth I and William Cecil (Baron Burghley).7 Indeed, F.W.G. 
Benemy argues that the office of prime minister essentially begins with Cecil’s time as 
chief advisor (1965, 3). When the monarchy was restored in 1660, Edward Hyde (Lord 
Clarendon) became “chief minister”, and was instrumental in developing the institution 
of the Privy Council as a smaller committee of the body of royal advisors that separated 
the “active” part, which became the cabinet, from the larger, honorific part (Carter 1956, 
17). Under Queen Anne (1702-1714), ministerial meetings became regularized if 
embryonic: she decided whom to invite and what to discuss, while retaining the right to 
decide on public matters without ministerial consultation.       
Robert Walpole served as First Lord of the Treasury from 1721 to 1742, and from 
this position he dominated Westminster. Although Walpole is regarded by many to be the 
first prime minister, the job was still in the mould of William Cecil: serving at the 
pleasure of the monarch. As Bagehot notes, Walpole had still to “manage the palace” 
(1963, 11). In Walpole’s case, however, prime ministerial power was reinforced by the 
convergence of an indifferent monarch with his own talent and personality. It was 
therefore an “accident of history” that allowed Walpole to become the prototype first 
minister (Thomas 1998, 1).  
                                                 
7 Clive Bigham’s The Chief Ministers of England, 920-1720 (1923) suggests an unexpectedly long 
historical lineage of such relationships. 
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George I (1714-1727), the first Hanoverian monarch, of which Queen Victoria 
was the last, spent much of his time in his native Germany and was not otherwise 
disposed to actively exercise sovereign power in a ‘foreign’ country (whose native 
language he could not speak). By necessity, then, Walpole and his allies guided the 
ordinary activities and made decisions of government. His brilliance in managing party 
and parliament, and his control over the purse strings, generated the job description for 
future prime ministers.  The prime ministership receded in importance after Walpole left 
the post in 1742, although practices continued to evolve.8 Lord North’s resignation in 
1782, over the loss of the American colonies, resulted in the resignation of the entire 
ministry, cementing the precedent of collective responsibility and the notion that the 
“supervision” of ministers was the prime minister’s duty, not the monarch’s (Berkeley 
1968, 28). By and large, though, the office remained relatively unchanged and 
unimportant until further developments in the 19th century. 
The great change in the Westminster prime ministership in the 19th century is a 
manifestation of what has been called the “first wave of democratization” (Huntington, 
1993). In the United Kingdom, this took the form of mass enfranchisement through the 
Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867 and the Representation of the People Act 1884. The 
average Member of Parliament in 1830 represented only 330 voters; by 1966, the number 
was 56,000 (Berkeley 1968, 31).9 With the expansion of the franchise, political parties 
                                                 
8 In leaving, Walpole also set the precedent that the prime minister should resign after losing a vote of 
confidence in the House of Commons, and his tenure also strengthened the status of the Commons vis-à-vis 
the Lords (Carter 1956, 24). 
9 Among other measures, the 1832 act eliminated most of the ‘rotten boroughs’, constituencies which had 
been centres of population but whose populations were now so small that there was no electoral 
competition, either because of simple bribery or because the constituency was essentially the ‘personal 
property’ of a landowner. The 1867 and 1884 acts progressively extended the franchise to adult males of 
some property qualification, first in towns, then in rural areas.     
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became more significant, and parties began to operate outside of the narrow corridors of 
the House of Commons. The nationalization of parties had two important effects.  
First, appealing to a broader electorate necessitated some centralization of party 
operations, which increased the power of the leadership of the party, including the prime 
minister, at the expense of party Members of Parliament. The second effect of the 
nationalization of parties was that mass politics magnified the role of the leader. As 
Berkeley writes, “from the moment the electorate achieved any significant size, one man 
came in the mind of the nation to represent an entire government and that man had of 
course to be the Prime Minister” (1968, 38). This personalization of politics was 
intensified by the larger than life rivalry between William Gladstone and Benjamin 
Disraeli, the great Liberal and Conservative archetypes, respectively (Carter 1956, 37). 
Disraeli himself recognized that the real source of power in the British system was 
shifting from the monarch to the people, and that it involved a relationship of delegation: 
“all power is a trust that we are accountable for its exercise – that from the people and for 
the people, all power springs and all must exist” (Berkeley 1968, 37).10 The prime 
ministership of Robert Peel (1834-1835; 1841-1846) also established the prerogative of 
the prime minister to intervene in any portfolio that she wishes, although certainly prime 
ministers must be cautious in doing so.  
By the end of the 19th century, the basic template of the prime ministerial job had 
been established, its constitutional position and customary practices largely settled, its 
centrality to electoral campaigning increasing. However, as Carter concludes, the position 
had not yet made “complete use of all facets of its latent powers” because the political 
                                                 
10 This is actually a quote from Vivian Grey, Disraeli’s first novel, published in 1826, but it illustrates the 
point well. 
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environment did not provide the pressure to do so (1956, 40). Government did relatively 
little and policy issues were relatively simple, the means of adducing public political 
opinion still rudimentary and indirect. In the 20th century, the Westminster prime 
ministership would evolve from a personal office into an institutional one.     
The first step in this development was the creation of the Cabinet Office, 
necessitated by the administrative burdens of World War I. Just as Robert Walpole is the 
generally agreed ‘first prime minister’, David Lloyd George’s prime ministership (1916-
1922) is seen by some as the beginning of prime ministerial government and the eclipse 
of collective cabinet government (Thomas 1998, 4). Exigencies of the war effort – the 
tremendous amount of information processing, coordination, and decision-making 
involved – caused Lloyd George to attach the Committee of Imperial Defence Secretariat 
to the cabinet as a whole, creating the Cabinet Secretariat and eventually the Cabinet 
Office. Under Lloyd George also came the first stirrings of a ‘prime minister’s 
department’: the ‘Garden Suburb’ of a handful of political aides who met in the garden of 
no. 10 Downing Street. This set the precedent for the expanding role for special advisors 
in the latter half of the century.  
Thus, under David Lloyd George, the institutional capacities of the prime 
ministership, through the creation of the Cabinet Secretariat, became a permanent part of 
the machinery of government. This development set the power of the prime minister on a 
more secure institutional footing. Before this point, prime ministerial dominance had 
largely been based on personal strength and ability. Henceforth, as Berkeley suggests, 
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“even an apparently unassuming Prime Minister like Attlee possessed immense powers… 
by virtue of the office which he held and the staff which serviced it" (1968, 47).11  
As with many “temporary” measures whose permanent usefulness becomes 
apparent, the Cabinet Office was not only institutionalized but grew in importance. Its 
coordination and information roles proved themselves in the crises of war and post-war 
state expansion. And, of course, though nominally the support system for the cabinet, the 
Office had always in fact answered to the prime minister as the “chairman” of cabinet. 
The agglomeration of institutional capacities continued through the latter 20th century, 
particularly in terms of its policy support and implementation roles. Prime ministers 
continued to create mechanisms through which they could better fulfill their duties. This 
is seen in the continual creation of policy support centres, such as the Central Policy 
Review Staff by Prime Minister Heath in 1971 and the Policy Units of recent prime 
ministers, to implementation-focused groups such as the Cabinet Office’s Implementation 
Unit and the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit established by Tony Blair.  
Thus, the development of the modern Westminster prime ministership is a long, 
historical agglomeration of sources of prime ministerial power, stretching from the 
confidence of monarchs to the confidence of Parliament, to popularity among the people 
as electorally expressed, to enhanced institutional support within government. This 
institutional lineage was transplanted to the distant colonies in British North America and 
the Pacific. As in the original British case, the role and powers of the prime ministerships 
in the colonies are based on convention and tradition. Neither the British government nor 
the colonial founders felt any need to write down the explicit constitutional rules defining 
the prime ministerial position. Indeed, they had the opportunity to do so when each 
                                                 
11 Clement Attlee was the Labour prime minister of the United Kingdom from 1945 to 1951.  
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country was established formally with a written constitution, unlike the essentially 
unwritten fundamental law of the UK.  
In Australia and Canada, whose constitutions were written by colonial delegates at 
series of founding conferences, neither the prime minister nor the cabinet are mentioned 
in the clauses defining executive power in the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution 
Act 1900 (ss. 61-70) or the British North America Act 1867 (ss. 9-16). In New Zealand 
neither the Constitution Act 1986, nor the British statute it replaced, the New Zealand 
Constitution Act 1852, mention those terms. Thus, the prime ministership in each of these 
countries is a distinct combination of the inheritance of British practice and adaptation to 
local cultural, political, and geographical contexts.12   
                                                 
12 Hughes describes the Australian prime ministership as being shaped by two historical factors: the lack of 
party structure which feeds factionalism; and the lack of aristocracy (1976, 6-7). We see the first reflected 
in the strength of internal party factions and the second in a political culture of egalitarianism, the idea of 
“mateship”. This idea of a social cohesion borne of “self-recognition of [Australians’] dependence upon 
one another” is one of the central tenets of the Australian radical tradition (Curran 2004, 180, 244). This 
tradition is one Hartz (1964) described in fragment theory as arising from the settlement pattern of 
Australia: the peculiar mix of literal prisoners, social reformers dedicated to the Chartist movement of mid-
19th century England, and gold prospectors. The lack of an established aristocracy also meant that 
Australian reform politics did not have to “struggle” in the same way it did elsewhere, creating a more 
utilitarian “socialisme sans doctrine” that emphasized pragmatism and consensus building (Rosecrance 
1964; Collins 1985). Bennister argues that the Australian prime ministership is characterized by its 
constraints: federalism, a strong Senate, the size of Parliament, and the leadership election process which is 
heavily influenced by the factionalism described above (2007, 329). 
In Canada, the British North America Act’s (1867) guarantee of a constitution “similar in principle to that 
of the United Kingdom” formalizes the inheritance of British practice. The prime ministership that Canada 
acquired in 1867 was also essentially a continuation of the same pre-Confederation role in the province of 
Canada, present day Ontario and Quebec. The experience of governing the pre-confederation Province of 
Canada reflects the distinctiveness of the Canadian prime ministership in one special respect: the 
significance of the prime minister in managing French and English relations, and regional difference more 
generally. Historically, successful prime ministers have been those who were able to maintain national 
unity. Those prime ministers and parties who could, mostly the Liberal party, were rewarded with long 
tenures in office, periodically punctuated in a pattern Leduc et al. (2010) call “dynasties and interludes”. In 
no other Westminster country is the significance of regionalism as profound or as impactful on the prime 
ministership as in Canada. 
It is more difficult to characterize the prime ministership in New Zealand because it has received relatively 
little attention. Johansson and Levine (2013) argue that an important element of New Zealand’s political 
culture is its emphasis on collective decision making. McLeay argues that it is precisely because of its 
smallness that New Zealand has a distinctive “culture of consultation” (2003, 94). In addition, some of the 
features that support executive pre-eminence in the other cases, such as federalism, are not present here. 
Arguably, New Zealand is the only Westminster case where one could say that “once out of office [prime 
ministers] tend largely to be forgotten, becoming obscure figures little remembered” (Johansson and Levine 
27 
 
2.2 Prime Ministerial Roles and Powers 
 The last section traced the evolution of the Westminster prime ministership in the 
United Kingdom. In doing so, it touched on the office’s roles and powers, enshrined in 
convention and historical practice. So now this section explicates these roles and powers 
in some detail. It considers the extent to which there is a standard job description for the 
Westminster prime ministership. What are the roles that prime ministers are expected to 
play? There is a view that “the prime ministership is what the prime minister does”. This 
view suggests that there is no fixed job description: that there are very few things the 
prime minister must do and many things they may choose to do. The task is to identify 
what they want to do and how to do those things most effectively. I argue that the modern 
prime ministership is expected to do much, and its true discretion is limited. Prime 
ministers cannot simply ignore what they have no interest in engaging, if they wish to be 
successful. These heightened expectations are not formal or constitutional ones, since 
these have not significantly changed in the modern prime ministerial era. Rather, they are 
public and political expectations, arising from a confluence of factors which tends to 
increase the prominence of prime ministers.   
What are these expectations that bear upon prime ministers? I identify seven 
distinct yet interrelated constitutional, administrative, and political roles that prime 
ministers play in Westminster systems.13 The constitutional expectations of the prime 
ministerial institution have not changed significantly since the emergence of the modern 
Westminster prime ministership, as recounted above. First, by constitutional convention 
                                                                                                                                                 
2013, 292). Given these considerations, the New Zealand case offers a distinctive contrast both in terms of 
the empirical story of prime ministerial institutionalization and an opportunity to fill a significant gap in the 
literature.           
13 The foregoing discussion is roughly inspired by chapter five of Thomas (1998, 92-113), “The Functions 
of the Prime Minister”. The synthesis presented is the author’s own.  
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the prime minister is the principal advisor to the sovereign, and as such, de facto 
exercises most of the royal prerogative powers.14 In particular, the prime ministership is 
the only position with authority to request the summoning, dissolution and prorogation of 
parliament, and hence the prime minister is the only individual who can ‘call’ a general 
election, subject to constitutionally mandated time limits (five years in the UK and 
Canada, three years in Australia and New Zealand).15 Historically, this is an important 
role because it guarantees the personal monarch’s non-interference in the sitting of 
Parliament. Politically, it offers prime ministers the ability to call elections when they are 
most electorally advantageous, although statutes in the UK (the Fixed-Term Parliaments 
Act 2011) and Canada (a 2007 amendment to the Canada Elections Act) and the shorter 
period limit in Australia and New Zealand have somewhat constrained prime ministerial 
discretion in this matter.           
Second, as an implication of the prime minister’s position as principal advisor to 
the sovereign, the prime minister recommends appointments to and dismissals from the 
ministry and cabinet and, within cabinet, is the “rule-maker, referee and judge” (Weller 
2007, 251). While it is in fact cabinet, as the ‘active’ or ‘efficient’ part of the sovereign’s 
                                                 
14 The Power Inquiry presents an ‘official’ list of royal prerogatives exercised by the prime minister (2006, 
138). The only significant prerogative power that the prime minister does not de facto exercise is the 
appointment and dismissal of prime ministers, for obvious reasons. That does not imply, however, that the 
sovereign is unfettered in their exercise of this prerogative. The constitutional convention holds that the 
individual who can command the confidence of the lower chamber of Parliament must be appointed prime 
minister, which in the presence of parties also means that party leadership selection is given quasi-
constitutional status. That is, the outcome of a leadership contest essentially is binding on the sovereign’s 
prime ministerial appointment power. She cannot simply appoint any individual she believes has the 
confidence of the House. To my knowledge, a situation in which this has arisen has not occurred in the 
modern party era.    
15 Of course, this does not mean that prime ministers have discretion to advise, or not advise, the Crown to 
dissolve, summon, or prorogue parliament. Rather, it means that no other actor can exercise these powers. 
In particular, individual cabinet ministers, or cabinet itself, cannot do so in the absence of the prime 
minister’s consent. Nor can parliament except indirectly through withdrawal of confidence. See Hicks 
(2010) for a brief analysis of the royal prerogative in these areas. A large Canadian literature has arisen out 
of the experience of the prorogation ‘crisis’ of 2008.  
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advisory body, which holds constitutional authority to advise the sovereign, prime 
ministers control who is in and out of the political executive, how that political executive 
operates, and what its ‘decisions’, as such, are.16 All of these roles are crucial elements 
contributing to the prime minister’s ability to control and direct cabinet. Of course, the 
appointment power is incredibly powerful.17 Generally, ministers will seek to make their 
views accord with the prime minister’s wishes or face the loss of status that comes with 
cabinet membership. Control over the operations and decisions of cabinet are, however, 
equally powerful. The latter can sometimes be overstated. Prime ministers “can lead only 
up to the point that the Cabinet will follow” (Thomas 1998, 99).  
However, given their informational advantages and ability to set cabinet agendas 
and procedures, prime ministers generally need not rule by fiat in order to get their way. 
These roles are not arbitrary but instead are a direct consequence of the prime minister’s 
privileged constitutional position as the sovereign’s principal advisor. This unique 
responsibility to the sovereign implies that the final say over governmental decisions 
should be the prime ministers’ alone. Similarly, the prime minister’s responsibility to 
                                                 
16 These advisory bodies, formally Her Majesty’s Most Honourable Privy Council in the UK, the Queen’s 
Privy Council for Canada, the Federal Executive Council in Australia, and the Executive Council in New 
Zealand, are primarily made up of current and former ministers, justices, and sometimes opposition leaders. 
In the UK case, various archbishops and members of the House of Lords are also appointed. 
17 The constitutional prerogative to appoint cabinet ministers is essentially the same in each country (the 
Australia and New Zealand constitutions expressly dictate that ministers must sit in parliament, while this 
requirement is left to convention in Canada and the UK). However, political practices vary. British prime 
ministers are relatively unconstrained, although there seems to be an entrenched practice of new prime 
ministers, coming from opposition, appointing ministers to the equivalent positions they held in the 
‘shadow cabinet’.  Canadian prime ministers face the ‘representational imperative’ of ensuring that all 
regions of the country are represented in cabinet, but are otherwise relatively unfettered. The Australian 
Labor and New Zealand Labour parties elect members to cabinet, though the allocation of portfolios is left 
to the prime minister and their ability to dismiss ministers is limited. In the New Zealand coalition 
governments since 1993 and the coalition government in the UK from 2010 to 2015 coalition agreements 
have played a large role in determining cabinet composition. Of course, in all cases prime ministers are 
wise to pay due attention to the ambitions, personality, and support within the party of potential ministers, 
which has often meant appointing their closest rivals to important ministerial positions.   
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parliament for expressing and defending the direction of her government creates a 
structural imperative for government decisions to accord with her wishes.           
A third expectation bearing on the prime minister is that, beyond cabinet, prime 
ministers are the chief architects and engineers of the machinery of government, i.e., the 
organization and procedures of the civil service. As Davis et al. (1999) show, this is not 
trivial; the reorganization of government is perpetual.18 Prime ministers have tremendous 
ability to create, reorganize, transfer, and abolish departments and government agencies, 
despite the separation of politics and administration typical of the Westminster 
administrative style.19 Westminster prime ministers are always the ‘minister of the civil 
service’, in fact if not in name. Working through central agencies such as the Cabinet 
Office in the UK, the Privy Council Office in Canada, and the Departments of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet in Australia and New Zealand, prime ministers have a great deal of 
capacity to shape administrative processes and, increasingly, oversee policy 
implementation in detail.  
A fourth role for prime ministers is to exercise a wide range of appointment 
powers outside of cabinet. These include appointments to a staggering array of agencies: 
government-sponsored enterprises, crown corporations, commissions, boards, and central 
banks among them. In Canada and the UK, appointment of members to the upper 
chamber (Senate and House of Lords, respectively) is effectively the prerogative of the 
prime minister; not so in Australia, where the Senate is elected, or New Zealand, which 
                                                 
18 They find that from 1950 to 1997 there were 247 departmental changes in Australia, 96 in Canada, and 
100 in the UK (Davis et al. 1999, 28).  
19 This style is called the “Whitehall model” (after the street on which many of the British civil service 
departments are located). The model is defined by limits on the politicization of civil service staffing with 
regard to appointments, that is, only senior positions are appointed, political neutrality of civil servants, and 
a “bargain” between civil servants and ministers which sees loyalty and competence of the former 
exchanged for responsibility for decisions of the latter (see Bourgault and Dion 1990; Savoie 2003). 
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has no upper chamber. Such appointment powers, in particular, are the “mother’s milk” 
of patronage, the practice of rewarding partisan or personal supporters with government 
jobs. While this still serves its traditional purpose of building party loyalty, arguably it 
increasingly serves an ideological purpose.20  
Other appointment powers are less entangled in partisanship, but are not always 
less contentious. The prime minister’s advice results in the appointment of governors 
general, the Queen’s representative in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and their 
subnational counterparts, governors of Australian states and lieutenant governors in 
Canadian provinces. Federal judges, including those on the High Court of Australia and 
the Supreme Court of Canada, are also prime ministerial appointees. Appointments to the 
recently created Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (2009) and Supreme Court of 
New Zealand (2003) also are made by the prime minister. 
Fifth, although prime ministers need not necessarily have a substantive portfolio 
of their own, in practice they do. Ordinary statutes and administrative actions can and do 
confer legal responsibility over certain matters to the prime minister qua prime minister. 
These can include ministerial titles or portfolios in addition to that of prime minister and 
responsibility for specific statutes or agencies. The British prime minister has the 
additional titles of First Lord of the Treasury, a mostly symbolic role, and Minister for the 
                                                 
20 For example, there has been some controversy over governments attempting to influence the decisions of 
arms-length independent, non-political bodies such as the BBC or Canadian Radio-television and 
Telecommunications Commission by appointing ideologically friendly persons to their governing boards. 
The Harper government appointed Tom Pentefountas to a vice-chairmanship of the CRTC in 2011. 
Pentefountas was a conservative partisan and acquaintance of high-ranking members of the Prime 
Minister’s Office; the NDP considered him “unqualified” and implied the appointment was purely 
ideological.  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/crtc-undermined-by-appointment-changes-ndp-1.1042873 
The House of Lords in the UK produced a 2007 report on appointments to the BBC. It recognized that there 
were substantive problems with ministerial interference in the appointments process. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldcomuni/171/17102.htm     
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Civil Service.21 In the modern era until 2015, the Canadian prime minister had no 
additional ministerial titles, but their legal responsibilities extend to the Office of the 
Secretary to the Governor General, the Privy Council Office, the Public Appointments 
Commission Secretariat, and the Security Intelligence Review Committee.22 They are 
officially responsible as prime minister for carrying out duties set out in seven Acts of 
Parliament.23 The current prime minister, Justin Trudeau, has also named himself 
Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs.   
By comparison, the prime ministers of Australia and New Zealand have many 
more legal responsibilities. The prime minister of Australia is officially responsible for 
forty-nine acts, though many of the duties involved overlap.24 Australia also has a 
ministerial system in which several ministers can serve ‘under’ a senior minister, while 
being responsible for some matter. In this way, four ministers serve within the prime 
minister’s portfolio (i.e., for which the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet is the 
administering agency): the Minister for Indigenous Affairs; the ministers assisting the 
Prime Minister for the Public Service; Counter-Terrorism; and Women. The prime 
minister of New Zealand is currently also Minister for National Security and Intelligence, 
                                                 
21 No. 10 Downing Street, the Prime Minister’s residence, is in fact the official residence of the First Lord 
of the Treasury (as no. 11 Downing Street is the residence of the Second Lord of the Treasury, who is the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer). The title was not always mostly symbolic: as discussed earlier, Walpole’s 
position was due to his being First Lord of the Treasury, since the title Prime Minister had neither formal 
recognition nor much informal meaning. 
22 Previous prime ministers have held additional portfolios. Notably, Prime Ministers Borden, Meighen, 
and King (and St. Laurent and Diefenbaker for short periods) were also the External Affairs Minister 
(‘Secretary of State for External Affairs’). Prime Ministers Macdonald and Thompson also held the 
Minister of Justice portfolio.  
23 These are the Constitution Act, 1867, Governor-General’s Act – R.S., 1985, c. G-9, Inquiries Act – R.S., 
1985, c. I-11, Ministries and Ministers of State Act – R.S. 1985, c. M-8, Public Service Rearrangement and 
Transfer of Duties Act – R.S., 1985, c. P-34, Royal Style and Titles Act – R.S., 1985, c. R-12, Salaries Act 
– R.S., 1985, c. S-3. 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Parlinfo/Compilations/FederalGovernment/MinisterialResponsabilities.aspx    
24 According to the most recent Administrative Arrangements Order, Dec. 23, 2014.  
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Minister of Tourism, and Minister Responsible for Ministerial Services, and has a list of 
statutory responsibilities similar to those of the Canadian prime minister.25  
 Turning to the more overtly political roles of the Westminster prime ministership, 
the sixth expectation bearing upon prime ministers is that they are the leaders and chief 
spokespersons for the government of the day. This is another direct implication of their 
role as principal advisor to the sovereign, but this also has a number of practical political 
manifestations. For instance, the institution of Prime Minister’s Questions, called 
“Question Period” in Canada and “Question Time” in Australia and New Zealand, where 
opposition and backbench members can ask questions of the prime minister, is the most 
high-profile way for opposition and backbenchers to hold the executive accountable for 
its decisions.26 Prime ministers ultimately are responsible for the parliamentary agenda 
and for what happens under the government’s imprimatur. While there is a tradition of 
government budgets being written, presented and defended by the minister responsible 
for finances, prime ministerial institutions play a central role in the process, and budgets 
must be acceptable to the prime minister.27 As its head, the prime minister represents, 
                                                 
25 Civil List Act¸1979, Governor-General Act, 2010, Intelligence and Security Committee Act, 1996, 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act, 1996, International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) 
Act, 1987, Royal Titles Act, 1974, Seal of New Zealand Act, 1977. 
http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/ministers/ministerial-list 
 http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/portfolios/prime-minister 
26 There are subtle differences in format among the countries which influence the effectiveness of Question 
Period as an accountability mechanism. Arguably, Prime Minister’s Questions in the UK is the most 
effective because it consists of a weekly half-hour session during which the PM personally answers 
questions from the opposition leader and all other members who are chosen by the Speaker to ask 
questions. Party control over the content of questions is comparatively limited. In the other cases, while 
prime ministers answer questions more frequently (every sitting day), prime ministerial involvement is 
lower. In general, especially in Canada, prime ministers only answer questions from other party leaders, 
while ministers answer the remaining questions, even when the questioner puts the question to the prime 
minister. Party control of both who gets to ask and what they get to ask is stricter.   
I would argue that the answers given by the British prime minister are much more informative, less 
political, and project a greater sense that the prime minister is engaged in detailed, substantive policy work 
than those given in the other cases.  
27 Unusual circumstances may create exceptions. Andrew Rawnsley’s (2010) account of Labour 
governments after 2001 notes a number of budgets where Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
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conducts negotiations, and speaks for the government abroad as the nation’s “chief 
diplomat” and domestically in heads of government meetings (particularly in Australia 
and Canada because of federalism). As well, although prime ministers are not heads of 
state as are presidents in presidential systems, they act as the symbol of government for 
many ceremonial purposes, essentially sharing the duties of embodying the state with the 
monarch and the monarch’s representatives.      
  The final role that prime ministers play is as leader of a political party, and indeed 
is prime minister essentially in virtue of that fact. It is always a primary task for prime 
ministers, and other party leaders, to consider the views and political standing of their 
parties. This has three important implications for the prime ministerial job description. 
First, in parliament the prime minister must maintain a system of party discipline by 
whatever sticks and carrots they have: whip systems, patronage, caucus consultation, 
committee assignments, and so on. It is as true now as in 1965 that the “power of the 
contemporary Prime Minister is largely based” on their ability to maintain party 
discipline in the legislature (Benemy 1965, 9). The burden of maintaining the support of 
their party in the legislature is increased in Australia and New Zealand, where the major 
parties’ parliamentary caucuses are still the sole selectorate for party leader. That is, the 
caucus has the exclusive authority to remove leaders from power, and so leaders must 
constantly monitor their support in caucus and be attentive to potential leadership rivals. 
As recent Australian history has demonstrated, such selectorate rules can create a climate 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘surprised’ the prime minister by announcing new measures without consultation. According to Rawnsley, 
Brown would not even allow Blair to see budgets until they were already finalized.  
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of tension, unease and instability that makes the prime ministerial job much more 
difficult.28    
Another implication of prime ministers as party leaders is that, outside of the 
parliamentary setting, all parties have their own constitutions that formally set out 
responsibilities of the leader, and laws governing electoral procedure enumerate certain 
duties. For example, the current Liberal Party of Canada constitution specifies that the 
leader of the party, Justin Trudeau, sits on the National Board of Directors, the party’s 
governing body, and the National Management Committee, the smaller, ‘active’ part of 
the National Board.29 The leader also designates the members of the National Campaign 
Committee, which oversees party readiness and candidate nominations.30  
The final and most important implication of prime ministers as party leaders is 
that, as discussed earlier in relation to the mass enfranchisement of the 19th century, the 
prime minister and other party leaders also are the face and voice of the party in electoral 
campaigning. This has taken on singular importance since the rise of mass media and new 
technologies such as the internet, since now party leaders can communicate directly to 
citizens on a large scale, which only strengthens the position of leaders in relation to 
other political actors. Arguably, we have also seen a shift to the ‘permanent campaign’, 
where the kinds of electoral strategy and communication approaches that have typically 
                                                 
28 This history is replete with leadership changes. Kevin Rudd won the leadership of the Australian Labour 
Party and the election in 2007, only to be replaced by Julia Gillard, his deputy prime minister, in 2010. 
Gillard went on to win the 2010 election but was toppled by Rudd in 2013, prior to that year’s election, 
which the ALP lost. The winner of that election, Tony Abbott, the Liberal party leader, was himself 
dethroned by Malcolm Turnbull in September 2015. Turnbull himself had been replaced by Abbott in 2009. 
These changes are only part of this story. 
29 Part D, Sec. 15, Liberal Party of Canada Constitution, adopted May 28, 2016.  
https://www.liberal.ca/files/2016/07/constitution-en.pdf 
30 Part G, Sec. 28. 
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been restricted to campaign periods have become a regular part of ordinary governance 
between elections. 
This section identified seven distinct roles that prime ministers play in 
Westminster systems and the expectations that bear upon them in these roles. Clearly, the 
‘job description’ of prime ministers is extensive and varied, ranging over formal, 
administrative, and political matters. The prime minister is the heart of the governmental 
process in these systems and is expected to generate energy and purpose to the slowly 
turning gears of the machinery of government and their parties. The nature of the 
configuration of political power in these systems is essential to prime ministers’ ability to 
fulfill these great expectations. The next section reviews the literature concerned with 
characterizing these configurations.                
2.3 Prime Ministers and Executive Power 
 This section reviews work on categorizing and assessing the institutional 
environment within which prime ministers operate, and explicates two key concepts that 
pervade the prime ministerial and executive literature: the core executive and 
presidentialization. As the epigraph at the start of this chapter suggests, to study 
executives is to contemplate the power to act. Executives make things happen in a 
political system. The predominant concern in the literature has been to characterize how 
power is distributed within political executives and the relationship between their various 
parts: prime minister and cabinet, prime minister and civil service. Patrick Weller’s 
important study of prime ministers in Westminster systems aimed to assess their 
“comparative power” in terms of their structural features: vulnerability to being 
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overthrown, control of party, control over cabinet committees, patronage powers, 
ministerial selection, level of policy advice, and control over Parliament.  
Among his conclusions, he argued that Conservative prime ministers in the UK 
are the least constrained. In Weller’s estimation, they lead a comparatively unified, 
ideologically coherent party in a unitary state, which means that there are neither rival 
centres of power nor regional representational imperatives in cabinet and policy-making. 
By contrast, leaders of the ALP and Labour parties in Australia and New Zealand lead 
fragmented parties with greater ties to societal actors (e.g., unions). On average, Weller 
finds that Canadian and British prime ministers are more powerful than their counterparts 
in Australia and New Zealand, primarily because they are less vulnerable to challenge 
and more in control of their parties (1985, 201-202).    
Building on Weller’s work, further efforts have attempted to identify general 
categories of the environments in which prime ministers operate and how they reflect and 
enable prime ministerial power. Anthony King (1994), for example, categorized Western 
European prime ministers into “strong, medium, and weak” executives. Robert Elgie 
(1997) constructed ‘models of executive politics’ according to where the central decision-
making power is located and the roles of the chief executive, cabinet, ministers 
(individually), and the civil service (222-225). Erwin Hargrove distinguished between 
collegial and dominant executives in arguing that both British and American chief 
executives have moved towards a dominant model, conditional on individual leadership 
style (2009, 14-15). Eoin O’Malley’s work (2005, 2007) builds on this literature by 
examining the positive relationship between the power of prime ministers and their power 
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to structure the conditions in which decisions are made, especially in terms of agenda 
control and selection of veto players (see Tsebelis 2002). 
 Other scholars have characterized the processes within the executive. Peter 
Aucoin (1997) and Rudy Andeweg (1997) theorized about executive decision-making 
processes, the former in terms of centralization and integration, the latter on collegiality 
and collectivity. This concern with executive decision-making processes also is evident in 
the literature on new democracies. For instance, Blondel et al. classified prime ministers’ 
offices in post-Communist countries by the type of coordination (political versus policy) 
and by the direction of support (cabinet versus prime minister) (2007, 134). Brusis and 
Dimitrov specifically examine the extent to which budget policy-making is centralized in 
these cases (2001, 895-896). This classificatory work is motivated by normative 
assumptions about the desirability of centralized prime ministerial government versus 
decentralized cabinet government and underlying beliefs about the deleterious nature of 
concentrated power.     
 This concern with characterizing relationships of power in parliamentary systems 
comes to fruition in the concept of the core executive, a central concept in contemporary 
executive studies.31 At its heart is a resource-dependency approach in which power is 
inherently relational and dynamic, rather than ‘fixed’ by type or model. It replaces what 
was seen as an excessively static and positional theoretical paradigm. Patrick Dunleavy 
and R.A.W. Rhodes’ original formulation defines the term functionally as “all those 
organizations and structures which primarily serve to pull together and integrate central 
                                                 
31 Elgie (2011) gives a comprehensive review of the history and state of core executive studies “two 
decades on”. It should also be noted that many of the analyses explicating the concept are volumes in a 
single research programme, the Economic and Social Research Council Whitehall Programme, and 
specifically the ‘Transforming Government’ series. See Weller et al. (1997), Peters et al. (2000). 
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government policies, or act as final arbiters of conflicts within the executive” (1990, 4). 
The notion is that instead of seeing the executive as a hierarchy in which the prime 
minister commands cabinet and the civil service, core executive actors each have 
particular resources that other parts of the core executive need in order to ‘get their way’. 
This picture is of a “barter economy” of exchange, negotiation, and strategic 
manoeuvring, in which “actors exercise power through possessing and deploying the 
correct combination of different resources” (Blick and Jones 2010, 172). Power is seen 
not as a static feature of a system but the outcome of exchange between actors.  
 This reconceptualization of the executive has been adopted by much of the 
literature. It is predominant in the study of European executives, especially (Goetz and 
Wollmann 2001; Hayward and Wright 2002; Wright and Hayward 2000). It is central, for 
example, to accounts of the democratic transitions of Central and Eastern Europe, 
particularly in terms of the ‘building’ of core executive capacity after communism 
(Dimitrov et al. 2006, Zubek 2008). Most of the major edited volumes in the study of 
executives take the concept as given, so it should not be ignored (see Peters et al. 2000; 
Poguntke and Webb 2005; Dahlstrom et al. 2011).  
 The key contribution of the core executive literature is its important argument that 
prime ministers are embedded in a web of relationships in which the answer to ‘who has 
power’ is often contingent and uncertain. Prime ministers perform their roles and seek to 
fulfill expectations within a complex, dynamic environment, and so context is essential to 
understanding the prime ministerial institution. These are reasonable arguments. 
However, it is also true that the literature has threatened to ‘collapse’ in on itself as 
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progressive explications have eroded the original notion of power as strictly relational 
(Elgie 2011).  
 It is evident that prime ministers do indeed hold privileged positions. They have 
institutional resources that other core executive actors simply do not have, in virtue of 
their location at the centre. In other words, prime ministerial power is not just an accident 
of how power relations happen to occur: it is structural. This study’s perspective 
emphasizes the role that institutional resources play in structuring prime ministerial 
power. I argue that characterizing the distribution of power in the core executive as a 
‘barter economy’ is misleading because it implies a relatively equal, mutually beneficial 
distribution of resources. Prime ministers are not simply one among many actors. Rather, 
I view the core executive as a network of principal-agent relationships, where cabinet and 
civil service actors are agents to prime ministers as principals. This implies both that 
there are clear inequalities in the distribution of resources but also that both principals 
and agents have resources that they can deploy.  
 The other prevalent concept in the prime ministerial literature is 
“presidentialization”. In contrast to the core executive literature, studies of 
presidentialization emphasize the enhanced roles of prime ministers within the executive, 
in relation to political party organizations, and in election campaigns. These are the 
“faces” of presidentialization identified by Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb. The first 
two faces refer to “the development of increasing leadership power resources and 
autonomy within the party and the political executive”, while the electoral face is 
manifest in “increasingly leadership-centred electoral processes” (2005, 5).  
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 The analogy is with the position of presidencies in presidential systems based on 
the American model. In such systems, presidents constitutionally are the sole holders of 
executive authority. They may be partisans but are not party leaders, as are prime 
ministers. They generally have loose ties to the party organization and face rival party 
leaders in the legislature with independent mandates. Their decision-making is more 
autonomous of the party organization but potentially faces greater contestation. In 
electoral terms, presidential candidates in such systems generally run on party tickets but 
in practice run on their own: their campaign teams are their own and campaigns are 
almost entirely centered on the candidate. Thus, the presidentialization perspective views 
prime ministers in parliamentary systems as becoming more like presidents in the sense 
of enhanced executive authority, autonomy from party organizations, and electoral 
campaigning increasingly focused on prime ministerial ‘candidates’ (Poguntke and Webb 
2005). The presidentialization thesis is essentially a broader, modern version of the long-
standing debate over the shift from collegial cabinet and party government to prime 
ministerial government.  
 As conceptualized in this study, prime ministerial branch institutionalization 
accords with the presidentialization thesis. It focuses on the building of prime 
ministerships as institutions that contribute to all three faces of presidentialization: 
executive, party, and electoral. It should be noted, though, that some prime ministerial 
scholars have been critical of the presidentialization concept. Keith Dowding, for 
instance, evinces scepticism close to ridicule about the notion, writing that it “should be 
expunged from political science vocabulary” (2013, 617). He argues that it misidentifies 
the nature of political change that it is trying to capture. Increasing prime ministerial 
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power, he suggests, are a move away from presidentialization. The prime minister has 
been and always will be much more powerful than a president; ‘presidentialization’ is the 
opposite of what is in fact occurring. This is not a new observation. Denis Smith, in the 
Canadian case, noted that even in 1977 parliamentary government had become 
“presidential government without its congressional advantages”, i.e., not presidential at 
all (1977).  
 As an alternative, Heffernan (2012) and Dowding (2013) prefer to call prime 
ministers ‘prime ministerial’ and the trend ‘prime ministerialization’. This is patently 
unhelpful if in the first place we are grappling with what exactly the prime minister(ship) 
means. While their basic argument is legitimate, the presidentialization perspective has 
the virtue of suggesting a clear direction to the institutional changes that the Westminster 
prime ministerships have undergone. If presidentialization is a misnomer, then it is a 
useful one. So, prime ministerial institutionalization presents a picture of change in the 
direction of prime ministers becoming more autonomous from cabinet, civil service, and 
parties and increasingly central to electoral campaigning. In other words, they are 
becoming more presidential. It can suggest this perspective without the separate claim 
relating these changes to power itself.     
2.4 Prime Ministerial Change in Westminster and Beyond 
 This section builds on the foregoing explication to review work on how prime 
ministerships have changed, both in the Westminster systems and in other parliamentary 
systems. In the last section, I discussed characterizations of power relations within the 
executive and the core executive and presidentialization concepts. These literatures 
demonstrate an overarching concern with tracing political shifts of power among actors: 
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from cabinets to chief executives, among executive actors within the core executive, from 
national governments to transnational governmental and private institutions, and from 
parties and formal institutions to individuals. In the Westminster systems, such questions 
form the dominant thread in the prime ministerial literature.  
 Observers of British politics have been debating ‘cabinet’ versus ‘prime 
ministerial’ government for decades, but R.H.S. Crossman’s assertion in 1963 that prime 
ministerial government was a permanent feature of British politics remains the 
touchstone for the debate. Benemy (1965) and Berkeley (1968) concurred with this 
assessment: the title of the 1965 volume is The Elected Monarch, a theme which has run 
through the prime ministerial scholarship. G.W. Jones took an opposing position in a 
series of studies at the time and since (1964, 1973; Blick and Jones 2010). In his original 
piece, he gave five counterarguments: the evidence for importance of leaders to electoral 
outcomes is thin, the power or threat of dissolution did not really enforce party discipline, 
factions within parties could not be ignored, mass media did as much to enhance the 
stature of rivals in government and opposition, control over cabinet procedure and 
composition did not mean that the prime minister could simply go against the majority of 
cabinet (1964, 174-182). In short, Jones suggested that prime ministers were seriously 
constrained by the necessity of consultation and consideration of party opinion and rivals’ 
positions. In later work, his main goal appears to be to show continuity in the prime 
ministership rather than change.         
 Despite Jones’ efforts, the presidentialization argument gathered steam in decades 
since, particularly with Labour’s victory in 1997 and the onset of the ‘Blair presidency’ 
(Allen 2003; Foley 2000; Heffernan 2003, 2005; Dowding 2013). It is inarguable that the 
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first two terms of the Blair prime ministership (1997-2001, 2001-2005) featured constant 
efforts at institutional innovation designed to strengthen capacity at the centre of 
government. For instance, the creation of the policy directorate in no. 10 and then the 
Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit, was charged with setting and achieving targets in policy 
implementation (Richards and Smith 2006). As discussed in chapter one, Prime Minister 
Blair was outspoken about his views that a strong centre was required in the face of 
modern political realities. Similarly, Prime Minister Cameron’s change of heart on the 
need for a robust capacity for policy-making and implementation at the centre speaks to 
its inexorable pull (Bennister and Heffernan 2012). The period also featured an increase 
in the number of ‘special advisors’, political appointees within ministries, across 
government (Yong and Hazell 2014). It is important to also recognize, though, that efforts 
to strengthen the centre’s capacity did not begin with Prime Minister Blair. In particular, 
the Central Policy Review Staff, established in the Cabinet Office by Prime Minister 
Heath in 1971, constituted the most notable of such efforts. It ultimately failed, largely 
because it did not have enough authority, being more an advisory ‘think-tank’ to 
government than an institutionalized part of the machinery with the prime minister’s 
authority behind it (Blackstone and Plowden 1988).  
 Even those who dismiss the presidentialization thesis as overstated acknowledge 
that power relationships within the core executive have undergone change, if not 
transformation (Blick and Jones 2010; Dowding 2013). Blick and Jones’ (2010) work on 
the development of the British prime ministership accepts that there have been changes in 
recent decades leading to some potential increases in power but that in historical context 
it is less clear that prime ministers are now more powerful than before, or that there is any 
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kind of permanent trend. The experience of coalition government from 2010-2015 has 
also tempered the enthusiastic trumpeting of the presidentialization thesis in Britain, but 
it seems clear that along some dimensions of institutionalization the British prime 
ministership has undergone change. 
 In Australia, notice has been taken of changes to cabinet government but the 
thesis of overly dominant prime ministers has been less evident (Weller 2007, 249). 
Walter and Strangio (2007) and Ward (2014) find that there has been a general trend 
towards leader predominance within and outside of the cabinet and core executive. Hart 
also found that the “trappings” of presidentialism had grown in Australia, particularly the 
rise of staff in the prime minister’s office and the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, and in the enhanced role of prime ministers in the media (1993, 193-194). 
However, he notes an important distinction in the Australian case: the ability of party 
caucuses to remove party leaders, which discourages prime ministers from disregarding 
cabinet and caucus colleagues entirely.  
 Spurred by the claims of Crossman (1963) of the coming of prime ministerial 
government and the ensuing debate, several scholars examined the extent and 
effectiveness of the prime minister’s bureaucratic support (Crisp 1967; Mediansky and 
Nockles 1975; Yeend 1979). Crisp was generally supportive of increasing the 
coordination capacity of the prime minister, arguing that the prime minister’s “relatively 
minor role in inter-departmental coordination… is bound to become more acutely fraught 
with difficulties” (1967, 53). Mediansky and Nockles (1975) and Yeend (1979) respond, 
in particular, to the innovations of the Gough Whitlam prime ministership (1972-1975). 
This period saw a build-up of organizations outside of the bureaucracy designed to 
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provide advice and support to a government with “high policy ambitions” and a “lack of 
confidence in the Public Service” (Mediansky and Nockles 1975, 217), one that they 
conclude was ultimately ineffective.      
 Some recent work has focused on the growth of ministerial staffers in the last two 
decades (Maley 2010; Tiernan 2007). In particular, Anne Tiernan’s (2007) thorough 
analysis demonstrates the potential dangers of the tremendous growth in the number and 
power of ministerial staffers in Australia and, in particular, the prime minister’s support 
system. Tiernan concluded that John Howard’s prime ministership (1996-2007) is a 
turning point in the institutionalization of the Australian office, setting a precedent for 
successors. As she notes, Prime Minister Howard’s support system was “large, active, 
interventionist and personalised”, and she argued that these changes reflected 
“institutional pressures and demands on leaders more generally… Howard has learned 
through experience that modern leaders must work with and through organisational 
structures to achieve results” (2006, 322-323). As in the British case, it seems clear that 
the prime ministership in Australia has undergone significant changes. 
 In Canada, the argument that the prime ministership has a “large, active, 
interventionist and personalized” support system would surprise no one. The thesis of a 
dominant, almost dictatorial, prime ministership has become the received wisdom, 
particularly since Donald Savoie’s detailed examinations of the workings of the centre of 
government (1999; 2010). The enhanced power of the prime minister’s office (PMO) and 
the Privy Council Office (PCO) have received much popular and scholarly attention. The 
argument that power increasingly and excessively has been concentrated within the prime 
minister and central agencies has gained wide currency (Smith 1977; Aucoin et al. 2011; 
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White 2005). This phenomenon has been traced to at least the prime ministership of 
Pierre Trudeau (1968-1979, 1980-1984). It seems to have been exacerbated in the public 
mind by Stephen Harper (2006-2015), under whom the interventionism of the PMO in 
controlling government messaging and ‘politicizing’ the civil service, especially, arguably 
reached extreme levels (Martin 2010; Wells 2013; Harris 2014).  
 Like George Jones vis-à-vis the British prime ministership, some scholars argue 
that the notion of an overly dominant prime minister is overblown, that there are 
“counterweights to prime ministerial power” such as other levels of government and an 
aggressive, scrutinizing media (Bakvis 2001, 76). However, at least from the perspective 
of prime ministerial branch institutionalization, prime ministerial power in Canada 
arguably is the most advanced of the Westminster countries. The Canadian prime minister 
has at his disposal large, well-developed political and civil service offices and faces fewer 
constraints which are operative in other cases.     
 As we discussed earlier, the New Zealand prime ministership has not been a focus 
of sustained inquiry because of the strength of the notion of collective government, and 
the ‘smallness’ of its political culture. Nevertheless, it has also “continued along the path 
to a more presidential style of government” (Henderson 2003, 106). Two changes in 
particular should be noted. First, the electoral reform of 1993, which saw New Zealand 
shift from a single-member plurality to a mixed member proportional system, should, in 
the traditional understanding of Westminster, have undermined the power of the prime 
minister. However, Henderson argues that under MMP there is an increased need for 
coordination at the centre, partly as a response to the inherent centrifugal tendencies of a 
more fragmented party system. Mulgan also argued that the prime minister’s exercise of 
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the right to call an election is actually enhanced under MMP because it can be used as a 
“major bargaining weapon for keeping other parties in line” (1997, 91-92). The other 
major change is the creation of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet itself in the 
late 1980s, about which more is said in later chapters. 
 These trends are also evident in non-Westminster parliamentary regimes, to 
varying degrees (Arter 2004; Dahlstrom et al. 2011; Poguntke and Webb 2005). A number 
of comparative studies of chief executives and centres of government have been 
conducted. Across parliamentary systems, the studies demonstrate consistent evidence for 
increased ‘presidentialization’ in all cases, though at different intensities (Webb and 
Poguntke 2005, 338), utilizing types of ‘steering’ strategies in the effort to provide 
“central direction to governance” (Dahlstrom et al. 2011, 272), and the build-up of 
resources in chief executive offices (Peters et al. 2000). Although the character and 
intensity of these shifts in power toward the chief executive certainly vary, they seem to 
constitute a general trend. Certainly, in no case has the opposite trend been realized: 
cabinets and political parties gaining power at the expense of the chief executive.32  
 Observations of increasing executive power are especially telling in cases where it 
is not expected. The Scandinavian countries of Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, 
for instance, are good test cases given the robustness of social democracy and collective 
orientations in addition to their proportional electoral systems. In Sweden and Denmark, 
the shift towards the executive has been pronounced (Aylott 2005; Pedersen and Knudsen 
2005; Sundstrom 2009; Jensen 2011). Kolltveit (2012) argues that Norwegian prime 
ministers, traditionally seen as more collegial than other Scandinavian chief executives, 
                                                 
32 I should emphasize strongly that this discussion, and the dissertation in general, is about trends in prime 
ministerial institutionalization: relatively long-term, sustained patterns of change. There are always 
exceptions arising from unique events which disrupt overall trends.   
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have followed this trend in recent decades: between 1986 and 2006, the growth rate in the 
prime minister’s office exceeded all other ministries, jumping from twenty-five to almost 
seventy full-time equivalent positions (385). Paloheimo (2003) argues that prime 
ministerial power has increased in Finland such that a formally semi-presidential system, 
in which the president retained important prerogatives and constitutional duties, has given 
way to a “a new kind of prime-ministerial governance” (241). It has become a 
parliamentary system in practice, where prime ministers lead the political executive and 
the president retains only symbolic powers.              
 On the whole, then, the literature reports a consistent pattern: prime ministers in 
advanced democracies have become more powerful. Existing explanations of how and 
where this pattern occurs point to four general factors: changes in media and 
communications, sociocultural trends, the effects of structural and constitutional factors, 
and economic and international forces.    
 The first explanation is a changing media environment and advances in 
communications technologies. New media tends to emphasize leaders as individuals over 
institutions and processes, enhancing their visibility and creating new mechanisms of 
pursuing policy and political goals, such as direct appeal to the public rather than through 
traditional means such as political parties (Webb and Poguntke 2005, 349). Because 
politics has become increasingly ‘mediated’, the media has a large role to play in many 
processes of institutional change. As Helms notes, “the mainstream perception of 
government–mass media relations in the West European parliamentary democracies... 
considers the media [to be] powerful catalysts of a gradual concentration of political 
power in the hands of governments and chief executives more particularly” (2008, 27). 
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New communications technologies contribute greatly to the extent to which leaders can 
assert themselves directly within citizens’ ‘spheres’ of political information and the extent 
to which they can learn about citizen preferences without the mediation of parties, 
legislatures, or established media. Savoie notes that the power of the media has arguably 
been the largest change in democratic politics in recent decades, and that the “end of 
deference, capacity for self-projection, and a more aggressive approach” has created 
immense pressures for chief executives, especially, to respond by building robust systems 
of image control and message management (2010, 13). Indeed, much of the growth in the 
institutional resources of chief executives has been in communications operations.   
 In turn, these factors play a role in sociocultural trends as an explanation for 
prime ministerial institutionalization. At the broadest level, some analysts argue that as 
public expectations of chief executives have increased, their incentives to centralize 
power have correspondingly grown (Hargrove 2009). This is an important insight which 
is explicated in detail in chapter three. Wright and Hayward point to the proliferation of 
new social actors and policy networks as crucial to understanding increased coordination 
requirements for core executives (2000, 32). They also argue that the “weakening” of 
“traditional props of governance” – parties, unions, sociocultural cleavages, deference to 
elites, and so on – has had similar effects, a claim echoed by Webb and Poguntke (2005, 
348-349). 
 An alternative sociocultural perspective looks to cultural tradition or national 
histories (Rose and Suleiman 1980). The basic idea is that countries have ‘ways of doing 
things’, shaped by their culture and history, that condition how their political institutions 
undergo change. Some political cultures are seen as emphasizing collective over 
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individualist orientations, for instance. Some characteristically value stability and 
continuity over change and disruption. In the United States, a broadly held suspicion of 
entrenched, undivided power is reflected both in the structural weakness of the executive 
and the much greater politicization of public administration, relative to other Anglo-
American countries. One perspective that applies directly to prime ministerial power is 
the concept of an ‘administrative tradition’. This refers to “an historically based set of 
values, structures and relationships with other institutions that defines the nature of 
appropriate public administration within society” (Peters 2008, 118). A country’s 
administrative tradition thus directly affects how power is distributed within the core 
executive. Dahlstrom et al. (2011), for example, find that “recentring”, the restoration of 
power to the centre of government after the “decentring” of New Public Management in 
the 1980s, has been strongest in Anglo-American countries, less evident in the 
Scandinavian states, and quite weak in the Napoleonic and Germanic countries (364).33  
 A third category of explanations for enhanced prime ministerial power invokes 
the role of structural and constitutional factors. For example, Muller et al.’s analysis of 
ministerial survey responses in Western Europe suggests that in terms of cross-case 
variation, “the structural distinction that plays the greatest part is that between single-
party and coalition cabinets”, with the former generally demonstrating more centralized 
prime ministerial institutions (1993, 253).34 Comparing the Westminster cases with cases 
in western Europe, O’Malley (2007) argues that a government’s legislative support and 
                                                 
33 These are standard divisions in the public administration literature (see Painter and Peters 2010).   
34 The Post-communist cases illuminate the continuing legacy of structural arrangements. The common 
theme in this literature is to overcome the Soviet-era style in which the challenge is to ‘governmentalize’ 
the core executive (Blondel et al. 2007; Dimitrov et al. 2006; Zubek 2001). Constitutional reform 
strengthened the prime minister’s position vis-à-vis the president and cabinet in both Hungary and Poland, 
while in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria constitutional structures have maintained and reinforced a more 
collegial governing environment and stillborn institutionalization of policy-making (Goetz and Wollmann 
2001, 872-873). 
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relationship with other parties conditions the likelihood of prime ministerial 
institutionalization. In the Westminster ‘majoritarian’ cases, where power is not generally 
shared between parties and majority governments are common, prime ministers have 
greater ability to choose to increase resources, while in ‘consensus’ systems, the lack of 
majority support and coalitional arrangements between parties constrain the discretion of 
prime ministers over executive organization. In such systems, the choices of prime 
ministers are subject to more veto points, an arrangement that favours the status quo.    
 Finally, economic and international forces are seen as a fourth significant factor. 
The growth of state activity as a cause of changing executive power is a pervasive theme 
in the literature (Poguntke and Webb 2005, 14; Wright and Hayward 2000, 32). 
Increasing state activity contributes to a fragmented and more complex environment 
where coordination across sectors becomes more essential. Coordination is functionally a 
key component of the core executive, and especially the centre of the core executive; 
thus, it “generates attempts to enhance the power and autonomy of the state’s chief 
executive” (Webb and Poguntke 2005, 350). Internationalization of policy-making is also 
seen to have increased incentives for executive power because it has increased 
coordination requirements, provided greater visibility and stature to chief executives, and 
strengthened the positions of chief executives as against other domestic political actors. 
 There is a large literature concerning the effects of Europeanization on the core 
executive, both in terms of accession to the European Union in post-Communist Central 
and Eastern European countries (Olsen 2002, Fink-Hafner 2007), and on how western 
European states have adjusted organizationally. Back et al. find that as a result of 
increasing European integration, prime ministers “appear to have gained autonomy from 
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parliament and from their parties” (2009, 247). In fact, in their case study of Sweden, the 
transfer of responsibility over EU affairs from the foreign ministry to a bureau within the 
prime minister’s office in 2005 represents a concrete manifestation of this phenomenon. 
Johansson and Tallberg (2010) argue that in general EU ‘summitry’, primarily taking 
place within the European Council, is an important explanatory factor in the 
empowerment of European chief executives.35 Thus, it is apparent that the extent to 
which a state is tied into the international political and economic system can significantly 
affect domestic executive power: as political and economic ties increase, chief executives 
have become more powerful.36  
 To summarize, in this section I reviewed work on how prime ministerships in 
Westminster and other parliamentary systems have changed in recent decades. Four 
potential explanations for the presidentializing trends in these prime ministerships were 
discussed: changes in media and communications technologies, sociocultural factors, 
structural and constitutional features, and the influence of economic and international 
forces. However, these explanations of prime ministerial institutionalization have not 
                                                 
35 The Council is composed of all EU heads of state and government as well as the president of the 
European Commission. As Johansson and Tallberg (2010) argue, the “European Council today constitutes 
the supreme political body of the EU” (215).  
36 A related explanation for prime ministerial institutionalization is the increasing fragmentation of policy-
making and the difficulties in exercising leadership from the centre (Weller et al. 1997; Campbell and 
Halligan 1992; Campbell 1983). The “hollow crown” thesis, for example, asks the question of what has 
happened to the executive as a result of the introduction of new techniques and ideologies in public 
administration, primarily New Public Management, and internationalization of decision-making (Saward 
1997; Peters 1991). They argue that governments, and especially core executives, have lost or willingly 
given capacities to societal actors, control over other state actors, and supra-state organizations as a 
response to governmental overload. Downloading of responsibilities to subnational governments and 
private actors, moving to alternative delivery systems for public services, ‘horizontal management’ of 
bureaucracy and a focus on efficiency and accountability are the order of the day (Peters 1991, 57-84). At 
the institutional level, responses to these apparent losses of capacity have taken different forms (Dahlstrom 
et al. 2011). The focus has shifted to finding ways to strengthen political control over the policy-making, 
leading to reconfigurations of core executives. The relevance of this stream in the literature is that it 
suggests one rationale for prime ministerial institutionalization: in order to cope with the increasing 
complexity of the public policy process or to meet public demands for effective public action, prime 
ministers have often viewed centralized mechanisms of policy control and oversight as desirable.       
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been rigorously examined in the literature, nor have they been deeply theorized. The rest 
of this study aims to do so. In particular, it builds and tests a sociocultural theory of prime 
ministerial institutionalization, the Theory of Public Expectations.     
2.5 From “Allegiant” to “Assertive” Citizenship 
 The Theory of Public Expectations argues that change in the political cultures of 
advanced democracies, particularly the Westminster systems of Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the UK, drives institutional change in prime ministerships. This theory is 
elaborated in detail in the next chapter. As a precursor to the explication of the theory, 
though, now I review in this section the claims that democratic political cultures have 
changed in transformative ways in the last half-century. These claims are important to 
understand because, taken together, they are the central empirical premise in the 
argument for the Theory of Public Expectations. That is, the theory hangs on at least the 
presumptive validity of the claim that there have been significant shifts in public attitudes 
and values.  
 This claim is captured in Dalton and Welzel’s (2014) notion of “allegiant” and 
“assertive” citizenship orientations. They argue that a number of salient aspects of the 
relationship between citizens and the state can be encapsulated in these two overarching 
orientations, and there has been a gradual shift from one to the other across democracies. 
As they put it conclusively, “[t]he transition from allegiant to assertive cultures is real” 
(305). These orientations are summarized in table 2.1, below.  
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Table 2.1  
Allegiant and Assertive Citizenship Orientations 
Domain Allegiant Citizens Assertive Citizens 
Value Priorities Output priorities with an 
emphasis on order and 
security limit input 
priorities that emphasize 
voice and participation; 
materialist/protective values 
predominate 
Input priorities with an 
emphasis on voice and 
participation grow stronger at 
the expense of output 
priorities with an emphasis on 
order and security; 
postmaterialist/emancipative 
values prevail over 
materialist/protective values 
 
Authority Orientations Deference to authority in 
the family, at the workplace, 
and in politics 
Distance to authority in the 
family, at the workplace, and 
in politics 
 
Institutional Trust High trust in institutions Low trust in institutions 
 
Democratic Support Support for both the 
principles of democracy and 
its practice (satisfied 
democrats) 
Strong support for the 
principles of democracy but 
weak support for its practice 
(dissatisfied democrats) 
 
Democracy Notion Input-oriented notions of 
democracy as a means of 
voice and participation mix 
with output-oriented 
notions of democracy as a 
tool of delivering social 
goods 
 
Input-oriented notions of 
democracy as a means of 
voice and participation 
become clearly dominant 
Political Activism Voting and other 
conventional forms of 
legitimacy-granting activity 
 
Strong affinity to nonviolent, 
elite-challenging activity 
Expected Systemic 
Consequences 
More effective and accountable governance? 
Source: Dalton and Welzel (2014, 11)   
 The other areas highlighted in table 2.1 - authority orientations, institutional trust, 
support for and concept of democracy, and political activism – reflect the shift in value 
priorities from allegiant to assertive citizens. Most scholars seem to agree that post-
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material value change has had significant effects on these and other attitudinal 
indicators.37 Allegiant citizens tend to be socially and politically deferential. Their 
orientation to authority is characterized by respect and an internalized recognition of the 
legitimacy of social and political institutions. Assertive citizens, on the other hand, are 
‘distant’ from authority and they do not share the recognition of legitimacy that allegiant 
citizens hold. The shift in authority orientations is captured in the ‘decline of deference’ 
thesis, most clearly associated with Neil Nevitte’s work (1996; 2014). Nevitte argues that 
deference to authority within the family, in the economy, and in politics are in decline 
because authority orientations are a product of familial socialization (2014, 55). As value 
priorities shift, individuals are increasingly socialized to disregard authority. This decline 
in deference, Nevitte argues, is evident across a broad sample of advanced democracies. 
 Institutional trust has also been on a long decline (Dalton 2005; Hetherington 
2005). Indeed, this decline was diagnosed as early as 1974 (Miller 1974; Citrin 1974), 
and led to a report on a perceived ‘crisis of governability’ (Crozier et al. 1975). The 
allegiant predisposition is to view institutions positively; they trusted that, generally 
speaking, institutions ‘do the right thing’ and have the public interest at heart. Assertive 
citizens, however, have low trust in institutions. They view institutions as dysfunctional, 
                                                 
37 However, the effects of post-materialism are by no means universally significant. In two studies within 
the Canadian context, the hypothesized effects were not found. Erickson and Laycock’s (2002) study of 
opinion among social democrats (members of the New Democratic Party) found no evidence that post-
material issues were ‘crowding out’ material issues. Butovsky (2002) found, more broadly, that post-
material issues had not replaced material issues among Canadians in general, and actually, that from the 
1988 to 1997 elections post-material issues had become less favoured. Both Janssen (1991) and Vreese et 
al. (2005) find no support for the idea that post-materialists would be more in favour of EU integration. 
Darren Davis, in a series of articles (Davis and Davenport 1999, Davis et al. 1999, Davis 2000) questions 
both the validity of Inglehart’s measure of post-materialism and its effects on a wide range of attitudinal 
indicators, such as tolerance, racial attitudes, and environmentalism. The empirical status of the post-
materialism thesis, and especially its effects on political attitudes, is still contested. 
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not responsive to citizens’ voices and the public interest, and they see institutional actors 
as having ulterior motives for what they do.      
 The decline of deference and trust in institutions can be linked with a number of 
other troubling trends. There is increased disengagement and cynicism, a ‘turning away’ 
from politics (Hay 2007; Pharr and Putnam 2000). Individuals in most advanced 
democracies increasingly are apathetic or actively repulsed by politicians and formal 
institutions. As Hay notes, there is a “near universal disdain for ‘politics’ and the 
‘political’” in contemporary democracies (2007, 1). This manifests itself, for instance, in 
the problem of falling voter turnout (Gray and Caul 2000; Blais and Rubenson 2013) and 
a pervasive distancing from, and contempt for, politicians, who are seen as ineffective, 
duplicitous, and unsympathetic and unconcerned with the public good (Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse 2002; Dalton 2008). Arguably, the 2016 election of controversial American 
President Donald Trump is a direct consequence of these attitudes. Others have pointed to 
declines in feelings of political efficacy and the ability of ordinary citizens to interpret 
and effect change in the political world, as governance becomes increasingly complex 
and power increasingly dispersed (Savoie 2010; Kane et al. 2009).   
 Dalton and Welzel’s characterization of allegiant and assertive orientations, 
summarized in table 2.1, also includes how individuals think about democracy itself and 
about their place in politics. The contrast between allegiant and assertive orientations is 
evident in terms of support for democratic practice, notions of democracy, and political 
activism. At the same time that traditional politics is a ‘turn-off’ to many, publics are 
more sophisticated, expect more of government than previous generations, and remain 
committed to democratic ideals but think of democracy in a much ‘thicker way than the 
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more allegiant publics of earlier periods. As would be expected, this is especially true of 
younger generations, who are much more likely to engage in non-electoral political 
participation but less likely to vote (Dalton 2008). This disjunction is a key driver of what 
Pippa Norris calls the ‘democratic deficit’: what occurs when “satisfaction with the 
performance of democracy diverges from public aspirations” (2011, 5). This deep 
dissatisfaction with democratic practice expresses itself in many ways.  
 For instance, Jakobsen and Listhaug (2014), among others, find that there is 
greater willingness to engage in protest, boycotting, and other elite-challenging activities. 
It is also reflected in the the rise of new social issues to the political agenda, for example, 
the rise of ‘political consumerism’ (Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti 2005), concern about 
the environment (Franzen and Meyer 2010; Rohrschneider et al. 2014), the increasing 
salience of cultural and environmental issues (Achterberg 2006), and entrepreneurial 
activity (Uhlaner et al. 2002). It affects even something as simple as personal happiness: 
Jan Dehley’s (2010) study shows that post-materialism generates a different “happiness 
recipe” than materialism; happiness means something different to individuals in more 
post-material societies than to those in less post-material (poorer) societies. 
 Allegiant citizens are ‘satisfied democrats’ who have lower expectations for both 
the output of government and the ability of government to recognize their individual 
voice. Thus, their political activity will tend to be limited to voting and other relatively 
passive ways of expressing support. Their assertive counterparts, however, have 
heightened expectations for what government can deliver and how much input citizens 
ought to have. When governments fail to deliver according to expectations or to 
recognize sufficiently citizens’ voice, they become dissatisfied and disillusioned. For 
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some this means disengagement. For others, it means political activity in more active, 
elite-challenging ways; voting becomes almost antithetical in the assertive orientation 
because it implicitly expresses support for the way democracy is working.     
 Therefore, there is substantial evidence, if not consensus, around a general picture 
in which a gradual shift in value priorities, from materialist to post-materialist values, has 
dramatically altered the nature of citizen politics in modern advanced democracies. This 
shift in value priorities has shifted citizen orientations across a spectrum of political 
values and attitudes. The shift is captured in Dalton and Welzel’s notion of allegiant and 
assertive orientations. My central claim is that if there has been a shift from allegiant to 
assertive orientations, it should have noticeable institutional consequences. Political 
institutions do not exist apart from the political cultures in which they operate. As 
discussed in chapter three, these consequences may not be entirely as promising as 
Dalton and Welzel suggest. They argue that assertive citizenship “bring[s] us closer to 
realizing democracy’s key inspirational promise: empowering people to make their own 
decisions and to make their preferences heard and counted” (2014, 306). It may well do 
this. However, it may also contribute to the centralization of executive power through the 
institutionalization of prime ministerships, as discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
To conclude, this chapter had four important goals. First, it described the 
historical and institutional context of the study by tracing the evolution of the 
Westminster prime ministership and its roles and powers in the contemporary political 
process. Second, I reviewed the literature on the structures of power in which prime 
ministers operate and introduced the core executive and presidentialization concepts as 
key elements of this literature. Third, I discussed work on how prime ministerships have 
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undergone change in Westminster systems, and elsewhere, and it outlined existing 
explanations for this change. Finally, this chapter explicated the literature underlying the 
central empirical premise of the primary theory of this study, the Theory of Public 
Expectations. The premise is that there has been a shift from allegiant citizenship 
orientations to assertive orientations, driven by shifts in value priorities and reflected in 
salient political values and attitudes, from deference to trust to activism. The review in 
this chapter sets the stage for chapter three. In the next chapter, I introduce and elaborate, 
in some detail, the Theory of Public Expectations and two alternative sets of explanations 
for changes in the institutionalization of prime ministerial branches.   
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Chapter 3  
Prime Ministers and Public Expectations: A Theory 
Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government... A 
feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but 
another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in 
theory, must be, in practice, a bad government. 
                Alexander Hamilton, Federalist no. 70, 1788  
The public expects governments to deliver policies and services to a high standard, 
regardless of structural or organisational divisions within government. These expectations 
are vastly higher than they were one to two generations ago and continue to increase. The 
pervasiveness and rapidity of media coverage gives political effect to high public 
expectations, even as it increases them. As the media constantly seek to expose any lack 
of cohesiveness in a government, there is more pressure for coordinating mechanisms 
that increase that cohesiveness. The prime minister above all other ministers is expected 
to respond to that pressure. 
          Peter Hamburger, et al. (2011, 379) 
     
This chapter presents the study’s primary explanation for institutional change in 
prime ministerial branches: the Theory of Public Expectations. This theory builds on four 
themes emphasized in the previous chapter. The first theme is that the story of prime 
ministerial power is the story of a historical democratizing process. In tracing the 
development of the Westminster prime ministership earlier, I stressed the extent to which 
power once held by monarchs, legislatures, and parties flowed towards the prime minister 
because of such innovations as responsible government and mass enfranchisement. 
Second, I described the basic ‘job description’ of the modern prime minister and its 
sources of power and authority. The take-away here is that prime ministerial power 
comes from a mix of formal and informal rules, conventions, and practices that uniquely 
locate prime ministers at the centre of government.  
62 
 
The third theme discussed in chapter two involves the debate about 
presidentialization and centralization of power around prime ministers. These phenomena 
are evident in many parliamentary democracies, suggesting that there are broader, general 
forces driving these shifts in power. Finally, I introduced the concept of allegiant and 
assertive citizens and its literature, which argues that contemporary democratic citizens 
are more likely to be distrustful, politically active, critical and elite-challenging than their 
more trustful, passive, and deferential counterparts in earlier periods. The empirical 
observation of this shift from allegiant to assertive citizenship orientations is central to 
the theory presented in this chapter.   
These four themes, then, are drawn together in the primary theoretical argument 
of this dissertation, the Theory of Public Expectations. The theory is an original and 
general explanation for the institutionalization of prime ministerships in parliamentary 
democracies. The theory locates the drivers of institutional change in the rise of 
“assertive” citizens who challenge government, increasing expectations about what 
government can deliver and how it should do so. These heightened expectations generate 
incentives for prime ministers to respond by augmenting the institutional capacity of their 
offices. The rest of this chapter elaborates the theoretical foundations of this explanation 
and sets out the logic of the argument in detail. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I set out the theoretical framework of the 
study by situating it within prevailing theories of institutions and institutional change. I 
then revisit the concept of institutionalization introduced in chapter one. I define the 
components of institutionalization that structure the study’s empirical investigation: 
autonomy and internal complexity. The second section of this chapter explicates my 
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original explanation for prime ministerial institutionalization, the Theory of Public 
Expectations. I discuss its theoretical antecedents prior to setting out the logic of the 
theory. I explain the mechanisms through which, the theory argues, cultural change and 
prime ministerial institutionalization are linked. I also set out the empirical predictions of 
the theory, and explore some of its most pressing implications. Finally, I discuss two sets 
of alternative explanations for institutionalization: economic factors and political 
conditions. Briefly, I also identify a ‘null’ hypothesis to the Theory of Public 
Expectations and its alternatives. This is the idea that prime ministerial 
institutionalization is not primarily the product of systematic factors but idiosyncratic 
factors which have to do, for instance, with individual leaders and leadership styles.       
3.1 Institutionalization and Institutional Theory 
 This section explicates the theoretical perspective of the study. It has two 
purposes. First, it situates the study’s general perspective within the various domains of 
institutional theory, in particular, the three strands identified by Hall and Taylor (1996): 
sociological, historical, and rational choice institutionalism. The study synthesizes 
important elements from all three perspectives, although the historical institutionalist 
paradigm provides the underlying approach of examining institutional change as a 
function of temporal processes. The second purpose of this section is to define and 
explain the components of institutionalization, the lens through which the theory and 
empirical data of the study are viewed. I discuss the notions of institutional autonomy and 
complexity, which together structure Part II of the study.     
 There are many ways to approach the study of political institutions. Scholars have 
grouped these into perspectives that share basic assumptions. These assumptions concern 
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what institutions are, how and why they are created, perpetuated, and changed, and what 
consequences they have. Since the rise of the “new institutionalism”, three perspectives 
in particular have accrued much theoretical and empirical development. These are 
sociological, historical, and rational choice institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996).38 
 Sociological institutionalism, most identified with March and Olsen’s (1984, 
1989) seminal work, emphasizes the role of socially constructed norms, identities and 
behaviours in explanations of institutional development and change. This perspective sees 
institutions as manifestations of these norms and conventions. Scholars in this tradition 
also contemplate how “logics of appropriateness” structure the contexts within which 
institutional actors operate. Thus, explaining institutional behaviour in the sociological 
institutionalism mode is typically a matter of showing how the sociocultural context 
enables and constrains choice.  
 Historical institutionalism, as the name implies, emphasizes the role of “concrete 
temporal processes” in shaping institutions (Thelen 1999, 369). When something happens 
is crucial to understanding why it happens. Historical institutionalists thus look to 
particular sequences of events. They emphasize, in concepts such as path dependence and 
critical junctures, how particular events and combinations of events determine 
institutional trajectories. In the broad outline, path dependence shapes institutional 
behaviour and outcomes by entrenching “increasing returns” from institutional 
configurations and rules in place, and increasing the costs of alternatives (Pierson 2000). 
These path-dependent processes often begin from “critical junctures”: short periods 
where historical processes become ‘open’ to change through choice or circumstance 
                                                 
38 This is, of course, not a universally accepted characterization, but it is the most widespread. In addition to 
these, other institutionalisms have arisen: discursive institutionalism, constructivist institutionalism, 
feminist institutionalism, and so on.  
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(Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 348). Thus, historical institutionalism offers a clear 
theoretical paradigm for explaining institutional creation, stability, and change: critical 
junctures create particular institutional configurations, which become increasingly 
entrenched because they are self-reinforcing.       
 Finally, the distinctiveness of rational choice institutionalism is the idea that 
institutions are sets of rules that implement ‘equilibria’ among actors. Equilibria, in this 
context, are sets of rules for behaviour from which no rational actors should deviate. 
These sets of rules arise because actors want to try to capture gains from cooperation. 
Because these actors are seen as instrumentally rational, they will always make choices 
based on what alternatives offer the most utility according to their preferences. In social 
interactions, however, this behaviour sometimes leads to outcomes that are worse for 
everyone involved. Better solutions, however, require actors to cooperate. Institutions 
implement cooperation. Therefore, the basic determinants of institutional creation and 
change are the costs to measuring and enforcing cooperation, that is, “transaction costs” 
(North 1990, 27). In summary, these approaches to studying institutions emphasize 
different factors in explaining institutions and institutional change: sociocultural norms 
and contexts, temporal sequences of events, and equilibrium-enforcing rules among 
actors.       
 This study borrows elements from all three perspectives, although in the main the 
theory shares the historical institutionalists’ particular concern with the development of 
institutions over time and the explanatory importance of concurrent temporal processes. 
Sociological institutionalism’s emphasis on the role of cultural values and socially 
constructed expectations for behaviour informs the theory’s appeal to expectations and 
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responsibilities that bear upon prime ministers. As the discussion in chapter two reveals, 
most of what prime ministers do is not mandated constitutionally, or legally. Thus, the 
roles and responsibilities of prime ministers are mostly a matter of the conventions and 
norms surrounding the institution and the expectations of the public, political parties, 
legislators, cabinet ministers, and so on. Because of this relative discretion, sociological 
institutionalism’s focus on informal norms and logics of appropriate behaviour are 
especially relevant to studying prime ministers and prime ministerships. Although the 
study does not directly explicate these aspects in-depth, the theory assumes the salience 
of sociocultural context to prime ministerial behaviour.    
 The theory is also informed by the emphasis of rational choice institutionalism on 
the instrumental rationality of actors and the notion that institutions are in some sense 
bargains among actors for mutual benefit. Instrumental rationality is embedded in the 
theory as an explicit premise, the rational actor premise. The theory suggests that 
institutional change is the outcome of a rational response to changing public expectations. 
Prime ministers, as rational actors, choose to institutionalize power not because they 
desire it per se, although they might, but because it is the alternative most likely to 
accomplish their ends.  
 I identify these ends as concerned with the perception of leadership effectiveness 
and achievement. These are ends that are shared by both prime ministers and those they 
lead. In this way, prime ministerial leadership is the result of an implicit bargain, in which 
prime ministers are agents for a number of principals: the government broadly, the 
cabinet, the legislature, and the public. This relationship is evident in many of the prime 
ministerial roles identified in chapter two. Thus, prime ministerial leadership, and 
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political leadership generally, is a “solution to a series of problems that groups face in 
trying to pursue common objectives” (Shepsle and Bonchek 1997, 404). The delegation 
of power to prime ministers, however, is highly flexible, and thus prime ministers can act 
entrepreneurially in building institutional capacity towards effective leadership.          
 The Theory of Public Expectations, however, is most informed by historical 
institutionalism, although it does not set out to exemplify or test concepts such as path 
dependence or critical junctures. It is historical institutionalist in orientation in two 
senses. First, it views and assesses change in the prime ministerships as occurring over 
relatively long periods of time. This may seem trite, but it is by no means obvious. 
Neither rational choice nor sociological institutionalism invokes time explicitly as an 
important component of institutional behaviour or change. The time horizons in these 
perspectives – the “period of time over which meaningful change occurs” (Pierson 2004, 
80) – are typically shorter than the time horizons in historical institutionalist accounts. 
Historical institutionalism typically sees change as occurring over decades, even 
centuries, often gradually and “invisibly”, in Pierson’s terms (2003), and it pays heed to 
cumulative effects of explanatory factors.                 
 Second, the theory’s particular conceptualization of institutional change is 
adapted from the discussion in Streeck and Thelen (2005), a discussion which falls 
squarely in the historical institutionalist approach.39 These authors are concerned with 
explicating how incremental institutional change occurs. Their view is set against much 
                                                 
39 The fit is not exact, however. Streeck and Thelen often seem to be speaking more about groups of 
institutions and changes in relationships between them, rather than change within one institution. As well, 
most of their examples are about public policy and policy systems; they view things like ‘health care 
policy’ or ‘social security’ as institutions. This is not quite the understanding of institutions in this study, as 
I discuss subsequently. However, Streeck and Thelen’s labels for patterns of institutional change nicely 
capture the kinds of change that might be observed in prime ministerships. 
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of institutionalist theory, which they argue, “mostly locate significant change in 
convulsive historic ruptures or openings” (18). Given that concepts such as equilibria and 
path dependence necessarily imply stability in the absence of large external shocks to the 
system, explaining incremental yet potentially transformative change is actually a 
difficult task. Streeck and Thelen suggest that the gap between institutional rules and how 
those rules are actually enacted in the real world offer particular opportunities for 
incremental change (2005, 13). How does such change happen? They argue that: 
 [F]undamental change ensues when a multitude of actors switch from one  
 logic of action to another. This may happen in a variety of ways, and it  
 certainly can happen gradually and continuously. For example, given that  
 logics and institutional structures are not one-to-one related, enterprising actors 
 often have enough ‘play’ to test new behaviors inside old institutions, perhaps 
 in response to new and as yet incompletely understood external conditions,  
 and encourage other actors to behave correspondingly. (2005, 18) 
   
In their view, then, incremental institutional change involves a pattern of tension, conflict, 
or co-optation among competing institutional logics, which opens space for actors to 
rationalize and inculcate preferred alternatives. Streeck and Thelen identify four such 
patterns of institutional change over time: displacement, drift, layering, and conversion 
(2005, 18-30).40  
 Displacement is defined as the “slowly rising salience of subordinate relative to 
dominant institutions” (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 31). Within institutions, displacement 
occurs when a predominant logic of institutional behaviour is gradually replaced by an 
alternative, often “suppressed”, logic. Streeck and Thelen suggest that the major 
mechanism of displacement is defection: actors, intentionally or otherwise, slowly 
                                                 
40 The authors also identify a fifth type, exhaustion: the gradual collapse of an institution over time (Streeck 
and Thelen 2005, 29). Given that none of the prime ministerships or prime ministerial branches has 
collapsed and that it is characteristic not so much of institutional change as de-institutionalization leading to 
breakdown, it is omitted for our purposes.  
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abandon an existing set of norms and rules until the alternative set becomes the prevailing 
logic. 
 The second pattern, drift, occurs when institutions do not adapt in the face of 
contextual changes that should change the way that institutional rules are enacted. As 
Streeck and Thelen suggest, “there is nothing automatic about institutional stability” 
(2005, 24). Institutions that are not ‘actively maintained’, therefore, may ‘drift’ into 
atrophy. Notably, this often occurs intentionally, as actors who want particular institutions 
to decay engage in “deliberate neglect” (31). For example, Hacker and Pierson (2010) 
argue that the dramatic decline in the institutional power of unions in the United States, 
as evidenced by the steep fall in membership from 30 percent in 1960 to 12 percent in 
2005, is characterized by drift. Political actors, by a ‘nondecision’ to update industrial 
relations policy as the economy globalized and became more service-oriented, 
strengthened employers’ positions and weakened labour’s (189). Thus, while on the 
surface institutional rules were stable, the enactment of these rules and their effect in the 
real world changed significantly. Incremental yet transformational change can occur 
when institutions are allowed to drift, through inaction and neglect.           
 Layering, the third pattern of institutional change that Streeck and Thelen identify, 
involves the agglomeration or accrual of rules onto existing institutions. Whereas 
displacement suggests substitution of one institutional logic for another, layering suggests 
a slower process where many logics co-exist and new rules operate alongside ‘core’ 
institutional rules. The mechanism of layering, Streeck and Thelen suggest, is 
“differential growth” (2005, 23). As rules are layered onto institutions, some sets of rules 
will ‘grow’ more than other sets, possibly becoming entrenched and perhaps 
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predominant. An example of institutional layering is the reforms to federal arrangements 
in Australia and Canada in the 1990s and 2000s (Broschek 2015). In both cases, new 
institutional arrangements, such as the Council of Australian Governments in Australia 
and the Social Union Framework Agreement in Canada, were attached to existing 
intergovernmental and fiscal arrangements. These developments were narrow and not 
deeply structural, as opposed to the broader constitutional reform in the federal systems 
of Germany and Switzerland, which Broschek views as cases of institutional 
displacement (2015, 66).         
 Finally, institutional change can occur through conversion. Conversion occurs 
when institutional rules are “redirected to new goals, functions, or purposes” (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005, 26). In their reckoning, conversion is the most intentional of the patterns of 
institutional change. It occurs because existing institutional actors choose to redirect or 
reinterpret institutional rules or because new actors enter institutions and reorient them to 
new ends (26). While the entry of new actors or the process whereby existing actors 
decide to redirect institutions may be incremental, the conversion idea suggests a 
relatively rapid change when it does happen. Crucially, Streeck and Thelen argue that 
conversion can often come about because of the passage of time: institutions outlive and 
outgrow both the original institutional design and the sociocultural conditions in which 
they were designed (2005, 28). This ‘gap’ affords opportunities for existing or new actors 
to rationalize conversion of institutional rules to new realities.          
 I locate these four modes of institutional change – displacement, drift, layering, 
and conversion - within a typology of change, as shown in figure 3.1. The typology 
places each pattern of change on two dimensions: institutional continuity and extent of 
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institutionalization. Continuity refers to the trend of change over time. Is it relatively 
incremental or discontinuous and abrupt? Are there only relatively small changes from 
year to year or are there periods of rapid and fluctuating change? The second dimension 
refers to the actual outcome of change: over time, does the institution become more 
institutionalized? As I discuss below, in this study, institutionalization specifically refers 
to the autonomy and internal complexity of the prime ministerial branches. Higher levels 
of institutionalization mean more autonomy and more complexity.   
Figure 3.1  
Patterns of Institutional Change: A Typology  
 
Source: Adapted from Streeck and Thelen (2005, 19-30). Typology by Author. 
 The location of each pattern within the typology is specific to the case of 
institutional change in the prime ministerships, the focus of this study, although it is 
possibly generalizable. I locate drift and displacement towards the low institutionalization 
end, with drift exhibiting high continuity and displacement low continuity. Almost by 
definition, drift implies high continuity, and since it suggests an absence of new rules, 
tends towards low institutionalization. Displacement suggests a greater degree of 
institutional disruption than drift. The concept does not imply the direction of 
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institutional change, so it could involve greater or lesser institutionalization, though 
typically less than either layering or conversion. 
 These two patterns of institutional change, layering and conversion, are expected 
to be the primary patterns of change in this study of the Westminster prime ministerships. 
The Theory of Public Expectations argues that changing sociocultural conditions drive 
institutional change. This change can occur more incrementally (i.e., with more 
institutional continuity) through the slow layering of new logics in response to these 
external changes, or can occur through a deliberate choice to convert prime ministerial 
branches towards these new purposes. Since, as we will see, the theory suggests a more 
gradual, cumulative pattern of change, the theory expects that institutional layering will 
be more evident than institutional conversion, although both may be present. Institutional 
layering in the prime ministerships involves the attachment and expansion of new roles 
and functions over traditional prime ministerial roles and functions, through the 
incremental accrual of institutional capacity. Alternatively, or in addition, intentional 
conversion of prime ministerial branches to new ends is expected in some measure. This 
pattern of institutional change would be demonstrated by more abrupt, rapid expansions 
of institutional capacity in the prime ministerships.          
 In summary, the central theory of the study, the Theory of Public Expectations, is 
situated within the historical institutionalist perspective because it focuses on examining 
patterns of change through time. However, it also borrows insights from other variants of 
institutional theory, specifically, sociological and rational choice institutionalism. This 
lens on institutional change, as incremental transformation through time, is also reflected 
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in the way that “institutionalization” is conceptualized in the study. This concept was 
introduced in chapter one but here is elaborated more concretely.  
 To reiterate, institutionalization is a description of a process whereby a system, 
organization, procedure, or event gains value and importance in itself. It does this by 
“acquir[ing] a definite way of performing its functions” which distinguishes it from its 
immediate environment, the individuals which inhabit it, and passing circumstances 
(Hibbing 1988, 682).  Institutionalization thus defined is inherently ‘architectural’ in the 
sense that it posits an (often incremental) building of stable, enduring resource structures 
that enshrine and enable the operation of rules and norms. This represents a ‘thick’ notion 
of institutions, one associated more with historical institutionalism than other variants of 
institutional theory. Both rational choice and sociological variants of institutionalism are, 
to cite Thelen’s dichotomy, “norm-oriented” (1999, 380). This ‘thin’ notion of institutions 
is evident in simple definitions. Douglass North, a rational choice scholar, defines 
institutions as “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (1990, 3). 
George Tsebelis, another rational choice scholar, identifies them as “the formal rules of a 
political or social game” (1990, 94). March and Olsen (2006) view institutions even less 
tangibly, as “relatively enduring collection[s] of rules and organized practices, embedded 
in structures of meaning” (3).   
 These norm-oriented views contrast with “materialist-oriented” views associated 
with historical institutionalism.41 Institutionalization, at least as presented here, adopts 
this materialist perspective.  Institutions, specifically prime ministerial branches, are 
material structures that have more or less formal-legal bases of existence (Lecours 2005, 
                                                 
41 Lecours (2005) also adopts this association, but Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) explication of gradual 
institutional change is heavily dependent on the basic notion of institutions as rules, with rule change 
constituting institutional change. Thus, the picture becomes less clear. 
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6). They are ‘those things through which political power flows’: they contain norms and 
rules but are not exhausted by them. Institutions embed norms and rules within 
organizations. These organizations have an independent existence and are not constituted 
simply by their rules (Blondel 2006, 722).  
 This materialist conception of institutions is integral to my assumption that 
institutional development in the modern Westminster prime ministerships is qualitatively 
different than prior development, recounted in chapter two. This “pre-modern” 
development was primarily institutionalization of the foundational rules and conventions, 
and was thus more norm-oriented. The modern institutionalization of the prime 
ministership, by contrast, is an institutionalization of the concrete structures through 
which prime ministers exercise those rules and conventions. In this way, the study takes a 
more explicitly materialist view of institutions. It is in this materialist sense that the 
Westminster prime ministerships have arguably become ‘more’ institutionalized, despite 
the fact that it has been a distinct, important and valued part of the Westminster 
constitutional order for centuries. In particular, the study points to two aspects of the 
Westminster prime ministerships which have undergone change in this period. These are 
their autonomy and their internal complexity, characteristics of institutionalization that 
are consistently cited in the literature (see, e.g., Polsby 1968; Hibbing 1988; Squire 1992; 
Ragsdale and Theis 1997).          
 Autonomy is defined as the “extent to which political organizations and 
procedures exist independently of other social groupings and methods of behaviour” 
(Huntington 1965, 401). Applied to prime ministerships, autonomy is defined as the 
extent to which these institutions have independent and exclusive sources of information 
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and means of acting politically. A prime ministership that is highly dependent on other 
political actors for information, advice and decision-making legitimacy is less 
autonomous than one which is less dependent on such actors. A high level of dependence 
on other political actors means that prime ministers are more constrained in their ability 
to pursue their own interests. If prime ministers must act solely through other actors, they 
must accept the way in which others provide information and advice, which may not be 
conducive to the prime ministerial interest. Even if prime ministers have a clear sense of 
their own interests, they must negotiate and compromise with other actors who may have 
opposing interests.  
 Thus, one way through which prime ministers can enhance their autonomy over 
time is to bolster their institutional support in terms of both budgetary and staff resources. 
All else equal, larger budgets and more staff give prime ministers greater capacity to 
generate and pursue their own interests, independently of other actors. It reflects a greater 
ability to produce and control the flow of information through the decision-making 
process.42 And, to put it bluntly, greater budgetary and staff resources allows prime 
ministers to do more, to expand their scope of activity. So, in chapters five and six we 
link our theories of prime ministerial institutionalization to the budget and staff resources 
of the Westminster prime ministerships.            
 Our second component of institutionalization is the internal complexity of prime 
ministerships. Nelson Polsby defines complexity as organizational functions being 
separated within a division of labour in which there are regularized and specified roles 
                                                 
42 The ‘all else equal’ and ‘capacity’ are important here. A capacity for greater autonomy does not mean 
that all prime ministers will use this capacity, nor does it mean that there are no other forces constraining 
autonomy in some particular circumstance. I refute this notion too prevalent in the literature that citing 
counterexamples is good evidence that the institutionalization thesis is overblown. The world is a complex 
place.  
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(1968, 145). In the prime ministerial context, it refers to a shift from generalist and 
universalist support structures to specialized and differentiated structures within the 
prime ministership. The more internal parts that prime minister’s offices and civil service 
counterparts have, the more internally complex they are. As a simple example, the 
Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in 1967 had a single deputy 
secretary and three basic divisions: cabinet and external relations, economic, and 
education (Crisp 1967, 42).The current DPMC is much more expansive, with five deputy 
secretaries, two ‘heads of domestic policy’, two associate secretaries of national security 
and international policy, and a counter-terrorism coordinator.43 These senior officials 
oversee twenty-eight divisions, almost all subdivided themselves, and ranging widely 
from, for instance, the Office for Women to the Cyber Policy and Intelligence Division to 
the Indigenous Employment and Recognition division (DPMC 2015).44  
 Clearly, like the resources that strengthen the autonomy of prime ministerships, 
increasing internal complexity gives prime ministerships greater capacity to address 
specific policy, political, and administrative problems and oversee decision-making and 
policy implementation processes over a wider range of government activity in more 
comprehensive ways. Like increasing resources, increasing internal complexity is a way 
of expanding the personal capacities of the prime minister. Complexity is a reflection of 
prime ministerships ‘coming into their own’ as institutions valued in themselves. 
Institutional change with regard to the internal complexity of the Westminster prime 
ministerships is discussed in chapter seven.         
                                                 
43 As of June 17, 2015. 
44 http://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/pmc/Org_Chart_June_17_2015.pdf 
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3.2 The Theory of Public Expectations 
 The previous section described the theoretical approach of the study. In this 
section, I introduce and explicate an original argument, the Theory of Public 
Expectations. This theory is the study’s primary explanation for prime ministerial branch 
institutionalization. To summarize, the theory argues that institutionalization in prime 
ministerial branches is in part a consequence of the broader sociocultural context, 
particularly the emergence of an assertive political culture across democracies. In this 
view, the shift from allegiant to assertive citizenship orientations, as described above in 
chapter two, generates a political culture of heightened public expectations of leaders. It 
creates a climate of extreme and constant, but short-term, accountability for outcomes. 
These trends contribute to an environment in which it is increasingly difficult for prime 
ministers to be effective leaders and for other political actors to remain effective checks 
on prime ministerial power.  
 In order to respond to public expectations, prime ministers as rational actors 
choose to increase their institutional capacities for policy, and political coordination and 
direction. In other words, prime ministers choose power because it is in their interest to 
do so. This theory provides a logical and compelling explanation for the effects of 
changing democratic political cultures on the extent of prime ministerial branch 
institutionalization.45 The remainder of this section elaborates the theoretical antecedents 
and logic of this theory. 
                                                 
45 There are interesting parallels between this phenomenon and two other roughly concurrent trends: the 
“judicialization of politics” and the delegation of authority to non-majoritarian institutions such as central 
banks, supranational organizations, and independent, arms-length government agencies. In both of these 
cases there has been a weakening of traditional institutional roles, e.g., the legislature as the appropriate 
place where social conflict over rights and liberties is resolved, and a strengthening of the power of ‘non-
political’ institutions.        
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3.2.1 Theoretical Antecedents 
 The Theory of Public Expectations is an original explanation for institutional 
change in prime ministerships. However, it is grounded in important theoretical ideas 
from the canon of political science and sociology. In particular, its characterization of 
citizens, leaders, and the linkages between them are informed by the work of Gabriel 
Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) and Theodore Lowi (1985a, 1985b). The theory is also 
informed by the perspective of scholars such as Joseph Schumpeter and Max Weber. 
Almond and Verba’s (1963) landmark study of political culture, The Civic Culture, argues 
that increasing democratic participation and active citizenship is not an unalloyed good. 
While it undoubtedly has benefits, it surely also has unintended and possibly negative 
consequences. Their conception of the role of citizens and elites in a well-functioning 
civic culture, i.e., a stable, well-governed, democratic culture, is especially striking 
because it is rather ‘undemocratic’ in modern political discourse. Almond and Verba write 
that: 
  If elites are to be powerful and make authoritative decisions, then  
  the involvement, activity, and influence of the ordinary man must be  
  limited. The ordinary citizen must turn power over to elites and let  
  them rule. The need for elite power requires that the ordinary citizen  
  be relatively passive, uninvolved, and deferential to elites… The  
  comparative infrequency of political participation, its relative lack of  
  importance for the individual, and the objective weakness of the  
  ordinary man allow governmental elites to act… [decision makers] are  
  free to act as [they] think best because the ordinary citizen is not  
  pounding on his door with demands for action. 
        (1963, 343, 346, 352) 
 Thus, Almond and Verba associate effective government action with the relative 
freedom of political elites from the assertion of citizens into the decision-making process. 
More concretely, Theodore Lowi’s concept of the “plebiscitary presidency” in the United 
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States suggests that some of the problems which Almond and Verba feared from the rise 
of assertive citizens had come to pass (1985a; 1985b). Lowi diagnosed an “expectations 
gap”: a perpetual distance between the heightened expectations of the public for 
presidential action and the means through which presidents could meet these 
expectations. As the size and scope of governmental activity grew and new media 
technologies (television, primarily) amplified the direct relationship between president 
and public, presidents became increasingly “personally responsible and accountable for 
the performance of the government” (1985a, 99).  
 The incentives for presidents to try to control events and, equally importantly, the 
public perception of events, generated increasingly larger policy advice and 
implementation structures within the Executive Office of the President, accompanied by 
the expansion of communications, media, and strategic operations. This has had serious 
implications. For example, Lowi argues that these ‘pathologies’ of presidential 
government, more than personal hubris or moral failing, are responsible for the ‘imperial’ 
presidency and its most troubling manifestation, Watergate (1985b, 187-190).       
 Lowi also detected another change in the public’s expectations of the presidency 
and the role of citizens themselves. This change is the shift to a form of ‘consumer 
democracy’ in which individuals increasingly see themselves as market-like consumers of 
government service rather than citizens and where evaluation of presidential performance 
is not made in terms of representation, process, or effort, but results (1985a, 95). The 
operative question for consumers is “what have you done for me lately?” In this view, the 
individual as consumer is a maximizer of their individual preferences with a direct, 
transactional relationship with government, while the citizen is a contributor to a process 
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of collective deliberation and decision-making with a sense of civic duty and 
responsibility to government and other citizens. Arguably, consumer democracy is an 
inevitable outcome of the assertive citizen: the rise of post-materialist individualism, 
demands for empowerment, and cynicism about politics and institutions. Notions of civic 
duty and deference to existing structures of authority are gradually eroded by rights-
claiming and de-legitimization of entrenched institutional arrangements. As such, 
consumer democracy is an expression of democratic progress, but one which may have 
unintended consequences. Lowi’s arguments, although made within the American 
context, are reflective of broader changes in political cultures across democracies. His 
view of the “plebiscitary” nature of the presidency reflects the post-materialism and 
assertive citizenship discussed earlier, in chapter two. To the extent that prime ministers 
have become increasingly presidentialized, along many dimensions, his diagnosis is 
trenchant.         
3.2.2 The Logic of the Theory 
 These theoretical antecedents highlight the basic puzzle at the heart of the Theory 
of Public Expectations. Almond and Verba’s conception of the role of citizens and leaders 
expresses a political culture in which citizens were passive and deferential and leaders 
were ‘left alone to lead’. Lowi’s arguments suggest that a presidency enveloped in public 
accountability and blame, in which individuals are ‘consumers’ rather than ‘citizens’ in 
some ideal sense, is one which aggrandizes itself. As Kane et al. argue, the “desire of 
executives with a heavy burden of responsibilities would seem quite naturally to lean 
towards gathering more securely into their own hands the reins of effectual power” 
(2009, 309). In our cases, the greater expectations there are for prime ministers to act and 
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the stronger the corresponding accountability for success and failure, the more that prime 
ministers will seek to layer more effective institutional logics onto existing logics or 
redirect institutional rules towards meeting these expectations.      
 The Theory of Public Expectations, therefore, reconciles the consequences of 
assertive citizenship with the apparent concentration of power in centres of government. 
Assertive citizenship, as we saw in chapter two, is supposed to empower citizens and 
disperse power away from elites and institutional structures. That is, if it has an effect on 
political institutions, it should be the opposite of what is suggested in much of the prime 
ministerial literature. My basic theoretical insight is that this tension is not anomalous but 
is, in fact, a significant cause of institutionalization in the prime ministerial branches. 
This section explicates the logic of this theory. It begins with a description of the basic 
theoretical ‘building blocks’: citizens and leaders. 
 Citizens. As we have seen, the nature of citizens in the Theory of Public 
Expectations can be traced to antecedents such as Almond and Verba (1963) and Lowi 
(1985a, 1985b), and to the work on allegiant and assertive values discussed in chapter 
two. This work is cross-cultural. While citizens of different countries obviously differ in 
many ways, the basic, generic nature of citizens in the theory is the same across national 
contexts. ‘Citizens’ are conceived here as individuals who inhabit a state under a 
particular institutional regime, with particular rights to be represented in politics, and 
corresponding duties. These are the inhabitants of the state to which political leaders are 
most responsive. These individuals have two salient characteristics. First, they have 
distinct attitudes about their roles in political life and the institutional arrangements 
through which they are governed, and they act accordingly. This is to say that in a broad 
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sense they are political, not uninterested. These political values and attitudes shape 
citizens’ expectations about what government ought to do and how they ought to act 
politically. Second, citizens are non-ideological in a specific sense. Although ideology 
certainly will inform attitudes about political life and institutions, the theory does not 
parse these ideological divisions. It does not assume anything about the ideological 
distribution of citizens, and it treats individuals as the same if they have the same values 
and attitudes about institutions. In the theory, therefore, citizens are simply bearers of 
certain political values and attitudes, without regard to other identities or distinctions.         
 The second aspect of the citizens’ theoretical role is that their effect on politics is 
aggregate and exogenous. The political attitudes and behaviour of individual citizens 
impacts institutional change only in terms of these attitudes and behaviour being 
‘summed’ or ‘averaged’ to create a prevailing political-cultural context. It is the context 
created through citizen attitudes, not the attitudes themselves, that shape institutional 
behaviour. This is important because it also means that the theory is non-pluralistic and 
suggests a uniform influence of citizens. In other words, citizens in the theory are not 
divided into political groups that contest for influence; they are individuals, each of 
whom contributes equally to the level of assertiveness in the political culture. It also 
means that the institutional behaviour generated by the context may be quite different to 
that suggested by the individual attitudes themselves.    
 Moreover, citizens are exogenous to institutional change in the prime 
ministerships, in the sense that their ‘contribution’ to the overall assertiveness of a 
political culture, via their attitudes and behaviour, is not itself affected by institutional 
change. To put it simply: individual citizens have certain assertive values and attitudes, 
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which when aggregated form a certain political-cultural context, which in turn stimulates 
institutional change. There is no ‘feedback’ from institutional change to attitudinal 
change; the latter is independent. This is a simplifying assumption for the purposes of 
theory-building and analysis, and is certainly artificial. However, as we saw in chapter 
two, the assertive citizenship transformation is supposed to have been driven by macro-
level changes in cultural values, borne of large-scale material well-being and socialized at 
an early age. In the jargon, it is largely a ‘generational’ rather than a ‘period’ 
phenomenon. Thus, to assume that it would be largely independent of small-scale 
institutional change, especially gradual change, is plausible.                 
 Leaders and Democratic Responsiveness. Political leaders and their 
responsiveness to democratic pressures are the second building block of the Theory of 
Public Expectations. Citizens produce aggregate demands and expectations on leaders in 
modern politics through their increasingly assertive orientations. But how are these 
expectations communicated to prime ministers and leaders generally? The theory 
assumes the robustness of standard democratic mechanisms that transmit signals from the 
public to leaders, such as the media, public and party officials, opposition parties, cabinet 
ministers, and not least, their own political and bureaucratic advisory system.  
It also assumes that political leaders in democracies are inherently responsive to 
the demands of citizens, albeit unevenly and selectively in practice. It conceives of 
democratic political leadership as a process through which individuals and groups in 
politically authoritative roles make decisions under conditions of dispersed power, public 
scrutiny and accountability, and normative constraint. James MacGregor Burns’ seminal 
conceptualization of leadership argued that leaders are “inseparable from followers’ 
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needs and goals” (1978, 18-19). Thus, leaders by definition need to be responsive to 
something outside of themselves, through which they receive their status. In this theory, 
leaders are responsive to citizens, in the aggregate, and to the political-cultural context 
that is created by citizen values and attitudes. The theory assumes this basic level of 
democratic responsiveness. Leaders’ actions are in some part driven by a desire to 
respond to public interests, at least as they perceive them.  
Filip Teles (2015) identifies several aspects of political leadership in democracies 
that reflect this fundamental connection between leaders and the demands and 
expectations set upon by them by followers. First, unlike in other areas of leadership, 
followers are ‘non-ascribed’: they are not in a hierarchical or contractual relation with 
leaders. Thus, their demands and expectations do not come in the form of specified 
mutual obligations that leaders can unambiguously satisfy. Instead, leaders must 
continually demonstrate that they are acting to satisfy expectations. Second, democratic 
leaders are “follower dependent”. This is most evident, Teles argues, in the paradigms of 
political accountability and transparency prevalent in modern politic (30).  
Third, leaders in democracies must deal with the problem of “limited acceptance” 
of their leadership. This is to say that leaders’ decisions are not automatically accepted by 
all followers all the time, and opposition is freely expressed. This means that effective 
democratic leaders must be attuned to the climate of public expectations and make 
decisions, in general, that are responsive to important public concerns. It also means that 
leaders must direct significant time and resources to cultivating public acceptance of 
decisions. These three aspects of democratic political leadership create strong and 
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constant ties between leaders and followers, and in particular, between prime ministers 
and the public.  
Of course, democratic leaders have significant discretion to decide how they 
receive public pressure, who they listen to, and how to respond. They also play a 
significant part themselves in shaping and managing the demands on leaders. But the 
fundamental nature of democratic political leadership provides reasonable grounds to 
assume that prime ministers are receptive and responsive to public demands and 
expectations. At the prime ministerial level, this basic component of leadership is 
heightened because prime ministers are heads of government, not simply leaders of 
parties or smaller social groups: prime ministers are the only de facto national political 
leaders. As suggested earlier, one way to think about this responsiveness is in terms of 
leaders, particularly prime ministers, being a kind of ‘agent’, delegated by various 
‘principals’ with power on their behalf. Indeed, this structure of delegation is a basic 
characteristic of parliamentary systems (Strøm 2000; Strøm et al. 2006). 
Thus, the theory purposefully leaves unspecified the exact causal mechanism that 
conveys public expectations to leaders because the theory deliberately invokes the notion 
of a contextual or environmental ‘background’ effect rather than a direct, explicit effect. 
That is, the shift to assertive citizenship gradually builds an environment in which 
leadership takes place. The boundaries and contours of this environment shape prime 
ministerial leadership in ways that are indirect, often intangible, and diffuse. A descriptive 
analogy might be to the effects of climate change on natural disasters. For any particular 
natural disaster, it is difficult to draw a direct causal link between it and the incremental, 
long-term warming of global temperature levels. Taking all the instances of natural 
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disasters, one could conclude, erroneously, that there is no relationship between the 
occurrence of natural disaster and long-term climate change. Yet certainly there is a 
linkage between long-term climate change and natural disasters that originate in new 
weather patterns and deeper instabilities.     
The theory also rejects the simple notion that assertive citizens communicate 
expectations to leaders clearly and unambiguously. Here, the mechanism is indirect and 
implied by the variegated and sometimes contradictory ways in which citizens act 
politically in ordinary life. They make demands of leaders by consuming the products of 
an aggressive media environment, by generating and receiving political complaints and 
criticisms on social media, by expressing views that leaders are not ‘getting the job done’, 
by demanding “responsive competence” from leaders (Hargrove 2009, 15), and so on. 
They are not submitting explicit statements of preference to leaders, and leaders generally 
do not solicit such statements. In other words, the public is not communicating 
“instructions” to prime ministers to institutionalize their offices, so the causal mechanism 
between change in public values and attitudes and institutionalization is not direct. The 
Theory of Public Expectations should, instead, be thought of as stating that aggregate 
increases in assertive citizenship cause change to the background conditions under which 
changes in institutional resources and structure are considered by leaders.      
 The Theory of Public Expectations builds on these concepts. Its logic is captured 
in three premises. The first premise is the dispersion premise. The theory begins with the 
shift from allegiant to assertive citizenship orientations, as discussed in chapter two. This 
shift both increases the pressure on, and expectations of, leaders. It also generates an 
expectation of dispersion of power because it undermines elite support and legitimacy. 
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This expectation, however, is in tension with the prevailing institutions of representative 
democracy. These institutions channel power to representative elites as a means of 
enabling collective action. There are simply no existing mechanisms through which a 
large, amorphous, and heterogeneous public can directly govern themselves, but through 
such institutions.  Thus, the expectation of dispersion of power leads to a situation where 
power has to flow to some actor who might best manifest these expectations. The 
supposition is that power will concentrate to where there is the most legitimacy within the 
assertive citizenship context. The theory argues that, for a broad scope of political 
activity, this is the prime minister and the centre of government.  
 Finally, from the point of view of leaders and their desires, the theory argues that 
prime ministers are rational actors whose incentive structure is shaped by public 
expectations and their unique claim to legitimacy. Therefore, prime ministers choose to 
further institutionalize their office because doing so is instrumental to satisfying those 
expectations. The theory thus rests on three premises: the dispersion premise, the 
delegation premise, and the rational behaviour premise. These are now elaborated in turn. 
 From the perspective of the Theory of Public Expectations, the gradual 
transformation of democratic political culture from allegiant to assertive citizenship 
implies that citizens will have increasingly large expectations both that power will be 
dispersed more broadly and that leaders will be held accountable for outcomes. The older 
paradigm of allegiant citizenship was one in which citizens’ political activity was mostly 
confined to simple, mostly passive democratic norms. They saw voting as both a duty and 
an effective way of providing input into the system. Allegiant citizens trusted that their 
representatives were working in their interest and that the outputs of the system would in 
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general be to the benefit of the public. They implicitly recognized that many political 
problems were complex, and the outcomes of compromises borne out of collective 
decision-making. They did not expect government to solve all of society’s problems, and 
did not criticize it constantly for not doing so. In short, allegiant citizens were acquiescent 
to existing political structures and norms, not ignorant of their limits but confident that 
political systems were capable of reform and of addressing problems. They therefore 
allowed leaders the latitude to act as they thought best.      
 The gradual shift to assertive citizenship orientations erodes the old allegiant 
norms. Assertive citizenship creates a political culture of individual empowerment and 
expression, and the desire for more mechanisms of engagement and consultation. It 
rejects the allegiant paradigm of deference to authority and trust in mechanisms of elite 
deliberation. An assertive political culture is one in which voting in itself is neither a duty 
nor even necessarily a democratic good, since it expresses confidence and satisfaction in 
distrusted political institutions. Attitudinally, assertive citizens are cynical and 
disillusioned about government. This is reflected in media consumption, which feeds the 
sense that government can do no right and that leaders are corrupt, self-serving, and 
incompetent. At the same time, they expect government to be immediately and directly 
responsive to individual concerns. In sum, assertive citizenship creates a political-cultural 
climate in which elites should not be trusted with political power. If elites should not be 
trusted, the power to make collective decisions must therefore be dispersed more broadly 
throughout society, away from representative institutions and towards individuals. This 
expectation of dispersed power shapes the norms and practice of politics. It is a diffuse, 
gradual pattern of political-cultural change over time.  
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 The theory thus sees expectations of a dispersion of power as a significant 
consequence of the shift to assertive citizenship in democratic political cultures. What 
happens to these expectations? The first premise of the theory, the dispersion premise, 
states that these expectations are not satisfiable in any modern, large-scale polity, at least 
not without fundamental transformations in the way government works. It is in tension 
with the foundations of representative democratic institutions that have developed over 
centuries, and have been rather successful. These institutions have been relatively 
effective solutions to problems of collective action and ensuring popular control over 
leaders.   
 Institutions arise when individuals recognize that their interests are often better 
pursued through rules regulating social relations and that delegating some of their power 
to such institutions is individually and collectively preferable. Society creates and 
entrenches further rules when it discovers ways within the social order in which 
seemingly reasonable individual actions have adverse consequences. Representative 
democracy is a product of this process: a democracy where citizens vote for 
representatives who are then empowered, through institutions, to govern on their behalf.46 
The expectation of dispersion of power away from these institutions threatens to 
undermine these arrangements. In mature democracies, political institutions have been 
structured which both legitimize rule by elected representatives and create institutional 
checks on power.  
 Assertive citizenship creates tendencies towards dispersion in many ways. It has 
changed the way that citizens and leaders relate to each other. For instance, politics has 
                                                 
46 This is not to imply any kind of teleological argument that representative democracy is an end stage in 
human evolution, though we are open to such a claim. 
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become more individualized, rather than group-oriented. It has increasingly oriented 
towards individual demands and servicing citizens as consumers, Group representation, 
mediated through parties and legislatures, is replaced by direct relationships between 
individuals and elites, in which the role of individuals in holding government accountable 
is inflated. Politics becomes less about an ordered process of representation and 
accommodation, and more about short-term public responsiveness.  
 Political institutions suffer in the context of such dispersion, generated by 
assertive political cultures. The attitudinal changes that mark assertive citizenship – the 
decline of deference and trust in institutions, cynicism about politics - erode the standing 
of institutions. Assertive citizens are less likely to accept that their political voice is 
limited to electing representatives who govern on their behalf, and have less patience for 
elite-driven processes. One consequence of this dynamic is that some institutions and 
processes which had served as reliable checks on executive power can no longer do so. 
There are many striking illustrations of how trying to disperse power has unintended, 
arguably negative consequences. 
 For instance, when parliamentary caucuses choose party leaders, as they still do in 
Australia and New Zealand, the leader’s primary responsibility is to caucus, and therefore 
they are more likely to consider its preferences. When chosen by members at large, they 
are less likely to do so because, not having been chosen by the caucus, they are not 
responsible to it. The leader’s mandate to lead comes from members, not the caucus. 
However, party members cannot plausibly hold leaders accountable in the same way that 
caucus can because they are a large, disorganized group who have only intermittent 
engagement in politics. Thus, the dispersion of power to party members in party 
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leadership selection in Canada and the United Kingdom has had the effect of enhancing 
the power of the leader relative to her caucus and cabinet.  
  Expectations of the dispersion of power, generated by assertive political cultures, 
cannot really create plausible alternative institutional arrangements. This would not be a 
problem if representative institutions served no purpose: if dispersion of power somehow 
solved social problems more effectively. But the big questions that representative 
institutions answer – how do we collectively govern ourselves? How do we constrain 
those who govern? – do not find an answer in the large-scale dispersion of power. Stable, 
effective governance – “energy in the executive”, to use Hamilton’s phrase – is much 
more likely when there is a coherent, institutionalized locus of power. This reflects the 
“iron law of oligarchy”, Robert Michels’ (1915) key insight that where organization is 
possible, a group’s desire for effectiveness will impose hierarchy and institutionalization 
to some extent and power will be delegated up the hierarchy.47  
 The first premise of the Theory of Public Expectations, the dispersion premise, 
posits that ultimately assertive citizenship does not succeed in dispersing power away 
from elites and institutions, towards individuals. It is not conducive to effective 
governance because, absent the representative institutions that are so distrusted, there are 
no institutional mechanisms allowing citizens to govern directly. In addition, the public is 
not a unitary, singularly identifiable actor, and thus cannot hold themselves accountable 
in any real way. The public does not vote on itself. The raison d’etre of representative 
institutions and elite-driven processes is to provide arenas for negotiation and 
compromise among interests, and to balance the need for popular input with the need for 
                                                 
47 Michels’ argument was formulated to explain why even socialist parties seemed to be as dominated by 
their leaders as traditional parties, when they were founded upon more ‘democratic’ bases.  
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effective, orderly governance. In summary, the dispersion of power implied by the rise of 
assertive citizenship cannot succeed in fulfilling expectations and erodes the ability of 
institutions to constrain prime ministerial power.      
 The second premise of the Theory of Public Expectations is the delegation 
premise. Taking the argument forward, this premise answers the question: what happens 
after it becomes clear that dispersion of power is untenable, and power must be delegated 
to some part of the system that has the legitimacy and ability to govern effectively? It 
argues that delegation is the source of power, and that prime ministers are uniquely 
placed to be delegated power and authority in the context of assertive citizenship. Thus, 
when power ‘re-concentrates’, it does so towards the centre of government and especially 
its head, the prime minister.   
 The power of modern representative institutions ultimately is derived from the 
delegation of control over outcomes from citizens to these institutions. This delegation 
can be formal, as in constitutional delegation of functions to governmental branches, or 
informal, for example, claims to mandates or public demands for action. The overall 
shape of institutional power is a mixture of formal and informal delegation. This mixture 
can change through time because of changes in context, external shocks, and intentional 
choices made. Formal changes, however, occur rarely, and in the context of the 
Westminster prime ministerships, have been essentially absent. The action lies in changes 
to informal delegation. Historically, it has been largely through changes in practice, often 
codified in conventions, which have shifted the relative statuses of various institutions: 
prime ministers, cabinets, parliaments, and the like. In the theory, the changes in informal 
delegation are related to the extent to which political actors can best claim to fulfill the 
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expectations of assertive citizens. Different actors have different capacities to make 
compelling or authoritative claims. The theory argues that the prime minister is uniquely 
situated and has the most capacity to make such claims.  
 It is at the ‘prime ministerial level’, to use Prime Minister Blair’s term, at which 
the whole of government comes into focus. As elaborated in chapter two, the roles of the 
prime minister in Westminster systems make it such that public expectations of 
government are most squarely heaped on the person at the head of government. Prime 
ministers are leaders of their parties, heads of government, chief legislators and 
administrators, primary communicators of government direction and policy, and 
representatives of their states in international forums. All of these roles combine to imbue 
them with symbolic and real standing to claim that they are delegated power, a claim 
which is simply unmatchable by other institutions. While representative institutions such 
as parliaments and political parties are widely distrusted and seen as unable to act 
effectively to address modern political realities, prime ministers, as singular actors with 
executive authority, are better positioned to project leadership and direction to the public. 
 Moreover, the power of the prime minister is much more directly related to 
popular support than its rivals.48 As we have discussed, individuals tend to see politics in 
personalistic terms. Ideological contests become conflicts between leaders. Elections 
become contests between rival personalities. Leaders are indispensable to popular 
conceptions of politics. It is no surprise, then, that as politics becomes more democratic, 
                                                 
48 Just to clarify, by popular support we do not really mean the term as expressed in polls or even elections, 
but the underlying expectation that the prime minister is responsible for the activities of government, not 
other actors. A particular prime minister might have quite low short-term popularity compared to 
opposition leaders or even other ministers, but this does not necessarily mean that they reject prime 
ministerial power but that the public would prefer those persons to be prime minister rather than the 
incumbent. In other words, they reject the person, not the institution.   
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as the ‘arena’ for political discourse expands to include more and more of society, the 
greater the potential for the aggrandizement of leaders claiming the mandate of the 
people, to the diminishment of more impersonal collective institutions, such as parties 
and legislatures. People readily identify with and respond to leaders. It takes considerable 
effort and wisdom to inculcate similar associations with the abstraction of the House of 
Commons or the Liberal party.49 James Bryce argued essentially this when he noted that 
“the larger a community becomes the less does it seem to respect an assembly, the more 
is it attracted by an individual man... he might be a tyrant, not against the masses, but 
with the masses” (Lowi 1985a, 97). As political communities grow, both literally and 
figuratively, as in the democratizing implied in the rise of assertive citizenship, singular 
political leaders, such as prime ministers, are more likely to be entrusted with power than 
other institutions. In summary, then, the delegation premise posits that prime ministers 
are uniquely positioned to be delegated power when the expectations of the dispersion of 
power are not met. 
 The final premise of the Theory of Public Expectations is the rational behaviour 
premise. The premise simply connects the argument thus far to actual decisions by prime 
ministers to further institutionalize their offices. Thus far, the theory has stated that the 
rise of assertive citizenship generates an expectation of dispersion of power, and in many 
ways ‘pulls the legs out’ from under existing institutional arrangements. This situation is 
not conducive to effective governance, however, and so some alteration of institutions is 
required to redress the situation. Power needs to be delegated to an institution that has the 
                                                 
49 Again, we stress that we are speaking institutionally; individuals may well have strong feelings about the 
House or the Liberal party which are likely generated by feelings about particular leaders. And as 
mentioned in chapter two, the decline of a cleavage-based politics in which parties were clearly associated 
with particular economic interests only adds to the decline of party as a meaningful referent outside of its 
leader.   
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ability and standing to meet the significant expectations of assertive citizens. I have 
argued that prime ministerships are uniquely positioned to do so. But prime ministers 
must be willing to accept the burdens of such great expectations. The rational behaviour 
premise simply suggests that prime ministers are rational actors who choose to further 
institutionalize their offices because of the incentives and opportunities generated by the 
assertive citizenship context. In other words, prime ministers ‘choose power’ because it is 
the rational course of action. 
 If this is the case, prime ministers must also bear the burden of succeeding (or 
appearing to succeed) in the eyes of an increasingly individualistic, cynical and 
disillusioned public. More than a personal “temptation to centralize the political 
executive”, as Hargrove suggests, it is an imperative if prime ministers are to fulfill their 
responsibilities and expectations (2009, 33). Importantly, if prime ministers are uniquely 
burdened with fulfilling public expectations, they must have adequate resources at their 
disposal. Prime ministers need to be able to depend on resources which do not have to be  
negotiated with other actors with different interests, such as cabinets or parties. That they 
must succeed suggests that they need the policy advice, support, and resources at their 
disposal to generate and implement their agenda. That they must appear to succeed 
suggests that they need a robust communications strategy and staff. These are substantial 
incentives to institutionalize; there are few incentives not to do so.  
 This premise suggests that an important behavioural motivation for any political 
actor is to acquire power over other actors and over the political process commensurate 
with (their perceptions of) their roles, responsibilities, and expectations. Prime ministers 
will be motivated to gain power equal to the task of leadership in the extremely difficult 
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context of modern politics and assertive citizenship. As rational actors, they should not be 
indifferent to these pressures. I consider the institutionalization of prime ministerial 
branches to be a rational response to a more assertive political culture in which it is 
increasingly difficult to lead successfully. In theoretical terms, the Theory of Public 
Expectations explains a macro-level outcome, prime ministerial branch 
institutionalization in Westminster systems, through a micro-level process, the rational 
individual decision-making on the part of prime ministers.  
 The basic argument of the rational actor premise is that chief executives can be 
modeled as rational actors who choose power, in the form of building the institutional 
capacities of their offices, not for its own sake but as an instrumentality for maximizing 
their effectiveness as leaders in increasingly challenging leadership environments. The 
theory assumes that prime ministers want to be effective leaders. Prime ministers will 
prefer to be more effective, or perceived as more effective, than less effective. They thus 
seek power not for its own sake but because of its centrality to effective performance. 
Inadequate power implies ineffectiveness, and ineffectiveness in turn tends to create 
conditions for diminutions of power. Assertive citizenship undermines the legitimacy of 
political institutions and generates heightened expectations for what government can do. 
Prime ministers are best placed, as discussed earlier, to claim the public mandate. Prime 
ministers are thus most responsible and accountable for fulfilling the heightened 
expectations of assertive citizens. They therefore choose to institutionalize, in terms of 
building the capacities of their offices, as a means to being effective at fulfilling these 
expectations.  
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 To recap, the study’s primary explanation for prime ministerial branch 
institutionalization is the Theory of Public Expectations. The theory’s logic is 
summarized in table 3.1, below. The broad theoretical argument is that one of the 
consequences of the shift from allegiant to assertive public values and attitudes is the 
further institutional growth of prime ministerships in Westminster systems, and thus 
centralization of power. 
Table 3.1  
Summary of the Theory of Public Expectations 
 
The rise of assertive citizenship creates an expectation of dispersion of power.  
Dispersion Premise. This expectation cannot be sufficiently met because dispersed power 
tends to be ineffective in satisfying both individual and collective preferences. It will 
concentrate in some more effective set of institutional rules.  
Delegation Premise. Where it will concentrate depends on formal and informal structures 
of delegation of power. In relation to other political actors, particularly cabinet, party, 
parliament, and the civil service, prime ministers have a stronger claim to have been 
delegated power from citizens. 
Rational Actor Premise. In addition to a stronger claim on delegated power, the incentive 
structure of prime ministers is such that institutionalization should generally be preferred. 
The effectiveness of prime ministerial leadership is strengthened through 
institutionalization.  
Therefore, if prime ministers are rational actors who gain utility from leadership 
effectiveness, they should choose institutionalization, all else equal. 
 
 A central and key assumption  of the theory is that the literature has correctly 
observed that both assertive citizenship and institutional centralization have risen in 
modern politics. The goal of theory is to connect the two phenomena through a set of 
theoretical premises. First, the dispersion of power outwards into society, implied by the 
assertive paradigm, does not and cannot produce stable configurations of power. Instead, 
power will ‘re-concentrate’ within institutions in some way. This was discussed at some 
length because it is the most counterintuitive suggestion, thus perhaps the hardest to 
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accept. The form that ‘re-concentration’ takes is a function of the delegation of power that 
institutions can claim. Second, the theory posits that prime ministers ‘receive’ a 
disproportionate amount of informally delegated power because of the unique roles that 
they play in the system and their status as ‘personified’ institutions. Finally, the theory 
claims that prime ministers will behave rationally to seek power equal to the expectations 
that an assertive, critical political culture places upon them. Therefore, modern prime 
ministers should seek to institutionalize. 
3.2.3 Empirical Expectations 
 The theory just set out is tested empirically in part II of this study. Each chapter in 
part II states the hypotheses specific to that chapter’s institutional outcome of interest 
(budget appropriations in chapter five, staff resources in chapter six, and organizational 
structure in chapters seven and eight). In this section, I describe generally the empirical 
expectations for the above theory that inform the chapter-specific hypotheses.  
 The Theory of Public Expectations is an effort to connect two disparate 
phenomena: change in political-cultural values and attitudes and institutionalization of 
prime ministerial branches in parliamentary democracies. As discussed, the former 
consists of gradual change over time in the assertiveness of a political culture. This 
assertiveness is cumulative and aggregative over the values and attitudes of citizens. It is 
contextual and thus does not have a direct effect on prime ministerial institutionalization. 
The Theory of Public Expectations elaborates the indirect impact of this change over 
time. As stated earlier, this indirect impact is connected to institutionalization outcomes 
through the rational decisions of prime ministers to augment institutional capacity. 
Because the rise of assertive citizenship is gradual over time, I expect that prime 
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ministerial institutionalization is characterized more by a ‘layering’ process than by a 
‘conversion’ process, although both will likely be evident. In response to the public 
expectations in assertive political cultures, prime ministers will incrementally add and 
strengthen institutional rules and capacities to their core functions. Over time, then, 
institutionalization will rise incrementally and consistently. At times, however, perhaps 
after periods of stagnation, institutionalization will occur more abruptly, indicative of 
institutional conversion.   
 Thus, the basic empirical expectation of this study is that measures of the 
aggregate assertiveness of publics over time will correspond with measures of prime 
ministerial branch institutionalization over time. As discussed earlier in the chapter, the 
latter involves measures of institutional autonomy and internal complexity. The empirical 
strategy is simple in concept if not execution: measure the assertiveness in the political 
culture and how it has changed over recent decades, measure institutionalization similarly 
over time, and assess the relationship between the two. Assertiveness is the independent 
variable, institutionalization the dependent variable. The broad empirical expectation 
arising from the Theory of Public Expectations is thus that: 
 As political cultures gradually become more assertive, prime ministerial branches 
 become incrementally more institutionalized: they become more autonomous and 
 more internally complex.  
This hypothesized relationship is made more specific in many different ways in the 
empirical testing of part II of this study. I look at three measures of assertiveness – 
political interest, strength of party identification, and an overall assertive index that I 
construct – and relate these measures to three measures of prime ministerial 
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institutionalization. These are budgetary and staff resources, which reflect prime 
ministerial autonomy, and changes in organizational structure, which reflect increasing 
institutional complexity.       
3.2.4 Theoretical Implications 
 In the previous two sections, I explicated the Theory of Public Expectations in 
detail. Because it is an original, complex and counterintuitive explanation for prime 
ministerial branch institutionalization, a few remarks on its broader implications are in 
order. First, to reiterate, the theory specifies a contextual, aggregate effect, not a direct 
causal one. It claims that value and attitudinal changes at the level of individuals create a 
political culture that induces both the withdrawal of power from political institutions and 
elites in general and redistributes that power to prime ministers in particular. The 
political-cultural context generates this hypothesized relationship, not any particular 
individual or group of individuals. This is simply central to the theoretical contribution, 
since it implies an unintended and counterintuitive result: that individual values and 
attitudes pushing in the direction of ‘more’ democracy and dispersion of power actually 
result in greater centralization of power in prime ministers, a result which would 
undoubtedly be anathema to many if not most of those individuals.  
 Second, the argument is also counterintuitive in its rejection of the positive 
normative implications of assertive citizenship theorists. As explicated in chapter two, 
these theorists are optimistic about the changes that assertive citizenship represents. For 
them, assertive citizenship is an ‘emancipative’ development that empowers people and 
enables them to flourish. To their credit, Dalton and Welzel also recognize that assertive 
political culture introduces new challenges, demands, and conflicts into politics (2014, 
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306). These difficulties are not spelled out. They insist that political institutions need to 
be transformed to conform to new norms. The Theory of Public Expectations suggests 
that assertive citizenship may have already transformed institutions in unanticipated and, 
for many deleterious, directions. Thus, my theory represents a profound challenge to the 
optimism of these scholars.   
 Third, since the theory identifies a relationship between a cultural context and a 
specific, ongoing institutional change, it is reasonable to expect the effect to be both 
cumulative and lagged. It builds up over time and precedes the actual institutional 
change. Political cultures are big: they generally build and change over long periods of 
time. Ideas gain and lose support, and norms gradually accrue legitimacy and stability. 
Specific institutional and policy responses to changing contexts often lag behind social 
change because it takes time for such change to acquire standing as something that 
necessitates a response. After institutional or policy change occurs as a response, it may 
become an entrenched part of the status quo, and thus may be resistant to further change. 
As discussed earlier, there may be an element of path dependence. Indeed, the 
institutionalization concept suggests that as prime ministers learn the value of 
institutionalizing their offices, they will continue do so, or at least not reverse the trend, 
even if the cultural conditions which motivated the change are altered.          
 Fourth, the Theory of Public Expectations is a causal theory of prime ministerial 
institutionalization. It is not meant as an argument for the virtues of elite-centered 
politics. Nevertheless, it is clearly within the lineage of democratic elitist theories, such 
as those of Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter (see Held 2006, 125-157). The core tenet 
of these theories is that democratic government works best when elites share power 
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competitively, but are held accountable to the public through regular means (i.e., 
elections). As we saw in Almond and Verba’s (1963) conception of the well-functioning 
civic culture, publics should be deferential to authority and should play a limited role in 
governing or pressuring the political elite. In his time, Schumpeter evocatively stated that 
“the practice of bombarding [politicians] with letters and telegrams” should be prohibited 
(1976, 295). In democratic elitist theories, leaders should be free to determine public 
policy “unimpeded by back-seat driving” (Held 2006, 150).  
 While this indictment of the public’s role is rather untenable in modern 
democracies, the Theory of Public Expectations suggests that there is some truth to the 
basic insight. Schumpeter may have been overly pessimistic about the rational capacities 
of the public and the feasibility of more inclusive institutional mechanisms. However, the 
theory shares the deep scepticism evident in democratic elitism. It is ‘conservative’ in that 
it recognizes that institutional change for the sake of change, or for the sake of 
responding to an increasingly assertive public, is not always beneficial. Relationships and 
ways of working among elites and between elites and the public are always fragile. To 
disrupt them is to invite unintended consequences. From a democratic elitist perspective, 
assertive political culture is counterproductive because it disturbs balanced arrangements 
of power among elites that have served to check the accumulation of power in any 
particular institution. This is to say that there is some value in some elements of the old 
“allegiant” citizenship. When trust in institutions and recognition of their positive aspects 
diminish, the consequence is not that power will be dispersed widely to the people, but 
that some elites, particularly those which are best positioned to claim popular support, 
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will gain power at the expense of others. This, it seems to me, is quite evident in the rise 
of populism of both right and left in recent years.         
 Fifth, the Theory of Public Expectations is a narrow empirical explanation for a 
specific phenomenon: the institutionalization of prime ministerships in the Westminster 
systems in the last half-century. While there is some historical support for the general 
statement that democratic movements also generate increases in executive power, we do 
not make that argument here.50 Like any relationship between variables, the theory is 
vulnerable to events that create contradictory tendencies. It could well be that the 
theorized relationship is but a part of a broader, non-linear historical sweep. Kane et al. 
may be right that in the long run there is a “tug of war between dispersing and 
centralizing tendencies” (2007, 307). It may be that prime ministerships follow a “zig-
zag” evolution in its large-scale historical development, as Blick and Jones (2010) argue.  
Just as the theory postulates that the shift from allegiant to assertive citizenship in the last 
half-century has encouraged prime ministerial power, further shifts could generate 
conditions undermining such power. 
 Finally, I recognize that the Theory of Public Expectations has shortcomings and 
challenges because of its breadth and originality. The theory is not merely an incremental 
variation on existing, well-established theoretical arguments, but proposes a new 
framework for conceptualizing and measuring the effects of political-cultural change on 
institutional change. There is a great deal of a priori uncertainty to the actual empirical 
                                                 
50 In the United States, for instance, the era of Jacksonian democracy, the progressive movement of the 
early 20th century, the New Deal, and the height of liberalism in the 1960s all brought about significant 
expansion of presidential power, while ‘conservative’ eras, such as the pre-Jacksonian period of the limited 
franchise, the Gilded Age of the late 19th century, or the 1920s, are marked by a relatively weak presidency. 
Democratization processes in developing countries have often been leader-centered, often translating into 
strong executive institutions in the new regimes. There is something in the notion that democratizing 
projects are most successful when they are intimately associated with notable or charismatic leaders who 
can serve as ‘embodiments’ of political change.   
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observation of change on both the independent and dependent variable sides of the 
theory. While the literature review in chapter two certainly gives cause to expect that both 
assertive citizenship and prime ministerial branch institutionalization have trended in 
theoretically expected directions, the theory hypothesizes changes, and thus depends for 
its validity, on both of these trends simultaneously. Deviations from these theoretical 
expectations on either or both trends will significantly affect the degree to which the 
Theory of Public Expectations is supported. As well, the selection of the Westminster 
cases prior to theory-building means that the cases may not present the ‘best’ tests of the 
theory. While, as mentioned earlier, the theory is a general claim about why 
institutionalization occurs, this study assesses the theory with regard to a more 
fundamental interest in the prime ministerships of the Westminster systems. For this 
reason, the match of the cases to theory is less important than the match of the theory to 
these particular cases. The goal of the study is to develop and test a theory of how the 
Westminster prime ministerships have changed, not, in the first instance, to assess a 
general theory by choosing a representative, best set of cases.      
3.3 Alternative Theories of Prime Ministerial Institutionalization 
 In addition to the Theory of Public Expectations, the study considers two 
alternative sets of theories for prime ministerial institutionalization: economic trends and 
political conditions. These are standard explanations and essentially derive from the 
existing literature, as described in chapter two, but neither of these sets of theories has 
been empirically tested in any real way. In this section, I briefly describe these theories. 
The first set of theories involves the relationship between long-term economic trends and 
prime ministerial institutionalization. Specifically, this perspective sees globalization and 
105 
 
the increasing role of governments in domestic economic activity in post-war 
democracies as significant contributors to institutionalization. The second set of theories 
posits that short-term political factors are associated with prime ministerial 
institutionalization. These factors relate to the timing of institutionalization decisions 
relative to prime ministerial terms and characteristics of governments, particularly its 
level of support in the legislature and its ideological orientations. These alternatives to the 
Theory of Public Expectations are explicated in this section.     
3.3.1 Economic Trends 
 The first alternative set of explanations for prime ministerial branch 
institutionalization involves transformations in the patterns and structures of state 
economic activity in the post-war era. One of these transformations is globalization, the 
growing interconnectedness and integration of economies and peoples globally. The 
impact of globalization on institutional change in the prime ministerships is threefold. 
First, globalization makes policy-making more diffuse and fragmented. In less globalized 
economies, the set of actors that governments must respond to is limited to a handful of 
mostly domestic stakeholders, and policy issues are less likely to implicate actors across a 
range of sectors. As globalization increases, new external pressures arise and policies 
themselves become more interconnected because of international mechanisms such as 
trade agreements and treaties. In order to have the institutional capacity to coordinate 
activity and implement responses across many sectors and stakeholders, leaders may find 
it beneficial to centralize such capacity within their own institutional structures.  
 Second, globalization may provide relative gains for prime ministerial institutions 
over other political actors. While globalization may mean that prime ministers have less 
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‘absolute’ power to guarantee the policy results they desire, relative to other domestic 
political actors, prime ministers are in an advantaged position to retain and even gain 
power. Webb and Poguntke (2005, 350) argue that: 
  [T]he very fact that many domestic decisions are now constrained by  
  supra-national governance provides national chief executives with  
  additional power resources and autonomy vis-à-vis potential sources  
  of domestic political dissent (including their own cabinet or parties) 
  precisely because they can argue that their freedom of action  
  is constrained by international or supra-national governance.     
 
 Third, political globalization, in particular, raises ordinary heads of government 
such as prime ministers to the level of ‘world leaders’. As decisions are increasingly 
taken in world forums and summits instead of at the domestic level, power is shifted 
towards prime ministers and their advisors (Johansson and Tallberg 2010). Such 
summitry increases the likelihood and legitimacy of prime ministers negotiating far-
reaching policy agreements, or at least plans of action, without consulting other domestic 
actors, and increases the incentives for prime ministers to ensure conformance of 
domestic policy implementation to international norms and agreements. These require 
robust information sources at the prime minister’s ready and the capacity at the centre to 
implement change.  
 The second transformation in the patterns and structures of national economies is 
the increasing role of government activity. The post-war building and entrenchment of 
large social welfare systems in all advanced democracies meant that governments came 
to be responsible for education, health, and social services at a higher level than they had 
been previously, and thus government spending came to constitute an increasingly higher 
share of domestic economic activity. The larger role for government in the economy 
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creates a greater need for policy coordination and implementation capacity at the centres 
of government. The policy-making process has become more complex and more 
fragmented within government, as policy issues cross sectors and involve ever more 
different departments and levels of government, and has come to involve a wider range of 
social and political actors.  
 In addition, the social and economic problems that the state has become 
increasingly responsible for are much more intractable. As we discussed in relation to the 
Theory of Public Expectations, responsibility breeds expectations, and expectations 
imply capacity to act to meet those expectations. The theory views the weight of 
expectations as arising from changing public values and attitudes. Here it arises from the 
changing nature of governance itself. In such an environment, it is reasonable to expect 
that prime ministers who aspire to success, or at least the perception of success, will want 
to increase their ability to both coordinate and steer policy-making and implementation 
from the centre. Again, prime ministers are uniquely placed to be the focal point for 
coordination, so they should bear the heaviest responsibility for doing so. 
3.3.2 Political Conditions 
 Both the Theory of Public Expectations and the economic explanations just 
discussed look to systematic trends over time to explain prime ministerial branch 
institutionalization. However, shorter-term political factors could also have an impact on 
institutionalization, adjusting the level of institutionalization from what would be 
expected from just the temporal trends. Institutionalization takes place in a concrete 
political setting where politicians are strategic actors looking to immediate interests and 
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short-term calculations, so it would not be surprising to find that political conditions 
make a difference. What kinds of conditions might be expected to do so?  
 I identify three. The first involves the time scale of the prime ministerial term. 
Different decisions about institutional change may be made depending on when they are 
made in a term. The first political conditions explanation posits that institutionalization 
depends on where we are during a prime ministerial term: I call this a term year effect. 
This could work in two ways. The first is that institutionalization will increase as terms 
elapse. The idea is that prime ministers may need time in office to ‘get their feet wet’ and 
to figure out what they want to do. While prime ministers may be at their political peak at 
the outset of a new term, they may have less confidence when confronted by an 
entrenched public service and less able to steer through the complexity of the machinery 
of government and the policy problems they face. Thus, institutional change may be 
approached incrementally and steadily over the prime ministerial term.  
 Alternatively, institutionalization could decrease as prime ministerial terms 
elapse. This is a kind of mandate effect. New governments, and prime ministers, may 
want to quickly establish control over the political and policy direction of the machinery 
of government, bolstered by the salience of electoral or leadership promises and the 
political capital that a change or renewal of democratic legitimacy provides. One way of 
doing so is to build their own institutional capacity to steer the work of government and 
establish a prime ministerial agenda. As the term continues, however, there is less need 
and ability to engage in institutional change: mandates and political capital diminish, 
election promises fade (or are fulfilled), and the constant flow of new problems and 
contingent events put prime ministers into ‘response’ mode. This suggests that we will 
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observe lower institutional change in later years of a prime ministerial term than earlier 
years.   
 The second type of political condition that may have an impact on prime 
ministerial branch institutionalization involves characteristics of governments. In 
particular, I identify legislative support and ideology as salient. I expect that prime 
ministers with more legislative support will be able to generate more institutional change 
than those with less support. Majority governments are the norm in Westminster systems 
that use single-member plurality electoral systems (all except New Zealand since 1993). 
However, there are a small number of minority governments in these cases, and New 
Zealand has had permanent coalition government since electoral reform. In majority 
governments, the constraint of consultation or agreement with other parties or coalition 
partners is absent; the necessity of such negotiations might be both a substantive and 
procedural limit on the prime minister’s capacity to engage in institutionalization. It is 
also reasonable that majority governments would perceive a greater mandate for political 
and policy change than governments with less legislative support. Prime ministers with 
more legislative support are thus freer to embark on change in the machinery of 
government, including the building of their own institutional capacities, and perceive a 
greater need to do so.  
 Finally, ideology may play a crucial role in conditioning the extent of prime 
ministerial branch institutionalization. Although prime ministers of all ideological stripes 
face similar pressures under the theories discussed thus far, ideology may mediate the 
extent to which prime ministers view growth in centralized government and thus their 
behaviour in inducing institutional change. As well, because ideological differences may 
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affect how active and ambitious a prime minister’s policy agenda is, especially in terms 
of government programming, ideology may imply greater or lesser need for policy 
direction and coordination from the centre of government. As a generalization, more 
conservative ideologies favour smaller, more decentralized government in general, and 
limiting the growth or decreasing the size of the bureaucratic machinery in particular: 
they want government to do less and less government to do less with. Therefore, my 
theoretical expectation is that prime ministerial branch institutionalization will be lower 
under more conservative prime ministers than under more liberal prime ministers.  
 Finally, it is possible that the theories of prime ministerial branch 
institutionalization presented in this chapter turn out to not provide much explanatory 
power, given the originality of the study’s research questions, theoretical approach, and 
methodology. Unlike many empirical studies, this analysis does not have a deep, 
consistent set of prior empirical findings on which to rest its empirical expectations. The 
present chapter has described, in some detail, a primary theory of institutional change, the 
Theory of Public Expectations, and several alternatives. These theories posit systematic 
causes of prime ministerial branch institutionalization: causes that are exogenous to any 
particular persons.  
 The “null” alternative to these theories that seems the most plausible is that 
institutional change is more a function of the idiosyncratic goals and preferences of 
individual prime ministers.51 Some prime ministers may desire a more autonomous and 
complex prime ministership with which to achieve personal goals. Others may have goals 
and preferences that do not necessarily imply strengthening prime ministerial capacity. If 
                                                 
51 Assuming that any theory of institutionalization is required, i.e., that we actually observe prime 
ministerships institutionalizing by our measures of autonomy and complexity. This, of course, is something 
we investigate in the empirical chapters. 
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this were the case, explaining institutional change in the prime ministerships would be 
more a matter of ‘thick’ assessments of the ideas, beliefs, and circumstances of each 
prime minister than of broad structural, general causes. Factors such as leadership style, 
psychological traits, and belief systems – in short, the kinds of factors that studies of 
political leadership often look to - could be a part of such an explanation. In setting up 
our systematic theories of prime ministerial branch institutionalization, I nonetheless 
recognize that these factors are likely to be significant in particular instances. A study 
investigating these factors would be a worthwhile analytical venture, but it is simply 
outside of the scope of this study. My goal is only to introduce and test these general 
theories; it is not to provide a complete and comprehensive account of all institutional 
change in the prime ministerships. 
3.4 Conclusion     
 To conclude, this chapter elaborated the theoretical perspective of the study and 
the specific theories of prime ministerial branch institutionalization that are evaluated in 
the empirical portion of the study. First, I discussed institutional theory and its application 
to institutional change in the prime ministerships, noting that the study is primarily 
historical institutionalist in approach. In particular, I elaborated Streeck and Thelen’s 
(2005) characterization of patterns of institutional change, and suggested that institutional 
layering and, to a lesser extent, institutional conversion, are likely to be observed in the 
Westminster prime ministerial branches. I then explicated the dependent variable of the 
study, prime ministerial institutionalization, and the components of institutionalization 
that structure the analysis: autonomy and internal complexity. 
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 In the second section, I introduced my original theory of prime ministerial 
institutionalization, the Theory of Public Expectations. In this view, the shift from 
allegiant to assertive citizenship has the unintended and counterintuitive consequence of 
incentivizing prime ministers to further institutionalize their offices. Assertive citizenship 
generates expectations of dispersion of power while raising expectations for what 
government must do. This is not conducive to stable, effective governance and so, in turn, 
a ‘re-concentration’ of power is necessary. The theory then argues that prime ministers 
are uniquely positioned to be delegated this power, based on their claim to the mandate of 
the public and their structural advantages at the centre of government. In this context, 
prime ministers as rational actors will seek to maximize the effectiveness of their 
leadership by building the institutional resources of their offices. This allows them the 
greatest ability to fulfill the heightened expectations of the assertive public. The empirical 
expectations and broader implications of this theory were also discussed. 
 Finally, the chapter identified two alternative sets of theories about why prime 
ministerial branch institutionalization occurs. The first set looks to long-term economic 
changes – globalization and growth in government involvement in the economy – as 
significant contributors. Both trends have the similar effect of making policy-making 
more complex, more fragmented, and more difficult. The second set of alternatives looks 
to short-term political conditions, notably term effects, legislative support, and 
ideological orientations. These explanations suggest that institutionalization is 
significantly affected by the short-term political considerations of prime ministers in 
power, rather than by any long-term systematic trends. Assessing these theories of prime 
ministerial branch institutionalization, above all the Theory of Public Expectations, is the 
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aim of the rest of this study. The next chapter discusses in detail the research design and 
methodological approach used to assess these theories.   
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Chapter 4  
Research Design and Methodology 
 In chapter three, I explicated the theoretical framework of this study and my 
primary explanation for institutional change: the Theory of Public Expectations. Chapter 
four sets out the study’s research design and the methodological choices made in the 
service of testing this theory. This discussion is important to understanding how the 
subsequent chapters translate the theory in chapter three into empirically testable models 
of prime ministerial branch institutionalization. Here I also mention some of the practical 
limitations and challenges encountered in setting up an empirical analysis of theoretical 
propositions. 
 This chapter begins by reviewing prevailing methodologies in the relevant 
literature. While the study’s methodology is derived from the theoretical considerations 
in chapter three, it turns out that a further contribution of this study is the methodological 
approach itself. Since scholars of prime ministerships have largely avoided quantitative 
analysis, this absence encourages the research design and methodology of the study. The 
second section of the chapter explicates the overarching causal model guiding the study. 
This model posits that change over time in prime ministerial branches is a function of 
levels of assertive citizenship, economic change, and contemporaneous political 
conditions. This model is what operationalizes the theories described in chapter three. 
The study takes this causal model and applies it to three different indicators of prime 
ministerial branch institutionalization: budget appropriations, staff resources, and internal 
complexity. Doing so enables more tests of the model and allows for more differentiated 
conclusions about its veracity. Moreover, this structure allows for a ‘parallel’, multiple 
methods research design, in which both quantitative and qualitative data collection and 
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analysis are used. Next, I consider the question of case selection. Finally, because the 
public expectations framework is central to the study, the third section of the chapter 
describes how the study operationalizes the abstract concept of assertive citizenship 
through the construction of three concrete measures: political interest, strength of party 
identification, and an aggregate index of assertive values and attitudes. Finally, the 
chapter addresses some of the limitations of the research design.     
4.1 Methodology in the Literature 
 I begin my explication of the study’s research design by briefly reviewing 
approaches in the existing literature. While there is much insightful, impressionistic, 
contextually rich work, quantitative methodologies have been ignored and seen as 
inappropriate. Instead, the literature is dominated by other approaches, two in particular. 
The first approach focuses on individual political leaders and is either biographical or 
historical in nature (O’Malley 2005, 14-15). Even outside of prime ministerial 
biographies, which do not aim to be analytical per se, the essential characteristic of the 
academic literature is that it focuses on specific prime ministers as the unit of analysis 
and seeks to explain variation through that lens. The focus is often on prime ministers 
within a single country. For instance, Hargrove’s (2009) account emphasizes the 
domineering, transformative visions of leaders such as Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair 
as crucial to understanding why executive power varies across time. Blick and Jones 
(2010) also stress that the extent of prime ministerial power is significantly related to the 
goals and ambitions of particular prime ministers (155-162). Such studies provide 
engaging, illustrative case studies. However, as O’Malley points out, such evidence is 
always partial, and rarely generalizable (2007, 16). A focus on individual political leaders 
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potentially leads to ignoring or downplaying the presence of systemic factors affecting 
institutional change in prime ministerships, and lacks comparative insight. 
 The second methodological strand that dominates academic work on prime 
ministerships is historical or descriptive analysis. These studies are historical and 
descriptive in the sense that they focus on institutional development over time, but 
generally in an atheoretical and methodologically simple way. Such analyses tend to 
focus on how executives developed historically in one country (e.g., Punnett 1977; Milkis 
and Nelson 2008; Blick and Jones 2010) or are comparative studies of the executives of a 
small number of countries (e.g., Elgie 1995; Peters et al. 2000; Helms 2005). Both types 
of studies are qualitative and use observational data selectively. Moreover, the 
comparative studies lack systematic, consistent comparisons across the cases. Rather than 
combining data from a number of cases to generate conclusions of a general nature, these 
studies tend to provide informative but relatively narrow, “within-case” assessments. In 
short, the literature is characterized by an ‘old institutionalist’ approach to studying 
institutions (Rhodes 2006), rather than approaches developed in ‘new institutionalist’ 
work.    
 In this literature, analytical techniques are limited to descriptive and historical 
observation and anecdote, sometimes supplemented by interviews or expert surveys. 
Numbers are used illustratively and selectively, and collections of numerical data are 
often incomplete. There is generally not a great deal of concern for research design, a 
priori theory building, or explication of methodology. Because of this, the credibility of 
the work is highly dependent on perceptions of the author’s expertise and depth of 
arguments, rather than on the strength of the research design and methodology. This does 
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not mean that it lacks substantive or methodological merit. Blick and Jones’ (2010) 
account of the development of the British prime ministership is well argued and 
compelling. Diamond’s (2014) extensive interview data sheds much light on the inner 
workings of the core executive in Britain. R.A.W. Rhodes and colleagues have adopted 
an interesting interpretive framework to the study of executives that is ethnographic in 
approach (Elgie 2011, 73; see Bevir and Rhodes 2003, 2006, 2010; Rhodes 2011). 
However, the relative lack of attention to research design and methodology creates space 
for the literature on prime ministers and prime ministerships to engage with more 
exacting approaches.   
 It is unfortunate that there is little space for explicit theory building and 
quantitative methodologies, particularly, in the study of prime ministerships. Such 
methodologies have been argued to be beyond the scope of any study of executives 
(Webb and Poguntke 2005, 347). For instance, Graham White, in a discussion about the 
power of first ministers in Canada, invokes time series analysis only to say that 
quantifying a concept such as the “democratic deficit” is impossible (2012, 229). This is, 
in my view, an unnecessarily limited perspective. Quantification and analysis of such 
concepts as democracy and freedom, if certainly contestable, is the “bread and butter” of 
comparative politics. The institutional literature specifically has introduced many useful, 
generalizable concepts and approaches that are more rigorous and theory-driven than the 
historical-descriptive approach can provide. There are many aspects of prime 
ministerships, especially as institutions, that are conceivably quantifiable, and worth the 
effort. The comparative study of prime ministerships cannot make much progress if it 
writes off some of the best practices of modern political analysis. Certainly, there are 
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problems with applying alternative methods in a context where there are no definitive, 
pre-existing measures for crucial concepts, such as power or leadership success, and 
where only a relatively small universe of cases can be feasibly studied. However, this 
should not constrain scholars from trying to innovate theoretically and methodologically. 
 In this regard, the prime ministerial literature could learn from work on the 
American presidency, much of which is highly quantitative (e.g., Ragsdale and Theis 
1997; Dickinson and Lebo 2007). Even though they are single-country studies, these 
analyses use statistical techniques such as time series analysis to identify the most 
significant determinants of changes in presidential staff and budget resources, i.e., the 
institutionalization of the US presidency. In doing so, they contribute the important 
insight that any executive institution is not simply one case but a series of observations 
over time. Combining this insight with a comparative lens provides us with a strong 
methodological rationale for collecting and analyzing cross-national time series datasets, 
something that other areas in political science regularly deal with. Such studies 
demonstrate “how one might go about testing, using quantitative data, theory that 
previously had strictly been the province of archival research” (Howell 2009, 16). The 
use of quantitative methods in the US case provides openings for innovative work in the 
prime ministerial literature, which the present study engages directly. The next section 
and remainder of this chapter outlines how the research design and methodology of this 
study addresses this opportunity.    
4.2 Research Design   
 This section describes the overall research design of the study, that is, the 
overarching structure and approach of the empirical work in part II. It also discusses the 
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basic conceptual and operational choices of the study and case selection, and provides an 
overview of the analytical techniques used in subsequent chapters. Detailed discussion of 
the specific empirical models and variable operationalization are located in the individual 
chapters and in the study’s appendices. 
4.2.1 A Causal Model of Prime Ministerial Institutionalization   
 To remind the reader, the core aims of the research design in part II of the study 
are to elucidate the extent of institutional change, and to assess empirical evidence for or 
against the three theories of institutional change discussed above. As elaborated in 
chapter three, the study posits several different theories of why prime ministerial 
branches become more institutionalized over time. Taken together, these theories posit a 
set of independent variables and a multifaceted dependent variable, institutionalization. 
This causal structure is generalized across the four cases and over time. Thus, the 
research design is complex and has three key elements: the overall causal model, the 
analytical structure, and the methodology. 
 First, the basic causal structure throughout the analysis is the same. The causal 
model views change over time in the level of prime ministerial branch institutionalization 
as a product of two kinds of independent variables: ‘time-varying covariates’, assertive 
citizenship and economic trends, and ‘mediating covariates’ in the form of political 
conditions. This causal model is depicted in figure 4.1, below.    
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Figure 4.1  
Causal Model of Prime Ministerial Branch Institutionalization 
 
 This model assumes that there are three significant, independent sources of 
institutional change in the prime ministerships. The time-varying covariates are assumed 
to have effects on institutionalization as a function of time. This means that variation in 
both assertive citizenship and economic trend variables is (expected to be) systematically 
related to time, and both co-vary with institutionalization, since the latter also varies 
across time. Political conditions, on the other hand, do not vary over time in any 
meaningful sense but, when included in the model, potentially alter the effects of the 
time-varying covariates as well as independently affect institutionalization.  
 The difference between these two sets of covariates extends to the treatment of the 
variables’ time series properties. The time-varying covariates imply effects over time, 
such that their overall effects on institutionalization may be a mixture of instantaneous 
and past effects. The political conditions covariates, however, are assumed to have only 
instantaneous effects because they are direct, rather than contextual, and do not 
meaningfully co-vary with time. For example, imagine that there is an ideological effect 
such that prime ministers with greater legislative support are more likely to 
institutionalize their office. Theoretically, it makes little sense to include parameters for 
past legislative support along with the current value, for both theoretical and 
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methodological reasons.52 Thus, for the purposes of model specification in subsequent 
chapters, the time-varying covariates are allowed to be included as both current values 
and past values, while the mediating political conditions covariates are constrained to 
having instantaneous effects (in the time series terminology, they are included as fixed 
regressors). To summarize, then, the causal model of the study is dynamic. It asserts that 
the level of prime ministerial branch institutionalization at any one point in time is a 
function of two exogenous sets of covariates: the levels of assertive citizenship and 
economic trends at that time and in previous time points, and the political conditions in 
place contemporaneously.         
 The second element of the research design is the analytical structure of the study. 
Given the causal model just described, the analytical structure guides the way in which 
the study breaks down this causal model into empirically tractable pieces. It does so by 
disaggregating the dependent variable, prime ministerial branch institutionalization, into 
three distinct indicators: budgetary appropriations, staff resources, and institutional 
complexity. Each indicator acts as an empirical proxy dependent variable for the 
conceptual dependent variable of institutionalization. Each of the sets of covariates is 
operationalized appropriately and entered into models of these empirical indicators of 
institutionalization. Structuring the analysis in terms of these measures of 
institutionalization has two advantages.  
 First, it enables more nuanced conclusions about the extent and causes of 
institutional change. The disaggregation of the dependent variable allows us to parse 
                                                 
52 Theoretically, it is difficult to conceive of a causal process whereby last year’s seat share, for instance, 
somehow has an independent effect on the present year’s budgetary appropriations. The political conditions 
are assumed to be direct inputs into prime ministers’ decision-making process, as it were, when selecting 
institutional resources. Methodologically, the political conditions variables are constant over a prime 
ministerial term, so recently past values of the variables are in most cases the same as the current value.  
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differences in the way the relationships play out. We might find, for example, that the rise 
of assertive citizenship has had a greater effect on budget appropriations than on 
institutional structure. This could point to a variety of interesting arguments. Perhaps 
appropriations are more responsive to public pressure than organizational change. 
Perhaps prime ministers face fewer constraints in manipulating financial resources than 
in altering bureaucratic structures and relationships, which are likely much more ‘sticky’ 
and difficult to pursue effectively. In short, the study’s analytical structure allows for 
interesting variation along dimensions of institutional change. It also multiplies the 
number of different tests of the theories embedded in the causal model; given that 
expanding the number of cases is not a realistic option, examining different facets of the 
overall concept of institutionalization allows us to probe these theories from different 
angles.   
 Second, this analytical structure allows for more explicit, transparent comparative 
conclusions relative to the other plausible analytical structure that could have been 
adopted, the case study design. The case study design would structure the analysis by 
country, that is, separate chapters on Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom. Cross-national comparisons would be in the form of concluding synthesis; the 
empirical focus would be on the case rather than the theory. This design would serve the 
study’s purposes poorly because the study is not interested in these cases purely in 
themselves. Rather, the study is more interested in institutional change in prime 
ministerships as a broad, general phenomenon rather than a case-specific one. My 
approach allows for direct comparisons between the cases to be drawn at multiple points 
in the study, not only synthetically but in analysis of the data as inherently cross-national. 
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 The design choice of disaggregating institutional change into three distinct 
dimensions and structuring the analysis accordingly has implications for the methodology 
of the study. It allows for the use of multiple methods, a research design in which 
different kinds of data collection and analysis are employed to improve the evidentiary 
value of a study. Thus, the third key element in the study’s research design is the use of a 
‘parallel’, multiple methods approach. The research design uses both qualitative and 
quantitative data and analysis to investigate the same broad research question of prime 
ministerial branch institutionalization, although its primary emphasis is on quantitative 
analysis. Using multiple methods can be a way to mitigate perceived weaknesses in 
strictly quantitative or strictly qualitative approaches. 
 Creswell (2014) identifies three basic templates for mixed methods designs: 
convergent parallel, exploratory sequential, and explanatory sequential (219-227). This 
study’s research design is closest to the first approach, although it is not a strict 
adaptation.53 In the convergent parallel design, qualitative and quantitative data are 
collected and analyzed separately, with hopefully convergent findings: the two methods 
are connected only in comparison of results. This is similar to the process of 
‘triangulation’, in which different methods are brought to bear on the same question, 
usually for reasons of poor or missing data (Tarrow 2004, 178-179).  
                                                 
53 The exploratory sequential model begins with a qualitative or small-N phase in order to identify and 
develop concepts and measures within a sample with the intent of testing their external validity on a 
broader sample (or the population) in the quantitative phase. The explanatory sequential model involves a 
procedure whereby quantitative analysis informs selection of cases for qualitative explanation and 
elaboration. Crucially, though, this two-stage process, in which the qualitative data is not separate from but 
builds on the quantitative data, means that comparing the results is an invalid procedure. The quantitative 
results are independent of the subsequent qualitative stage and the qualitative stage cannot invalidate or 
confirm the quantitative modeling, although they certainly can inform future quantitative models 
(Lieberman 2005). The basic function of the qualitative case studies is to provide insight into the workings 
of mechanisms generating the relationships identified (or not) in the quantitative model (Creswell 2014, 
224-225).     
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 The disaggregated indicators of institutionalization are not only substantively 
different but imply different kinds of data. Analysis of the first two indicators, budget 
appropriations and staff resources, lends itself to statistical analysis because they are 
inherently quantifiable (they are literally numbers) and good, consistent numerical data 
over time can be more or less readily obtained. Thus, the chapters investigating these 
measures approach empirical analysis through the lens of quantitative methodology: 
specification and estimation of the causal model using regression techniques is the 
primary tool for causal inference.  
 However, analyzing change in institutional complexity is less amenable to 
quantitative approaches, at least in the way complexity is operationalized here. As 
discussed in chapter seven, complexity is operationalized in terms of tracing the number 
and types of organizational units within prime ministerial branches over time. These 
measures are both count and categorical data, but the analysis is primarily interested in 
tracing qualitative change over time rather than simple quantitative change. Further 
methodological reasons, discussed in the chapter, suggest that qualitative analysis is a 
more appropriate choice for the chapter’s goals; in particular, regression is not used. 
Changes in institutional structure also have a more trenchant ‘narrative’ quality than 
appropriations or staff; since institutional structure is a more variegated outcome than 
appropriations or staff, explicating it in greater depth and detail is appropriate. In other 
words, comparing number of staff and comparing the scope of policy units in a prime 
ministerial branch should be different analytical processes. The study therefore presents 
primarily quantitative, statistical treatments of appropriations and staff, and a primarily 
qualitative, narrative assessment of changes in institutional complexity. It then 
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synthesizes the findings to form overall conclusions about the theories and patterns of 
institutional change introduced in chapter three.           
4.2.2 Data Collection 
 The data collected and analyzed in this study is observational, primarily 
quantitative data. The assertive citizenship variables are constructed from survey data in 
the national election studies; this process is further described in section 4.3, below. 
Further details about the data source and construction, including summary statistics, are 
found in the study’s appendices A2 and A3. The economic variables are drawn from two 
publicly accessible cross-national time-series data sets, the KOF Globalization Index, and 
the Penn World Tables 9.0.  
 The political variables come from a variety of public sources. For the most part, 
these data are simple historical facts. Prime ministerial terms, legislative support, and 
prime ministerial party are culled from sources such as tables of electoral histories from 
official electoral bodies (such as Elections Canada), as well as the author’s prior 
knowledge. The only constructed variable is one measure of prime ministerial ideology, 
which is drawn from the coding of party manifestos by the Manifesto Research on 
Political Representation (MARPOR) project.54       
 The one area of discretion was in the demarcation of prime ministerial terms. For 
the purposes of this study, terms were demarcated according to three rules. First, any 
change of prime minister within a government term started a new prime ministerial term. 
Second, any general election, whether won by the incumbent prime minister or not, 
                                                 
54 While the output of the MARPOR is not uncontroversial (see Gemenis 2013 for a summary of 
criticisms), the data set is widely used in comparative party research. My examination of the data for these 
four countries shows a sufficient degree of face validity: commonly perceived ideological differences 
among prime ministers are mostly reflected in these scores.    
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started a new term. Third, term starts and ends are pinned to the outcome under 
investigation. Thus, in chapters five and six, they are pinned to the passing of the relevant 
appropriation act. In other words, a prime minister’s first year refers to the first budget 
for which they were in power. This makes a difference only in a few cases. For instance, 
John Major’s government passed the budget for fiscal year 1997-98, not Tony Blair’s, 
even though Blair took power in May 1997. The observations for this time point are thus 
considered the fifth year of Major’s term, rather than the first of Blair’s. The prime 
ministerial terms for the four countries since 1945 are listed in the study’s Appendix A1.  
4.2.3 Case Selection 
 In this section, I discuss the issue of case selection. This study focuses on the 
prime ministerships of four countries: the Westminster systems of Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. These countries share a common cultural 
heritage and exhibit both institutional similarity and difference. However, as discussed 
earlier, our primary theoretical goal is not to assess these particular prime ministerial 
institutions per se, but to articulate and empirically assess general theories of institutional 
change in the branches of political chief executives. Indeed, the focus on these particular 
cases is a weaker test of these theories than is potentially achievable; as Westminster 
systems, they are only a subset of the systems in which the theories are intended to apply. 
The Theory of Public Expectations, in particular, is a general theory about how social 
change affects executive institutions in democratic systems. The ideal study would 
include all countries that fall within this scope. Such a study would have allowed for 
more variation in the data and the testing of further alternative explanations, such as the 
effect of constitutional type (presidential or parliamentary). However, this constraint is 
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somewhat mitigated by the fact that the analysis examines change over time. The unit of 
analysis, particularly for statistical purposes, is the “country-year”, e.g., Canada 1985. 
This multiplies the number of observations considerably, although obviously the 
observations exhibit dependence within countries.   
 The choice of limiting the study to these Westminster cases is justified practically 
and, more importantly, theoretically.55 The justification for our focus on these 
Westminster systems is the notion of Most Similar Systems (MSS) design. MSS is a 
method of selecting cases designed to overcome the “many variables, small N” problem 
that is particularly acute in macro-comparative research. Such research is often concerned 
with comparing countries, which vary in essentially infinite ways but are limited in 
number.56 There is thus a need for some methodologically sound way of limiting the 
number of cases while retaining the ability to make causal claims about a general 
phenomenon.  
 The MSS design depends for its causal authority on finding systems that are very 
similar on many dimensions, particularly those that are relevant to explaining variation 
on the dependent variable, and then identifying differences among these systems. The 
logic of MSS is twofold. First, observed similarities among cases imply latent similarities 
and thus unobservable, or unobserved, factors are implicitly controlled. There is thus no 
                                                 
55 Practical considerations include the limited availability and accessibility of data for a large number of 
countries, many of which are not English speaking. The resources in time and effort required to find and 
process these data means that this data collection is simply infeasible for the current project. Given this, in 
the first instance the scope is narrowed to cases familiar to the researcher, where data is readily available, 
and which have comparable prime ministerial institutions, political systems, and social contexts.  
56 The problem is that causality cannot be established when the theory of the causal relationship is 
underdetermined or when there are not enough cases to disentangle the independent effects of explanatory 
variables when there is high multicollinearity between them (King et al. 1994, 119). Many questions of 
interest to comparativists also imply restrictions on the number of applicable cases. A further concern is 
that efforts to compare countries through detailed case study or historical narrative are costly and become 
impractical as the number of cases increases. 
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need to include all of the potential control variables in the cases, which is often 
impossible. Second, similarities cannot explain differences. We can choose a small 
number of cases where we know that there are relevant similarities but on which there are 
differences in outcomes. Then we look for theoretically interesting explanatory variables 
on which these cases differ. If differences in outcome among cases correspond to the 
differences on the explanatory variables, while other variables are the same among cases, 
we can infer that only the differing explanatory variables are causally related to the 
outcome.      
 MSS requires each variable to be independent and dichotomous (Gerring 2008, 
669). While the first is more a problem of model specification than fundamental, the 
second presents an underappreciated problem. If variables are not dichotomous, the 
notions of similarity and difference are undermined.57 Of the variables in this study, only 
a few of the political conditions variables are inherently dichotomous. More importantly, 
the outcome of institutionalization is not dichotomous and dichotomizing it (e.g., into 
high and low institutionalization) is not an option in this study. Thus, the case selection in 
this study is in the spirit of MSS without following it to the letter. It relies on the idea that 
“if two countries can be assumed to have similar cultural heritages one needn’t worry” 
about explicitly measuring these similarities in order to assert that a host of background 
factors are actually being controlled for (Gerring 2008, 670). In any case, we are as or 
more concerned with temporal dynamics within each country as with comparing the 
countries as single observations. The study’s selection of the Westminster countries of 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom is therefore merited for both 
                                                 
57 This is one reason for the development of methodologies like qualitative comparative analysis, which 
uses things like “fuzzy sets” so that variables can be continuous rather than dichotomous.  
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practical and theoretical reasons. As discussed earlier, the choice of limiting cases to 
these Westminster systems is a common one; the framing is well established. 
4.3 Measuring the Dynamics in Assertive Citizenship 
 Thus far, this chapter has explicated in general terms the research design and 
methodology of the study. In the final section of this chapter, I focus on a more specific 
design choice: the measurement of changes in assertive citizenship. This is the key 
explanatory factor in the Theory of Public Expectations. Here, I explain the basic 
construction of the variables, while a detailed explanation is found in appendices A3, 
which describes the construction process, and A4, which lists the survey items used. 
 Assertive citizenship refers to a set of particular values and attitudes that are 
measured at the individual level but are theorized to be salient only as an aggregate. They 
generate a sociocultural context to which prime ministers are responsive. The underlying 
set of values and attitudes constituting assertive citizenship is adapted from the work of 
Dalton and Welzel (2014), as discussed in chapter two, but its operationalization in this 
study is original. For the purposes of this study, there is no readily importable data with 
which to measure assertive citizenship. Existing work probing the concept of assertive 
citizenship and related concepts is mostly based on the World Values Survey (WVS). 
While the WVS is a useful tool for studying social values cross-culturally and cross-
regionally, as a tool for studying temporal change, especially in our cases, it is limited.58 
                                                 
58 Only Australia has been surveyed in all six waves. Canada is included in four waves (1982, 1990, 2000, 
2005), New Zealand in three (1998, 2004, 2011) and the United Kingdom in four (1981, 1990, 1998, 2005). 
Thus, the WVS data is consistent, comprehensive and tailored to examination of changing values, but the 
lack of temporal data points is a serious problem in terms of analyzing relationships over time. We do not 
have the option of expanding our scope of cases to the larger set of countries that the WVS covers. Filling 
in the missing data simply by interpolation and extrapolation is not an option when there are so few ‘real’ 
data points. If we ‘fill in’ these missing entries with other sources of data, we face issues of comparability 
of questions and samples.  
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Thus, this study uses survey data from national election studies: the Australian Election 
Study (AES), Canadian Election Study (CES), New Zealand Election Study (NZES), and 
the British Election Study (BES).59 These series of election studies provide regular, 
relatively long-running and consistent sets of data and contain many similar questions to 
those on the WVS.60 Years for all sources of data used are given in Table 4.1. The 
election studies data is supplemented with earlier projects that were forerunners to the 
‘official’ election studies and in some cases involved similar teams of researchers. 
Table 4.1  
Sources of Data for Assertive Citizenship Measures 
Year AES CES NZES BES Year AES CES NZES BES 
1963    X^ 1990 X  X  
1964    X^ 1991     
1965  X   1992    X 
1966    X^ 1993 X X X  
1967 X*    1994     
1968  X   1995     
1969 X*    1996 X  X  
1970    X^ 1997  X  X 
1971     1998 X    
1972     1999   X  
1973     2000  X   
                                                                                                                                                 
 An additional problem is that when use of the WVS is limited to the Westminster countries, many 
of the measures of assertive citizenship do not vary much across time or cases. This is because the primary 
purpose of the WVS is to assess broad cross-cultural patterns. Thus, its questions are more useful in 
differentiating between large differences in context, such as between the Central and Eastern European 
post-communist countries and Western Europe or between two distant points in time, than when “zooming 
in” to advanced democracies, much less our cases.   
59 Election studies for academic purposes began in the United States, where the first American National 
Election Study (ANES) was conducted in 1948 by the Survey Research Centre at the University of 
Michigan. The ANES model wherein a small group of principal investigators would conduct pre-election 
and post-election surveys, sometimes supplemented by panel data, mailback surveys and, more recently, 
internet surveys, on a core set of questions related to vote choice, political attitudes and beliefs, political 
engagement, and demographic characteristics, was highly influential. It formed the basis for the other 
national election studies, on which much political behaviour research has been grounded. 
60 Although we considered combining WVS and election studies data, initial explorations made it clear that 
they are not comparable. Tranter and Western (2003, 244) also show this in the Australian case, where the 
WVS data anomalously show the proportion of postmaterialists twice that of other sources. They suggest 
sampling and question wording differences. Another intriguing possibility is that there is an “in-
election/out-election” effect, such that asking even the same questions within the context of an election 
campaign period introduces bias relative to asking them outside of elections. The heightened political 
environment of elections may have a significant effect on the kinds of associations and saliency of issues 
that form the heuristic context of respondents’ choices.   
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1974  X  X 2001 X   X 
1975   X  2002   X  
1976     2003     
1977     2004 X X   
1978   X  2005   X X 
1979 X* X  X 2006  X   
1980  X   2007 X    
1981   X  2008  X X  
1982     2009     
1983    X 2010 X   X 
1984  X   2011  X X  
1985     2012     
1986     2013 X    
1987 X  X X 2014   X  
1988  X   2015  X  X 
1989          
AES: Australian Election Study; CES: Canadian Election Study; NZES: New Zealand Election 
Survey/Study; BES: British Election Study . 
* Australian Political Attitudes Survey. ^ Political Change in Britain. 
 My basic goal is to construct variables that measure the prevalence of allegiant 
and assertive orientations at different points in time in order to track change in these 
orientations over time. WVS data is inadequate for this purpose. However, the election 
study data also are not ideal. The surveys exhibit a high degree of variation in question 
wording and response coding, both between countries and within each country series. 
Questions enter and exit the surveys from study to study, understandably so; these 
broader value and attitude questions are of secondary importance to questions probing 
more immediate electoral behaviour. Thus, there is no simple way to measure these 
orientations using a consistent set of questions across time in one country, let alone 
among the four.61    
                                                 
61 I also argue, contrary to what is implied in the Dalton et al. approach, that what constitutes allegiant and 
assertive orientations changes over time as broader norms and expectations change. We should not expect a 
priori that the same questions measure the same underlying concepts over time. Indeed, there are many 
examples of changes in the questions themselves that reveal broader changes in sociocultural norms and 
which distinguish the election studies from the WVS. For instance, in the WVS the same question 
measuring attitudes towards homosexuality is asked every wave: whether homosexuality is justifiable. In 
the CES, though, changes in the questions reflect contemporary societal concerns. The 1968 CES asked 
132 
 
 The study operationalizes the concept of assertive citizenship in three variables: 
aggregate levels of political interest, strength of party identification, and an index 
aggregating many values and attitudes related to assertiveness. We operationalize 
assertive citizenship in three different ways because we want to have as strong a test of 
the Theory of Public Expectations as possible given other constraints and because we 
want to use as much of the data available as possible. Each of these indicators is a 
plausible measure of assertive citizenship, as discussed in previous chapters. The more 
assertive citizens are, the more politically interested they are likely to be. However, this 
increased level of political interest is accompanied by a growing lack of attachment to 
and trust in institutions; strength of party identification is a reasonable proxy for citizens’ 
attachment to parties and its decline has been widely remarked upon. A further 
methodological consideration is that political interest and party identification are among 
the few questions that have been asked more or less consistently across the series of 
election studies in all four countries. The assertive index, by construction, aggregates all 
survey items that are a priori relevant to assertive citizenship.         
 Constructing the assertive citizenship variables is a four-step procedure. First, we 
identify and extract data on assertive values from election survey data sets. For the 
political interest and party identification variable this is simple, since these are single 
questions for each data set. For the assertive index, drawing on Dalton and Welzel (2014) 
and Dalton (2004), I identified potential measures of allegiant and assertive orientations 
                                                                                                                                                 
whether homosexuals should be imprisoned. In 1984, respondents were asked whether homosexuals should 
be permitted to be teachers. In 1988, the question was about the effects of giving equal rights to 
homosexuals. The 1993, 1997, and 2000 surveys asked whether homosexual couples should be allowed to 
legally marry, and from 2004 whether the respondent favoured or opposed same-sex marriage, which had 
become a constitutional right.  Thus, the WVS approach is ill-suited for present purposes.  
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in each election study. Any items associated with institutional confidence and trust, belief 
in democracy, general social trust, norm compliance (e.g., duty to vote), beliefs about 
individual liberties (particularly homosexuality and abortion) and equal opportunity, 
individual voice, expression and political efficacy, and democratic participation and 
activism were included. In total, the number of unique identical questions and the number 
of times the questions are asked in each country are, respectively: Australia, 44 and 173, 
Canada, 37 and 175, New Zealand, 29 and 139, and the UK, 42 and 160. Questions were 
considered identical when they had the same or nearly the same wording and the same 
response options. All of the survey items are listed in appendix A4. 
 The second step is to aggregate this data. For political interest and strength of 
party identification, the aggregated values for each survey are simply the mean response. 
The assertive index is much more complicated. I adapt Stimson’s (1999, 2015) ‘dyad 
ratios’ approach to creating a smoothed time trend when aggregating partial data 
collected over time. The mathematical details of this method are given in the study’s 
appendix A3. Briefly, each item’s responses are recoded into a binary categorization for 
assertive and non-assertive responses. For instance, the Likert scale responses to the 
statement “Generally those elected to Parliament soon lose touch with the people” are 
recoded so that ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ are assertive and other responses not 
assertive. Then the proportion of assertive responses for each question administration is 
calculated. The dyad ratios algorithm takes these proportions and calculates changes in 
proportions between identical question administrations in succeeding and preceding 
election studies. It then calculates the average change across all survey items for a 
particular year, with each item’s contribution to this average weighted according to its 
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correlation with the overall measure. The method produces a time series for an 
underlying concept, assertive citizenship, for which there is only partial, inconsistent 
data.           
 The third step in the procedure is to fill in the missing data for the years between 
election studies. This is an acute issue here because the election study surveys are 
conducted only periodically. There are more missing observations on country-years than 
not, but using only the years in which elections were held reduces the number of 
observations drastically and eliminates the possibility of testing some of the political 
conditions variables; the low degrees of freedom would not allow for meaningful 
statistical inference. Having as complete a time series as possible is thus important, even 
if it means including imputed values. I impute values for the missing observations using 
Honaker et al.’s (2012) software program Amelia II, which has been used even in studies 
with large amounts of missing data (e.g., Denny and Doyle 2009, Ross 2006). Amelia II 
performs a “multiple imputation” procedure in which all variables that appear in the 
regression model are used to produce a posterior distribution for the complete data set via 
maximum likelihood. Multiple draws from this distribution are then taken to produce a 
specified number of complete data sets, which are then combined. This produces a more 
data-driven approach to imputation of missing values, as compared to mean or linear 
imputation. While this is not ideal, it is a next-best solution. 
 Finally, the data are transformed in order to better differentiate the trends in 
assertive citizenship from the irregular components of the time series. This is done 
through exponential smoothing of the time series. This variable construction procedure 
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results in a time series of country-year observations for the three variables: political 
interest, strength of party identification, and an overall assertive values index.   
4.4 Research Design: Limitations 
 This section identifies several important limitations of the study’s research design; 
I return to these more fully in my concluding remarks. As in any good empirical study, 
the research design makes subsequent analysis possible while also precluding alternative 
approaches and creating its own “built-in” difficulties for inference. Indeed, because of 
the theoretical and empirical originality of the study, its limitations are arguably more 
apparent. I discuss, briefly, three in particular: the treatment of context, the constraints on 
both case and conceptual scope, and the difficulty of establishing the veracity of time-
dependent relationships.    
 The first limitation pertains to the treatment of context in the study. Each country 
is treated abstractly and somewhat superficially, especially in the more quantitative 
analyses in chapters five and six. The rich political histories and cultures of these very 
different cases are reduced to “observations on variables” in the interest of producing 
generalizable and statistically analyzable hypotheses. To be sure, this is a strength of the 
study, but many scholars of each of these countries’ politics will find the relative absence 
of historical and political case-specific context to be a flaw.  In the same vein, the study’s 
design precludes full attention to the ideational context of prime ministerial leadership: 
the norms, values, and internalized understandings of salient actors in shaping prime 
ministerial power. Instead, the dissertation is explicitly ‘objective’ in the sense that it 
assesses institutional change using concrete, measurable factors.  
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 Second, clearly the scope of the study is constrained by the research design and 
methodology, in two important ways. The first is that limitations of data and resources 
lead to constrained tests of the theories of institutionalization. The Theory of Public 
Expectations is a general theory of institutional change, relevant in many more countries 
than the four Westminster cases. Indeed, parliamentary cases that have not demonstrably 
presidentialized could also be included as ‘negative’ cases. Moreover, there is no reason 
that the scope of the theory could not include presidential systems. Comparing executive 
branch institutionalization with “parliamentary versus presidential” as an explanatory 
variable would be a tremendously valuable exercise. Widening the scope of analysis 
would also increase the number of cases, which is usually a benefit statistically. 
Therefore, in selecting this set of similar Westminster systems, the study does not capture 
all sorts of interesting variation in both the extent of executive branch institutionalization 
and in the explanatory factors.        
 The second limitation is the gap between the full concept of the “prime ministerial 
branch” and its operationalization in this study. For methodological reasons, the study 
focuses only on the bureaucratic extensions of prime ministers, and further, on their 
material aspects. The prime ministerial branches have changed in many ways that are not 
addressed in the study. For instance, the bureaucratic extensions of prime ministers have 
arguably undergone politicization. Peter Aucoin’s (2012) New Political Governance 
thesis argues that there have been systematic efforts to undermine the impartiality and 
professionalism of the civil service which, “at best… constitutes sleazy governance; at 
worst, is a form of political corruption” (178). In this view, the traditional role of the 
prime minister’s civil service offices in providing “politically-sensitive policy advice” 
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has become more “promiscuously partisan”, as Aucoin suggests (179). The extent to 
which prime ministerial branches are increasingly the locus of control for all government 
and party messaging is not explored here.  
 The third limitation is that in exploring relationships between trends over time it 
is somewhat difficult to disentangle ‘true’ relationships from spurious relationships that 
are only apparent because variables share a common trend with time itself, rather than 
each other. This problem is mitigated in a technical way by the particular form of time 
series modelling, error correction models, that is used in chapters five and six. However, 
this only corrects for time within the model estimation itself, i.e., it makes the model 
conform with assumptions about error distributions, independent observations, and so on. 
It does not directly answer the broader question of temporal causality or if there are other 
over-time trends that should be included. Moreover, the qualitative explication in 
chapters seven and eight depends on the assumption that corresponding temporal trends is 
evidence for an association. Unfortunately, in the absence of a more rigorous way of 
establishing causality such as an experimental setup or, perhaps, evidence from 
interviews with salient actors, this is clearly a limitation of the study. In my concluding 
chapter, I articulate several directions for future research that could address some of these 
limitations.            
 The first part of this study frames the empirical analysis to follow in part II. The 
present chapter concludes this framing by explaining the research design and 
methodology of the study. I first discussed the dominant methodological orientations in 
the literature on prime ministers and noted opportunities for methodological innovation. 
In the second section, the overall causal model and the multiple methods analytical 
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structure designed to assess it were discussed. As well, I discussed the sources of data and 
case selection. I then described the construction of the primary explanatory variables, 
those capturing assertive citizenship. Finally, I identified key limitations of the study’s 
design. The next four chapters constitute the empirical portion of the study, beginning in 
chapter five with an assessment of autonomy of the prime ministerial branches, as 
measured by budget appropriations. We now turn to these empirical studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART TWO: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140 
 
Chapter 5  
Prime Ministerial Branches and Budget Appropriations 
 
The first part of this study, chapters one through four, explicated the context, 
theoretical approach, and research design that frames its empirical investigation of 
institutional change. Part II, chapters five through eight, forms the core of this 
investigation. The following chapters draw on both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to assess empirically both the patterns of institutional change in each of the 
four countries and the extent to which the Theory of Public Expectations and its 
alternatives are supported. The analysis has a two-part structure. This chapter and the 
next explore and assess change in the institutional autonomy of prime ministerial 
branches, operationalized as their budget appropriations in chapter five and staff 
resources in chapter six. These analyses are predominantly quantitative in approach. In 
chapters seven and eight, I explore the institutional complexity of prime ministerial 
branches, using a case study approach. I discuss short case studies of New Zealand and 
Canada in chapter seven, and the United Kingdom and Australia in chapter eight. 
Chapters five and six examine the Westminster prime ministerial branches from 
the perspective of institutional autonomy. The “big picture” analytical goal is to assess 
the extent and causes of the development of prime ministerial branches from small, 
personal offices into large bureaucracies with significant budgets and staff resources. The 
development of more robust institutional support allows them to act increasingly 
independently of other political actors. I apply the theories discussed in chapter three to 
the putative adaptation and reinvention of prime ministerships as autonomous actors in 
Westminster systems.  
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The present chapter analyzes budget appropriations to the prime ministerial 
branches in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. It proceeds as 
follows. The first section, 5.1, discusses these appropriations as a measure of autonomy 
and then examines the trends in appropriations in these cases, aiming to provide an 
overall assessment of trends over time. Section 5.2 articulates the hypotheses that capture 
the specific empirical expectations under investigation. Section 5.3 provides brief 
descriptive assessments of these hypotheses. In section 5.4, I describe the regression 
model specification and estimation and discuss issues specific to time series analysis. 
Section 5.5 presents and discusses the results, and section 5.6 returns to the broader 
question of patterns of institutional change.   
5.1 Appropriations to the Prime Ministerial Branches 
The core of this chapter is budget appropriations to prime ministerial branches. 
This section describes the conceptualization and operationalization of this outcome as an 
indicator of institutional autonomy. Appropriations in this context are monetary resources 
that are statutorily allocated to government departments and programs from government 
accounts, in the form of appropriation acts for particular fiscal years.62 These acts are the 
outcomes of budget processes that begin long before the acts are given royal assent. 
Because of the general tendency to executive dominance and single-party government in 
Westminster systems, appropriations are highly reflective of government priorities. The 
budget process is highly controlled and appropriations as enacted are essentially 
unchanged from the budget estimates presented by the government, since they are treated 
                                                 
62 The Fiscal Year in Canada and the United Kingdom runs from April 1 to March 31. In Australia and 
New Zealand, the Fiscal Year runs from July 1 to June 30.   
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as matters of confidence.63 Even in a separation of powers presidential system, wherein 
budgets are contests of negotiation and compromise between the legislature and 
executive, scholars have taken appropriations to be indicative of institutionalization, so 
this indicator is well established (Krause 2002; Dickinson and Lebo 2007).64 
Appropriations have three important characteristics that make them useful as 
indicators. First, they are intentional, well-scrutinized government decisions. In other 
words, they reflect deliberate choices on the part of decision makers, not accidents or ad-
hoc responses to contingent events.65 Second, they are clear, considered manifestations of 
what prime ministers value and prioritize. Third, appropriations are communicated as 
precise, concrete numbers, formalized in legislation and publicly available. As 
quantitative data, this increases their validity and reliability from an operationalization 
standpoint. Other than a few minor issues requiring analyst choice, explained in more 
detail below, subjective researcher interpretation of the measure is minimized.   
Appropriations are also meaningful, if imperfect, proxies for institutional 
autonomy. In general, more resources enable actors to do more; this is almost inherent in 
the term ‘resources’. Autonomy is closely linked to this freedom of action. Johan Olsen, 
for instance, describes autonomy as both the absence of external interference and the 
“capability… to exploit available spaces to manoeuvre” (2010, 152). Prime ministers in 
                                                 
63 This allows us to substitute estimates for final appropriated amounts in the few instances where 
appropriations data were missing.  
64 The US Congress has the legislative authority to appropriate funds, and, specifically, the House of 
Representatives has the sole constitutional authority to originate spending bills. The president has veto 
power. Presidential authority to unilaterally alter or amend appropriations has been the subject of 
constitutional debate. The so-called impoundment power, i.e., simply not spending funds that had been 
appropriated, was considered to be within presidential authority until the Supreme Court found President 
Nixon’s use of it unconstitutional. The Line-Item Veto, which in 1996 had granted the president the 
authority to nullify individual provisions of a legislative act, was found unconstitutional in 1998; presidents 
since, and a number of legislators, have advocated for it in some modified form.    
65 Of course, they often are responsive to exogenous events but they go through a legislative procedure that 
makes them different from spontaneous, “knee-jerk” choices. 
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Westminster systems have evolved to be increasingly autonomous; this evolution has 
minimized potential sources of external interference.  
However, arguably prime ministers have not always had the means “to exploit 
available spaces to manoeuvre” independently from other political actors, whose interests 
may not always align with the head of government’s. Even if prime ministers were 
always more than primus inter pares, the heart of collective cabinet government lies in 
the fact that prime ministers had to work through and with the cabinet to achieve their 
goals. And the Whitehall model that grew out of civil service reforms in Britain in the 
1850s created a neutral, professional, and departmentalized civil service. Thus, before the 
advent and institutionalization of full-fledged, well-resourced prime ministerial branches, 
prime ministers were often dependent on such external actors for the kind of authority 
that comes from control over procedure, information, and advice. Prime ministers have 
not always been able to counterweigh the authority of other actors who possessed 
superior institutional resources or representative legitimacy. Thus, increasing the financial 
resources of prime ministerial branches strengthens the capacity of prime ministers to act 
on their own to “exploit” opportunities for political action.  
The specific operationalization of the measure is the total budgetary 
appropriation, in the main Appropriation Act for each year, to each prime ministerial 
branch:  the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in Australia and New Zealand, 
the Privy Council Office in Canada, and the Cabinet Office in the United Kingdom. The 
data are collected from fiscal years 1946 to 2015, although the foregoing analyses 
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generally extend only to the 1960s or 1970s.66 However, three case-specific issues in 
collecting these data required adjustments.  
First, in the appropriations acts for the United Kingdom, Cabinet Office 
appropriations are reported separately only beginning in FY1969-70.67 Therefore, to 
obtain the amounts for years previous, I reconstructed the amounts from partial data.68 
Although I include these data in showing the appropriations trends in figure 5.1, they are 
not included in the actual analyses in subsequent sections, since most of the data on the 
explanatory time series post-date 1968. A second UK-specific issue is that there are five 
years in which there are two main appropriations acts for the same fiscal year, before and 
after general elections.69 In all of these cases the appropriations figures were added 
because it became clear that the sum is more consistent with the prime ministerial 
appropriations in the years before and after.70  
                                                 
66 These appropriations set out the allowable expenditures of each department and are the statutory 
manifestation of the government’s budget statements. Thus, they are a reasonable reflection of the 
government’s priorities in particular years. It should also be noted that the annual appropriations bills only 
account for 25-30% of the government’s total expenditures; the majority of spending is incurred by 
standing or special appropriations set out by prior statute, e.g., pensions, benefits, and continuing payments 
to states or provinces.  
67 In prior years, the appropriations for the Cabinet Office are included under “Treasury and Subordinate 
Departments”, but without differentiation. 
68 In a few years (1952, 1953, 1955, 1964) Cabinet Office appropriations were stated in reply to 
parliamentary questions. In order to reconstruct the other amounts, I searched Hansard for statements of the 
cost of the Treasury excluding subordinate departments. This was found in the House of Commons Debates 
of March 17, 1953. These costs were £1280000 in 1951-52 and £1248000 in 1952-53. This allows us to 
have an approximation of the ratio between the Treasury and Cabinet Office budgets for the above years. I 
then linearly interpolated (and extrapolated) these ratios for the missing years and multiplied the 
interpolated ratios by the treasury budget. The imputed years are 1946 to 1951, 1954, 1956-1963, and 
1965-1968. 
69 1966, 1974, 1979, 2005, and 2010. For instance, in 1974, 1.021 million pounds was appropriated to the 
Cabinet Office in the February Appropriations Act and another 1.568 million pounds in Appropriations Act 
(no. 2) in July (both for FY1975). 
70 To continue the example, Cabinet Office appropriations for FY1974 are 2.270 million, FY1975 2.589 
million, FY1976 3.381 million. In gathering the data on the total amount of appropriations (as a control 
variable), the more consistent amount differed. In 1966, 1974, and 1979, the amount chosen is the post-
election appropriation. The latter two cases involved changes of both prime minister and party in power. In 
2005 and 2010 the total amount is the more consistent in the time series.    
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The final issue in collecting the appropriations data was particularly acute in 
Australia. The inclusion of temporary, ad-hoc line items within the DPMC clearly skews 
the trend of the variable in some cases.71 Excluding these items from the appropriations 
total creates a more consistent time series, and the items are arguably not indicative of the 
building of institutional capacity and autonomy that is theoretically relevant.72 While they 
do certainly speak to the role of DPMC as a central coordinating body and a key ‘go-to’ 
agency for running politically sensitive and urgent policy processes, they do not 
inherently represent institutionalized, stable resource structures serving Australian prime 
ministers.           
The appropriations data are transformed in certain ways to facilitate proper 
analysis. First, to account for inflation, I transformed appropriations using a Consumer 
Price Index inflator with 2003 as the reference point (that is, 2003 = 1). Second, for both 
comparative and ease of interpretation reasons, I standardize appropriations in many 
instances, particularly in regression analysis.73 Since the actual amounts are quite varied 
                                                 
71 For instance, the raw data shows a very large increase from FY1993 to FY1994: from 173.21 million to 
1.08 billion. It remained in the billions until FY2002, when it dropped back to 170 million. This is due to 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, which accounts for as much as eighty percent of the 
total in some years.  
This Commission was established in 1990 and was intended to provide robust and meaningful advice, 
advocacy, and service delivery functions to government concerning indigenous issues. It consisted of 
elected officials (representatives and an elected board) and an administrative section of civil servants. 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications
_Archive/CIB/cib0203/03cib29   
Other examples of this include the National Water Commission (FY2006 and 2007) and one-time payments 
to Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act Bodies. These are bodies under the Act which are set up 
by statute as separate legal and financial entities from the government or corporations in which the 
government has controlling interest. Examples from FY2012 include the Australian Sports Commission, 
the National Library of Australia, and the Australian Film, Television, and Radio School.  
72 In chapter seven, we do return to this question in discussing units within prime ministerial institutions. 
73 More precisely, each fiscal year’s appropriation is divided by the CPI Index value for that year, where 
2003 = 1. For example, the unadjusted PMI appropriation for FY1972-73 in Canada is $10,832,700. The 
adjusted PMI appropriation is 
1
𝑐𝑝𝑖2003
× 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑝𝑝 =
1
0.219
× 10,832,700 = $49,464,180. This reflects 
inflation and allows within-country comparisons. For across-case comparisons, this value is then 
standardized within-country because the adjusted appropriations level is not comparable across countries. 
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among the cases, directly comparing the unstandardized trends and interpreting the 
unstandardized regression coefficients across cases is problematic. As well, because the 
inflation-adjusted appropriations amounts are relative to 2003, their actual values are 
meaningless; standardizing the measure creates a more meaningful comparator.      
The discussion thus far explicates conceptual and methodological issues in 
utilizing appropriations to prime ministerial branches as a measure of institutional 
autonomy. Finally, then, I present the appropriations trends over time for each case. 
Figure 5.1, below, plots the appropriations time series for each country from 1946 to 
2015, adjusted for inflation as described earlier. For visualization purposes, both New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom trends are split into two periods. Dramatic shifts in 
these series, at 1990 in New Zealand and 2000 in the UK, make graphs of the whole 
trends visually misleading. These trends reveal significant variation in appropriations to 
prime ministerial branches across cases and over time. One of the key findings in this 
chapter is that the simple story of gradually increasing institutional resources is belied by 
the more complex patterns of change seen in the appropriations trends.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
The standardized version outputs the z-score, where =
𝑥𝑖− ?̅?
𝑠𝑑(𝑥)
 . This is the variable expressed in terms of 
standard deviations from the mean. So, the FY1972-73 CPI indexed and standardized appropriation is -
0.015.   
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Figure 5.1  
Appropriations to Prime Ministerial Branches, All Countries, 1946-2015 
 
Note: Figure shows budgeted appropriations to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (Australia 
and New Zealand), the Privy Council Office (Canada), and the Cabinet Office (UK). Amounts are in 
millions of the respective currencies, inflation-adjusted within country using a Consumer Price Index 
measure, with 2003 as the benchmark, i.e., amounts are relative to 2003 values.  
In Australia, no overall trend in appropriations emerges. Two different patterns are 
evident. First, there are periods where extreme spikes in appropriations occur: the mid-
1960s, early to mid-1970s, and the most recent two years. The earlier periods correspond 
to moments of extensive machinery of government change, especially in the 1970s, with 
dramatic economic and social policy upheaval undertaken by Gough Whitlam’s Labor 
government from 1972 to 1975. To recall, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
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itself was only established in 1971. In recent years, the DPMC has established new and 
institutionally expansive structures dealing with indigenous affairs (see chapter 8). 
Second, between these spikes, DPMC appropriations seem to follow a cyclical pattern in 
which appropriations are stable or incrementally increasing, reach a peak, then fall 
abruptly. This cycle characterizes much of the period from the mid-1970s to 2010.   
The New Zealand appropriations are divided into two periods in figure 5.1, from 
1946 to 1989 and from 1990 to 2015. This periodization reflects the establishment of the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in 1990, replacing the Prime Minister’s 
Department. In the pre-DPMC period, the post-war department was extraordinarily well-
resourced because of the significant burdens of transitioning to peacetime and inertia 
from the wartime context itself. From 1950 to the early 1970s, appropriations consistently 
remain very low. This changes in the 1970s and 1980s; appropriations in 1982, for 
instance, are almost seven times what they were ten years earlier. The establishment of 
the DPMC in 1990 produces another dramatic increase in appropriations. From 1990 to 
1993, they grow more than eight-fold. There is then a reduction in appropriations of 
almost forty percent, to a level which is relatively stable until the mid to late-2000s. Thus, 
while the prime ministerial branches in these countries are certainly better resourced and 
more institutionally autonomous than they were in 1946, the patterns of appropriations in 
Australia and New Zealand are much more volatile than our initial expectation of a more 
incremental process of institutionalization.  
In contrast, the Canadian case exhibits an appropriations trend that conforms more 
to expectations of gradual institutionalization. Appropriations to the Privy Council Office 
remain relatively low until the mid-1960s, after which they follow an incremental upward 
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trajectory.74 Although the trend fluctuates slightly and appears to have some periodic 
component, the overall direction is positive and there are no dramatic changes as seen in 
the Australian and New Zealand cases. The PCO at its peak of appropriations, from 2005 
to 2007, is eighteen times larger compared to forty years prior. Thus, the Canadian PCO 
presents in many ways the “model” case for institutional change in the prime ministerial 
branches: incremental yet, accumulated over time, of extraordinary magnitude. 
Finally, appropriations to the Cabinet Office in the United Kingdom follow a 
similar pattern to that observed in Canada, with one major exception. As the figure 
shows, appropriations in the UK remain at low levels until the early 1970s, and increase 
steadily afterwards.75 However, appropriations increase dramatically from 1999 to 2000 
(from 42.5 million GBP to 219.8 million, in nominal terms), so much so that the trends 
had to be plotted separately for ease of visualization.76 After 2000, the trend is still 
positive but the correlation between year and appropriations decreases (from 0.87 to 
0.70). As above, testing for structural breaks supports these observations. Thus, on the 
basis only of visual inspection of the appropriations trends, one should expect that the 
Canadian and UK cases will generally provide stronger support for the dynamic theories 
involving longer-term change over time: the public expectations and economic trends 
                                                 
74 This observation is borne out by a statistical test for structural breaks in a regression, the Chow Test, in 
this case of appropriations on year. With 1967 as the break point, the test result is statistically significant: 
the year coefficient is statistically different in the period to 1967 from the period after (F = 7.88, p = 0.006). 
The post-1967 coefficient is five times larger than the pre-1967 coefficient (1678.1 versus 346.7).         
75 It should be noted that the consistency of the trend before 1969 is due to the linear imputation of many of 
the values, as described above. Nonetheless, all of the ‘actual’ data points in this series support this 
interpretation of the overall trend.   
76 This dramatic increase is not reflected, however, in all of the information sources. The Cabinet Office 
departmental reports, for instance, indicate that expenditure outturn figures were 167 million for 1999 and 
170 million for 2000. Indeed, there are many discrepancies even between the annual department reports, 
reporting for the same periods. In the interest of consistency, the line-item appropriation figure is used here, 
even though it shows this considerable disjunction.   
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theories. The Australian and New Zealand cases should conform less strongly with 
expectations because they lack a clear longer-term positive trend over time.        
It is important to have a clear picture of how appropriations to the Westminster 
prime ministerial branches have varied over time. However, the above discussion does 
not necessarily reveal whether these appropriations have changed in relative terms. It 
could be the case that they simply reflect changes in government spending over time. 
That is, prime ministerial branch appropriations could simply be tracking overall 
spending trends. This is accounted for in the regression analysis below by controlling for 
both “government consumption” as a measure of central government activity, and total 
annual budget appropriations. Here, I demonstrate graphically that branch appropriations 
are not simply reflections of total appropriations. Figure 5.2 shows branch appropriations 
as a percentage of total budgetary appropriations for all four countries between 1946 and 
2015.  
Figure 5.2 
Appropriations to Prime Ministerial Branches, Percent of Total, All Countries, 1946-
2015 
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If branch appropriations were simply a function of total appropriations, the 
percentage of the latter that the former constitutes would remain constant over time. For 
example, if branch appropriations constituted one percent of total appropriations 
consistently for a period even as they increase by twenty percent during the period, one 
would conclude that the increase is due entirely to increasing total appropriations, not 
specifically prime ministerial branch appropriations. If these were distinct phenomena, 
however, the percentage would change over time in some meaningful way (presumably, 
related to the branch appropriations trend). The graphs clearly indicate that this is not the 
case in any of the countries. Indeed, the percentage trends mirror closely the 
appropriations trends presented in figure 5.1. The static and dynamic periods in the 
appropriations trends correspond in time with static and dynamic periods in the relative 
proportion that branch appropriations constitutes. The two are distinct phenomena, 
suggesting that they are driven by distinctive sets of factors. 
5.2 Empirical Expectations 
In chapter three, I presented several broad, theoretical expectations about how 
assertive citizenship, economic trends, and political conditions are related to prime 
ministerial branch institutionalization. In order to assess these theories empirically, I 
restate these expectations as they apply specifically to appropriations to prime ministerial 
branches. These hypotheses are summarized in table 5.1, and elaborated below.    
Table 5.1  
Summary of Hypotheses for Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations 
 
Theory of Public Expectations 
H1. As aggregate interest in politics increases, appropriations to prime ministerial 
branches increase. 
H2. As aggregate identification with political parties weakens, appropriations to prime 
ministerial branches increase. 
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H3. As the aggregate assertiveness of political cultures increases, appropriations to prime 
ministerial branches increase. 
 
Economic Factors 
H4. As a country’s level of globalization increases, appropriations to its prime ministerial 
branch increases. 
H5. As central government activity increases, appropriations to prime ministerial 
branches increase. 
 
Political Conditions 
H6a. Prime ministerial branch appropriations decrease as terms continue. 
H6b. Prime ministerial branch appropriations increase as terms continue. 
H7. The more legislative support a prime minister has, the greater the appropriations to 
prime ministerial branches.  
H8. Prime ministerial branch appropriations are lower under more conservative prime 
ministers than under more liberal prime ministers. 
 
 
First, the core proposition of the Theory of Public Expectations is that assertive 
political citizenship creates conditions that incentivize prime ministerial branch 
institutionalization. As assertive citizenship becomes more predominant, the power of 
prime ministers to control political messaging, advance a political and policy agenda, and 
deliver on policy change declines. Coupled with a growing lack of trust in and perceived 
legitimacy of political actors generally, prime ministers face significant, new pressures to 
build their institutional capacity in response. One way they do so is to augment the 
budgetary resources of their support structures.  
As discussed in chapter four, I operationalize assertive citizenship in three 
indicators, using electoral survey data. The process of constructing these variables was 
discussed in the previous chapter and, in further detail, in appendix A3. These three 
variables are levels of interest in politics, where high interest reflects more assertiveness; 
second, strength of party identification, where lower (weaker) identification reflects a 
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higher assertive orientation; and third, a constructed index of assertiveness, where by 
construction higher index values indicate higher assertiveness. In this chapter, then, the 
hypothesized relationships between these measures and appropriations to prime 
ministerial branches are as follows:         
 H1. As aggregate interest in politics increases, appropriations to prime 
 ministerial branches  increase. 
 H2. As aggregate identification with political parties weakens, appropriations to 
 prime ministerial branches increase. 
 H3. As the aggregate assertiveness of political cultures increases, appropriations 
 to prime ministerial branches increase. 
I also articulate several sets of alternatives to the Public Expectations hypotheses, 
drawn from the literature and the discussion in chapter three. The first looks to change 
over time in macroeconomic structures in advanced democracies. In particular, I assess 
the institutional impact of two significant trends of the post-war period: globalization and 
growth in government economic activity. Globalization, the increasing social, economic, 
and political integration and interdependence of countries and economies, arguably drives 
institutionalization because it pressures prime ministers to respond to and countermand 
the “withering of the state”, generates new pressures to coordinate and implement policy 
decisions, and raises the symbolic stature of prime ministers on the international stage. 
Second, all advanced economies took on new responsibilities for social welfare 
and maintaining economic growth in the post-second world war period (though unevenly 
and to varying extents). In fiscal terms, this implies that a larger proportion of a country’s 
total economic output would be taken up by government spending. This change generates 
a significantly more complex, more contested and more difficult public policy process 
requiring greater coordination, oversight, and attention to outcomes. To the extent that the 
centre of government is inherently best positioned to perform these functions, the 
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institutional impact of growth in government activity is growth in the centre’s resources.     
These relationships are expressed as follows:     
 H4. As a country’s level of globalization increases, appropriations to its prime 
 ministerial branch increases. 
 H5. As central government activity increases, appropriations to prime ministerial 
 branches increase. 
Finally, because prime ministers are political actors it is reasonable to expect that 
short-term political considerations would enter into their decisional calculus. I identified 
three aspects of the political context in which prime ministers make decisions that seem 
directly relevant to appropriations to prime ministerial branches: term effects, legislative 
support, and ideology.77 Term effects refer to when, during a prime ministerial term, the 
appropriations decision occurs. On the one hand, experience suggests that new 
governments usually seek to establish control over the political and policy direction of 
government, bolstered by the salience of electoral or leadership promises and the political 
capital that a change or renewal of democratic legitimacy provides. Prime ministers will 
want to ‘put their stamp’ on government for both substantive and symbolic purposes. 
However, as the term continues, the decreased salience of promises, the diminishment of 
political capital, and the constant flow of new issues and problems to be dealt with will 
erode the ability and willingness of prime ministers to make significant institutional 
change. This suggests a diminishing relationship between years in a prime ministerial 
term and appropriations, as follows:      
 H6a. Prime ministerial branch appropriations decrease as terms continue. 
                                                 
77 By short-term we mean effects that do not systematically vary with time across our time period (1946-
2015), but with the cycles of political events, e.g., elections.  
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 Alternatively, prime ministers may need some time in office to assess the 
conditions for prime ministerial leadership, and their own position. While prime ministers 
may be at their political peak at the outset of a term, they may have less confidence when 
confronted by an entrenched public service, and risk being overwhelmed by the 
complexity of the machinery of government and the public policy problems facing them. 
While incumbent prime ministers may not share these issues, it may still be the case that 
policy change, rather than institutional change, is prioritized in the beginning of a prime 
ministerial term, with institutional change only considered once governments settle into 
office. Thus, rather than declining, appropriations might instead increase as terms 
continue. An alternative sixth hypothesis is thus that:  
 H6b. Prime ministerial branch appropriations increase as terms continue. 
A second political condition is the legislative support that a government has. I 
expect that governments with greater seat share or majority status appropriate more 
resources to prime ministerial institutions.78 Unlike in the US case, where legislative 
bargaining with Congress is seen as the key driver of presidential institutionalization 
(Dickinson and Lebo 2007), prime ministers in Westminster systems are structurally 
more legislatively secure; their ‘fight’ is with the civil service, other actors in the political 
executive, and the public at large. Regardless of the legislative support they have, all 
prime ministers confront the difficulties of complex, entrenched, and often unwieldy 
bureaucracies, and the imperatives of pushing a government agenda forward and 
communicating this agenda to the public. However, more highly supported prime 
                                                 
78 The latter we test only in Canada because in Australia and the UK there are not enough non-majority 
observations and in New Zealand majority status is perfectly correlated with the ‘structural break’ of 
electoral reform in 1993. Even in Canada the minority observations are low and associated with particular 
periods, creating a lack of variation. Thus, in the analysis we strongly emphasize the seat share measure.  
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ministers are less constrained by the need to satisfy other parties, coalition partners, or 
their own caucus. Thus, they are arguably freer to embark on change in the machinery of 
government, including the building of their own institutional capacities. These 
considerations are captured in hypothesis 7: 
 H7. The more legislative support a prime minister has, the greater the 
 appropriations to prime ministerial branches.  
Finally, ideology is expected to play an important role. I probe whether there is a 
significant relationship between ideology and appropriations, whereby conservative 
prime ministers will appropriate resources less than their liberal counterparts. While the 
above logic about pressures on prime ministers applies equally to left and right, right-of-
centre ideologies favour smaller government in general (at least in practice), and limiting 
the growth or decreasing the size of the bureaucratic machinery in particular. They want 
government to do less, and less government to do less with. Thus, more conservative 
prime ministers have ideological and pragmatic reasons to be somewhat less enthusiastic 
about growing the prime ministerial branch. In such cases they will not choose to 
increase appropriations, or will do so at lower levels than other prime ministers. This 
proposition is captured in hypothesis 8. 
 H8. Prime ministerial branch appropriations are lower under more conservative 
 prime  ministers than under more liberal prime ministers. 
In sum, these eight hypotheses represent the core of my inquiry, and form the foundation 
for the empirical analysis below. 
 5.3 Preliminary Assessments 
I turn now to examining the evidence for these eight fundamental hypotheses. 
This section sets up the primary analysis in later sections of the chapter by exploring the 
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data and presenting some preliminary assessments of the hypotheses. It uses basic 
descriptive statistical techniques and visualization. This serves two purposes. First, it 
relates information about the summary characteristics of variables and their relationship 
with appropriations. This is, in my view, an underappreciated step in analysis because it 
offers readers greater ability to assess how variable distributions affect their estimated 
impacts. Simply offering a table of summary statistics (which is additionally included in 
the study’s appendix A2) sometimes underplays the extent to which variables may be 
skewed or otherwise distributed non-normally. 
The second reason for engaging in preliminary exploration is to provide a ‘first 
cut’ at determining whether these hypotheses are supported by the data. Although the 
effects of other variables are not controlled for, the apparent relationships demonstrated 
in this section serve to provide a comparative baseline for further analysis. The theories 
and hypotheses in this study are highly original; they do not directly build from previous 
empirical tests in the literature. Because of this study’s exploratory aspect, descriptive 
analysis is helpful in building expectations against which more rigorous investigation can 
be set. 
As the Theory of Public Expectations is the primary theory, I focus on its 
associated hypotheses. I briefly examine the alternative explanations concerning 
economic trends and political conditions. The first Public Expectations hypothesis 
associates political interest, as a measure of assertive citizenship, with prime ministerial 
branch appropriations. Higher levels of political interest indicate higher assertiveness, so 
we expect a positive relationship. Bivariate correlations for this and the other assertive 
measures are given in appendix table A5.1, and visualizations of these associations are 
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plotted in appendix figures A5.1 through A5.3. This evidence suggests that the expected 
relationship between interest and appropriations, where high values of political interest 
correspond to high appropriations, is not evident in all cases; Canada is the most positive 
case. In both Canada, as a whole, and in the United Kingdom prior to 2000, the 
relationships are relatively linear and in the hypothesized positive direction: the 
correlations for the two cases are r = 0.72 and r = 0.76, respectively. However, after 2000, 
the linearity of the points is not very strong; this is confirmed by the lack of a statistically 
significant correlation (r = 0.21, p  = 0.44).79  
Thus, in only one case, Canada, is there a strong prima facie for the hypothesis 
connecting political interest and appropriations. In the United Kingdom, the relationship 
is evident in the pre-Blair period, while the last fifteen years, since 2000, do not provide 
such evidence. In the other cases, the relationship is far less evident. For Australia, the 
association between interest and appropriations appears to be absent. The same 
conclusion can be made for New Zealand both over the whole period, and before and 
after the establishment of the DPMC in 1990. Bear in mind, however, that the plots only 
visualize the contemporaneous association of the variables, without dynamic elements 
such as lags and long-run effects. 
Is party identification associated with prime ministerial branch appropriations? 
Hypothesis H2 posits a negative relationship, so weaker party identification should be 
associated with greater appropriations and vice versa. Again, the Canadian and pre-2000 
UK cases exhibit the strongest evidence for such a relationship. In Canada, there is a 
clear negative association, although the observations are not tightly clustered around a 
linear fit line, were one drawn; the correlation statistic is moderate (-0.56). The pre-2000 
                                                 
79 That is, the average error between the points and a best linear fit line is relatively large. 
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UK plot also demonstrates an apparent negative association between party identification 
and appropriations, although more ‘curvilinear’ than in Canada. Weaker levels of party 
identification have a strong linear negative association with appropriations while stronger 
levels exhibit a ‘flatter’ relationship, suggesting an asymmetric effect. The association, 
however, is not present in the post-2000 period (r = -0.38). 
In Australia, the bivariate relationship between party identification and 
appropriations is not demonstrated. In New Zealand, while the overall association is 
strongly negative, this is driven by clustering of pre- and post-1990 observations. After 
the establishment of the DPMC in 1990, the association between strength of party 
identification and appropriations is not evident. Thus, support for the party identification 
hypothesis shows a similar pattern to political interest: clearly supportive in the Canada 
and pre-2000 UK data and not supportive in Australia and the UK since 2000. In New 
Zealand, the evidence favours a relationship between party identification and 
appropriations before 1990 but not since.       
A third indicator of assertive citizenship is the Assertive Index, constructed from 
surveys over time. The index aggregates many values and attitudes that represent the 
range of areas where assertive citizenship differs from allegiant citizenship. Once again, 
observations of the Canadian prime ministerial branch show unequivocal support for the 
hypothesis. A linear, positive relationship is definitively shown, although the dispersion 
in the observations suggests a degree of heteroskedasticity. The evidence also suggests 
that in Australia there is a small but meaningful positive association between 
appropriations and the index; the correlation is moderately strong (r = 0.51, p = 0.00). By 
contrast, the New Zealand plot shows no evidence that the two are related.     
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 Finally, the plots and correlations of UK Cabinet Office appropriations against the 
assertive index present an interesting counterpoint. In contrast to what we observed for 
the political interest and party identification measures, the pre-2000 period shows a 
relationship opposite to expectations. The association has a clear negative direction; the 
correlation of -0.59 is robust. Meanwhile, the post-2000 plot suggests a positive  
association, but one or two of the observations seem to have strong influence on the 
correlation. As with the other UK measures, then, differential effects of assertive 
citizenship on appropriations based on period are suggested. I assess this in the regression 
analysis below through various means, including a period dummy variable, interaction of 
this dummy with the assertive measures, and separate models.           
 The preceding observations do not directly reflect the temporality of the Theory 
of Public Expectations. At its core, the theory concerns the effects of social change on 
institutional change. These changes take place over time, and so the theory is a story 
about how social change generates institutional change as a function of time. How do the 
assertive citizenship measures and prime ministerial branch appropriations change as 
functions over time? The regression models account for these dynamics in certain ways. 
Here, I examine whether these trends move together over time, based on the time series 
plots in the chapter’s appendix, figure A5.4.      
These visualizations of change over time largely support the observations above. 
Political interest increases together with appropriations relatively closely in the Canadian 
case and in the United Kingdom, prior to 2000. The congruence of the trends in Canada is 
especially evident since the mid-1980s; in the latter, since the early 1980s. Over the 
whole period, both political interest and appropriations begin relatively low and end at or 
161 
 
near their peaks. In Australia, political interest rises markedly in the mid-1980s to mid-
1990s, fluctuating since, but appropriations have not consistently trended until, perhaps, 
the mid-2000s. In New Zealand, again, there is little evidence of covariance across time; 
indeed, New Zealanders have not become noticeably more politically interested over 
time.  
Party identification is a more complex story, perhaps because of the three 
measures it is the most tied up in electoral politics. While in all of the countries, party 
identification has weakened overall since the 1960s or 1970s, the trends are not as 
straightforward. In Canada, for instance, the period in which party identification drops 
the most noticeably, from about 1980 to 2005, is also a period in which appropriations 
generally trend upward. However, the identification trend is erratic so it is unlikely to be 
strongly temporally covarying with appropriations. Outside of this period, party 
identification appears to show a positive relationship with appropriations, contrary to 
expectations. Australia is a similar case: party identification weakens considerably until 
after 2000, a period in which appropriations do not trend much either way; both trends 
increase after this point. Clear associations between party identification and 
appropriations in the expected negative direction are not shown in New Zealand or the 
UK, either. Thus, in accounting for time, it appears the party identification hypothesis is 
not well supported. 
The time series plots for the Assertive Index support earlier observations: the 
index and appropriations trend together very closely in Canada and relatively closely in 
Australia. In the UK, the earlier finding of a differential association between the pre- and 
post-2000 period is confirmed here. Assertiveness and appropriations diverge from about 
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1980: Britons became less assertive for the next two decades, while appropriations 
increased. In New Zealand, there is no visual evidence of a temporal co-variance between 
assertiveness and appropriations. To summarize, then, the evidence in this section 
provides both supporting and contrary evidence for the public expectations hypotheses. 
Only in the Canadian case is there strong supporting evidence for the hypotheses broadly. 
Among the other cases the evidence is much more mixed, and in New Zealand there is 
little to substantiate the hypotheses, especially in terms of the post-1990 period.  
Finally, I briefly examine the alternative hypotheses identified earlier. In chapter 
three, I identified and described two sets of explanations as alternatives to the Theory of 
Public Expectations, economic trends and political conditions, and articulated specific 
hypotheses earlier in this chapter. The first, H4, is that globalization is positively 
associated with prime ministerial branch appropriations. The second, H5, posits that 
government activity is also positively associated with appropriations to prime ministerial 
branches. The second set of explanations considers the effects of the short-term political 
conditions under which prime ministers operate on appropriations decisions, specifically, 
time of occurrence in a prime minister’s term, legislative support, and ideology.  
Is globalization positively associated with prime ministerial branch 
appropriations? Like the assertive measures, both globalization and appropriations should 
vary systematically over time. Both measures of globalization, the KOF Index and trade 
openness, trend upward over time, although the index plateaus after 2000 in all cases. 
This suggests that the two cases where the upward trend in appropriations is most 
evident, Canada and the UK, should be the most supportive. Indeed, the correlations for 
Canada and the UK are quite high (r = 0.82 and 0.70, respectively), and the 
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correspondence between the trends over time is especially striking in the Canadian case. 
In Australia, the correlation is negative and not statistically significant. Excluding outliers 
in the Australian data reduces the magnitude of the negative association but it remains 
anomalous. The correlations between trade openness and appropriations tell a similar 
story, though in Australia the correlation is still relatively low (r = 0.36) but now 
significant, likely a result of more (earlier) observations. Finally, in New Zealand the 
correlation is again affected by clustering; in the period since the DPMC was established, 
the association is not significant. Thus, the theoretical expectations for the globalization 
hypothesis are better met in the Canadian and UK cases than in Australia and New 
Zealand.    
The government activity hypothesis posits that government spending will be 
positively associated with prime ministerial branch appropriations: as activity increases, 
appropriations increase in similar fashion. The descriptive evidence for this is mixed. In 
two cases, Australia and Canada, there are positive, statistically significant associations 
(Australia, r = 0.31, Canada, r = 0.84). However, in New Zealand the correlation is 
positive (0.11) but not significant, while in the UK the correlation is negative (-0.12) but 
also not significant. In these two cases, there is clear clustering of points. These findings 
reflect the fact that government activity in Australia and Canada follows the expected 
increasing trend over time with only slight departures, while the trends in New Zealand 
and the UK follow a much different pattern. In both, activity rises sharply between 1960 
and 1980 but falls just as sharply in the next two decades. One reason for this is that both 
cases adopted aspects of new public management and budget austerity to an extent not 
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evident in Australia and Canada. Thus, there should be government activity effects in the 
latter but not in New Zealand or the UK. 
Then, I turn to the political conditions hypotheses. These hypotheses set out ways 
in which prime ministerial branch appropriations are impacted by aspects of the political 
contexts within which prime ministers operate. H6, the term effect hypothesis, posits that 
appropriations are a function of the elapsing of prime ministerial terms, either increasing 
or decreasing during terms. Descriptively, neither directional hypothesis is unequivocally 
supported; there does not appear to be any consistent, systematic relationship. Analysis of 
variance tests show that in three of the four cases, excepting New Zealand, the 
differences between term years is statistically significant at different significance levels.80  
This tells us that change in prime ministerial branch appropriations is not equal across the 
term on average in these cases, but does not provide evidence for any directionality. Thus, 
the evidence supports neither of the term effect hypotheses.  
The second political conditions hypothesis posits that legislative support is 
positively associated with change in prime ministerial branch appropriations. However, 
there does not appear to be any relationship between the two in terms of seat share. 
Correlations are very low to negligible; none are statistically significant. An alternative 
measure of legislative support, the dichotomous measure of whether a government has a 
majority, is assessed only in the Canadian case, where a difference of means test shows 
no significant difference between average change in appropriations in majority versus 
non-majority governments.  
                                                 
80 Australia, F = 3.70, p = 0.02; Canada, F = 2.22, p = 0.08; UK, F = 4.68, p = 0.00; UK w/o imputed 
results, F = 2.97, 0.04 
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Finally, H8 proposes that conservative prime ministers will appropriate resources 
at lower levels than liberal prime ministers. This hypothesis is tested with two different 
measures. The first uses Manifesto Research on Political Representation data on party 
election platforms. Matching this data against change in appropriations suggests that 
ideology is not meaningfully related to change in appropriations. This is confirmed by the 
correlations, which are low and not significant for any of the cases. The second measure 
is a dichotomous indicator of whether the prime minister’s party is a “centre-left” party or 
a “centre-right” party.81 However, none of the mean differences between party types is 
significant and, in three of the four cases, the centre-right average is actually higher than 
the centre-left average. Therefore, the political conditions hypotheses are not supported 
by the descriptive analysis here.  
5.4 Regression Model Specification and Estimation 
This section and the next constitute the main empirical test of the hypotheses 
about determinants of prime ministerial branch appropriations. In this section, I explain 
and justify the model specification and estimation process for the regression analyses in 
the subsequent section (and those in chapter six). These are the main tests of the model of 
prime ministerial branch institutionalization elaborated in previous chapters.  
Thus far, I have introduced the Theory of Public Expectations, and two alternative 
views, framed them in terms of a dynamic causal model, and derived specific empirical 
hypotheses about determinants of appropriations. This is about as far as theory can go in 
terms of specifying regression models. While theory guides the basic choices of variables 
                                                 
81 The centre-left parties are the Australian Labor Party in Australia, the Liberal Party in Canada, the 
Labour Party in New Zealand, and the UK Labour Party. The centre-right parties are the Liberal Party in 
Australia, the Progressive Conservative or Conservative parties in Canada, the National Party in New 
Zealand, and the Conservative Party in the UK. 
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to include and the basic modeling setup, it is often not an adequate guide for 
specification, especially in time series setups. As de Boef and Keele (2008, 186) argue, 
theories “typically tell us only generally how inputs relate to processes we care about”. In 
dynamic specifications, the role of theory is to focus attention on the idea that the “past 
matters”. It is difficult to envision a theory of politics so precise as to dictate “which lags 
matter, whether levels or changes drive Yt, what characterizes equilibrium behaviour, or 
what effects are likely to be biggest in the long run” (186). This is not unique to dynamic 
specifications, although it may be more acute; analysts always make certain modeling 
decisions that are not strictly theory-driven but responses to violations of statistical 
assumptions.82  
The most important characteristic of the study’s data is that many of the crucial 
variables are time-variant, that is, they form time series. This is incorporated in our causal 
model, in which we treat these variables differently from variables that are not time 
series. Time series data poses particular problems for analysis. Analysts must “take time 
seriously” by modeling the dynamics in the first place (de Boef and Keele 2008). As well, 
key assumptions of the classical linear model, particularly error independence and 
constant error variance, are likely to be violated in time series data.83 Additionally, the 
correlation between two variables that vary over time may appear strong, but is in fact 
spurious; there is no true relationship between the variables but they share an association 
with time so they appear related. In order to make valid inferences about dynamic 
                                                 
82 For example, aggregating or dropping variables because of multicollinearity, transforming variables to 
account for non-linearity, or excluding outliers. These decisions are sometimes retroactively given a 
theoretical interpretation but often they are clearly based on statistical necessity.    
83 These violations generally do not bias the coefficients themselves but do underestimate standard errors, 
which causes incorrect significance tests on those coefficients. 
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relationships, these issues should be accounted for. The rest of this section describes this 
accounting.         
The first issue is serial correlation. Serial correlation is simply when errors are 
correlated across time: a common case is when error at one time point is correlated with 
error at the next time point (Pickup 2015, 12). This is called ‘first-order’ 
autocorrelation.84 In time series data, serial correlation is often not due to measurement 
error but has substantive meaning (Pickup 2015, 92). The correlation occurs because the 
value of variables at one point in time is a function of their values at other (previous) 
points in time. Thus, we can model the correlation by using lagged terms such as lagged 
dependent variables (which often minimizes residual autocorrelation), introducing a 
dynamic element, rather than simply ‘fixing’ it.   
Time series analysis also encounters the issue of stationarity. A stationary variable 
is one whose mean and variance are constant over time and in which the covariance 
between two time points depends only on the distance of lag (potentially) and not on the 
actual time (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2014, 125). A stationary time series has no memory; 
by definition, changes cannot persist because the series must return to equilibrium. 
Conversely, for a nonstationary, or integrated, variable, the mean and variance change 
over time; in theory, they wander infinitely far as time passes. The impact of changes in a 
time series can persist into the future. Stationarity is important for several reasons. 
Statistical tests used to determine the statistical significance of estimated coefficients, for 
                                                 
84 Economic time series often have fourth-order autocorrelation in seasonal data or twelfth-order 
autocorrelation in monthly data. ‘Autocorrelation’ refers to a variable that correlates with itself, of which 
serial correlation is a specific type. One way of treating this issue is simply to ‘ignore’ it by correcting it 
post-hoc. However, an opportunity is missed by treating misspecification errors like serial correlation as 
“nuisances” to be corrected by alternative estimation techniques or by manipulating standard errors in a 
static model (e.g., Prais-Winsten regression or OLS with Newey-West standard errors). As Beck and Katz 
(2011, 341) note, doing so is both inefficient and still produces incorrect standard errors. 
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instance, depend on certain asymptotic properties that are not satisfied under non-
stationarity. Stationarity is also important because regressing one nonstationary variable 
on another without accounting for it can lead to spurious inferences about their 
relationship. In the time series context, two variables can ‘move together’ across time 
without actually being related. To substantiate proper inferences about the long-run 
relationship between two nonstationary variables, one needs to test for and include a 
model term that renders the relationship between them stationary.    
The analysis below, and in the next chapter, uses error correction models (ECMs) 
to specify and estimate the parameters of interest. “Error correction” means that the 
model provides a direct estimate of how quickly the long-term equilibrium relationship 
between outcome and explanatory variables is restored after the short-term impact of a 
change in explanatory variables (de Boef and Keele 2008, 189). These models are general 
in that they can be applied to both stationary and non-stationary data (Box-Steffensmeier 
et al. 2014, 171; Pickup 2015, 191), although they have traditionally been limited to 
situations where cointegration exists (de Boef and Keele 2008). ECMs are designed to 
“account for the nonstationary nature of the data by allowing for the possibility of a long-
run relationship, while also investigating whether short-term perturbations are related” 
(Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2014, 157). They allow analysts to estimate both the 
instantaneous effects of variables and the amount of persistence in a variable’s effect after 
the instantaneous effect; together, these effects constitute a variable’s total impact on the 
dependent variable. The general form of the ECM for one independent variable is as 
follows, from Pickup (2015, 185): 
∆𝑦𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛾(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝜅1𝑥𝑡−1) + 𝜅0∆𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
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In this form, the estimate of 𝛾 is the error correction rate, 𝜅0is the short-run 
(instantaneous) effect of the variable, and 𝜅1the long-run impact of the variable. Note that 
the ECM is a differenced model: the dependent variable and the short-run effects are 
differences, not levels. This is because of the non-stationarity of the variables; tests for 
stationarity of the dependent variable, prime ministerial branch appropriations, show that 
in none of the four countries is the variable stationary.85 The model’s dynamic variables 
are also all non-stationary. As long as the error correction model satisfactorily eliminates 
residual autocorrelation and heteroskedastic errors, estimates can be obtained via 
ordinary least squares regression. The models thus estimate three parameters of interest.  
First, they produce estimates of the error correction rate. Recall that the error 
correction model posits a long-term equilibrium relationship between the dependent 
variable, appropriations, and the dynamic independent variables included in the model. 
However, short-run changes in the independent variables can produce ‘shocks’ to the 
dependent variable such that the equilibrium relationship is disturbed. The error 
correction rate is an estimate of how much of the divergence from equilibrium is 
corrected or eliminated in each period (year). Theoretically, it suggests the ‘stickiness’ of 
the variable relationships. Normally, it should fall between 0 and -1, where -1 indicates 
that 100 percent of the disequilibrium is corrected in one year. A slower rate of error 
correction, for example, -0.5, indicates that the adjustment to equilibrium occurs over 
multiple years. A very slow error correction rate, close to 0, means that shocks caused by 
independent variable changes persist for many years, which is indicative of a ‘sluggish’ 
process. An estimate less than -1 may mean that the system ‘overcorrects’, i.e., that the 
                                                 
85 Results are given in the study’s appendix table A5.1.  
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return to equilibrium occurs in a fractional period, or that the variables actually do not 
converge on a long-term equilibrium. 
Second, the short-run effects are the instantaneous (or lagged) impact of changes 
in the independent variables on the dependent variable. Since the short-run variables are 
period-differenced, the estimated coefficients indicate how much a one-unit difference in 
the year-on-year change in independent variables affects year-on-year change in the 
dependent variable, on average. For instance, if the short-run coefficient on ∆𝑥𝑡 is 0.5, 𝑦𝑡 
changes 0.5 units per year on average for every one unit change in ∆𝑥𝑡 , e.g., the 
difference between an increase of four units of x per year versus three units of x per year. 
In the models, there are also ‘exogenous’ parameters, the political conditions, that are 
constrained to having only short-run effects because the theory expects them to not have 
long-run, persistent effects; they are not time-variant but periodic. Since they are 
stationary by definition, they are not differenced. Thus, these short-run effects can be 
interpreted much as normal regression coefficients are.         
 Finally, the long-run effects of the dynamic variables indicate the ‘total’ effect of 
the variables distributed across time. These effects indicate the relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable in equilibrium, in level form. In other 
words, while short-run effects are about year-on-year change, long-run effects more 
directly attest to the question of whether high levels of assertive citizenship, for example, 
are significantly related to high levels of branch appropriations, or vice versa. This is 
precisely the advantage of error correction models in dealing with time series: they 
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produce estimates of both short and long-run effects, as well as the speed with which the 
long-run equilibrium is restored after short-run disturbances.86      
I estimate separate error correction models for each of the three public 
expectations variables of political interest, party identification, and the assertive index, 
for all four countries. In each model, I include the economic trend and total 
appropriations variables. As well, each model includes the political conditions variables 
as ‘exogenous’, deterministic variables. In the models for New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom, I include dummy variables to account for the discontinuity in the 
appropriations trend, at 1990 and 2000, respectively, where applicable. Although I did not 
specify hypotheses for any interaction effects in the models, for interest’s sake I also 
estimate models that include variables interacting public expectations with political 
conditions. This would indicate whether the effects of assertive citizenship are different 
in different political contexts such as ideology. As mentioned earlier, I also estimate the 
interaction between the public expectations variables and the period dummy variable in 
the UK case to assess if their effects are significantly different before and after 2000.   
As post-estimation checks, I run various tests for heteroskedasticity and residual 
autocorrelation, the results of which are given in the chapter appendix table A5.6. 
Additionally, I report a number of model goodness of fit measures and the results of the 
                                                 
86 Modeling the process of appropriations change in error correction form also has the advantage of 
minimizing multicollinearity. In level form, many of the dynamic regressors – that is, assertive citizenship, 
globalization, government activity, and total appropriations – exhibit very high collinearity. When this is 
the case, inferences about the independent effects of regressors are incorrect because the standard errors of 
coefficient estimates are inflated (though not biased), increasing the probability of Type II errors. 
Essentially, disentangling the effects of highly intercorrelated variables is difficult because they share the 
proportion of the dependent variable explained. However, in difference form, correlations among variables 
are drastically reduced. For example, in the Canada data, several of the pairwise correlations between 
variables are in the 0.70-0.80 range, while the highest correlation in difference form is -0.56, and most are 
much smaller. This greatly simplifies model specification and presentation because it reduces the number 
of separate models needed.      
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Bounds Test procedure of Pesaran et al. (2000). This is a significance test of whether, in 
an error correction model, there is in fact a long-run relationship among all of the 
independent variables and the dependent variable in level form: the null hypothesis is no 
such relationship. The models were estimated in Stata, a statistical program, with the 
user-written command ardl, which has an option to estimate in error correction form. As 
above, since we do not have sufficient theory to specify variable lags, the optimal lag 
structure is found using the Akaike Information Criterion.87 Time trend variables were 
included only in the Canadian and the pre-2000 UK cases, the only appropriations time 
series that seemed to suggest a clear linear trend.  
5.5 Regression Results 
 To what extent are prime ministerial branch appropriations determined by public 
expectations, economic trends, and political conditions? To answer this question, this 
section presents the results from the model estimation process described in the previous 
section. The results are extracted from the full regression results tables provided in the 
chapter’s appendix tables A5.2 through A5.5, by country. I explicate the overall 
performance of the models and then examine the results pertaining to the specific 
hypotheses.  
 In terms of overall model performance, there is a great deal of variability in how 
well the models explain change in prime ministerial branch appropriations and the extent 
to which dynamics are present. Overall, all of the models explain a relatively large 
proportion of variation in the dependent variable, but this is to be expected given the 
inclusion of lagged dependent variables. In examining the goodness of fit measures, no 
single type of model performs better than the other models across the board. In Australia, 
                                                 
87 The optimal lag structure is the one that minimizes this criterion. 
173 
 
both the political interest and assertive index models perform better than the party 
identification model. In Canada, the party identification and assertive index models 
perform marginally better than the political interest model, but the results are nearly 
identical. For the post-1990 New Zealand models, the political interest model performs 
best, but the assertive index model performs best overall. Finally, in the UK the assertive 
index model produces the best overall fit, but performs worse than the party identification 
model in the pre-2000 models. Overall, the models that measure public expectations 
through the assertive index exhibit greater model fit than the others, but not markedly so.   
 For the most part, the choice of the error correction structure to model 
appropriations is supported by post-estimation tests and tests for the existence of long-run 
relationships. In most cases, the model residuals are serially uncorrelated and show 
constant error variance, within statistical significance levels. However, the overall United 
Kingdom models exhibited statistically significant heteroskedasticity, attributable to the 
larger error variance after 2000: in the pre-2000 models, the errors are unproblematic. In 
a few models, tests for serial correlation conflicted, but in only one model was serial 
correlation clearly evident; in New Zealand model (5), additional lags were included to 
reduce the statistic to insignificance.  Finally, the Bounds Test for long-run relationships 
introduced by Pesaran et al. (2001) is conclusive in many models and inconclusive in 
some others.88  
 To recall, the error correction coefficient estimates the ‘speed of adjustment’ in 
the model: how quickly the long-term equilibrium relationship between independent and 
                                                 
88 The test provides upper and lower critical values in an F-distribution depending on the number of long-
run parameters in the model. If the F-statistic is greater than the upper critical value at a chosen level of 
statistical significance, one rejects the null hypothesis that there is no long-run levels relationship. If it falls 
below the lower critical value, one accepts the null hypothesis that all variables have only short-run effects. 
If it falls between the two, the test is inconclusive. 
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dependent variables is restored after short-term shocks caused by changes in independent 
variables. While many of the estimated error correction terms are within the nominal 
range of 0 to -1, and nearly all are statistically significant, there are indications of 
overcorrection in several models. This means that instead of converging to equilibrium, 
there is ‘cyclic divergence’; the system does not directly return to a steady state but 
“fluctuates around the long-run value in a dampening manner” (Narayan and Smyth 
2005, 339). This is evident in New Zealand and the pre-2000 United Kingdom models 
especially. Additional lags and more time points would possibly return these models to 
within nominal bounds, but this is not possible with the data at hand. In Canada, the error 
correction coefficients suggest a well-behaved process in which about 50 percent of the 
effects of short-term shocks are corrected in one year. In Australia, the speed of 
adjustment is much faster: 90 percent in the political interest model, 70 percent in the 
assertive index model. This suggests that appropriations are more ‘sticky’ and 
incrementally responsive to short-term changes in Canada than in Australia, where 
shocks are more quickly absorbed.    
 The long-run and short-run coefficient estimates for the public expectations 
indicators – political interest, party identification, and the assertive index – are 
reproduced from the appendix tables in table 5.2, below. Even though we observed strong 
bivariate correlations for political interest in Canada and in the UK before 2000 above, 
this is not borne out in the regression estimates. Political interest does not appear to have 
any long-run relationship with prime ministerial branch appropriations. Short-run effects 
of political interest are significant in Australia (-0.41, p < 0.05) and in the overall New 
Zealand model (-0.37, p < 0.05). The signs on these coefficients do not indicate negative 
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effects but that the short-run effects are larger than the cumulative long-run effect 
(Kennedy 2005, 82). The short-run effects indicate that in both Australia and New 
Zealand, moving from, say, the mean yearly difference in interest to a one standard 
deviation’s difference in interest is expected to increase change in appropriations by 
about four-tenths of a standard deviation. However, the overall impact of political interest 
is not significant.       
Table 5.2 
Effects of Assertive Citizenship on Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations  
 Australia Canada New Zealand United Kingdom 
   All Post-1990 All Pre-2000 
Long-Run       
Political Interest  0.10 
(0.25) 
0.41 
(0.33) 
0.16 
(0.11) 
-0.19 
(0.23) 
-0.34 
(0.19) 
-0.32* 
(0.11) 
Strength PID -0.21* 
(0.09) 
-0.31** 
(0.10) 
-0.78** 
(0.26) 
0.53 
(0.32) 
-7.62 
(21.26) 
0.18 
(1.47) 
Assertive Index  -0.18 
(0.30) 
0.57** 
(0.15) 
 -0.19 
(0.17) 
0.25* 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
Short-Run       
ΔPolitical Interest -0.41* 
(0.19) 
-0.19 
(0.14) 
-0.37* 
(0.15) 
 0.32* 
(0.15) 
0.37 
(0.23) 
L.ΔPolitical Interest -0.22 
(0.18) 
 -0.21 
(0.13) 
   
L2.ΔPolitical Interest   -0.18 
(0.13) 
   
ΔStrength PID     0.59 
(0.33) 
1.08 
(1.32) 
L.ΔStrength PID      -0.37 
(0.74) 
L2.ΔStrength PID      -1.23 
(0.83) 
ΔAssertive Index -0.28 
(0.24) 
-0.14 
(0.11) 
-0.32 
(0.30) 
  -0.09 
(0.19) 
L.ΔAssertive Index 0.67* 
(0.25) 
    0.47 
(0.22) 
Note: Entries are OLS coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
indicated: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Extracted from tables A5.2 – A5.5 in the chapter appendix.  
 There is comparably more substantial evidence that our second measure of 
assertive citizenship, strength of party identification, is significantly related to branch 
appropriations.  In both Australia and Canada, the long-run relationship between party 
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identification and appropriations is negative and statistically significant. In Australia, the 
estimated long-run impact is -0.21 and statistically significant at the 5% level, which 
means that in equilibrium a one standard deviation increase in party identification 
decreases appropriations by one-fifth of a standard deviation. The negative impact of 
party identification is larger in magnitude in Canada (-0.31) and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. These effects are shown visually in figure 5.3, below, which plots the 
predicted marginal effects of party identification on appropriations in the two countries. 
While there is a significant negative coefficient for party identification in the full New 
Zealand model, the effect disappears in the post-1990 model, suggesting that it is driven 
by the discontinuity in the appropriations trend rather than being a true effect. 
Figure 5.3  
Marginal Effects of Party Identification, Australia and Canada 
 
 However, no short-run effects for party identification were found; indeed, the 
model selection process excluded them from the estimates produced. This suggests that 
short-term changes in the strength of party identification do not immediately, or with lag, 
produce corresponding changes in the extent to which prime ministers increase or 
decrease appropriations, but that over a stretch of time weakening party identification is a 
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significant determinant of increasing branch appropriations. That is, in the long run, as 
citizens’ attachment to parties weakens in Australia and Canada, appropriations are likely 
to increase, but change in the level of appropriations does not significantly respond to 
change in the level of party identification.       
 Meaningful long-run impacts of assertive value change on prime ministerial 
branch appropriations, as measured by the assertive index, are evident only in Canada. 
This is not surprising given the descriptive observations earlier in the chapter. The long-
run effect of assertiveness in Canada is quite large and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The size of the coefficient, 0.57, indicates that appropriations is estimated to be 
more than half a standard deviation higher when the assertive index increases from its 
mean to one standard deviation away. In context, this is quite a large effect. For example, 
the difference between the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile of assertiveness is $44 
million (in nominal 2003 dollars), which in 2003 was more than 40 percent of the entire 
PCO budget. However, as in the party identification case, the models did not produce 
statistically significant short-run effects for the assertive index in Canada. Again, this 
suggests that the equilibrium relationship between assertiveness and branch 
appropriations is not short-run responsive to changes in assertiveness; the effect is not 
significant year to year but is cumulatively powerful. Finally, there appears to be a short-
run, lagged effect for assertiveness in Australia; the coefficient is relatively large, 
positive, and statistically significant (0.67, p < 0.05). This suggests that changes in 
assertiveness produce a lagged increased response in change in appropriations, but have 
no ongoing cumulative effect.   
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 Despite the presence of only a few notable short-run effects for assertive 
citizenship, I also ran models to test for any interaction effects between the assertive 
citizenship variables, short-term political conditions and, in the New Zealand and UK 
cases, the period dummy variables. The interaction terms were entered into the models as 
exogenous parameters since they involve exogenous (non-dynamic) political conditions 
variables. These estimates are provided in appendix table A5.7, and offer several 
interesting results. The effects of several assertive citizenship variables do seem to 
depend on political conditions. In Australia, the negative short-run impact of political 
interest that we found earlier is conditional on both term year and on seat share, but in 
opposite directions: as prime ministerial terms continue, the effect of political interest 
weakens, while greater legislative support increases the effect of interest. We observe the 
same statistically significant interaction effect between interest and legislative support in 
Canada. The effect of party identification on branch appropriations appears to be 
conditional on the party in power in Canada and New Zealand but in different ways. The 
negative effect of party identification is stronger under more conservative prime ministers 
in Canada than under more liberal prime ministers, while the opposite is true in New 
Zealand. Lastly, the UK models exhibit several interaction effects. Of particular interest, 
all of the interactions between the assertive variables and the period dummy (separating 
pre and post-2000 observations) are positive and statistically significant. This confirms 
that there is a structural break in the UK model, i.e., that the magnitudes of regression 
coefficients change between the two periods, and that the effect of assertive citizenship 
appears to be greater in the post-2000 period than in the pre-2000 period.  
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 I turn now to testing the hypotheses concerning alternative explanations for 
change: economic trends and political conditions. To recall, the economic hypotheses 
posit that both globalization and government activity are positively associated with prime 
ministerial branch appropriations. There was mixed evidence for these hypotheses in the 
descriptive assessment earlier in the chapter. The results of regression model estimation 
present an interesting counterpoint to the assertive results: there are few long-run impacts 
but several short-run economic effects. This could be due to the difficulty of 
distinguishing the long-run effects among the dynamic variables or it could be the case 
that the economic trends do produce more immediate but not persistent responses in the 
appropriations variable.  
 In any case, the short-run effects for the globalization measures are consistent but 
vary in direction across cases. In Australia, change in levels of trade openness has a 
negative short-run effect (-0.88 in the interest model, -0.81 in the assertive index model), 
not immediately but lagged two years. The same effects are found in both New Zealand 
and the UK, except at different lags: change in trade openness has both an instantaneous 
effect on change in appropriations, and a one-year lagged effect. However, trade 
openness exhibits the hypothesized positive effect (0.31, p < 0.05) in one of the Canadian 
models. The alternative measure of globalization, using the KOF Index, does not offer 
any statistically significant results except in Canada, where it is estimated to have a 
negative short-run effect on appropriations. These results provide minimal evidence for 
the globalization hypothesis H4: globalization does not appear to drive prime ministerial 
branch appropriations, either short-term or long-term.  
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 The effects of government activity posited in hypothesis H5 are somewhat more 
apparent but very case-dependent. In both Australia and Canada, government activity has 
short-run positive impacts on change in appropriations. The effect is quite large in 
Australia (1.90, p < 0.01), while it has a smaller effect (0.33) in Canada in the political 
interest model, significant at the 5% level. In both cases, the effect is instantaneous, not 
lagged. In New Zealand, government activity appears to be negatively associated with 
appropriations. This is unsurprising given the deviations from the expected trends that 
both government activity and appropriations exhibit in this case. Overall, then, I conclude 
that the regression models do not provide significant support for the economic 
hypotheses. Neither globalization nor government activity has notable long-run 
relationships with appropriations, and the short-run impacts of economic changes are as 
contrary to expectations as they are conforming.  
 The second set of alternative explanations, political conditions, also does not 
receive strong, consistent support from the model estimates. The effects of legislative 
support and ideology on appropriations are not apparent. Term effects are evident in 
Australia and Canada, but they pull in opposite directions. In Australia, term year effects 
in two models are negative and statistically significant. This suggests that Australian 
prime ministers change appropriations at a lower rate as the term elapses; conversely, the 
predicted change in appropriations is highest at the start of terms, decreasing through the 
term. In Canada, however, the coefficients are positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting the opposite pattern: higher levels of change in appropriations are more likely 
as prime ministerial terms continue. I posit two reasons for this difference. First, 
Australian prime ministers serve shorter terms; elections are held every three years, as 
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opposed to four, conventionally, in Canada. Second, differences in party leadership 
selection processes means that Australian prime ministers are generally less secure in 
their positions. These factors could lead prime ministers in Australia to push for 
institutional change more immediately, while Canadian prime ministers have more time 
and less political pressure to embark on institutionalization. 
5.5.1 Discussion     
 In this section, I summarize and discuss the results of this chapter’s regression 
analysis. How do the core hypotheses about determinants of prime ministerial branch 
appropriations fare? Table 5.3, below, lists the hypotheses and gives an overall 
assessment of their empirical support. First, and most importantly, do public expectations 
drive prime ministers to increase the institutional resources of their offices? The 
regression results are equivocal on the question. While the evidence is not consistent 
across the board, all three public expectations hypotheses received some support. For 
political interest, H1, there is ‘limited’ support in that we found only short-run effects, 
and only in Australia and New Zealand. The party identification hypothesis, H2, is 
‘partially’ supported: there are meaningful long-run effects on appropriations in two 
cases, Australia and Canada. Finally, H3, which utilizes the assertive index of values and 
attitudes, also receives partial support, though only in Canada.  
Clearly, there is tremendous variation in how the cases accord with our theoretical 
expectations. Given the descriptive results observed earlier, overall the Canadian case 
offers the best evidence that public expectations indeed drive prime ministerial branch 
appropriations. Two of the three measures were demonstrated to have statistically 
significant long-run effects in expected directions. The analysis suggests, by and large, 
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that assertive citizenship is not a universal determinant of long-run change over time in 
prime ministerial branch appropriations in most cases, but that it has certain case-
contextual effects. Overall, the economic trends and political conditions hypotheses do 
not prove to be satisfactory alternative explanations for institutional change, either not 
being supported at all or, for the term effect hypothesis, receiving partial (and 
contradictory) support.   
Table 5.3 
Summary of Findings: Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations 
Hypothesis Finding 
 
H1 
 
Political Interest (+) 
 
Limited Support 
H2 Party Identification (-) Partial Support  
H3 Assertive Political Culture (+) Partial Support 
H4 Globalization (+) Not Supported 
H5 Government Activity (+) Not Supported 
H6 Term Effect (+/-) Partial Support 
H7 Legislative Support (+) Not Supported 
H8 Ideology (-) Not Supported 
Note: The (+) and (–) signs indicate the hypothesized direction of the relationship between the factor and 
appropriations.  
 In addition to the cross-case variation, another reason for the mixed empirical 
evidence is the difficulty of modeling time series, and especially multiple time series in 
single models. In order to avoid spurious correlations and potential violations of classical 
linear regression using ordinary least squares, these models must transform the simple 
theoretical setup into more complicated dynamic models. For instance, instead of models 
of appropriations per se, the dependent variable of the error correction models is change 
in appropriations from year to year, and the short run effects are year to year change in 
the dynamic independent variables, themselves differenced. The presence of multiple 
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dynamic variables also increases the complexity of the models. The dynamics in these 
models are thus necessary but make clear, consistent results difficult to achieve.  
 In addition, the appropriations time series themselves, as discussed earlier in the 
chapter, are not particularly well behaved. Instead of the smooth, incrementally 
increasing appropriations trends that were theoretically expected, three of the four cases 
exhibit more fluctuating, unstable patterns of change over time. In two cases, New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom, there are readily identifiable structural breaks in the 
time series that, again, induce complications in analysis. These patterns of change reflect 
interesting differences among the Westminster countries but make support for these 
general theories difficult to find. The only appropriations trend that conforms reasonably 
well with prior theoretical expectations is that of the Privy Council Office in Canada. 
This is reflected in how well the models perform and the greater degree of  evidence 
these models generate for our theories of institutionalization. 
 5.6 Patterns of Institutional Change 
 The previous section presented and discussed the results of estimating several 
time series models of prime ministerial branch appropriations.  In this section, I 
characterize each case in terms of the typology of institutional change introduced in 
chapter three. To recall, this typology, adapted from Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) work, 
and Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) elaboration, posits four distinctive patterns of 
endogenous, incremental institutional change: layering, drift, displacement, and 
conversion. I borrowed these terms to characterize how institutions change along 
dimensions of institutionalization and continuity. This typology is reproduced in figure 
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5.4, below, along with my assessment of where the cases fall given the evidence in this 
chapter.  
Figure 5.4 
Patterns of Institutional Change: Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations  
 
 I characterize both Australia and Canada as cases of institutional layering. The 
latter is a clear case. The gradual, incremental, but nonetheless dramatic pattern of change 
in appropriations over time in the Canadian case attests to a high degree of continuity and 
institutionalization. Moreover, the fact that the Canadian case offers relatively strong 
support for the Theory of Public Expectations also contributes to the characterization. As 
values and attitudes gradually shift from more allegiant to more assertive orientations, the 
evidence suggests that the Canadian prime ministerial branch has responded by 
incrementally accruing institutional capacity. Australia, however, is a borderline case. Its 
appropriation trend has been more periodic than incrementally increasing, but it would be 
misleading to place it in the lower half on the institutionalization dimension because it is 
clear that, while volatile, the institutional capacity of the Australian DPMC is well 
entrenched. The fact that there was little evidence that DPMC appropriations are driven 
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by systematic, long-term changes, at least those tested here, also suggests a significant 
role for individual prime ministers in shaping the institution. Thus, in Australia, the 
pattern of institutional change is what might be called “periodic layering”. This process is 
characterized by a cycle of institutional growth and retrenchment, more unstable than the 
normal incremental layering but not marked by abrupt changes that create entirely new 
institutional capacity quickly. I return to this theme in subsequent chapters. 
 As a case, New Zealand stands apart from the other cases, particularly in its level 
of institutionalization. After an initial growth in appropriations after the department was 
established in 1990, the financial resources of the DPMC remained relatively unchanging 
until 2008 or so. In recent years, appropriations have increased again, after falling from 
2011 to 2012. This relative stasis for much of its existence is a typical pattern of 
institutional drift. However, if we consider the transition from the pre-1990 to post-1990 
period, there is significant discontinuity, which brings the New Zealand case close to the 
conversion quadrant. It is not clear, though, that the transition from the Prime Minister’s 
Department to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in 1990 constituted a 
conversion in the institutional capacity of the office. While it had increased resources, 
this growth was not sustained. The regression results also do not suggest, overall, that 
appropriations in the post-1990 DPMC are driven by different sets of factors than had 
been the case. Arguably, the substantial growth in appropriations observed in the mid-
1970s marks the true turning point for the New Zealand prime ministerial branch. Since 
that point, it is characterized by institutional drift. 
 Finally, I characterize the UK case as institutional conversion. This is clear both 
from the appropriations trend itself and from evidence in the regression results that there 
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is a structural break in the model. While Cabinet Office appropriations were 
incrementally increasing from 1946 to the end of the 1990s, the first term of Prime 
Minister Blair brought dramatic institutional change. While this level of upheaval has not, 
and could not, persist after 2000, the conversion of the office into a tremendously well-
resourced institution at the centre of government must be the defining feature of its 
pattern of change. The UK prime ministerial branch has undergone tremendous 
institutionalization in terms of budgetary resources, but in contrast to other cases where 
institutionalization has been gradual or cyclical, the process was abrupt and 
discontinuous.       
  This chapter assessed appropriations to prime ministerial branches as a measure 
of the institutional autonomy of the prime ministerships in Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the United Kingdom. In chapter three, I introduced and argued in detail for 
the Theory of Public Expectations, a theory that ties changes in democratic political 
citizenship, from predominantly ‘allegiant’ to predominantly ‘assertive’, to a context 
which incentivizes prime ministerial institutionalization. I also set out alternative 
explanations: economic trends and political conditions.  
 In this chapter, I tested these theories in relation to one aspect of that 
institutionalization: budgetary appropriations to prime ministerial branches. First, I set 
out a series of hypotheses specifying expectations about the relationships between the 
explanatory factors and appropriations. I then examined these relationships in descriptive 
terms. Finally, I specified, conducted, and presented results from a set of time series 
regression models of prime ministerial branch appropriations. These models did not 
produce widespread, consistent support for the hypotheses: the appropriations trends are 
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too dissimilar across the cases, and too volatile in some cases, for general theories to be 
consistently confirmed. Still, the analysis uncovered meaningful evidence that assertive 
citizenship is a significant driver of institutionalization with regard to appropriations, 
particularly in the long run. The Canadian case proves to be the most robust in terms of 
according with theoretical expectations. It does not appear that economic trends and 
political conditions have consistent effects on institutional change. These results attest to 
the difficulty and complexity of assessing change over time, particularly when 
incorporating many variables across dissimilar cases. In chapter six, I continue to test the 
case for the Theory of Public Expectations and its alternatives, examining a second 
indicator of institutional autonomy: staff resources.   
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Appendix to Chapter 5 
Table A5.1  
Assertive Citizenship and Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations, Correlations 
 Political Interest Party Identification Assertive Index 
Australia 
 
0.22 -0.12 0.51** 
Canada 
 
0.72** -0.56** 0.76** 
New Zealand 
Pre-1990 
Post-1990 
 
0.17 
0.37 
-0.37 
-0.79** 
-0.84** 
-0.26 
0.12 
 
0.12 
United Kingdom 0.59** -0.70** 0.74** 
Pre-2000 0.76** -0.73** -0.59** 
Post-2000 0.21 -0.38 0.54* 
Note: Entries are Pearson’s r correlation values between the variable and prime ministerial branch 
appropriations. Asterisks indicate statistical significance levels (that coefficient is different from zero), * p 
< 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
Table A5.2 
Determinants of Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations, Australia 
 (1) (2) (3) 
EC -0.92** 
(0.18) 
-1.91** 
(0.41) 
-0.71** 
(0.18) 
Long-Run    
Political Interest 0.10 
(0.25) 
  
Strength PID  -0.21* 
(0.09) 
 
Assertive Index   -0.18 
(0.30) 
KOF Index  -0.67* 
(0.25) 
 
Trade Openness 0.37 
(0.28) 
 0.55 
(0.42) 
Govt Activity -0.42 
(0.85) 
-0.25 
(0.26) 
-0.25 
(0.39) 
Total Apps 0.24 
(0.73) 
1.45** 
(0.24) 
0.52 
(0.58) 
Short-Run    
LD.App  0.63 
(0.36) 
 
D1.Interest -0.41* 
(0.19) 
  
LD.Interest -0.22 
(0.25) 
  
D1.Assertive Index   -0.28 
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(0.24) 
LD.Assertive Index   0.67* 
(0.25) 
D1.KOF  0.94 
(0.73) 
 
LD.KOF  2.17 
(1.05) 
 
D1.Openness 0.22 
(0.35) 
 -0.18 
(0.42) 
LD.Openness -0.22 
(0.36) 
 -0.11 
(0.39) 
L2D.Openness -0.88** 
(0.27) 
 -0.81* 
(0.28) 
D1.Govt Activity 1.34 
(0.77) 
 1.90** 
(0.52) 
LD.Govt Activity 1.79* 
(0.65) 
 0.57 
(0.60) 
L2D.Govt Activity 0.96 
(0.49) 
 0.90 
(0.48) 
D1.Total -0.39 
(0.48) 
-2.55** 
(0.76) 
-0.44 
(0.36) 
LD.Total -0.33 
(0.48) 
-2.02* 
(0.73) 
 
L2D.Total 0.67 
(0.39) 
-0.77 
(0.60) 
 
Exogenous    
Term Year -0.09 
(0.07) 
-0.19* 
(0.08) 
-0.24** 
(0.08) 
Seat Share -0.02 
(0.08) 
0.00 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
Party 0.01 
(0.16) 
 0.19 
(0.15) 
Ideology  0.07 
(0.14) 
 
Constant 0.07 
(0.41) 
-0.93 
(0.45) 
-0.03 
(0.27) 
    
N 33 33 33 
Adj. R2 0.75 0.61 0.75 
AIC 3.53 18.90 4.04 
BIC 33.46 41.35 30.98 
RMSE 0.22 0.28 0.22 
Bounds Test F-Statistic 6.61r 4.42r 3.77 
Notes: Entries are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated 
by * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. L is a one-period lag, L2 a two period lag, etc. D indicates the variable is period-
differenced. The ‘r’ superscript on Bounds Test F-Statistics denotes models in which the model’s F-statistic 
was greater than the critical value for I(1) regressors, implying a rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-
term levels relationship.  
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Table A5.3 
Determinants of Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations, Canada 
 (1) (2) (3) 
EC -0.40* 
(0.15) 
-0.51** 
(0.14) 
-0.49** 
(0.13) 
Long-Run    
Political Interest 0.41 
(0.33) 
  
Strength PID  -0.31** 
(0.10) 
 
Assertive Index   0.57** 
(0.15) 
KOF Index 0.31 
(0.21) 
  
Trade Openness  -0.07 
(0.35) 
-0.51 
(0.35) 
Govt Activity 0.36 
(0.42) 
-0.01 
(0.29) 
-0.25 
(0.32) 
Total Apps -0.25 
(0.46) 
0.75** 
(0.19) 
0.84** 
(0.22) 
Short-Run    
D1.Interest -0.19 
(0.14) 
  
D1.Assertive Index   -0.14 
(0.11) 
D1.KOF -0.45* 
(0.19) 
  
D1.Openness  0.23 
(0.15) 
0.25 
(0.16) 
LD.Openness  0.31* 
(0.13) 
0.18 
(0.12) 
D1.Govt Activity  0.28 
(0.17) 
0.33* 
(0.16) 
D1.Total 0.43 
(0.22) 
  
LD.Total 0.38 
(0.22) 
  
Exogenous    
Term Year 0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.10** 
(0.02) 
0.09** 
(0.02) 
Seat Share -0.14* 
(0.06) 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
-0.08 
(0.06) 
Party -0.03 
(0.10) 
 -0.05 
(0.09) 
Ideology  -0.08 
(0.08) 
 
Trend (Year) -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Constant 22.55 
(29.01) 
-17.61 
(30.58) 
-25.24 
(28.32) 
    
N 43 48 48 
Adj. R2 0.41 0.41 0.42 
AIC -9.91 -16.56 -16.67 
BIC 14.75 7.76 9.53 
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RMSE 0.19 0.18 0.18 
Bounds Test F-Statistic 3.38 3.92 5.00r 
Notes: Entries are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated 
by * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. L is a one-period lag, L2 a two period lag, etc. D indicates the variable is period-
differenced. The ‘r’ superscript on Bounds Test F-Statistics denotes models in which the model’s F-statistic 
was greater than the critical value for I(1) regressors, implying a rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-
term levels relationship.  
Table A5.4 
Determinants of Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations, New Zealand 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EC -1.42** 
(0.26) 
-0.67** 
(0.10) 
-1.44** 
(0.23) 
-0.77** 
(0.16) 
-1.90** 
(0.24) 
Long-Run      
Political Interest 0.16 
(0.11) 
  -0.19 
(0.23) 
 
Strength PID  -0.78** 
(0.26) 
  0.53 
(0.32) 
Assertive Index   -0.19 
(0.17) 
  
KOF Index 1.24** 
(0.37) 
 0.41 
(0.40) 
 0.54* 
(0.19) 
Trade Openness  0.14 
(0.40) 
 0.10 
(0.28) 
 
Govt Activity 0.15 
(0.15) 
0.12 
(0.28) 
0.92* 
(0.30) 
-0.14 
(0.35) 
0.70** 
(0.17) 
Total Apps -0.31 
(0.26) 
-0.37 
(0.31) 
-1.32 
(0.61) 
0.63 
(0.45) 
-0.50 
(0.25) 
Short-Run      
LD.App 0.63** 
(0.17) 
 0.67** 
(0.17) 
0.41* 
(0.16) 
0.87** 
(0.13) 
L2D.App 0.21 
(0.16) 
   0.38** 
(0.10) 
D1.Interest -0.37* 
(0.15) 
    
LD.Interest -0.21 
(0.13) 
    
L2D.Interest -0.18 
(0.13) 
    
D1.Assertive Index   -0.32 
(0.30) 
  
LD.Assertive Index      
D1.KOF     -0.53 
(0.46) 
D1.Openness  -0.73** 
(0.19) 
 -0.97** 
(0.20) 
 
LD.Openness  -0.91** 
(0.15) 
 -0.94** 
(0.19) 
 
L2D.Openness      
      
D1.Govt Activity -0.18 
(0.31) 
0.33 
(0.20) 
-1.08 
(0.47) 
0.20 
(0.37) 
-1.03 
(0.62) 
LD.Govt Activity -0.71* 
(0.26) 
0.08 
(0.20) 
-0.91 
(0.41) 
-0.56 
(0.26) 
-2.06** 
(0.51) 
L2D.Govt Activity  0.43    
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(0.21) 
D1.Total  -0.62 
(0.39) 
-0.61 
(0.80) 
-1.03 
(0.53) 
-0.60 
(0.55) 
LD.Total  -0.78* 
(0.35) 
0.84 
(0.60) 
0.97 
(0.54) 
 
L2D.Total  -0.33 
(0.30) 
   
Exogenous      
Term Year -0.01 
(0.07) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.19 
(0.11) 
0.14 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
Seat Share 0.28 
(0.15) 
0.33** 
(0.11) 
-0.18 
(0.23) 
0.22 
(0.15) 
0.60 
(0.32) 
Party 1.26** 
(0.32) 
  -0.03 
(0.21) 
 
Ideology  -0.02 
(0.07) 
0.35** 
(0.08) 
 0.76** 
(0.11) 
Post-1990 Dummy 0.37 
(0.60) 
0.94* 
(0.41) 
   
Constant -0.28 
(0.35) 
0.09 
(0.39) 
2.73** 
(0.68) 
0.45 
(0.26) 
0.92 
(0.45) 
      
N 37 37 23 25 22 
Adj. R2 0.62 0.83 0.85 0.91 0.92 
AIC 41.44 11.51 8.04 1.67 10.24 
BIC 68.82 40.51 25.07 21.18 26.61 
RMSE 0.36 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.27 
Bounds Test F-
Statistic 
7.23r 10.01r 9.65r 5.63r 17.70r 
Notes: Entries are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.  Models (1) and (2) include all 
years. Models (3) to (5) are post-1990 only. Statistical significance is indicated by * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
L is a one-period lag, L2 a two period lag, etc. D indicates the variable is period-differenced. The ‘r’ 
superscript on Bounds Test F-Statistics denotes models in which the model’s F-statistic was greater than 
the critical value for I(1) regressors, implying a rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-term levels 
relationship.  
Table A5.5 
Determinants of Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations, United Kingdom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EC -0.64** 
(0.14) 
-0.12 
(0.29) 
-0.84** 
(0.22) 
-1.28** 
(0.23) 
-2.36 
(0.79) 
-1.38** 
(0.37) 
Long-Run       
Political Interest -0.34 
(0.19) 
  -0.32* 
(0.11) 
  
Strength PID  -7.62 
(21.26) 
  0.18 
(1.47) 
 
Assertive Index   0.25* 
(0.12) 
  0.01 
(0.10) 
KOF Index  -7.22 
(20.30) 
  -3.22 
(1.38) 
 
Trade Openness 0.72 
(0.36) 
 0.24 
(0.13) 
0.15 
(0.18) 
 -0.98 
(0.46) 
Govt Activity -0.04 
(0.05) 
-2.72 
(7.68) 
-0.10 
(0.05) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
0.28 
(0.88) 
0.15 
(0.11) 
Total Apps 0.01 
(0.19) 
-2.46 
(7.80) 
0.07 
(0.13) 
1.02* 
(0.41) 
0.15 
(0.39) 
-0.21 
(0.27) 
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Short-Run       
LD.App -0.45** 
(0.13) 
-0.67* 
(0.24) 
-0.32* 
(0.14) 
0.42* 
(0.18) 
1.02 
(0.63) 
0.60* 
(0.26) 
L2D.App -0.42** 
(0.11) 
-0.26 
(0.14) 
-0.34** 
(0.11) 
 0.63 
(0.46) 
 
D1.Interest 0.32* 
(0.15) 
  0.37 
(0.23) 
  
D1.PID  0.59 
(0.33) 
  1.08 
(1.32) 
 
LD.PID     -0.37 
(0.74) 
 
L2D.PID     -1.23 
(0.83) 
 
D1.Assertive Index      -0.09 
(0.19) 
LD.Assertive Index      0.47 
(0.22) 
D1.KOF  0.64 
(0.43) 
  5.79 
(1.95) 
 
LD.KOF     3.11 
(1.11) 
 
D1.Openness -0.82** 
(0.26) 
 -0.49** 
(0.16) 
  1.21* 
(0.49) 
LD.Openness -0.77** 
(0.23) 
 -0.51** 
(0.18) 
  1.14** 
(0.38) 
L2D.Openness -0.38* 
(0.17) 
 -0.24 
(0.15) 
   
       
D1.Govt Activity 0.16 
(0.11) 
0.50* 
(0.19) 
0.24* 
(0.11) 
0.22 
(0.20) 
0.23 
(1.44) 
0.12 
(0.23) 
LD.Govt Activity  0.20 
(0.16) 
  1.06 
(0.62) 
0.34 
(0.22) 
L2D.Govt Activity     0.94 
(0.86) 
-0.46 
(0.23) 
D1.Total -0.58** 
(0.16) 
-0.13 
(0.31) 
-0.65** 
(0.16) 
-1.52** 
(0.45) 
-1.84 
(0.89) 
-0.78 
(0.40) 
LD.Total -0.68** 
(0.15) 
-0.61** 
(0.21) 
-0.76** 
(0.15) 
-0.76 
(0.38) 
-1.45 
(1.01) 
 
L2D.Total    -0.97* 
(0.37) 
-2.91 
(1.88) 
 
Exogenous       
Term Year 0.02 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.11* 
(0.05) 
-0.29 
(0.32) 
0.10 
(0.05) 
Seat Share 0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.28** 
(0.09) 
0.22 
(0.39) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
Party -0.09 
(0.09) 
0.09 
(0.16) 
  0.30 
(0.56) 
-0.42 
(0.23) 
Ideology   0.00 
(0.06) 
-0.12 
(0.10) 
  
Post-2000 Dummy 1.17** 
(0.24) 
1.20** 
(0.31) 
1.31** 
(0.24) 
   
Year    0.02 
(0.05) 
1.14 
(0.55) 
0.27* 
(0.10) 
Constant -0.11 
(0.12) 
-0.28 
(0.18) 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
-51.55 
(110.01) 
-2263.32 
(1110.40) 
-534.11 
(191.82) 
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N 49 42 49 33 26 33 
Adj. R2 0.76 0.67 0.75 0.52 0.50 0.47 
AIC -0.06 20.02 1.77 17.40 -8.17 20.07 
BIC 35.89 51.29 35.82 41.35 20.77 48.50 
RMSE 0.21 0.26 0.21 0.27 0.25 0.28 
Bounds Test (F-
Statistic) 
5.32r 3.53 5.38r 7.05r 4.44 4.16 
Notes: Entries are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.  Models (1) – (3) include all years. 
Models (4) – (6) are pre-2000 only. Statistical significance is indicated by * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. L is a 
one-period lag, L2 a two period lag, etc. D indicates the variable is period-differenced. The ‘r’ superscript 
on Bounds Test F-Statistics denotes models in which the model’s F-statistic was greater than the critical 
value for I(1) regressors, implying a rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-term levels relationship.  
Table A5.6  
Post-Estimation Tests 
 Breusch-Godfrey 
LM Test 
(autocorrelation) 
Durbin’s Alt Test 
(autocorrelation) 
ARCH LM Test 
(heteroskedasticity) 
 χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p 
Australia       
Political Interest 0.14 0.71 0.05 0.82 0.00 0.96 
Strength PID 0.31 0.57 0.16 0.69 0.07 0.79 
Assertive Index 0.81 0.37 0.35 0.55 0.40 0.52 
Canada       
Political Interest 1.60 0.20 1.08 0.30 0.02 0.89 
Strength PID 0.02 0.89 0.01 0.90 1.35 0.24 
Assertive Index 0.56 0.45 0.39 0.53 0.29 0.59 
New Zealand       
Political Interest 2.95 0.08 1.65 0.20 0.05 0.82 
Strength PID 0.42 0.52 0.21 0.65 3.80 0.05 
Assertive Index 0.01 0.91 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.99 
Interest (Post-1990) 0.20 0.65 0.07 0.80 3.69 0.05 
PID (Post-1990) 5.80 0.02 2.15 0.14 0.03 0.86 
United Kingdom       
Political Interest 0.15 0.70 0.09 0.77 6.47 0.01 
Strength PID 0.78 0.37 0.44 0.51 10.77 0.00 
Assertive Index 0.04 0.85 0.02 0.88 5.34 0.02 
Political Interest 
(Pre-2000) 
0.05 0.82 0.02 0.87 1.41 0.23 
Strength PID 
(Pre-2000) 
14.94 0.00 2.70 0.10 0.01 0.92 
Assertive Index 
(Pre-2000) 
0.79 0.37 0.32 0.57 0.69 0.41 
Note: The Breusch-Godfrey and Durbin’s Alternative Tests for autocorrelation have a null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation. Rejecting the null hypothesis (p < 0.05) indicates that there is residual autocorrelation. 
The null hypothesis for the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) test is no 
heteroskedasticity. Rejecting the null hypothesis (p < 0.05) indicates the presence of heteroskedastic errors.   
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Table A5.7 
Interaction Effects for Prime Ministerial Branch Appropriations 
 Australia Canada New Zealand UK 
Interest*TermYear 
 
-26.87** 
(8.29) 
0.30  
(1.97) 
3.48 
(6.27) 
-1.74 
(5.47) 
Interest*SeatShare 
 
343.50* 
(132.75) 
57.99* 
(23.60) 
-23.68 
(20.01) 
30.43 
(20.69) 
Interest*Party 
 
16.37 
(12.12) 
-3.48 
(4.89) 
2.74 
(8.26) 
-4.58 
(9.77) 
Interest*Period 
Dummy 
  -9.00 
(12.20) 
2.28** 
(0.47) 
PID*TermYear 
 
-14.15 
(8.17) 
3.27 
(1.82) 
0.08 
(5.21) 
-2.68 
(2.40) 
PID*SeatShare 
 
11.28 
(22.00) 
15.52 
(10.62) 
-48.32 
(41.38) 
128.47** 
(43.56) 
PID*Party 
 
20.28 
(9.83) 
-8.48* 
(3.31) 
16.80* 
(6.00) 
-10.78* 
(5.08) 
PID*Period 
Dummy 
  9.05 
(9.65) 
1.59** 
(0.53) 
Assert*TermYear 
 
5.12 
(8.18) 
3.10 
(4.52) 
-16.97 
(15.04) 
-6.39* 
(3.00) 
Assert*SeatShare 
 
113.77 
(120.70) 
-29.29 
(17.35) 
403.18 
(360.52) 
-122.14* 
(52.04) 
Assert*Party 
 
-3.31 
(8.94) 
22.06 
(13.03) 
-95.46 
(38.71) 
-16.75* 
(0.02) 
Assert*Period 
Dummy 
   4.85** 
(0.69) 
Notes: Entries are estimated OLS coefficients on interaction terms included as exogenous regressors in the 
main models, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated: * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01.   
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Figure A5.1  
Political Interest and Appropriations, All Countries 
 
Note: Figure excludes observations for Australia 2014 and 2015 because of the outlying appropriations 
values for these years. The UK case is split into pre- and post-2000 observations for ease of interpretation. 
 
Figure A5.2  
Strength of Party Identification and Appropriations, All Countries 
 
Note: Figure excludes observations for Australia 2014 and 2015 because of the outlying appropriations 
values for these years. The UK case is split into pre- and post-2000 observations for ease of interpretation. 
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Figure A5.3  
Assertive Index and Appropriations, All Countries 
 
Note: Figure excludes observations for Australia 2014 and 2015 because of the outlying appropriations 
values for these years. The period for New Zealand is 1991-2015. The UK case is split into pre- and post-
2000 observations for ease of interpretation. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
198 
 
Figure A5.4 
Assertive Citizenship and Appropriations Time Series, All Countries 
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Chapter 6  
Staff Resources in the Prime Ministerial Branches 
 In the previous chapter, I examined the financial resources allocated to the prime 
ministerial branches in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. I 
found substantial variation in both the patterns of institutional change and in the extent to 
which the cases accord with theoretical expectations. Broadly speaking, the budgets of 
the prime ministerial branches in the Westminster countries have grown in relative terms 
over the last five decades; today’s branches are greatly expanded as compared to the 
1960s. However, the process of change has been quite dissimilar among the cases.  
 In Canada, the Privy Council Office has grown incrementally and consistently 
since its substantial expansion in the late 1960s by Pierre Trudeau, with a few exceptions, 
the latter years of Prime Minister Harper’s tenure among them. The Cabinet Office in the 
United Kingdom shares this incrementalism until the late 1990s, when, under Prime 
Minister Blair, its budget increased dramatically. In the last fifteen years, the resource 
level resulting from this extraordinary, abrupt growth has been maintained if not 
markedly increased.  
 The two oceanic countries also offer contrasting patterns of institutional change. 
The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in Australia has normally exhibited a 
pattern of ‘cyclical’ change where its budget increases for four or five years, declines, and 
repeats. Outside of the occasional spikes, notably under Prime Minister Menzies in the 
mid-1970s and in the most recent few years, this pattern suggests a well-entrenched 
baseline institutional capacity that is periodically enhanced, possibly driven by short-term 
considerations. Finally, the New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet has 
undergone two notable periods of abrupt institutional growth, outside of which the 
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department has exhibited relative stasis. In the mid-1980s, under Prime Minister Lange, 
the then-Prime Minister’s Department’s budget resources were significantly enhanced, 
but apparently insufficiently; it still lacked the resources to effectively coordinate policy 
(Boston 1992, 95). This realization eventually led to the creation of the DPMC in 1990, 
which received a substantial increase in resources. However, since 1990 the department, 
for the most part, has not built further upon this foundation in terms of budget resources. 
This suggests that external forces have not significantly impinged on perceptions of the 
prime ministerial job in New Zealand.             
 With respect to these resources, chapter five also assessed the Theory of Public 
Expectations and alternative theories of institutional change. In part because of the 
uneven growth in institutional resources across these countries and the uncertainty of the 
assertive citizenship shift itself, the fit between theory and empirics was modest. The 
hypotheses about how assertive citizenship impacts branch appropriations were partially 
supported in cases where the assumptions of the theory were met, which only was 
observed fully in one case. As expected, the Canadian case most accords with 
expectations. The analysis found that both strength of party identification and general 
assertive orientations drove appropriations within the Privy Council Office in the long-
term. Party identification was also found to be significant in Australia. In the UK, the 
effects of assertive citizenship were found to depend on the period: they were evident in 
the ‘post-conversion’ Cabinet Office, since 2000, but not prior. Neither of the two 
alternative explanations, economic trends and political conditions, proved to be widely 
supported, although various significant effects were revealed.        
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 In this chapter, I conduct a similarly structured assessment on a second measure 
of institutional autonomy: the staff resources of prime ministerial branches. As in the 
previous chapter, I assess the Theory of Public Expectations and economic and political 
explanations for institutional change. The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss 
staff resources as a measure of autonomy, describe the sources of data, and examine the 
staff trends over time. Second, the hypotheses tested in the chapter, which are iterations 
of the hypotheses set out in chapter five, are identified. The third section briefly 
examines, in descriptive terms, the relationships between the explanatory factors and staff 
resources. Section 5.4 explicates regression model specification and estimation issues, 
and section 5.5 presents and discusses the results of regression analysis. Finally, I 
characterize the patterns of institutional change evident in the chapter and conclude.   
6.1 Staff Resources in the Prime Ministerial Branches 
 This chapter examines staff resources in the prime ministerial branches of 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Staff resources simply are the 
number of people employed in the respective institution.89 I posit that staff resources, like 
financial resources, are an important indicator of institutional autonomy. This argument is 
supported both by the literature on prime ministerial power, and popular views. Staff are 
concrete manifestations of power and influence. While budget appropriations to prime 
ministerial branches are numbers on a page, not readily visible to the public eye, staff are 
living, breathing embodiments of prime ministerial activity. They personify the reach and 
scope of prime ministerial power. They are literally extensions of, and servants to, prime 
ministerial authority. There is an extensive literature on the growth of ministerial advisors 
                                                 
89 Technically, the staff measure used in this analysis is in units of Full Time Equivalents (FTEs), as this is 
how the measure is generally reported.   
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and staff in central agencies in the Westminster countries (e.g., Maley 2000, 2011; 
Tiernan 2007; Yong and Hazell 2014). This literature is predicated on the assumption that 
staff resources and political power are inherently and intricately related to each other. 
Many studies of the US presidency, especially those that inspire this study, use growth in 
staff resources as a measure of institutionalization (e.g., Ragsdale and Theis 1997; 
Dickinson and Lebo 2007). In short, staff do things. They undertake activities the purpose 
of which is to further the goals of their principal in various ways. For prime ministers, 
staff resources provide, among other functions, policy advice, support, and expertise that 
increases their ability to manage and intervene in the policy process. Arguably, the more 
that prime ministers’ own departments undertake these roles over time, the more the 
predominance of party functionaries and cabinets in these roles is eclipsed. This 
decreases the dependence of prime ministers on actors whose interests and incentives 
may not fully align with their own. Thus, it is reasonable to take staff resources as a 
measurable proxy for institutional autonomy in the Westminster prime ministerships.  
The two measures of institutional autonomy, budget appropriations and staff 
resources, are of course connected inherently. Staff are compensated through 
appropriations to the prime ministerial branch and the use of and oversight over 
appropriated funds involves staff. Thus, a theoretical concern is whether this analysis is 
redundant, that is, whether the results of this chapter simply replicate those in the 
previous chapter. My justification for considering staff resources as a distinct measure is 
two-fold. First, considering the novel theoretical arguments and methodological approach 
of this work, showing that certain conclusions are consistent across different ways of 
measuring autonomy strengthens the case for the conceptual and operational decisions 
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made. Even if they are almost identical trends, that both appropriations and staff track 
closely with given explanations should increase our confidence that prime ministerial 
branch institutionalization is a robust phenomenon with robust theoretical explanations.   
Second, the extent to which the two trends are correlated varies significantly 
among the cases. In Canada, the correlation between appropriations and staff is nearly 
perfect (0.97), but in Australia the correlation is only 0.72. In New Zealand, the 
correlation is lower (0.62), and in the UK it is much lower still (0.40). This suggests that 
while the appropriations and staff trends are clearly related, and move in generally the 
same directions across time, in three cases they are clearly distinct phenomena that may 
be driven by different sets of determinants. In Canada, where the nearly perfect 
correlation implies that the pattern of findings should be the same, it is still of substantive 
interest to determine what affects staff levels in its prime ministerial branch. Examining 
staff resources, then, enriches our picture of institutional autonomy in the prime 
ministerial branches and the extent to which different modes of institutional change are 
evident in otherwise similar institutional contexts.  
 The staff resource measure is a count of the number of staff employed in the 
respective prime ministerial branch (the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in 
Australia and New Zealand, the Privy Council Office in Canada, and the Cabinet Office 
in the UK), expressed in most cases as permanent ongoing full-time equivalents. The 
Australian staff data is extracted from the DPMC annual reports, which begin in 1978. 
The staff data for Canada comes from two sources: the annual budget estimates and the 
Privy Council Office’s annual reports from 1997-98. The New Zealand staff data, like the 
appropriations data, is extracted from documents obtained directly from the DPMC and 
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from annual reports after 2002. Finally, the UK staff data comes from civil service 
statistics publications, Cabinet Office annual reports from 1998, and “government 
expenditure plans” from 1992 to 1997.  
 Unlike the appropriations measure used in chapter five, the staff resources 
measure is not affected by inflation. Thus, they need not be transformed to make them 
comparable over time. As well, the kinds of data issues encountered in the appropriations 
case were much less apparent in the staff case. The only data collection issue of note for 
the staff data is its comparative lack of availability further back in time. In Australia, the 
first annual DPMC report was produced in 1978. The author was unable to find staff data 
for earlier years. Similarly, in New Zealand, the staff data includes only staff of the 
DPMC, established in 1990, and not of the Prime Minister’s Department, its predecessor. 
In the UK, the time series begins in the late 1960s. Only in Canada do we have a 
complete time series from 1946. This is not particularly problematic for analysis because 
the most theoretically important variables, those measuring assertive citizenship, do not 
extend further back in time than the staff data. However, for descriptive purposes, 
complete time series would have been of benefit.     
 Finally, as I have reiterated several times earlier in this work, the study’s focus is 
firmly upon prime ministers’ civil service offices. Staff level data over time for the 
political offices of prime ministers are sometimes available for recent years, but are too 
fragmentary and unreliable to be used as historical time series. This is unfortunate 
because political staff are often the flashpoint for critiques of prime ministerial power and 
presidentialization. They are among the prime ministers’ closest advisors and have a great 
deal to do with the projection of prime ministerial leadership. However, while political 
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staff are, of course, central to the prime ministership as a political office, and to prime 
ministers as political and party leaders, they have not usurped the role of the civil service 
organizations examined here. The policy advisory, research, and implementation 
capacities of the political ‘arm’ of the prime ministerial branches are still limited, its role 
in enabling prime ministers to manage and control cabinet processes, much less the civil 
service machinery, still rudimentary. The mainstays of the political offices remain 
restricted to political strategy and communications. While the gradual agglomeration of 
policy capacities in political offices is interesting in its own right, the centrality of the 
civil service organizations in supporting prime ministers in these cases is fundamental.        
The staff resources in the prime ministerial branch of each country over time are 
shown in figure 6.1, below. In Australia, the data suggests that staff levels do not vary 
significantly from 1978 to 2005, similar to the pattern observed for appropriations. 
During this time, the DPMC had an average staff count of 433 FTEs. This reflects the 
fact that the department had already achieved a significant degree of institutionalization 
by 1978. There had been a Prime Minister’s Department since 1911, which had been 
transmuted into the DPMC in 1971. As we saw in chapter five, after an initial period of 
fluctuation under the Whitlam government (1972-1975), appropriations stabilized in the 
way that staff levels do here. Staff levels rise and peak during the first part of the Paul 
Keating government (1991-96), while they stay consistently lower during the subsequent 
Howard government. Overall, however, there is no discernible trend in staff in the DPMC 
during this period. The mean level of annual change in staff from 1978 to 2005 is only 
2.53 percent, indicating that only small, incremental changes were made. Positive staff 
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growth is almost completely offset by negative growth, reflecting the lack of an overall 
directional trend. 
 After 2005, however, staff levels rise significantly under the Australian Labor 
Party governments of 2007-2013, and they take a dramatic leap coinciding with the 
Abbott Liberal government (2013-2015), not shown in the figure. In 2013, department 
staff totalled 798; in 2014, the total was 2141. This dramatic leap is specifically related, 
as the department’s 2014 report notes, to “new functions... in the delivery of Indigenous 
affairs policy and programmes, reducing the burden of government regulation, and the 
delivery of women’s policies and programmes” (Australia, Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 2014, 6). In the analysis below, the time series is truncated at 2013. 
Figure 6.1 
Staff in Prime Ministerial Branches, All Countries 
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     The staff trend in Canada shows that staff levels in the Privy Council Office have 
steadily increased over the period from 1946 to 2015. In 1946, there were only 30 
employees in the PCO, and their work was mostly administrative in nature. Beginning in 
the mid-1960s, there is a significant increase in staff levels that continues until the 1980s 
and staff increasingly took on policy roles. This confirms the established view (e.g., 
Savoie 1999) that Pierre Trudeau’s prime ministership (1968-1979, 1980-1984), and to a 
lesser extent, Lester Pearson’s time as leader (1963-1968), is responsible for originating 
the modern prime ministerial office in Canada.  
After relative stability through Brian Mulroney’s administrations and the early 
government of Jean Chrétien, there is another phase of expansion around 1995. During 
the tenure of the Harper government (2006-2015), staff levels in the PCO rise and then 
fall. In 2015, the total number of staff, 884, is about the same as in 2007. The mean level 
of change from 1946 to 2015, 5.76 percent, is higher than in Australia and, tellingly, 65 
percent of the annual changes in staff are positive, while only 26 percent negative. 
Overall, then, the staff level trend in Canada is indicative of a ‘typical’ institutionalizing 
process of staff growth and qualitative change from a mostly administrative office to a 
robust, sprawling, policy-oriented bureaucracy.       
 Staff levels in the New Zealand Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
(DPMC) resemble the appropriations picture we encountered in chapter five. The time 
series runs from 1990, when the DPMC was formed, to 2015. There is a dramatic 
increase in staff in the first two years of the DPMC’s existence, from less than 50 in 1990 
to 171 employees in 1992. However, after 1992, staff levels begin a slight downward 
trend, to a low of 112 employees by 2001. Between 1992 and 2013, the average annual 
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change in staff levels is only -1.70 percent, suggesting a relatively stable period. The 
most recent years, from 2013, appear to be a period of renewed staff growth in the New 
Zealand DPMC. This pattern of initial increase, stabilization, then recent expansion, was 
also evident for appropriations, although the latter showed greater fluctuation. This is a 
distinctive pattern as compared to Australia and Canada. It could be indicative of a kind 
of typical institutionalization process as new organizations invent, entrench, and extend 
their capacities and roles. In this regard, then, the New Zealand prime ministerial branch 
serves as a useful counterpoint to the other cases. We will see this pattern again in the 
internal structure of the New Zealand DPMC later on, in chapter seven.      
 Finally, staff levels in the United Kingdom also show a distinctive pattern of 
change. The trend is quite volatile. Until 1983, the number of staff in the Cabinet Office 
is relatively stable at around 500 employees. The addition of the Management and 
Personnel Office to the Cabinet Office in 1983 increases the staff count by more than 
1000. A similar increase in the mid-1990s, corresponding to the creation of the Office of 
Public Service and Science by John Major, brings the staff count to its peak, at close to 
3000 employees. Reorganization then reduces the number of staff dramatically, to less 
than 1000, by 2009. It has since recovered somewhat; in 2015, 2100 people worked in the 
Cabinet Office. The relatively large annual changes in staff levels since the mid-1990s - 
the absolute value is 14.56 percent - testify to the manipulability of the office as a proxy 
for prime ministerial priorities and intentions. Because of the relatively low and 
essentially constant number of staff before 1984, subsequent analysis of the British case 
is of the period from 1984 to 2015.  
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 Examining staff levels over time in each of the four cases presents quite different 
and somewhat unexpected institutional histories. However, as with appropriations in the 
previous chapter, it could be the case that staff resources are simply a function of overall 
civil service staff changes. If this were true, the trends shown in figure 6.1 are 
‘epiphenomenal’ in the sense that, rather than reflecting real relative change in prime 
ministerial branches, they only reflect broader trends. Thus, I also assess whether there is 
change in the proportion of total civil service staff that prime ministerial branch staff 
constitute. This is plotted in figure 6.2, which shows staff in prime ministerial branches as 
a percentage of total civil service staff over time. This total includes only staff working in 
the core civil service, not, for instance, defence personnel, health care staff, or ‘industrial’ 
employees.90  
Figure 6.2 
Staff in Prime Ministerial Branches, % of Total Civil Service, All Countries 
 
                                                 
90 A term used in the UK sources to refer to ‘blue-collar’ persons employed by the government. 
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 These plots indicate whether staff levels increase or decrease in relation to overall 
growth in the public service of these countries. A constant proportional trend (i.e., a 
horizontal line) over a long time period suggests that staff levels in the prime ministerial 
branch are not growing or shrinking relative to the overall public service; they are more a 
function of change in general public service staff levels than of any unique process of 
institutionalization in the prime ministership. The figure suggests that the proportional 
trend tracks closely with the staff level trend, indicating a non-constant relationship 
between the two. In New Zealand, there is some divergence after the initial two years of 
the DPMC’s establishment. Even though the staff trend declines, its proportion of the 
civil service remains high for the next few years. It should be noted, though, that in 
absolute terms these changes are small. Overall, the correlations between the staff level 
trends and the proportional trends are nearly perfect in three of the four cases and in New 
Zealand it is still very high (0.73). This gives credence to the notion that prime 
ministerial branch staff levels move independently of staff levels in the overall civil 
service; they are driven by distinct factors and are not simply reflective of overall 
changes in the broad administrative machinery of government.         
6.2 Empirical Expectations 
 This section articulates the hypotheses relating public expectations, economic 
trends, and political conditions to staff resources in the prime ministerial branches. Table 
6.1, below, summarizes these hypotheses, which are iterative of those in the previous 
chapter. The goal, then, is to test further the robustness of these explanations. For the 
Theory of Public Expectations, I set out three hypotheses. To reiterate briefly, the theory 
suggests that the shift from predominantly “allegiant” to “assertive” patterns of citizen 
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attitudes and orientations to politics and institutions creates conditions of heightened 
public expectations of leaders. These expectations stimulate leaders, especially prime 
ministers, to generate the institutional capacity to respond adequately, partly in the form 
of institutionalizing budgetary and staff resources. What we tested in chapter five and 
continue testing here are the impacts of specific observable indicators of assertive 
citizenship on concrete institutional outcomes.  
Table 6.1  
Summary of Hypotheses for Prime Ministerial Branch Staff  
 
 The first public expectations hypothesis, H1, is that as overall interest in politics 
increases, staff resources in prime ministerial branches increase. The second hypothesis, 
H2, states that there is a negative relationship between overall levels of party 
identification strength and staff levels; high levels of the former are associated with low 
levels of the latter, and vice versa. The third and final public expectations hypothesis, H3, 
 
Theory of Public Expectations 
H1. As overall interest in politics increases, staff resources in prime ministerial branches 
increase. 
H2. As overall party identification weakens, staff resources in prime ministerial branches 
increase. 
H3.  As the level of assertive citizenship in a country increases staff resources in prime 
ministerial branches also increase. 
 
Economic Factors 
H4. Globalization is positively associated with staff resources. 
H5. Central government activity is positively associated with staff resources. 
 
Political Conditions 
H6a. Staff resources decrease as a prime ministerial term continues. 
H6b. Staff resources increase in successive term years. 
H7. The more legislative support a prime minister has, the greater, on average, the staff 
resource growth in the prime ministerial branches.  
H8. Growth in staff resources is lower under more conservative prime ministers than 
under more liberal prime ministers. 
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states that political assertiveness, as measured by the constructed Assertive Index, is 
positively associated with staff resources in the prime ministerial branches. The public 
expectations hypotheses for staff resources, then, are: 
 H1. As overall interest in politics increases, staff resources in prime ministerial 
 branches increase. 
 H2. As overall party identification weakens, staff resources in prime ministerial 
 branches increase. 
 H3.  As the level of assertive citizenship in a country increases staff resources in 
 prime ministerial branches also increase. 
The analysis below also tests five other hypotheses related to economic trends and 
political conditions. As discussed in chapter three, we expect that globalization and the 
growth of central government activity contribute to prime ministerial branch 
institutionalization generally. Both of these trends can be seen as creating fertile 
conditions for staff level growth. They implicate new societal and transnational actors in 
domestic policy-making processes. In doing so, they attenuate the ability of prime 
ministers and governments generally to decide, coordinate and implement political and 
policy goals. The growth of government activity itself arguably has a similar 
“expectations-heightening” effect to the political-cultural shift. As governments do more, 
citizens, rather than being satisfied, come to expect more from government. These 
implications of globalization and government activity are likely to incentivize prime 
ministers to seek greater institutional capacity within their purview, and staff resources 
are one manifestation of this capacity. Thus, H4 and H5 are as follows:         
 H4. The level of globalization in a country is positively associated with the staff 
 resources in its prime ministerial branch. 
 H5. The level of government economic activity in a country is positively 
 associated with the staff resources in its prime ministerial branch.   
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Our second set of alternative explanations involves short-term political conditions. The 
theoretical rationale here is relatively straightforward: as political actors, prime ministers 
are highly sensitive to the political context of their decisions. They also bring certain 
preconceptions and expectations – their own and those of their supporters – that are 
political and ideological in nature. Prime ministers are not simply neutral actors rationally 
responding to exogenous cultural and economic forces; they are strategic actors 
considering what is politically feasible, advantageous, and desirable.  
 Thus, I identify three political conditions that could affect institutionalization of 
staff resources: a term effect, legislative support, and ideology. I expect that the location 
of an observation within a prime ministerial term matters, but do not have a strong, 
theoretically informed, sense of the directionality: staff levels might increase or decrease 
during a term. H7, the legislative support hypothesis, posits that higher levels of 
legislative support are associated with increases in staff levels. Finally, I hypothesize that 
ideology has an effect on staff level change: prime ministers that are more conservative 
will, on average, be associated with decreases, or at least smaller increases, in staff levels 
than more liberal prime ministers. The final three hypotheses are thus as follows: 
H6. Staff levels are a function of the duration of prime ministerial terms. They 
either decrease or increase as a function of the amount of term elapsed.   
H7. The more legislative support a prime minister has, the greater the staff level 
increase in the prime ministerial branches.  
H8. Growth in staff resources is lower under more conservative prime ministers 
than under more liberal prime ministers.    
6.3 Preliminary Assessments 
 As in the previous chapter, I offer initial descriptive assessments of these 
hypotheses. As discussed above in chapter five, such descriptive investigation provides 
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context to further ground this analysis, and also helps to set our expectations about the fit 
between theory and empirics. First, I examine the bivariate associations and time series of 
the assertive citizenship variables and prime ministerial branch staff. Statistical 
correlations between the assertive citizenship variables and staff are provided in table 
A6.1 of the chapter’s appendix, and scatterplots visualizing the associations are provided 
in appendix figures A6.1 to A6.3.  
 Preliminary analysis suggests that political interest does not have a uniform, 
positive association with staff resources as hypothesis H1 expects. Once again, the only 
case that strongly supports the hypothesis is the Privy Council Office in Canada. Higher 
values of political interest correspond with higher staff counts, and vice versa; the points 
are relatively closely clustered, and the correlation coefficient (r = 0.76, p < 0.01) 
confirms this apparent association. In the other cases, the relationship is not readily 
apparent. In Australia, several outlying points have outsized influence on the positive 
finding (these points correspond to the last three years in the data, 2011-2013). In New 
Zealand, there is no evident pattern. Finally, in the UK, a slight positive relationship 
exists but there is a great deal of heteroskedasticity (non-constant error variance). 
Therefore, the descriptive analysis does not suggest that the political interest hypothesis 
should be strongly supported in further testing.  
 For party identification, Canada proves to be the only case where the 
hypothesized negative relationship between party identification and staff appears to be 
true. Weaker party identification is associated with observations of more staff, while 
stronger identification is associated with fewer staff. The correlation is relatively strong 
and statistically significant (r = -0.53, p < 0.01). The associations in other cases are either 
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not significant (Australia), driven by outlying values (New Zealand), or opposite to 
expectations (United Kingdom).     
 Finally, I examine the strength of the relationships between aggregate assertive 
values and attitudes, as measured by the assertive index, and staff resources in the prime 
ministerial branches. By and large, these results are consistent with those of political 
interest and party identification in not demonstrating robust support for the hypotheses, 
except in the Canadian case. Once again, Canada seems to be the best case for the 
hypothesis. The association is relatively linear, positive, and statistically significant (r = 
0.76, p < 0.01). In contrast, the relationship between assertiveness and staff is negative in 
the UK, though with a highly spread distribution. There is a positive correlation in 
Australia, but this is again driven by particularly high values on both variables; without 
which the relationship is null. These results suggest that the assertiveness hypothesis is 
not broadly supported in the cases.  
 The above evidence for the relationship between assertive citizenship and staff 
resources is inconsistent and generally scant. This attests to the fact that the staff resource 
trends over time, and to an extent the assertive trends themselves, are less straightforward 
than theory expects. The case that best conforms to expectations about incremental 
institutionalization and the pace and direction of value change, Canada, unsurprisingly 
produces the strongest support for the Theory of Public Expectations. The discussion 
heretofore, however, does not account for the temporality of the theory. It is not simply 
that assertive citizenship and institutional change are expected to be associated in certain 
directions; I also expect that they co-vary over time in theoretically congruent ways. 
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Thus, I also consider the association of their trends through time, based on the time series 
plots in appendix figure A6.4.  
 Examining these trends through time offers broadly similar findings to the 
bivariate associations. In Australia and Canada, the level of political interest roughly 
shifts with staff resources over time. In both cases, both interest and staff are at their 
lowest early in the observed period and are highest near the end of the period. During the 
period, they diverge at points and do not always exhibit similar rates of change, but 
broadly speaking, the over-time correlation is relatively strong. This is not the case in 
either New Zealand or the United Kingdom: branch staff levels seem to move 
independently of political interest entirely.  
 For party identification, the over-time relationships are not as clear even in the 
cases where significant bivariate associations were found. For instance, in Canada the 
party identification trend and the staff trend only share the characteristic that they are 
high and low, respectively, through the 1960s and 1970s and comparably lower (higher) 
in the 1990s and early 2000s. The staff trend exhibits gradual, incremental change over 
the period, while party identification is much more volatile, dropping precipitously in the 
late 1980s, and fluctuating until the mid-2000s. In New Zealand, the two trends parallel 
each other closely until the last three years, but this is due to both trends being relatively 
constant through most of the period. In neither Australia nor the UK is it evident that 
party identification and staff levels are related through time. 
 The third measure of assertive citizenship, the assertive index, shifts over time 
relatively closely with corresponding change in prime ministerial branch staff in the two 
cases where significant positive correlations were observed: Australia and Canada. In 
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Australia, assertiveness has increased steadily since 1990, which is not precisely matched 
by staff level changes early but does so in the 2000s. In Canada, the assertiveness trend 
actually closely follows the political interest trend, and thus also diverges from the staff 
level trend in the 1970s but converges in subsequent decades. Interestingly, assertiveness 
has fallen somewhat since the early 2000s, which precedes a corresponding change in 
staff levels: they reach a peak in 2005 and have not changed consistently since. In the 
UK, the negative correlation found earlier is reflected in the time series trends: 
assertiveness is lowest in the mid-1990s, when staff in the Cabinet Office is at its highest 
level; the subsequent shift to increased assertiveness from the mid-1990s to the mid-
2000s is not reflected in staff levels at all. Thus, the time series trends for assertive 
citizenship and staff levels generally accord with earlier evidence; in Australia and 
Canada, various measures of assertive citizenship co-vary through time with prime 
ministerial branch staff in theoretically expected ways, generally. In the two other 
countries, there is less evidence that this is the case.      
 Finally, this section briefly explores the alternative hypotheses positing economic 
trends and political conditions as important drivers of staff resource institutionalization. 
To recall, hypotheses four and five posit that globalization and central government 
activity, respectively, are positively associated with prime ministerial branch staff 
resources. As countries become more globalized, prime ministers require more 
institutional capacity to foster effective policy coordination. The two measures of 
globalization produce similar results: in Australia and Canada, the relationship between 
globalization and levels of prime ministerial branch staff appears to be relatively strong, 
although in Australia, a pattern like those found earlier is also evident here: the statistics 
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are driven by a small number of large variable values. However, the time series do 
generally correspond to expectations: staff increasing along with globalization levels over 
time. Neither of the two other cases suggests that globalization is a factor in driving 
institutionalization of their prime ministerial branches. 
 The government activity hypothesis predicts that higher levels of government 
activity (spending as a proportion of GDP) will be associated with higher levels of staff 
resources in the prime ministerial branches. Here, the associations are more ambiguous. 
While several of the correlations show the expected relationships, particularly in 
Australia and Canada, the time series do not suggest a close congruence between 
government spending and prime ministerial staff. For instance, government activity in 
Canada rises precipitously in the early to mid-1980s and falls as dramatically in the mid-
1990s, while staff levels remain low throughout the 1980s and increase consistently from 
1990 to 2005. Thus, in general the hypothesized relationships between economic change 
and prime ministerial branch staff change are not consistently supported. In both New 
Zealand and the UK, they are not apparent at all.   
 The second set of alternative explanations for staff levels in prime ministerial 
branches looks to the salience of political conditions, specifically, term effects, legislative 
support, and ideology. The descriptive evidence suggests that there are neither ‘new 
government’ nor ‘adjustment’ term effects for staff: changes in staff levels do not 
meaningfully vary through the course of prime ministerial terms. There are no discernible 
patterns in the changes from year to year, according to results of ANOVA tests on the 
mean change by term year in each country. There is simply too much variance within 
each term year, overwhelming between-year differences.   
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 The seventh hypothesis states that greater legislative support will, on average, be 
associated with greater staff level change. This hypothesis is operationalized in terms of 
the relationship between seat share for the prime ministerial party and staff level change. 
However, descriptive analysis suggests that legislative support does not affect change in 
staff levels in the expected direction. In only one case, New Zealand, is a positive 
correlation found, but this is driven by two observations (1991 and 1992) in which, 
occurring before significant electoral reform in 1993, the prime minister controlled 69 
percent of the legislative seats, obviously unequalled since. Thus, there is no evidence of 
a general legislative support effect.     
 The final political conditions hypothesis posits that ideology has an effect on staff 
level change in prime ministerial branches: the more conservative the prime minister, the 
lower rates of change in staff levels we expect. There is little evidence of systematic 
association between ideology and change in staff levels in any of the countries, on either 
measure of ideology (manifesto scores and party of the prime minister). Only in Canada 
are there significant, substantial associations in the negative direction between the two 
measures of ideology and staff levels, and these are over the period from 1946 to 2015. 
For the period tested in the regression models below, generally 1966 to 2015, the 
association is not significant.    
 To conclude, this section assessed descriptive evidence for the Public 
Expectations theories and its alternatives in terms of the staff resources of the prime 
ministerial branches in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The 
clearest conclusion is that two of the cases, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, offer 
little evidence that the staff levels in their prime ministerial branches are related to the 
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systematic factors identified. By contrast, the Canadian case demonstrated solid, 
consistent evidence that assertive citizenship and globalization are both related to staff, 
while there is some evidence of such relationships in the Australian case, particularly 
when considered between time series. Political conditions do not appear to significantly 
impact change in staff levels in any country. How robust are these findings? To find out, 
in the next two sections I turn to the second part of the empirical analysis in this chapter, 
which uses time-series regression techniques to model the determinants of staff levels in 
the prime ministerial branches.        
6.4 Regression Model Specification and Estimation 
 The next section presents and discusses the results of estimating models of prime 
ministerial branch staff, with assertive citizenship, economic trends, and political 
conditions entered as regressors. These models are specified and estimated via the same 
process as employed for the models in chapter five. To reiterate briefly, in order to 
account for specific issues that time series data present, I use a form of time series 
regression known as error correction modeling.91 The error correction specification 
allows estimation of the extent to which independent variable series and the dependent 
variable series are in a long-term equilibrium relationship, the short-term impact of 
                                                 
91 Time series variables often exhibit serially correlated errors and, in political science applications, are 
often not stationary. A stationary variable is one whose mean, variance, and covariance do not depend on 
when it is observed, but many variables that have a trend over time violate this assumption. A variable that 
increases over time theoretically has infinite mean and variance, which creates problems for estimating 
distributional statistics that underlie significance tests. As well, regressing non-stationary variables on each 
other can result in spurious relationships; if they share a time trend, they will be highly correlated even if 
they are not actually related.  
One way of addressing this is to difference all trending variables, but this throws out information about 
their levels in the long-run. Error correction models capture the long-run joint dynamics of multiple non-
stationary series by positing that non-stationary variable time series are in an equilibrium relationship (Box-
Steffensmeier et al. 2014, 151). The variables are said to be ‘cointegrated’, which means that a linear 
combination of their series is stationary. 
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changes in independent variables on change in the dependent variable, and the speed at 
which equilibrium is restored after short-term shocks.  
 As in chapter five, I estimate separate models for each of the three measures of 
assertive citizenship: political interest, strength of party identification, and the assertive 
index. Different combinations of the economic trend variables were included in each 
model, and a total staff variable was included in all models to control for overall civil 
service staff growth. To test for the effects of the political conditions, political variables 
were included in all models as ‘exogenous’ variables, meaning that they were not 
differenced (since they are constant during each prime ministerial term) and constrained 
to having instantaneous short-run effects.  
 Unlike the previous chapter, it was not necessary to estimate additional period-
specific models for New Zealand and the United Kingdom. In New Zealand, this is 
because the available staff data begins in 1991 with the establishment of the Department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Thus, the New Zealand models are estimated for the 
period 1991-2015. In the United Kingdom, the descriptive analysis indicates that pre-
1984 staff levels were essentially constant and very low relative to post-1984 levels; 
including them would certainly generate dubious inferences about variable effects. As 
well, the structural break in 2000 that was a defining characteristic of the appropriations 
trend was not evident in staff levels. The UK models are thus estimated for 1984-2015.92 
The Australian models are estimated for 1978-2013 because, as was the case with 
appropriations, staff levels in the most recent two years are extreme outliers relative to 
                                                 
92 In the UK, inclusion of the government activity variable resulted in many unintelligible, inordinately 
large estimated effects. This is probably because the variable is distributed very abnormally, in a ‘v’ shape. 
Excluding the variable produces more sensible estimates, so it was excluded from the main models. Its own 
effects were estimated separately.   
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the time series. The Canadian models are estimated for 1966-2015. However, in all of the 
models the particular variables and the inclusion of lagged values reduce the actual 
period length from these initial periods. The actual number of periods used is given in the 
full regression results in the chapter appendix tables A6.2 through A6.5.          
6.5 Regression Results 
 In this section, I present and discuss the results of modeling prime ministerial 
branch staff as a function of trends in assertive citizenship, economic change, and 
political conditions. I first assess the overall performance of the models in terms of 
capturing variation in prime ministerial branch staff. This performance is indicated by the 
goodness of fit measures reported in the appendix tables. As expected because of the 
dynamics included in the model, such as lags of the dependent variable, the models 
generally capture a sizable proportion of the variation in branch staff. There are, however, 
substantial differences in how the models perform. The fit statistics generally agree that 
models including political interest perform the best in all countries, the exceptional case 
being the UK. The assertive index models also perform well, especially in Canada. Party 
identification performs least well in Australia and Canada. Although this model has the 
lowest average error and information criterion estimates in the UK, this is likely because, 
as described below, it includes dummies for two years that produced large residuals. 
Initially, the UK party identification model performed worse than the assertive index 
model. Thus, I conclude that, in terms of overall model performance, political interest 
and assertive index models best capture variation in prime ministerial branch staff.  
 The models also were subject to a statistical test, the Bounds Test (Pesaran et al. 
2001), for the existence of a long-run relationship in levels between cointegrated 
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independent variables and dependent variables. The test produces a value that is 
compared to critical values on an F-distribution. Surpassing the upper critical value 
suggests that there is a long-run relationship, while falling within the lower and upper 
critical values is inconclusive. The test found that long-run relationships are evident in 
Canada and in two of the three models in the UK (excepting political interest). In both 
Australia and New Zealand, the political interest models were found to exhibit long-run 
relationships but the other models were inconclusive. This does not necessarily mean that 
there are no long-run relationships in these models but that the test cannot sufficiently 
determine the significance of the relationship.    
 In addition to the overall performance of the models in terms of explaining 
variation in prime ministerial branch staff, the results also provide information about how 
branch staff trends respond to changes in independent variables. The error correction 
specification estimates the rate at which equilibrium is restored after transient shocks 
(indeed, this is the meaning of “error correction”). A slow rate of correction, nearer to 
zero, indicates that shocks persist for many periods after they occur, while a value closer 
to one indicates that most of the disequilibrium is corrected after one period (year). This 
can be characterized as the ‘memory’ of the process; a long-memoried process has a slow 
error correction rate and means that changes in independent variables have long-lasting 
effects, while a short-memoried process means that changes in independent variables do 
not have persistent effects. Normally, estimates of error correction rates should fall 
between zero and one and be statistically significant.  
 Most of the models produce such estimates. The error correction is the slowest in 
the United Kingdom, although it is still relatively quick: only about 54 percent of the 
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divergence from equilibrium is corrected in one year. In Canada, the models estimate that 
between 71 and 87 percent of the effects of short-term shocks are corrected in one period. 
This indicates a relatively short-memoried process in which short-term changes do not 
have long-lasting, ongoing effects.93 In both Australia and New Zealand, the error 
correction estimates vary significantly. In both cases, estimates below -1 were obtained in 
some models, indicating that the process overcorrects for short-term shocks, and thus that 
it may not converge to equilibrium but instead cycles above and below it. This is only the 
case for the political interest model in Australia; the other two models exhibit nominal, 
though fairly different rates of correction (63 and 92 percent). The best performing model 
in New Zealand, the political interest model, suggests a relatively fast error correction 
rate of 74 percent. These estimates suggest that, across the board, prime ministerial staff 
change is relatively short-memoried and malleable; immediate disruptions from the long-
term equilibrium trend do not have persistent effects.          
 Post-estimation tests for residual autocorrelation and heteroskedastic errors 
generally show that the models adequately corrected for these violations. None of the 
Australian or Canadian models produced statistically significant chi-squared values 
(since the null hypotheses of the tests are no autocorrelation and no heteroskedastic 
errors, respectively, this is a good sign). In New Zealand, the party identification model 
produced conflicting results for autocorrelation, while the corresponding model in the UK 
showed evidence of heteroskedasticity. Inspection of residuals showed that the spike in 
staff in the mid-1990s was problematic; including a dummy variable for 1995 and 1996 
                                                 
93 If the changes continue from year to year, obviously their effects persist because they will be ‘new’ 
effects; the error correction rate only estimates how the effects of change at time t are perpetuated in the 
time series at time t+1, t+2, etc. 
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eliminated the problem. Overall, then, the tests suggest that the models are properly 
specified.       
 I turn now to analysis of the covariates in the models of prime ministerial branch 
staff. First, I assess the strength of evidence for the covariates that capture the assertive 
citizenship hypotheses. These are aggregate political interest, strength of party 
identification, and the index of assertive values and attitudes. Overall, as might be 
expected given the descriptive results earlier, the assertive citizenship indicators are not 
found to have robust effects on prime ministerial branch staff consistently across the 
cases, either in the short- or long-run. Table 6.2, below, provides the model estimates of 
both the long-run and short-run effects of assertive citizenship on branch staff, extracted 
from the full regression results found in the chapter appendix tables A6.2 through A6.5. 
Table 6.2 
Effects of Assertive Citizenship on Prime Ministerial Branch Staff  
 Australia Canada New 
Zealand 
United 
Kingdom 
Long-Run 
Political Interest  0.46* 
(0.19) 
0.06 
(0.10) 
0.33 
(0.30) 
1.54* 
(0.64) 
Strength PID 0.58 
(0.45) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
0.12 
(0.36) 
0.57 
(0.77) 
Assertive Index  0.37 
(0.40) 
0.19* 
(0.08) 
-0.10 
(0.17) 
-2.72* 
(1.15) 
Short-Run 
ΔPolitical 
Interest 
-1.08** 
(0.29) 
-0.12 
(0.08) 
0.56* 
(0.19) 
-0.52 
(0.35) 
L.ΔPolitical 
Interest 
-0.94** 
(0.23) 
 0.51* 
(0.20) 
 
ΔStrength PID  0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.58 
(0.81) 
-0.33 
(0.28) 
L.ΔStrength 
PID 
  -1.92 
(0.96) 
 
ΔAssertive 
Index 
0.43 
(0.37) 
-0.25** 
(0.07) 
 0.58 
(0.51) 
L.ΔAssertive 
Index 
0.48 
(0.34) 
  1.24* 
(0.51) 
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L2.ΔAssertive 
Index 
   1.81** 
(0.46) 
Note: Entries are OLS coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
indicated: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Extracted from tables A6.2 – A6.5 in the chapter appendix.  
 The estimated long-run impacts of our assertive citizenship measures produce 
partial, if not consistent, support for the idea that public expectations generate prime 
ministerial branch institutionalization via staff resource growth. Political interest is found 
to be correctly positive and statistically significant in two cases, Australia and the United 
Kingdom. In Australia, the estimated effect is substantively large (0.46) and significant at 
the 5% level, while the effect is even larger in the UK (1.54, p < 0.05). This means that 
an increase of one standard deviation in political interest increases branch staff by almost 
half a standard deviation in Australia and by one and a half standard deviations in the 
UK. I visualize these marginal effects of political interest on branch staff in figure 6.3, for 
all countries. The predicted standardized staff score for chosen percentiles of political 
interest, along with 95 percent confidence intervals for each point estimate, are shown. 
This demonstrates that in Canada and New Zealand, the predicted staff score increases 
with the level of political interest but the confidence intervals overlap significantly. In 
Australia and the United Kingdom, the confidence intervals do not all overlap, indicating 
that the positive effect is statistically significant.94 To put these effects into concrete 
terms, consider that moving from the 25th to 75th percentiles of political interest is 
estimated to increase staff by 125 in Australia and more than 400 staff in the UK.       
 
 
 
                                                 
94 Although this might not be evident in the graphs because of their size, consider that the y-axis scale is 
also different in the Australian and UK plots than in the others, running from -3 to 2 in the former and -2 to 
2 in the latter. In Canada, the scale is actually in tenths, from -0.2 to 0.4; in New Zealand, the y-axis rungs 
from -1 to 1.  
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Figure 6.3 
Marginal Effects of Political Interest on Prime Ministerial Branch Staff 
 
 The long-run effects of party identification are not borne out in the models, so we 
need not elaborate further. However, the impact of assertive values and attitudes on prime 
ministerial branch staff is noteworthy, though not entirely in accordance with our 
hypotheses. In Canada, the long-run impact of assertiveness, as measured by the assertive 
index, is correctly positive (0.19, p < 0.05), while in the United Kingdom, the impact is 
negative (-2.72, p < 0.05). This is not altogether surprising, considering the bivariate 
correlations and time series assessments earlier in the chapter. The long-run impact in 
Canada is, as expected, significant but relatively small, attesting to the incrementalism of 
branch staff change in the Privy Council Office since the 1960s. The estimate indicates 
that the difference between staff levels at the 25th percentile of assertiveness versus the 
75th percentile is about 96 employees, which is larger than the PCO until the mid-1960s 
but less than ten percent of the staff complement at the office’s peak in 2011. This effect 
is shown visually in figure 6.4, below, which plots all marginal effects at selected 
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percentile values of assertiveness on prime ministerial branch staff, with 95 percent 
confidence intervals.   
Figure 6.4 
Marginal Effects of Assertiveness on Prime Ministerial Branch Staff 
 
 As we have discovered, the UK case presents a challenge to theoretical 
expectations because its staff level trend does not ‘look like’ what it should look like: 
instead of gradual, incremental change, the trend is highly volatile and not increasing as a 
function of time, since the mid-1980s (i.e., it does not have a linear trend). In relation to 
assertiveness, then, the reason for the estimated negative effect is apparent. Staff levels 
are highest in the mid-1990s when assertiveness is at its lowest, while assertiveness 
increases considerably thereafter and staff levels decline. I would argue that the negative 
estimate for assertiveness in the UK Cabinet Office context thus does not so much 
disconfirm the hypothesis as provide a deviant case with which to consider the theory’s 
limits.     
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 The models also estimate the effect that changes in assertive citizenship have on 
changes in prime ministerial branch staff in the short run. These short-run effects 
generally correspond to the long-run effects in that they are statistically significant in the 
same models. Thus, political interest has both a long-run impact and short-run impacts on 
staff in Australia. The short-run impacts are both instantaneous (-1.08, p < 0.01) and 
lagged by one year (-0.94, p < 0.01).95 In Canada, a standard deviation increase in 
assertiveness at one point in time would increase staff levels by a quarter of a standard 
deviation, equivalent to 81 FTE employees. In the UK, the long-run, negative impact of 
assertiveness is played out in the short-run as lagged effects, at a one year lag (1.24, p < 
0.05) and a two year lag (1.81, p < 0.01). Finally, in New Zealand, political interest 
appears to have instantaneous and lagged short-run impacts on DPMC staff levels, but 
these impacts do not aggregate to a long-run effect.   
 The fourth and fifth hypotheses of the chapter posit that globalization and 
government activity, respectively, are significant determinants of change in prime 
ministerial branch staff. In terms of long-run impacts, the globalization hypothesis is 
supported to some extent in the Australian and Canadian models and not supported in the 
New Zealand and UK models. Both an aggregate indicator of globalization, the KOF 
index, and a purely economic measure, trade openness, have positive, statistically 
significant effects in Australia, while in Canada, only the trade openness factor is a 
significant determinant.  
 The effect sizes are also quite large. In real terms, for instance, the globalization 
effect in model (2) in Australia is equivalent to an increase of 287 employees, comparing 
                                                 
95 The negative coefficients do not indicate a negative effect but, instead, that the short-run effects are 
larger than the long-run effect. The same applies to the fact that the short-run effects have opposite signs to 
the long-run impact in both Canada and the UK (Kennedy 2005, 82). 
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globalization at its 25th and 75th percentiles. This is almost thirty percent of the staff 
complement in the DPMC in 2012 (the peak year in the estimated period). By way of 
comparison, the political interest effect found earlier is equivalent to an increase of only 
125 employees. This effect is the largest of the globalization effects, but all of the 
statistically significant effects in the Australian and Canadian models are substantively 
meaningful. In contrast, the hypothesized long-run effects of government activity on 
prime ministerial branch staff are not found in any model. Contrary to expectations, then, 
when government activity in the economy increases, there is no corresponding increase in 
prime ministerial branch staff, on average.  
 Short-run economic effects on prime ministerial branch staff follow the long-run 
effects, for the most part. In both Australia and Canada, trade openness is found to be a 
statistically significant determinant of change in branch staff. In Australia, the impact of 
trade openness on staff is not instantaneous but lagged one and two years, while in 
Canada, there is both an instantaneous effect of change in trade openness and a one-year 
lagged effect (coefficients are -0.27 and -0.20 respectively, significant at the 99% 
level).The short-run effect of overall globalization (i.e., the KOF index measure) in 
Australia is also lagged two years. Finally, there is some evidence, though not strong, that 
government activity has a short-run, though not long-run, impact on branch staff in New 
Zealand: one-year lagged change in government activity has a statistically significant 
effect (-1.26, p < 0.05). Overall, though, as with the estimated long-run effects, there is 
no clear indication that government activity drives institutional change in terms of prime 
ministerial branch staff.      
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 Finally, the models provide little evidence that political conditions have direct 
effects on change in prime ministerial branch staff. Almost none of the estimated 
coefficients for term year, legislative support or ideology are found to be statistically 
significant. One exception is in the New Zealand political interest model, where prime 
ministerial party is found to have a positive, statistically significant effect (b = 0.93, p < 
0.01). However, this is almost certainly because the few significant positive changes 
(increases) in staff levels in the New Zealand DPMC occurred in the last three years 
under John Key, a National party prime minister. Thus, the positive finding is not a 
particularly reliable indicator of a general effect. Overall, then, the models do not suggest 
a critical role for these political conditions in inducing staff change.   
 However, despite the lack of main effects for the political conditions variables, 
additional model estimates suggest that politics does have certain moderating effects on 
the relationship between assertive citizenship and change in prime ministerial branch 
staff. These were estimated as interactions between each political variable and measure of 
assertive citizenship. The results are provided in the appendix table A6.7, below. The 
most notable interaction effect is between assertive citizenship and prime ministerial 
party. In three of the four cases – Australia, Canada, and New Zealand – the interaction 
between the two is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. This indicates 
that, on average, assertiveness has a much weaker impact on branch staff when the prime 
minister belongs to the “centre-right” party than when she belongs to the “centre-left” 
party, and that the difference is meaningful. There is thus an ideological component to 
institutionalization, even if not a direct effect. It implies that, in general, more 
conservative prime ministers are less responsive to pressure from sociocultural changes 
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than more liberal prime ministers, which we probably would expect. It is reasonable to 
suggest that many of the values and attitudes that underlie assertive citizenship resonate 
more forcefully for liberals than for conservatives.   
6.5.1 Discussion  
 In summary, then, this section assesses the hypotheses about determinants of 
prime ministerial branch staff by estimating and analyzing several dynamically specified 
models. Overall, the models performed well in terms of goodness of fit measures and 
post-estimation tests. For the most part, the error correction specification was found to be 
an appropriate way of accounting for the time series nature of the variables, and in most 
cases normal, statistically significant “error correction” rates were found. While there was 
variation in the speed of convergence back to equilibrium after short-term shocks, 
generally the branch staff processes appear to be relatively ‘short-memoried’: a 
substantial proportion of the changes induced by shocks is corrected in only one period. 
This suggests that the processes of institutional change in the prime ministerial branches 
are quite malleable and flexible, in that changes at one point in time do not have impacts 
that resonate for long periods thereafter.  
 In terms of substantive empirical theory, a summary of the findings for the 
chapter’s hypotheses is provided in table 6.3. The table lists the eight hypotheses and 
gives an overall assessment of empirical support for each. Overall, the public 
expectations hypotheses were only partially supported by the analysis: supporting 
evidence was found in some cases but not in others. H1, the political interest hypothesis, 
was found to have significant, positive long-run impacts on prime ministerial branch staff 
in both Australia and the United Kingdom. This suggests that, on average in these cases, 
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increases in political interest generate corresponding increases in prime ministerial 
branch staff. However, an alternative measure of assertive citizenship, strength of party 
identification, was not found to have a significant relationship with staff in any country. 
As in the appropriations case, H3, the hypothesis relating assertive political culture 
broadly to institutionalization via branch staff, was supported only in Canada. The short-
run effects of these factors correspond to the long-run effects in terms of where they are 
significant.  
Table 6.3 
Summary of Findings: Prime Ministerial Branch Staff 
Hypothesis Finding 
 
H1 
 
Political Interest (+) 
 
Partial Support 
H2 Party Identification (-) Not Supported 
H3 Assertive Political Culture (+) Partial Support 
H4 Globalization (+) Partial Support 
H5 Government Activity (+) Not Supported 
H6 Term Effect (+/-) Not Supported 
H7 Legislative Support (+) Not Supported 
H8 Ideology (-) Not Supported 
Note: The (+) and (–) signs indicate the hypothesized direction of the relationship between the factor and 
staff.  
 I also found that the impact of the assertive citizenship measures is to some extent 
conditional on political contexts. In particular, ideology is a key moderating variable on 
the impact of assertiveness on institutional change: “centre-right” prime ministers are 
much less responsive to the expectations and pressures generated by increasing assertive 
values and attitudes than “centre-left” prime ministers are. While the results are obviously 
not clear and consistent across the cases, the analysis suggests that assertive citizenship 
plays a substantial role in determining prime ministerial branch staff in certain cases and 
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contexts. The alternative explanations, however, were not supported generally. The 
globalization hypothesis, H5, received some support in Australia and Canada, but the 
second economic explanation, the impact of government activity, was not supported. 
There was essentially no evidence to support the claims in hypotheses H6 through H8 
that political conditions have independent effects on change in prime ministerial branch 
staff, although as noted, they evidently condition the impact of public expectations on 
staff.  
 More broadly, the results speak to the difficulty in precisely establishing the 
validity of relationships among processes over time. Although the error correction model 
specification is the appropriate choice in light of the violations of regression assumptions 
that are typical of time series data, it does create stringent tests for finding significant 
effects. In particular, disaggregating the long-term relationships of several time series 
variables is a difficult task, made more difficult by the relative shortness of the time 
periods under observation. Relatedly, the results also confront the fact that the theories 
discussed in chapter three depend, to a significant extent, on observing a ‘normal’ pattern 
of institutional change in the prime ministerial branches: slow and incrementally 
increasing. This pattern turned out not to be consistently exhibited here or, indeed, in the 
appropriations chapter. Thus, the extent to which the cases support the theoretically-
derived hypotheses largely reflects the extent to which the case exhibits this normal 
process, with Canada as a prototypical case and New Zealand and the UK exhibiting 
problematic patterns, for analytical purposes. This also suggests that the selection of 
cases, while made for justifiable reasons as stated in chapter four, may not afford the 
most analytical leverage in assessing these theories of institutionalization.      
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6.6 Patterns of Institutional Change  
 The preceding discussion assessed the extent to which empirical evidence 
matches theoretical expectations. Perhaps the clearest overall thrust of the evidence is 
that institutional change has not been as straightforward and consistent as theory 
expected. This is good for distinguishing between the cases but makes it difficult to find 
across the board support for general theories. In this section, I consider directly the 
observed variations in branch institutionalization to characterize dominant patterns of 
institutional change in the cases, based both on their time series and on how they 
responded to external factors. To recall, in chapter three I introduced a typology adapted 
from historical- institutionalist work on incremental change (Streeck and Thelen 2005; 
Mahoney and Thelen 2010). This typology maps four general patterns of change - 
layering, drift, displacement, and conversion – onto dimensions of institutionalization and 
continuity in the process of change. This typology is reproduced in figure 6.5, below, and 
each case is characterized therein.    
Figure 6.5 
Patterns of Institutional Change: Prime Ministerial Branch Staff  
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 As in the analysis of prime ministerial branch appropriations in the previous 
chapter, the Canadian case clearly can be characterized in terms of a process of 
institutional layering. Its time series exhibits both a high degree of continuity and a high 
degree of institutionalization: staff levels have grown steadily and incrementally, for the 
most part, since the late 1960s. The Canadian prime ministerial branch also is relatively 
responsive to the dynamics of shifting public expectations and economic trends; this 
response was always shown to be substantive but not extraordinary in magnitude, 
attesting to a smooth, gradual process of institutionalization.  
 The Australian case also is a case of layering with regard to prime ministerial 
branch staff, although it is much less continuous than the Canadian prime ministerial 
branch. Rather than a steady, incrementally increasing trend in staff levels, the Australian 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet has only started to exhibit notable staff 
growth since the early 2000s. This growth has been significant but not expansionary in 
the way that we saw appropriations growth was in the UK in the late 1990s; thus, 
comparatively it cannot constitute a case of institutional conversion. In addition, like the 
Canadian case it exhibits a relatively strong but measured response to external factors 
such as levels of political interest and globalization. Therefore, Australia could be 
qualified as a case of ‘compressed’ layering relative to the slower, more spread out 
institutional layering evident in Canada. 
 The pattern observed in the previous chapter again is reflected here with regard to 
New Zealand. Excluding the most recent few years, staff growth in the New Zealand 
DPMC has been almost absent since the initial increase after the department was 
established in 1990. Thus, the case exhibits a high degree of continuity without a 
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significant degree of growth or evidence that the prime ministerial branch has undergone 
change. Moreover, the descriptive and regression analyses found minimal evidence that 
the New Zealand DPMC is particularly responsive to external factors; indeed, the 
patterns of change in the external factors themselves do not suggest that the department 
faces the same kinds of pressures and expectations bearing upon the branches in other 
cases. Thus, New Zealand is here, as in chapter five, a case of institutional drift. 
 Finally, the UK case offers an intriguing pattern of institutional change: I 
characterize it as being in between displacement and conversion. The time series of staff 
levels in the Cabinet Office is marked by abrupt, dramatic changes without necessarily 
demonstrating that it is more institutionalized than it was at points in the past. There is no 
structural break in the staff series, as there was in the appropriations series, which neatly 
splits it into distinct periods. Thus, in my view, there is no evidence to suggest a 
wholesale institutional conversion in the Cabinet Office, whereby fundamental 
institutional goals and norms are altered. Rather, at certain points there have been 
significant alterations in structure that have added a multitude of staff to the office, 
temporarily tilting the institutional balance from one set of functions to others (for details, 
see the discussion of structural change in the Cabinet Office in chapter eight). When these 
experiments in institutional structure were abandoned, the staff increases were not 
institutionalized. Thus, the UK case clearly exhibits less institutionalization, in terms of 
staff resources, than the Australian or Canadian cases, but probably more than in New 
Zealand. The UK’s pattern of institutional change is not continuous, but not as extremely 
discontinuous as in the appropriations pattern in chapter five. It falls, therefore, at the 
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boundary of institutional displacement and conversion in our typology of institutional 
change.             
 This chapter investigated the extent and determinants of staff resources, as a 
measure of institutional autonomy, in the prime ministerial branches of Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The next two chapters, chapters seven and eight, 
offer a different perspective on institutional change in the prime ministerial branches. The 
study moves from quantitative analysis to a case study approach that is more qualitatively 
oriented. It also moves from assessing the quantity of institutional capacity per se to 
assessing changes in how this capacity has been structured. Specifically, I examine the 
extent to which organizational units have proliferated and specialized in each of the prime 
ministerial branches. Chapter seven considers the cases of New Zealand and Canada, 
where structural change has been comparatively less evident, and chapter eight considers 
Australia and the United Kingdom, whose prime ministerial branches have exhibited 
much more robust change in unit structure.    
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Appendix to Chapter 6 
Table A6.1 
Assertive Citizenship and Prime Ministerial Branch Staff, Correlations 
 Political Interest Party Identification Assertive Index 
Australia 
 
0.35* 0.11 0.46** 
Canada 
 
0.76** -0.53** 0.76** 
New Zealand 
 
-0.03 -0.50** 0.38 
United Kingdom 0.78** -0.62** -0.05 
Pre-1984 0.38 -0.42 0.22 
Post-1984 0.28 0.35 -0.42* 
  
Table A6.2 
Determinants of Prime Ministerial Branch Staff, Australia 
 (1) (2) (3) 
EC -1.72** 
(0.32) 
-0.63** 
(0.18) 
-0.92** 
(0.29) 
Long-Run    
Political Interest 0.46* 
(0.19) 
  
Strength PID  0.58 
(0.45) 
 
Assertive Index   0.37 
(0.40) 
KOF Index  2.75** 
(0.97) 
 
Trade Openness 0.92** 
(0.12) 
 0.39 
(0.46) 
Govt Activity -1.06* 
(0.47) 
-1.40 
(1.29) 
-0.15 
(0.41) 
Total Staff 0.50** 
(0.11) 
0.54* 
(0.22) 
0.46 
(0.22) 
Short-Run    
LD.Staff 0.85* 
(0.30) 
 0.35 
(0.24) 
L2D.Staff 0.43 
(0.27) 
  
D1.Interest -1.08** 
(0.29) 
  
LD.Interest -0.94** 
(0.23) 
  
D1.Assertive Index   0.43 
(0.37) 
LD.Assertive Index   0.48 
(0.34) 
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D1.KOF  0.24 
(1.16) 
 
LD.KOF  -0.31 
(1.28) 
 
L2D.KOF  -2.96* 
(1.38) 
 
D1.Openness -0.83 
(0.54) 
 0.91 
(0.50) 
LD.Openness -1.38* 
(0.48) 
  
L2D.Openness -0.94* 
(0.41) 
  
D1.Govt Activity 0.76 
(0.75) 
  
D1.Total -0.71* 
(0.26) 
 -0.41 
(0.31) 
LD.Total -0.46* 
(0.21) 
 -0.34 
(0.27) 
L2D.Total -0.61** 
(0.19) 
 -0.52* 
(0.23) 
Exogenous    
Term Year -0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.21 
(0.15) 
-0.23 
(0.12) 
Seat Share -0.32 
(0.16) 
0.11 
(0.16) 
-0.08 
(0.18) 
Party -0.29 
(0.32) 
 -0.30 
(0.38) 
Ideology  -0.23 
(0.23) 
 
Constant 0.99 
(0.66) 
0.74 
(0.52) 
0.36 
(0.41) 
    
N 33 33 33 
Adj. R2 0.72 0.25 0.51 
AIC 22.57 55.42 42.51 
BIC 52.50 73.37 66.45 
RMSE 0.30 0.49 0.39 
Bounds Test F-Statistic 7.99r 3.32 3.86 
Notes: Entries are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated 
by * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. L is a one-period lag, L2 a two period lag, etc. D indicates the variable is period-
differenced. The ‘r’ superscript on Bounds Test F-Statistics denotes models in which the model’s F-statistic 
was greater than the critical value for I(1) regressors, implying a rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-
term levels relationship.  
Table A6.3 
Determinants of Prime Ministerial Branch Staff, Canada 
 (1) (2) (3) 
EC -0.77** 
(0.16) 
-0.71** 
(0.15) 
-0.87** 
(0.15) 
Long-Run    
Political Interest 0.06 
(0.10) 
  
Strength PID  -0.05 
(0.05) 
 
Assertive Index   0.19* 
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(0.08) 
KOF Index  -0.02 
(0.10) 
 
Trade Openness 0.45** 
(0.15) 
 0.28* 
(0.14) 
Govt Activity 0.19 
(0.10) 
-0.20 
(0.14) 
0.13 
(0.09) 
Total Staff 0.09 
(0.07) 
0.22* 
(0.09) 
0.23* 
(0.08) 
 
Short-Run    
LD.Staff 0.39** 
(0.14) 
0.41* 
(0.16) 
0.34* 
(0.14) 
L2D.Staff 0.22 
(0.16) 
 0.22 
(0.15) 
D1.Interest -0.12 
(0.08) 
  
D1.PID  0.07 
(0.05) 
 
D1.Assertive Index   -0.25** 
(0.07) 
D1.Openness -0.27** 
(0.10) 
 -0.09 
(0.11) 
LD.Openness -0.20** 
(0.09) 
 -0.19* 
(0.08) 
L2D.Openness -0.13 
(0.08) 
 -0.14 
(0.07) 
D1.Govt Activity  0.14 
(0.10) 
0.11 
(0.10) 
LD.Govt Activity  0.18 
(0.10) 
 
L2D.Govt Activity  0.16 
(0.10) 
 
D1.Total   -0.06 
(0.09) 
LD.Total   -0.17 
(0.09) 
Exogenous    
Term Year 0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Majority -0.22 
(0.07) 
 -0.15 
(0.08) 
Seat Share  0.06 
(0.04) 
 
Party -0.13 
(0.07) 
 -0.10 
(0.07) 
Ideology  -0.06 
(0.03) 
 
Year 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.04** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
Constant -18.21 
(23.34) 
-86.87** 
(24.88) 
-32.65 
(19.19) 
    
N 47 42 47 
Adj. R2 0.41 0.39 0.55 
AIC -57.25 -49.11 -69.31 
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BIC -27.64 -23.04 -34.16 
RMSE 0.11 0.12 0.10 
Bounds Test F-Statistic 6.03r 4.74r 9.62r 
Notes: Entries are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated 
by * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. L is a one-period lag, L2 a two period lag, etc. D indicates the variable is period-
differenced. The ‘r’ superscript on Bounds Test F-Statistics denotes models in which the model’s F-statistic 
was greater than the critical value for I(1) regressors, implying a rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-
term levels relationship.  
Table A6.4 
Determinants of Prime Ministerial Branch Staff, New Zealand 
 (1) (2) (3) 
EC -0.74* 
(0.30) 
-1.59 
(0.71) 
-1.45* 
(0.50) 
Long-Run    
Political Interest 0.33 
(0.30) 
  
Strength PID  0.12 
(0.36) 
 
Assertive Index   -0.10 
(0.17) 
KOF Index -0.21 
(0.29) 
  
Trade Openness  0.46 
(0.49) 
-0.12 
(0.23) 
Govt Activity 0.11 
(0.38) 
-1.29 
(0.62) 
-0.31 
(0.25) 
Total Staff 1.31 
(1.30) 
2.42 
(1.19) 
1.25 
(0.86) 
Short-Run    
LD.Staff  0.56 
(0.35) 
0.41 
(0.24) 
D1.Interest 0.56* 
(0.19) 
  
LD.Interest 0.51* 
(0.20) 
  
D1.PID  -0.58 
(0.81) 
 
LD.PID  -1.92 
(0.96) 
 
D1.KOF 1.03 
(0.58) 
  
LD.KOF 1.10 
(0.65) 
  
D1.Openness  -0.96 
(0.47) 
-0.39 
(0.28) 
D1.Govt Activity  -0.85 
(0.85) 
-0.82 
(0.53) 
LD.Govt Activity  -1.58 
(0.65) 
-1.26* 
(0.55) 
D1.Total  -3.43* 
(1.39) 
-3.10* 
(1.37) 
LD.Total  2.03 
(1.80) 
 
Exogenous    
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Term Year 0.16 
(0.09) 
-0.06 
(0.16) 
0.13 
(0.13) 
Seat Share -0.45 
(0.25) 
-1.75** 
(0.59) 
-0.91 
(0.45) 
Party 0.93* 
(0.37) 
 -0.08 
(0.34) 
Ideology  0.39 
(0.27) 
 
Constant -0.56 
(0.52) 
2.00 
(0.08) 
0.98 
(0.80) 
    
N 23 23 23 
Adj. R2 0.67 0.54 0.47 
AIC 18.99 23.07 29.73 
BIC 33.75 42.38 45.62 
RMSE 0.31 0.37 0.40 
Bounds Test F-Statistic 5.73r 2.70 2.72 
Notes: Entries are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated 
by * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. L is a one-period lag, L2 a two period lag, etc. D indicates the variable is period-
differenced. The ‘r’ superscript on Bounds Test F-Statistics denotes models in which the model’s F-statistic 
was greater than the critical value for I(1) regressors, implying a rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-
term levels relationship.  
Table A6.5 
Determinants of Prime Ministerial Branch Staff, United Kingdom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EC -0.56** 
(0.19) 
-0.57** 
(0.20) 
 
-0.54** 
(0.16) 
-0.27 
(0.23) 
Long-Run     
Political Interest 1.54* 
(0.64) 
   
Strength PID  0.57 
(0.77) 
  
Assertive Index   -2.72* 
(1.15) 
 
KOF Index  1.50 
(0.80) 
  
Trade Openness 0.37 
(0.59) 
 3.24 
(2.01) 
0.98 
(1.78) 
Govt Activity    -0.40 
(0.90) 
Total Staff 0.12 
(0.43) 
-0.02 
(0.43) 
0.69 
(0.60) 
-0.26 
(0.87) 
Short-Run     
D1.Interest -0.52 
(0.35) 
   
D1.PID  -0.33 
(0.28) 
  
D1.Assertive Index   0.58 
(0.51) 
 
LD.Assertive Index   1.24* 
(0.51) 
 
L2D.Assertive Index   1.81** 
(0.46) 
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D1.KOF  -1.04 
(0.64) 
  
D1.Openness   -1.43 
(0.79) 
 
LD.Openness   -0.67 
(0.46) 
 
D1.Govt Activity    0.85 
(0.64) 
Exogenous     
Term Year -0.09 
(0.15) 
0.00 
(0.15) 
0.13 
(0.13) 
-0.01 
(0.15) 
Seat Share 0.81 
(0.43) 
0.09 
(0.33) 
0.31 
(0.44) 
0.32 
(0.36) 
Party 2.05* 
(0.91) 
(1.10) 
 2.00* 
(0.95) 
1.32 
(0.87) 
Ideology  0.73 
(0.52) 
  
Constant -1.06 
(0.58) 
0.02 
(0.39) 
-1.67* 
(0.68) 
-0.78 
(0.62) 
     
N 29 29 29 29 
Adj. R2 0.13 0.17 0.39 0.00 
AIC 74.37 73.36 65.49 78.27 
BIC 86.68 87.03 83.26 90.58 
RMSE 0.77 0.75 0.64 0.82 
Bounds Test F-Statistic 2.66 2.55 4.92r 0.78 
Notes: Entries are OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated 
by * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. L is a one-period lag, L2 a two period lag, etc. D indicates the variable is period-
differenced. The ‘r’ superscript on Bounds Test F-Statistics denotes models in which the model’s F-statistic 
was greater than the critical value for I(1) regressors, implying a rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-
term levels relationship.  
Table A6.6 
Post-estimation Tests  
 Breusch-Godfrey 
LM Test 
(autocorrelation) 
Durbin’s Alt Test 
(autocorrelation) 
ARCH LM Test 
(heteroskedasticity) 
 χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p 
Australia       
Political Interest 0.93 0.33 0.35 0.55 0.45 0.50 
Strength PID 0.04 0.83 0.03 0.87 0.16 0.69 
Assertive Index 2.12 0.14 1.10 0.29 0.47 0.49 
Canada       
Political Interest 3.83 0.05 2.66 0.10 0.37 0.54 
Strength PID 2.46 0.12 1.62 0.20 2.75 0.10 
Assertive Index 0.58 0.44 0.34 0.56 0.38 0.54 
New Zealand       
Political Interest 0.20 0.65 0.08 0.78 0.20 0.65 
Strength PID 5.91 0.02 1.73 0.19 1.11 0.29 
Assertive Index 0.07 0.79 0.02 0.87 0.00 0.99 
United Kingdom       
245 
 
Political Interest 0.08 0.77 0.05 0.81 1.70 0.19 
Strength PID 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.99 3.86 0.05 
Assertive Index 0.57 0.45 0.30 0.58 1.54 0.21 
Govt Activity 0.11 0.74 0.07 0.79 3.61 0.06 
Note: The Breusch-Godfrey and Durbin’s Alternative Tests for autocorrelation have a null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation. Rejecting the null hypothesis (p < 0.05) indicates that there is residual autocorrelation. 
The null hypothesis for the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) test is no 
heteroskedasticity. Rejecting the null hypothesis (p < 0.05) indicates the presence of heteroskedastic errors.   
Table A6.7 
Interaction Effects for Prime Ministerial Branch Staff 
 Australia Canada New Zealand UK 
Interest*TermYear 
 
-4.77 
(5.18) 
-0.35 
(0.24) 
4.33 
(5.09) 
11.46 
(10.29) 
Interest*SeatShare 
 
10.53 
(110.45) 
3.74** 
(0.91) 
-167.69 
(253.42) 
-1774.78* 
(602.63) 
Interest*Party 
 
1.41 
(8.48) 
-0.74 
(0.96) 
-13.30 
(17.66) 
169.87 
(76.60) 
PID*TermYear 
 
4.07 
(5.00) 
-0.40 
(0.29) 
-11.96* 
(3.84) 
-0.36 
(5.66) 
PID*SeatShare 
 
67.19 
(120.87) 
4.63 
(4.60) 
390.33 
(277.43) 
-104.67 
(220.51) 
PID*Party 
 
-0.99 
(0.97) 
0.43* 
(0.17) 
1.33 
(22.48) 
25.51 
(34.94) 
Assert*TermYear 
 
-0.37 
(3.10) 
-0.41 
(0.60) 
-16.99** 
(3.25) 
9.79** 
(1.92) 
Assert*SeatShare 
 
-19.90 
(123.94) 
4.09** 
(0.84) 
1265.47** 
(272.38) 
689.36** 
(219.63) 
Assert*Party 
 
-17.62* 
(6.91) 
-5.28* 
(2.34) 
-57.27* 
(17.19) 
42.15* 
(17.70) 
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Figure A6.1 
Political Interest and Staff Resources, All Countries 
 
 
Figure A6.2 
Party Identification and Staff Resources, All Countries 
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Figure A6.3 
Assertive Index and Staff Resources, All Countries 
   
Figure A6.4 
Assertive Citizenship and Staff Time Series, All Countries 
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Chapter 7  
Institutional Complexity in New Zealand and Canada 
 
The overarching question of this study concerns the extent to which prime 
ministers have pursued institutional responses to the problems of political leadership in 
modern democratic politics. The preceding chapters examined these responses through 
the lens of particular institutional resources: budget appropriations in chapter five; and 
staff levels in chapter six. I found that there was some evidence for the Theory of Public 
Expectations, although quite partial and limited to certain cases. The alternative theories 
of institutionalization received minimal support overall. Crucially, the Westminster cases 
also exhibited distinctive, and unexpected, patterns of institutional change. Change in 
Canada’s Privy Council Office can be characterized as a case of institutional layering, 
while the New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet is marked by elements 
of institutional drift. The prime ministerial branches in Australia and the United Kingdom 
have tended to reflect both institutional layering and conversion; the latter is especially 
evident in the British case. Clearly, this suggests that prime ministers have not responded 
in the same way in all the cases across time. Rather than sharing a common tendency to 
institutionalization, the prime ministerial branches reflect more complex, contextual 
practices and understandings of prime ministerial power and the demands of citizens.   
In this chapter and the next, I continue to probe this question in examining a 
second dimension of institutionalization, institutional complexity. As before, I also assess 
the role of public expectations and other factors in driving institutional change. 
Complexity is a characteristic of the internal organization of prime ministerial branches, 
specifically, the units and structures of units that constitute the branches. The core 
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assumption is that a more complex internal organization is indicative of a higher level of 
institutionalization.  
I trace such change over time in the prime ministerial branches through short case 
studies of New Zealand and Canada, located in this chapter, and the United Kingdom and 
Australia, presented in the next chapter. The case studies are split into two chapters owing 
to length considerations, and for substantive, thematic reasons. As a pair, New Zealand 
and Canada exhibit contrasting institutional trends but a similar pace of change relative to 
the other cases. In New Zealand, which I characterize as a case of institutional drift, there 
has been very little institutional change in the direction of greater complexity since the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet was established in 1990. In the Canadian 
Privy Council Office, there has been a surprisingly sporadic and inconsistent layering of 
new and more specialized organizational units over the existing structure: the core 
structure of the PCO has remained largely intact and unchanged. Thus, in both of these 
cases there has been remarkably little institutional change with regard to complexity.  
In contrast, the two studies in chapter eight concerning the United Kingdom and 
Australia exhibit a significantly greater degree of change in institutional complexity. Both 
the Cabinet Office and the Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet have 
undergone robust structural change, in different ways. In the British case, the process of 
change was one of ‘conversion’, instigated by Prime Minister Blair in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. In this short period, an explosion of units radically changed the institutional 
orientation of the office. Many of these units were different in kind to those in the 
Cabinet Office heretofore, and indeed, to centres of government internationally. In the 
Australian case, the robustness of institutional change is not abrupt but periodic:  
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extensive unit building and unit specialization has occurred in distinct periods of 
sustained, incremental institutional growth.    
Because this analysis of institutional complexity is separated into two chapters, 
the first provides the conceptual and methodological framework guiding both chapters. It 
then develops the first two case studies, New Zealand and Canada. The succeeding 
chapter briefly reiterates the analytical framework before continuing the case study 
analysis with the British and Australian cases. The four case studies share a similar 
format, with some variation: they trace changes in the complexity of the prime ministerial 
branches in each country and assess the extent to which changes in complexity are 
associated with the explanatory factors of assertive citizenship, economic trends, and 
political conditions.  
7.1 Concepts and Methodology 
 This section describes the concept and operationalization of institutional 
complexity, the dimension of institutional change at the heart of this chapter and the next. 
Complexity involves the basic idea that all institutions have parts, and configurations of 
roles, actors, and processes that can evolve over time. Indeed, institutional theory is in 
part an effort to address how these constituent elements work together, and how and why 
they change. Complexity is one way to characterize these institutional configurations. 
Many institutions begin with relatively low complexity and, as they adapt and adjust to 
changing contexts, gradually become more complex. If they do not, they risk institutional 
atrophy, exhaustion, or more radical transformation. This identification of complexity as 
a salient characteristic of institutions is a key element of Huntington’s concept of 
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institutionalization. Huntington (1965) elaborates on the concept of complexity as 
follows: 
   The more complicated an organization is, the more highly institutionalized 
it is. Complexity may involve both multiplication of organizational 
subunits, hierarchically and functionally, and differentiation of separate 
types of organizational subunits. The greater the number and variety of 
subunits, the greater the ability of the organization to secure and maintain 
the loyalties of its members. In addition, an organization which has many 
purposes is better able to adjust itself to the loss of any one purpose than 
an organization which has only one purpose. 
  
 The differentiation of subunits within an organization may or may not be 
along functional lines. If it is functional in character, the subunits 
themselves are less highly institutionalized than the whole of which they 
are a part. Changes in the functions of the whole, however, are fairly easily 
reflected by changes in the power and roles of its subunits. (399-400) 
This description provides the framework and underlying logic in this chapter. 
Institutions become more complex when, within their organizational structure, there is 
proliferation, differentiation, and specialization of units. These three processes are the 
key aspects of institutional complexity investigated in this chapter. Proliferation occurs 
when the number of units within a given institution increases.  
This is captured in our first measure of complexity: the number of distinct, 
formally established units within an institution. This is a very simple but profound 
measure. While it does not reveal anything about the nature of these units per se, it is 
telling: more units imply greater specialization and differentiation within prime 
ministerial institutions. Even if there are broad areas of overlapping responsibility among 
units, an institution with a greater number of non-identical parts is, by definition, more 
complex than one with fewer. Ragsdale and Theis (1997) use a measure of the number of 
units in the Executive Office of the President to measure complexity. They argue that 
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proliferation improves institutional stability and that it adds value by “developing an 
intricate internal identity – many offices doing many compartmentalized tasks” (1291). 
Thus, the “number of units” indicator of complexity tells a simple but revealing story 
about broad patterns of institutional change over time.     
The analysis’s second measure of institutional complexity is differentiation and 
specialization of units within prime ministerial branches. The concept of 
institutionalization also suggests that units contribute to the institutional scope of prime 
ministerships. As Huntington suggests, differentiation and specialization of units 
strengthens and reflects the ability of organizations to adjust and adapt to changing 
circumstances: the more institutions do, the more valuable they become. This is 
essentially the functionalist premise that if an institution performs socially valuable 
functions, it is normatively desirable: activity confers legitimacy. In order to measure 
differentiation and specialization, we need to know the types of units that are created and 
their pattern of creation. Thus, I articulate a typology of units, examine the types of units 
created in prime ministerial branches, and how use of various types changes over time.  
Measuring institutional complexity in these ways - the number and types of units - 
is also quite closely indicative of prime ministerial intent, given that such changes are 
very closely connected to the prime minister’s prerogatives over the machinery of 
government. Moreover, the priorities of prime ministers are arguably revealed more 
directly in organizational change than in budget appropriations and staff resources, 
especially when the latter are measured in the aggregate. Although appropriations and 
staff are reasonable measures of the overall institutional capacity of the Westminster 
prime ministerships, examining internal structures allows a richer, more explicit account 
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of how prime ministers direct their resources to particular ends. It demonstrates the extent 
to which prime ministerships have developed into multifaceted, multipurpose 
organizations at the centre of government.      
7.1.1 Measuring Complexity: Units in Prime Ministerial Branches 
My classification of unit types is adapted from Ben-Gera (2009), as explicated in 
Alessandro et al. (2013). They list sixteen functions performed by centre of government 
units.96 Because I am interested less in minute details of institutional activity than in the 
broader patterns of institutional change, I amalgamated these functions into six generic 
types of prime ministerial branch units: administrative; policy-specific; advisory; 
implementation; “ad-hoc limited”; and communications. I describe each of these types of 
units in turn; they are summarized in table 7.1.   
Table 7.1 
Types of Units in Prime Ministerial Branches 
Type Description Example 
 
Administrative 
 
Logistical and bureaucratic 
coordination & oversight; 
cabinet support 
 
Cabinet Secretariat (UK Cabinet 
Office) 
 
Policy-Specific Policy coordination & support 
within distinct policy areas 
Social Policy Division, Office 
for Women (Australian DPMC) 
Advisory General policy advice & support Policy Advisory Group (NZ 
DPMC) 
Implementation Policy implementation oversight 
& strategy 
Cabinet Implementation Unit 
(Australian DPMC) 
Ad-Hoc Limited Temporally-bounded, reactive / 
urgent government response 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
Authority (NZ DPMC) 
Communications Public information & media 
relations 
 
Government Communications 
Group (UK Cabinet Office) 
Source: Author, adapted in part from Alessandro et al. (2013) and Ben-Gera (2009).   
                                                 
96 These are: preparation of meetings; planning and monitoring; policy coordination; communications; 
administrative support; political cabinet (advisors); EU coordination legislative secretariat; chief 
executive’s direct support units; strategy units; policy coordination; performance monitoring; press, 
communications and speechwriting; policy advice; legal counsel; and internal management.  
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Administrative units perform the logistical and bureaucratic oversight and 
coordination functions of prime ministerial branches, ranging from corporate support 
units to civil service agencies. If a unit is generically a “Cabinet Secretariat”, it is 
classified as administrative, although it performs a variety of other functions. 
Administrative units form the backbone of prime ministerial branch institutions: they 
fulfill necessary core functions. They are generally perpetuated throughout the 
institution’s life and they change very little. Thus, they can be seen as the “baseline” level 
of complexity. While a step removed from an exclusively personal office, a hypothetical 
prime ministerial branch with only administrative units is not institutionally complex, 
relatively speaking.97  
Policy-specific units are those whose functions range over a discrete, identifiable 
policy domain such as national security or social policy. These units may perform any 
number of particular policy functions, from advice to coordination to monitoring, as long 
as they pertain to a specific policy area only. This type of unit is key to understanding 
growth in complexity. The proliferation and specialization of policy-specific units 
directly reflects a prime ministerial branch expanding its institutional ambit. Policy-
specific units in most cases could just as well be established in relevant line departments. 
There is little reason, for example, that the current DPMC in Australia should have a 
robust Industry, Infrastructure and Environment Division, when there are three ministries 
with responsibilities in these areas. That such a division exists reflects the imperatives of 
prime ministers to have the institutional capacity to drive policy change from the centre, 
coordinate departmental activity to ensure prime ministerial priorities are met, and access 
independent sources of policy advice. Thus, policy-specific units are central to tracing 
                                                 
97 None of the prime ministerial branches in this study has administrative units only.  
255 
 
how organizational changes in prime ministerial branches reflect the changing “face” of 
prime ministerial power. 
Similarly, advisory and implementation units speak to the growing complexity of 
prime ministerial branches. Advisory units are units that furnish policy advice to prime 
ministers but are not specific to a policy sector. A typical example is the Prime Minister’s 
Strategy Unit, established by Prime Minister Blair in 2003 (Burch and Holliday 2004, 
12).98 The output of this Cabinet Office unit included reports and seminars in a broad 
range of policy areas, from urban transportation to anti-social behaviour.99 The activities 
of advisory units often resemble a kind of ‘in-house’ policy think tank. They are often 
staffed by non-career civil service experts, such as academics and policy advocates. Like 
policy-specific units, but with a broader mandate, advisory units reflect prime 
ministerships that actively seek to drive policy change from the centre. However, it may 
also be the case that advisory units are supplanted or bypassed in favour of policy-
specific units as institutions become more complex.  
The fourth type of prime ministerial branch unit is implementation. These units 
are tasked specifically with oversight of policy and programme delivery: working to 
make policies decided upon actually come to fruition. Beginning in the mid-1970s, 
scholars of public administration have paid increasing attention to the way that policy 
decisions can be “diverted, deflected, dissipated, and delayed” as those decisions are 
disseminated through the machinery of government (Lindquist 2006, 311). However, the 
innovation of formal implementation units began much later. The first such unit was the 
                                                 
98 The PMSU was an amalgamation of two prior units: the Performance and Innovation Unit in the Cabinet 
Office and the Forward Strategy Unit in no. 10. 
99http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100125070726/http://cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/publicati
ons/archive.aspx 
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Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit established by Prime Minister Blair in 2001; the Cabinet 
Implementation Unit was established in the Australian DPMC in 2003, by Prime Minister 
Howard (Lindquist 2006, 312).100 Lindquist suggests a variety of rationales for the 
establishment of such units, but these rationales are thematically similar. They suggest a 
growing need for prime ministers to closely monitor and set clear targets and standards 
for how policies are actually delivered by measuring outcomes and setting expectations 
of accountability for results in the civil service, especially for politically salient policy 
goals (Lindquist 2006, 315-316).   
Ad-hoc limited units are a fifth type of prime ministerial branch unit. I refer to 
these units as “ad-hoc” because they are established in response to a specific policy (or 
political) problem, and are limited in duration. In general, units established as ‘task 
forces’ or ‘reviews’ are of this nature. For instance, in New Zealand, the Y2K Task Force 
was established in 1997/98 to assess the preparedness of government for the potential 
threat to technological infrastructure caused by the change in year to 2000. This unit 
produced a report in August 1998 and then disbanded.  
Such units, in my view, speak to the ambit of prime ministers but in a different 
way than the policy-specific or policy advisory units described above. They are not 
reflective of institutionalization so much as they are short-term political responses to 
pressing, publicly salient policy issues. They speak to the well-established prerogative of 
prime ministers to involve themselves in any issue, or as Donald Savoie puts it, 
“governing by bolts of electricity” (1999, 313). They also can reflect what Lee et al. 
                                                 
100 The head of the PMDU, Sir Michael Barber, is a leading proponent of what he calls “deliverology” and 
is an advisor to governments globally on its tenets, including consulting for Justin Trudeau’s Liberal 
government in Canada.     
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(1998) call the “’Christmas tree’ function” of the Cabinet office, “providing a place 
where decorative symbols can be hung” (187). This does not mean that they are 
unimportant reflections of prime ministerial power. On the contrary, the continued use of 
ad-hoc limited units suggests an active, interventionist, centralized approach to prime 
ministerial leadership. However, by their temporary nature, such units maintain cannot be 
seen as contributing to the strengthening of permanent institutional capacity in the prime 
ministerial branches.  
Finally, communications units are those units overseeing communications and 
information functions. These may range from media and press units, which directly deal 
with the relationship between the prime minister, the public service, and the media, to 
information units, which are more directed towards dissemination of government 
information within and outside the public service. It also includes units related to 
government branding or messaging, although these are rare in the civil service prime 
ministerial branches.  
I include communications units as a separate type of unit, even though they are 
not especially prevalent in the departments under discussion, for two reasons. First, and 
most importantly, where they have been established they speak to a particularly modern 
set of problems for these offices. Traditionally, the public service in the Whitehall 
tradition was inward-oriented. Ministers spoke for departments; while parties and elected 
officials spoke for the government. Communications therefore traditionally were internal 
and focused on the administrative flow of information, not on ‘packaging’ for external 
public consumption. The fact that communications units have been created in some 
instances attests to the public nature of modern politics. Second, as a more general 
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characterization of organizational structure, differentiating communications units is 
useful because their function is quite different from the policy and administrative 
functions performed by the other types of units.      
To summarize, this chapter and the next assess two dimensions of institutional 
complexity: proliferation of units and functional differentiation or specialization of units. 
The indicator of proliferation is a count of units within each prime ministerial branch. As 
a measure of complexity, the indicator is simple: the more units, the more institutional 
complexity exists. The indicator of differentiation and specialization is the types of units 
that are created and perpetuated through time. I identified six types of organizational 
units: administrative, policy-specific, advisory, implementation, ad-hoc limited, and 
communications. These types reflect institutional complexity in a number of ways.  
Administrative units, while providing core functions of these offices, represent 
only a baseline level of institutional complexity. Although administrative capacities of 
prime ministerial branches may be quite extensive, they predominantly serve the 
prerogatives of prime ministers: the “activities that are the responsibility of the minister 
as a minister”, including legislative process, management of cabinet business and 
machinery of government arrangements (Hamburger et al. 2011, 379). When the prime 
ministerial branches were small, these were, almost exclusively, its functions.101 On the 
other hand, changes in advisory, policy-specific, and implementation unit types are 
primary indicators of changes in institutional complexity with regard to prime ministerial 
branches. They represent significant changes in the institutional capacity of prime 
                                                 
101 Indeed, in its most embryonic stages, prime ministerial branches were often not concerned even with 
these things, since the prime minister might have had, at most, a handful of private secretaries dealing 
primarily with correspondence and logistics. Prerogatives were managed personally by the prime minister, 
cabinet, and political parties. 
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ministerial branches to actively initiate, coordinate, and implement policies across a 
range of governmental activity, and to attend to priorities of prime ministers, not only 
their administrative duties.   
The use of ad-hoc limited units – units that are inherently temporary, usually 
narrow in scope, and often set up in response to an urgent policy or political problem – 
does not necessarily contribute to institutional complexity. However, they are helpful 
reflections of what kinds of problems prime ministers deem important to bring within 
their offices. Finally, communications units are rare in these cases but do also reflect a 
prime ministerial branch that is expanding in scope and specializing in function. They are 
more readily found, and indeed have somewhat proliferated, in the political offices of 
prime ministers. The communications, media relations, and public engagement aspects of 
PMOs in these countries have seen significant growth in both size and importance to the 
overall operations of prime ministerial branches.                  
As in the rest of the study, these chapters focus on the central civil service office 
as the bureaucratic extension of prime ministerial authority and source of policy advice 
and support. These are the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in Australia and in 
New Zealand, the Privy Council Office in Canada, and the Cabinet Office in the UK. As 
discussed in chapter one, while these offices are not the entirety of the ‘prime ministerial 
branch’, they still constitute the bulk of the substantive policy advice and support that 
prime ministers receive. Moreover, while they are less publicly visible than their political 
counterparts, they are, in my view, more central to the story of prime ministerial 
leadership within the core executive and the policy process.  
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As noted in earlier chapters, this narrower focus probably underestimates the 
extent to which the prime ministerial branches, as a whole, have institutionalized.  
Clearly, other elements of these branches, i.e., prime ministers’ political offices, have also 
undergone institutional change, most in the direction of greater institutionalization of 
resources and support (Peters et al. 2000). Certainly, there is available information about 
the structures of the respective PMOs in Australia, Canada, and the UK cases, in 
particular. However, the information is less complete than information about the civil 
service offices, and thus not ideal for investigating change over time.102 Such information 
merits further examination beyond the scope of this study. Analytically, I also want to 
maintain consistency with previous chapters and within the cases in these chapters.  
7.1.2 Empirical Approach 
 This chapter takes a different approach to empirical assessment of the overall 
institutionalization model compared with the chapters examining institutional resources. 
In those chapters, five and six, the approach to theory testing was primarily quantitative. 
This was straightforward in principle, if not always in practice. While the same approach 
could be applied in this chapter, it is not the primary mode of analysis. This is because of 
the nature of the dependent variables. First, the “number of units” variable is a count 
variable, meaning that its values are generated by a counting process. It can thus only 
take on non-negative integer values. If a count variable has a large enough mean and non-
integer values are plausible, treating a count variable as a continuous variable is 
acceptable.103 Indeed, the staff resources variable in chapter six is technically a count 
                                                 
102 This is because prime minister’s offices are not as formally institutionalized as their civil service 
counterparts and are thus not required to report on their operations as a matter of course.   
103 Treating a count variable as continuous may still require the use of techniques other than ordinary least 
squares for regression analyses, since OLS can produce negative estimates.  
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variable, but is treated as a continuous variable.104 The “number of units” variable does 
not have a large enough mean and in some cases has low variance; the yearly 
observations are also highly dependent on temporally adjacent observations. Treating it as 
a continuous rather than discrete variable is also less plausible than in either the 
appropriations or staff resources case.  
Second, the “types of units” measure is a qualitative measure that is best 
described qualitatively, although numeric description is also useful in order to get a basic 
sense of trends. The problem of low variation is also more acute when differentiating 
between types of units: in some cases, the number of administrative units, for example, is 
constant. As well, in many instances, there are no units of a particular type at all. Thus, 
drawing these data into a regression model, even with techniques designed to account for 
these violations of the classical linear model, undermines the usefulness of this 
information.       
 Instead, these two case study chapters take a more holistic, qualitative approach. 
This means, firstly, that there is a much greater descriptive element. Each case study 
begins with a review of the historical context of each institution. Second, although still 
primarily based on quantitative information, the analysis qualitatively describes trends in 
the proliferation and specialization of units for each case.105 Third, I examine the 
relationships between the theoretical explanatory factors and measures of institutional 
complexity descriptively, and I consider these relationships in terms of congruence of 
time periods, not single-year observations. Analytically, this means that I do not depend 
                                                 
104 Actually, since the measure used in chapter six is staff Full-Time Equivalents, it does allow for non-
integer values, but the data is still generated by a counting process, which are then manipulated to give the 
FTE number. 
105 The section discussing the Cabinet Office in the UK takes a slightly different approach, for reasons 
given in that section.   
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on regression estimates of effects that control for the effects of other variables, as in 
previous chapters. Thus, the findings here are less ‘precise’ and less exacting than in 
previous chapters, though still as rigorous as possible. This rigor is evident in at least two 
ways.  
 First, the collection of data on prime ministerial branch units was as complete as 
was feasible. I counted and categorized every unit, for each case, in every year for 
appropriate lengths of time (particular to each case, as described in detail below).106 
While obviously not all of this evidence is explicitly discussed, the totality of the data 
informs my conclusions. Second, in keeping with the overall research design of the study, 
the chapter identifies hypotheses prior to data collection and analysis and assesses 
support for these hypotheses in the data. This constrains and clarifies the analysis, 
guarding against ill-defined conclusions and ‘fishing’ for significant findings.  
 Structurally, the two chapters on institutional complexity also differ from previous 
chapters in consisting of short case studies. Because the analysis employs much 
qualitative description and narrative, focusing on institutional change in one case at a 
time enables clearer and more coherent analysis. This case-oriented approach also 
provides a level of context-specific depth that complements the variable-oriented 
approach of earlier quantitative analyses.   
                                                 
106 This is different from other studies in the area, which are often selective in data collection and 
presentation, constructing narratives out of a small number of time points. 
In all references to specific years where I am discussing my own data collection from the departmental 
reports and other organizational structure sources, years refers to fiscal years. For example, 1991 refers to 
FY1991, i.e., July 1, 1990 to June 30, 1991 in Australia and New Zealand, and April 1, 1990 to March 31, 
1991 in Canada and the UK. Often the organizational information is explicitly as of June 30 of the 
respective year; in some cases, it is as close as was available to that date.   
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7.1.3 Hypotheses 
 In line with the chapters on institutional resources, chapters seven and eight assess 
institutional complexity in relation to the three types of explanations introduced in 
chapter three: the Theory of Public Expectations; economic trends; and political 
conditions. While the empirical strategy is different, the hypotheses are the same. In this 
section, I state these hypotheses as they relate to the subsequent case studies of 
institutional complexity.  
 The Theory of Public Expectations argues that shifts in political culture in recent 
decades, from allegiant to assertive orientations, generate a favourable context for prime 
ministerial branch institutionalization. Thus, the overarching empirical expectation is that 
increases in assertive orientations will tend to be associated with increases in 
institutionalization. Within these case studies of institutional complexity, this expectation 
implies the following hypothesis: units within prime ministerial branches proliferate and 
functions become more differentiated and specialized during periods of increased 
assertive citizenship. In other words, assertive citizenship generates increasing 
institutional complexity. As in the previous chapters, assertive citizenship is 
operationalized in terms of aggregate political interest, strength of party identification, 
and an index of assertive attitudes. Since the analysis is more descriptive in approach, the 
conclusions I draw are based more on congruence of trends within certain periods rather 
than the granular annual observations of previous chapters. For example, if both 
proliferation of units and assertive attitudes trend together over a five-year period, this is 
taken as positive evidence for the hypothesis.   
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 Here, I also examine the importance of two other potentially determinative factors 
in producing changes in institutional complexity. The first concerns long-term economic 
trends. As with assertive citizenship, economic trends also are expected to co-vary 
positively with levels of institutional complexity over time. As we have already seen, the 
two specific factors examined, globalization and central government activity, generally 
increase over time and all measures of these factors are serially correlated.107 The 
question, then, is whether the trends in these economic indicators are reflected in unit 
proliferation and specialization over time. Thus, my expectations for the effects of these 
variables mirror the assertive hypotheses above: when globalization and government 
activity are higher relative to their trends over time, institutional complexity in prime 
ministerial branches will tend to increase correspondingly.       
 The second alternative explanation for change in institutional complexity is the 
impact of political conditions. As in previous chapters, I examine three political contexts 
that seem especially relevant to prime ministerial decisions to induce institutional change. 
First, when this decision takes place, relative to the whole of a prime ministerial term, 
could be important; we have called this a term effect. Second, the legislative support a 
prime minister is able to command may affect a prime minister’s ability or priorities with 
regard to making changes in his branch: the expectation is that greater legislative support 
will be associated with greater institutional complexity. Third, prime ministers of 
different ideological orientations may choose to institutionalize differently. Specifically, 
prime ministers of more liberal orientations will be more likely to increase institutional 
complexity, and conservatives less likely. There are a number of putative reasons for this 
                                                 
107 The correlations of each variable with its one-period lag are: the KOF Index 0.99, openness 0.97, 
government consumption 0.98. 
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expectation, including a greater likelihood of policy activism and belief in the efficacy of 
government on the part of more liberal prime ministers. It is hypothesized that these 
factors tend to incentivize centralizing policy coordination mechanisms, among other 
things.                  
7.1.4 Data Sources 
 Examining the foregoing hypotheses about institutional complexity requires data 
on the institutional structures of prime ministerial branches over time. These data come 
from a variety of sources. The primary sources are annual departmental reports published 
by the respective organizations themselves. Within these reports, I extracted information 
about the organizational structure of the departments, usually in the form of charts 
visually depicting the department’s unit and reporting structure. For the first case study, 
New Zealand, data prior to 2002 comes from an access to information request, by the 
author, to the New Zealand DPMC. This data listed all staffed units since 1990 on a year-
by-year basis, along with information on salary levels. Data on the DPMC’s structure 
after 2002 was gleaned from the department’s annual reports. 
 Organizational information for the Canadian Privy Council Office was obtained 
from several sources. Separate annual performance reports of the Privy Council Office 
begin in 1996-97. Prior to this date, data about PCO structure was obtained from Part III 
of each year’s budget main estimates, which provide additional details for each 
department, such as program activity and organizational structure.108 Some of the PCO 
annual reports do not provide full and consistent information about the unit-level 
organization of the department. Thus, several organizational charts and other sources of 
                                                 
108 Part I is the Government Expenditure Plan, an overview of the government’s fiscal position and goals as 
reflected in the budget. Part II provides the line item departmental spending.  
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evidence (particularly the sporadically updated “Role and Structure of the Privy Council 
Office” document) were obtained from archived versions of the PCO website on the 
Internet Archive, and Library and Archives Canada’s own stored versions, particularly for 
years after 2008.109    
 In the United Kingdom, the Cabinet Office has produced a separate, online 
departmental report since 1997/98. Information on the Office’s organizational structure 
prior to 1998 was collected from two sources. First, I consulted the Government’s 
Expenditure Plans, published alongside annual budgets. Similar to part III of the budget 
estimates in Canada, these documents provide a more detailed account of each 
department’s activities and resources. Second, I used the Cabinet Office entry in the Civil 
Service Yearbook, which is an annually published directory of government officials. The 
Cabinet Office entry lists senior officials by unit, from which a picture of unit structure 
can be assembled.  
 Finally, the Australian case study relies heavily on departmental reports of the 
Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, which began publication in 1979. 
The reports to 1997 were obtained in electronic form via the author’s request to the 
National Library of Australia, while the remaining reports were available online. 
However, from 2010 to 2015, the reports did not always provide explicit, full depictions 
of the DPMC’s unit structure compared to previous reports. Thus, for these years I 
accessed organizational charts from archived versions of the DPMC website on the 
Internet Archive, as in the Canadian case. The versions used were those captured as near 
                                                 
109 As in other cases, the shift in public management accounting and reporting expectations from describing 
inputs to organizational activity to outputs measured against strategic objectives undermines this 
researcher’s ability to compare organizational information consistently across time.  
The Internet Archive is a website that captures and stores websites as they were at various points in time, 
and can be found at https://archive.org/index.php   
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in time to the end of the fiscal year (in Australia, June 30) in order to align with the 
annual reports, which are tied to the fiscal year.  
7.2 New Zealand: The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 1990-2015  
 The preceding explication is put to the test first in the case of the New Zealand 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. As earlier chapters suggest, this case stands 
out among the four by the relative absence of institutional change observed. The case 
demonstrates that prime ministerial branch institutionalization is not a universal process. 
My analysis suggests that, until recently, there has been very little growth in institutional 
complexity within the New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC). 
This supports the characterization of the New Zealand case as a case of institutional 
‘drift’. The New Zealand DPMC has not faced the same external pressures of increasing 
public expectations and structural economic change, and has thus not incentivized actors 
(i.e., prime ministers) to seek reorientation of institutional rules and norms.       
 The case study focuses on the period since the DPMC’s establishment in 1990. 
Prior to 1990, the prime minister was supported by a small Prime Minister’s Department 
(PMD), established in 1926. Like its counterparts in the other cases, the PMD began as a 
small office with mostly clerical duties (Boston 1988, 9). Since most prime ministers also 
were the minister responsible for foreign affairs, their main source of policy advice and 
support was the External Affairs department. In addition, Boston characterizes the post-
war prime ministers as generally passive policy actors, with “less need for a large 
personal staff or a high-powered, multi-disciplinary team of professional advisers” (1988, 
9).     
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 In line with currents in other Westminster systems, the 1960s and 1970s saw an 
increasing recognition that prime ministers “needed help”. This resulted in significant 
reorganization of the PMD in 1975. The department now consisted of five units: the 
private office, the Cabinet Office, the Press Office, the Advisory Group, and the External 
Intelligence Bureau (Boston 1988, 10). In 1987, after some controversy over the 
appointment of a non-career civil servant to head the Advisory Group, the PMD was 
divided into a Cabinet Office, staffed by civil servants, and a Prime Minister’s Office, 
staffed by partisan appointees as well as civil servants. This arrangement, however, did 
not endure. A formal review of the prime minister’s support system resulted in the 
establishment in 1990 of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. This review 
recommended a single department for all civil service policy and coordination support, 
essentially hiving off the purely political functions from the policy functions (Palmer and 
Palmer 2004, 75). The arrangement was quickly implemented and it remains the basis for 
the contemporary DPMC. The rest of this case study traces the New Zealand DPMC’s 
institutional development since 1990 and assesses the factors driving this development.  
7.2.1 Proliferation and Specialization in the New Zealand DPMC 
 The proliferation of units in the New Zealand DPMC since 1990 does not exhibit 
a high degree of institutional change. On this measure, the office has not become 
markedly more institutionally complex over time, although it is more complex in 2015 
than it has ever been. The number of total units in the organizational structure of the 
DPMC is shown in figure 7.1, for the period 1990 to 2015.   
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Figure 7.1  
Units in the New Zealand DPMC, Total and by Type, 1990-2015 
 
Source: 1990-2002: DPMC (New Zealand) Request for Information by author. 2003-2015: DPMC Annual 
Reports.  
 In the first year of its existence, the DPMC contained five units: the Office of the 
Chief Executive; the Cabinet Office; Corporate & Support; the Policy Advisory Group; 
and the Domestic and External Security Secretariat. These units formed the core of the 
DPMC’s work, and all have been retained, mostly unchanged. The number of units 
initially rises quickly, up to ten in 1992-93. After this initial build-up, the overall trend in 
the proliferation of units resembles the trends in the department’s budget appropriations 
and staff levels. After an initial rise, relative stability characterizes the next two decades, 
from 1992. In the most recent two years, the number of units has increased steadily to 
thirteen in 2015. This pattern suggests that outside of an initial burst of activity and more 
recently, New Zealand prime ministers in the last twenty years have not regularly 
manipulated the organizational structure of the DPMC to expand the scope of their 
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activities. Throughout this period, the DPMC has remained a relatively small 
organization, with little change from year to year.                       
 I turn now to examining differentiation and specialization within the New Zealand 
DPMC. I do so by examining changes in the types of units that are created and 
perpetuated. The number of units for each of the six types is depicted above, in figure 7.1, 
and the name, duration, and type of each unit is provided in table 7.2, below.110 At its 
establishment in 1990, the configuration of units in the New Zealand DPMC closely 
resembled that of the Prime Minister’s Department before 1987. It had three 
administrative units (Office of the Chief Executive, the Cabinet Office, and Corporate & 
Support), a policy advisory unit, and one policy-specific unit, the Domestic and External 
Security Secretariat (DESS). There is negligible change in the number of administrative 
units from 1990 to 2015, and no change at all in advisory units: the Policy Advisory 
Group remains the only such unit.  
Table 7.2 
Units in the New Zealand DPMC, 1990-2015 
Unit Years Type 
Office of the Chief Executive 1989/90 – present Administrative 
Policy Advisory Group 1989/90 – present Advisory 
DESS / DESG (2004) / SRG (2010) 1989/90 – 2013/14 Policy-Specific 
Cabinet Office 1989/90 – present Administrative 
Corporate & Support / Corporate Services 1989/90 – present Administrative 
Government House 1990/91 – present Administrative 
Change Team on Targeting Social 
Assistance 
1990-91 Ad-Hoc Limited 
Communications Unit 1991/92 – 1999/00 Communications 
EAB / NAB (2010)  1991/92 – present Policy-Specific 
Crown Health Enterprise Establishment 
Unit 
1991/92 – 1992-93 Ad-Hoc Limited 
Health Reforms Directorate 1991/92 Ad-Hoc Limited 
National Interim Provider Board 1991/92 Ad-Hoc Limited 
                                                 
110 There have been no units in the New Zealand DPMC specifically tasked with policy implementation, so 
this type is not represented here. 
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Coordination and Communications Group 1992/93 Communications 
Crime Prevention Unit 1993/94 – 1999/00 Policy-Specific 
Employment Taskforce 1993/94 Ad-Hoc Limited 
Task Force for Positive Ageing 1995/96 – 1996/97 Ad-Hoc Limited 
Y2K Task Force Secretariat 1997/98 Ad-Hoc Limited 
Climate Change Project 2001/02 Ad-Hoc Limited 
Foreshore and Seabed Group 2003/04 Ad-Hoc Limited 
Corporate – Government House Project 2007/08 – 2013/14 Administrative 
ICG / ICG and NCPO (2013) 2010/11 – 2013/14 Policy-Specific 
National Cyber Policy Office 2013/14 – present Policy-Specific 
MCDEM (from DIA) 2013/14 – present Policy-Specific 
Intelligence & Assessments 2014/15 – present Policy-Specific 
National Security Systems 2014/15 – present Policy-Specific 
National Security Policy 2014/15 – present Policy-Specific 
National Security Communications 2014/15 – present Policy-Specific 
CERA 2014/15 – present Ad-Hoc Limited 
Abbreviations: DESS: Domestic and External Security Secretariat. DESG: Domestic and External Security 
Group. SRG: Security and Risk Group. EAB: External Assessments Bureau. NAB: National Assessments 
Bureau. ICG: Intelligence Coordination Group. NCPO: National Cyber Policy Office. MCDEM: Ministry 
of Civil Defence and Emergency Management. CERA: Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority.  
Source: 1990-2002: DPMC (New Zealand) Request for Information by author. 2003-2015: DPMC Annual 
Reports. Categorized into type by author.  
 
 The trend over time in policy-specific units demonstrates both the limited 
institutional growth in the New Zealand case and the focus of prime ministerial priorities. 
New Zealand prime ministers have clearly not turned to policy-specific units in the 
DPMC for policy coordination in a broad field of government activity. Rather, policy-
specific units have been almost entirely focused on matters of national security and 
foreign policy. The only exception is the Crime Prevention Unit, which only operated 
from 1994 to 2000. The first two policy-specific units are the DESS and the External 
Assessments Bureau (renamed the National Assessments Bureau in 2010), an intelligence 
analysis and reporting unit. The growth in the overall number of units has been driven by 
a proliferation of such security and intelligence units. In 2010, an Intelligence 
Coordination Group was established, and a unit dealing with cybersecurity, the National 
Cyber Policy Office, was attached to it in 2013, before the latter became a separate unit. 
The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management was transferred to the 
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DPMC in 2013 from the Department of Internal Affairs. Finally, in 2014/15, a plethora of 
new, more specialized policy-specific units was created: Intelligence and Assessments, 
National Security Systems, National Security Policy, and National Security 
Communications.   
 Ad-hoc limited units have been established sporadically throughout the existence 
of the DPMC. They are particularly prevalent from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, 
when a succession of such units was established. Early ad-hoc units tackled health and 
welfare policy, tied to market-oriented reforms to New Zealand’s health care system in 
the early to mid-1990s (McAvoy and Coster 2005).111 Subsequent units have largely been 
responses to pressing public problems, such as The Y2K Task Force Secretariat 
(1997/98), Climate Change Project (2001/02), and Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
Authority (2014/15). Thus, throughout the DPMC’s existence, ad-hoc units have played 
some part in signalling the public responsiveness of prime ministers to urgent concerns. 
However, their use has not been as widespread or as systematic as in other cases.     
 The areas in which New Zealand prime ministers have chosen to expand the 
institutional complexity of their departments and, equally as revealing, where they have 
not chosen to do so, speaks to the uniqueness of the New Zealand case among the 
Westminster systems. Change in the institutional complexity of the New Zealand DPMC 
is most evident in areas at the core of prerogative prime ministerial power: foreign policy 
and national security. The use of policy-specific units to oversee domestic policy 
coordination and drive domestic policy change from the centre is almost entirely absent 
in the New Zealand case. There has been no institutionalized drive towards policy 
                                                 
111 These were the Change Team on Targeting Social Assistance (1990/91), the Crown Health Enterprise 
Establishment Unit (1991-1993), the Health Reforms Directorate (1991/92), and the National Interim 
Provider Board (1991/92). 
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implementation. Communications units have also been largely absent, although this is in 
line with the other Westminster cases.            
 Overall, then, change in the institutional complexity of the New Zealand DPMC is 
a story of limited, focused growth. In most areas, the institution has remained relatively 
stable. The administrative bedrock of the department has stayed constant, while the areas 
of foreign policy and national security have seen special interest on the part of New 
Zealand’s prime ministers. In other policy areas and other types of units, change has been 
sporadic or minimal. Given this relative lack of institutional change, it is somewhat 
difficult to assess the competing sets of explanations for institutionalization that we have 
been examining. Nevertheless, I consider the extent to which these explanations fit the 
pattern of institutional complexity in the New Zealand case. What factors might explain 
change in the number and types of units in the New Zealand DPMC? 
7.2.2 Assessing Theories of Change in Institutional Complexity 
 To recall, the Theory of Public Expectations implies that periods of greater 
assertiveness will be associated with institutional change in the direction of greater 
internal complexity. In terms of specific measures, this means that increasing political 
interest, weakening party identification, and increasing overall assertiveness, as indicated 
by an index of assertive value and attitudes, should be found together with increasing 
numbers of units and greater differentiation and specialization. In the New Zealand case, 
the previous two chapters have demonstrated minimal conformity to these expectations. 
Put simply, the impact of assertiveness on institutional outcomes in New Zealand has not 
been significant. Figure 7.2, below, shows the same total unit trend over time in the New 
Zealand DPMC as the previous figure, with the assertiveness trends superimposed.  
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Figure 7.2 
Assertive Citizenship and Units in the New Zealand DPMC, 1990-2015 
 
   
 Overall, this evidence suggests that assertive citizenship is not a significant driver 
of increasing institutional complexity in New Zealand. If the hypothesis were true, 
periods of relatively high political interest, weak party identification and high assertive 
index values should be periods in which institutional complexity would be increasing. 
This is not evident in any of the periods shown. For example, political interest increases 
from the mid-1990s through the mid-2000s; at the same time, party identification is 
weaker than it was in 1990, although it declines further later. Even though the assertive 
index declines throughout the entire period, we might expect that the trend in the other 
two factors is reflected in unit proliferation, but it is not. In the period in which there is 
noticeably increasing proliferation of units, from around 2007 to the present, political 
interest is on the decline and the assertive values index is stable at relatively low levels. 
Only the party identification trend aligns reasonably well with the proliferation of units; it 
reaches a ‘local maximum’ in 2008 and declines thereafter. 
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 Similarly, the only serious indication we see of some degree of specialization of 
units is in the area of policy-specific unit growth, where there has been some effort in 
recent years to expand the national security and foreign policy apparatus of the DPMC. 
This does not track with a correspondingly high level of assertiveness in relative terms. 
Since it is a very limited, focused build-up of units, in a short period, in an area in which 
there are many other external pressures, it makes sense that there is little evidence it is 
driven by large-scale cultural change. Taken over the whole period, then, the proliferation 
of units in the New Zealand DPMC and the assertiveness factors appear to be unrelated. 
 However, although this evidence does not conform to the articulated hypotheses, 
it suggests a ‘negative’ case for the Theory of Public Expectations. Instead of directly 
showing that increasing public expectations drive prime ministerial branch 
institutionalization, the New Zealand case shows that in the absence of such expectations, 
incentives to institutionalize are apparently not a salient part of prime ministerial 
decision-making. New Zealand’s prime ministers have not engaged in robust institution-
building because they have not faced the level of public pressure that is stronger 
elsewhere. There is thus a strong correlation here, just not in the expected fashion. While 
observing other periods of positive change in the DPMC would strengthen this argument, 
it is nonetheless an illuminating contrasting case of institutional change (or lack thereof). 
 The evidence does not support the thesis that structural economic change, namely, 
globalization and government activity, has the posited positive effect on institutional 
complexity. For one, the index of globalization measure, which aggregates many 
indicators of political, economic, and social globalization, increases steadily until 2000 
and remains level thereafter, which is not at all reflected in the observed proliferation of 
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units. Second, both the trade openness and government activity measures increase over 
time from the late 1990s through the 2000s, which should spur the institutional 
complexity of the New Zealand DPMC, but it does not. Unless there is a larger lagged 
effect of these trends than I would expect, there is no reason to believe that they have the 
posited effect. A simple significance test on the correlations between the economic 
measures and the unit count measure confirms the lack of evidence for these 
relationships.112 
 These arguments also apply to the differentiation and specialization of units 
measure of complexity. The economic trends are not found to align with the periods in 
which specialization of units occurs in the DPMC, which, again, have been limited in 
scope and in time to recent years. Theoretically, it is also difficult to make the case that 
the areas in which there has been institutional growth, national security and foreign 
policy, are related to these economic changes. Certainly, the notion of a greater need for 
policy coordination and oversight arising from increasing government activity has not 
been reflected in broad proliferations of advisory, policy-specific, or implementation 
units in the New Zealand DPMC. Neither have we seen a centralizing response to the 
supposed effects of globalization, such as policy fragmentation and relative degradation 
of state power: at least not within the prime ministerial branch. Overall, then, changes in 
the institutional complexity of the New Zealand DPMC are not found to be driven by 
structural economic changes.            
 Finally, our third set of explanations involves the political conditions under which 
institutional change occurs. In the New Zealand case, I examine the effects of two 
                                                 
112 The correlations and p-values are: KOF globalization index [r = -0.09, p = 0.65], trade openness [r = -
0.20, p = 0.37], government consumption [r = -0.23, p = 0.30]. 
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political variables: the cycle of prime ministerial terms and prime ministerial ideology.113 
As above, the impact of the term cycle is based on the idea that incentives and 
opportunities will change during a term. Political capital is often highest at the beginning 
of a prime ministerial term, whether because of a general election or a leadership contest 
victory, but the ability of a prime minister to formulate their priorities effectively, 
evaluate the capacities they have to achieve goals, and arrange their support systems 
accordingly, often starts low and increases through a term.  
 In New Zealand, there have been eight full or nearly full prime ministerial terms 
since the establishment of the DPMC. This is too small a sample size to arrive at any firm 
conclusions, but there are several observations that at least suggest patterns. The evidence 
suggests that there is no uniform pattern of change across prime ministerial terms. We do 
not see a consistent trend of change across terms, as expected, and the annual changes are 
mostly only one or two units. It does appear that a unit increase toward the end of terms 
is more likely than a decrease: the most recent three terms, Helen Clark’s last term and 
John Key’s first two terms, reflect this pattern. There is also no change between the first 
and second years of these terms, suggesting that organizational change tends not to be a 
significant prime ministerial priority. Considering the relative lack of specialization in 
units in this case, no general conclusions can be made, but there is no evidence that 
specialization is tied to term cycles in any way. 
 Finally, our expectation is that we will see a lower level of changes in institutional 
complexity under more conservative prime ministers than more liberal ones. However, in 
this case the test is essentially a comparison between just two leaders: the Labour prime 
                                                 
113 The “legislative support” variable cannot be meaningfully tested because of a lack of variation in the 
New Zealand case. 
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minister Helen Clark and the National prime minister John Key. Clearly, Key’s prime 
ministership has seen a greater proliferation and specialization of units than Clark’s, but 
attributing these changes to partisan or ideological differences is unwarranted. It is 
perhaps notable that in the other cases we saw a relatively robust and timely institutional 
response to the national security concerns raised by the 9/11 attacks. In the New Zealand 
case, however, the build-up of units specializing in national security did not occur until a 
change of prime ministers. However, this may reflect the relatively smaller, less central 
role of the prime ministerial branch in New Zealand; the response is more apparent 
outside of the centre of government machinery than within the core executive.114       
7.2.3 Institutional Complexity and Change in the New Zealand DPMC 
 As revealed in earlier chapters, the New Zealand case exhibits a pattern of 
institutional drift, in terms of the schema presented in chapter three. There has certainly 
not been a high degree of institutionalization with regard to institutional complexity. 
Other than the notable build-up in national security units in recent years, neither 
proliferation nor specialization of units has been especially prevalent in the New Zealand 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet over its twenty-five year history. Unlike their 
counterparts in other Westminster countries, to varying degrees, New Zealand prime 
ministers have not sought to expand the scope of the prime ministerial branch. The core 
administrative units have remained largely unchanged, while the kinds of policy-specific, 
                                                 
114 A DPMC document outlining the government’s national security framework, “New Zealand’s National 
Security System”, published in May 2011, demonstrates this argument. For instance, it describes the 
management of national security as “managed with devolved arrangements to the greatest extent possible” 
(5). It points to a defence and intelligence review in 2009, eight years after 9/11, as precipitating 
subsequent changes. It describes a forum of government chief executives (akin to Deputy Ministers in 
Canada), the Officials’ Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination, as the predominant 
policy coordination mechanism. It is also telling that instead of establishing a National Security Advisor 
and apparatus, as Canada and other jurisdictions did after 9/11, the role remained with the chief executive 
of the DPMC (12).   
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advisory and implementation units associated with a more institutionalized capacity for 
policy initiation and coordination are largely absent. In addition to this relative lack of an 
institutionalizing trend, the complexity trend is highly continuous. It is essentially 
unchanging, apart from the initial build-up of units due largely to the ad-hoc health 
reform units and the recent increased prominence of national security.  
 These findings accord with the characterization of the New Zealand prime 
ministership and political culture in chapter two. To recall, scholars have argued that 
collective decision making and a “culture of consultation” largely retain their normative 
strength in New Zealand (Johansson and Levine 2013; McLeay 2003). Additionally, as a 
small unitary state, New Zealand prime ministers do not have to consider 
intergovernmental relations in decision-making. Neither the direct need for 
communication and liaison with subnational governments nor the indirect need to 
consider federal fiscal and structural arrangements in policy-making are present in New 
Zealand. Finally, as shown above, political culture in New Zealand is ambiguous in its 
embrace of assertive values. Many of the assertive indicators involve questions of trust, 
political efficacy and government responsiveness; Banducci et al. (1999) show that the 
switch to a proportional representation system in 1993 significantly shifted attitudes in 
these areas. They found that “more voters came to see that their votes really mattered, 
fewer thought that their MPs did not care or were out of touch, and fewer thought that 
government was run by a few big interests” (550-551). This is another point of contrast 
between New Zealand and the other Westminster cases, and also an interesting example 
of feedback between institutional change and sociocultural change.  
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 In terms of institutional complexity, then, I characterize the New Zealand 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet as a case of institutional drift since its 
establishment in 1990. Institutionalization has been relatively low and institutional 
continuity relatively high, although the department may currently be in a period of 
increasing complexity. Since the department in its current incarnation is relatively new, 
however, caution in characterizing its development is warranted. To date, there has been 
relatively little institutional change, and there are distinctive factors militating against 
change, as just discussed. But it may be premature to definitively characterize the case. In 
contrast, the DPMC’s counterpart in Canada, the Privy Council Office, has a long 
institutional history, arguably predating Confederation in some sense (Dutil 2017, 53).115 
The next section examines this case.  
7.3 Canada: the Privy Council Office, 1984-2015  
 This section explicates the study’s second case of institutional complexity: the 
Privy Council Office (PCO) in Canada. It focuses on the period from 1984, when 
organizational information is first detailed in the budget estimate documents.116 Unlike 
the New Zealand case, the literature suggests that the institutional growth of the PCO is 
closely linked with the growth of prime ministerial power in Canada (Aucoin et al. 2011, 
121; Savoie 1999, 2010). This has involved not only institutional growth but also a 
reorientation of institutional values and functions. As Graham White (2005) and others 
have long noted, the idea that the PCO’s master is cabinet collectively is not tenable. 
                                                 
115 The Privy Council Office was established at Confederation in 1867, but many of the initial staff also 
worked as clerks for the various Executive Councils (cabinet) that existed in the province of Canada and 
Upper Canada prior to 1841. This included the first Clerk of the Privy Council. 
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There is, suggest Peters and Savoie (2000), “little question that above all it serves the 
prime minister” (47). The PCO has become in function and purpose the “prime minister’s 
department”, with the Clerk of the Privy Council the “prime minister’s deputy minister” 
(White 2005, 66). The office itself has recognized this in its values statements since at 
least the early 1990s. For example, the 2001 departmental report states that the office 
 provides professional, non-partisan advice, information, and support services to 
 the Prime Minister on a range of policy, management, and operational issues… 
 PCO advises and supports the Prime Minister as Head of Government on 
 Government policies and priorities, on the Government’s organization and its 
 relations with Parliament, the provinces and other institutions, and on the 
 planning and operations related to Canada’s representation in the international 
 community. PCO also provides support to the Prime Minister as the Chair of 
 Cabinet. (Canada 2001, 2) 
 
Moreover, Campbell’s observation in 1983 that the PCO “maintains virtual control of 
policy advice to the prime minister” suggests that the Office is not only a prime 
minister’s department but the prime minister’s department (1983, 83). It is helpful to 
understand that though the Prime Minister’s Office has also grown institutionally and is 
responsible for much of the perception of growing prime ministerial power, it does not 
yet have the policy expertise and depth of institutional knowledge that the PCO has, nor 
should it necessarily. The PMO is more the external face of the prime ministerial branch 
and its role is more politically charged, but the PCO provides the prime minister with the 
crucial levers operating the machinery of government. Moreover, prime ministerial 
priorities are the priorities of the PCO. As Savoie puts it, “if the prime minister expresses 
an interest in any given matter, that is reason enough for the Privy Council Office to bring 
it into its own office” (1999, 154). Thus, though the PCO performs several functions that 
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serve the cabinet collectively or its committees, its basic orientation is to the prime 
minister, not only because of her position as ‘chair of the cabinet’ but in her own right. 
 As the prime minister’s department, the PCO has a distinctive policy coordination 
role that outstrips its administrative origins. It also extends beyond putting “six goalies on 
the ice” (Savoie 1999): a defensive counterbalance to departmental interests rather than 
an active player in policy initiation (134). The idea that the PCO is simply a bulwark 
against aggressive departmentalism is in tension with the notion that it is the prime 
minister’s department, and is belied by its own institutional structure. If the office serves 
the prime minister’s priorities, it would be a poorly functioning institution if it did not 
engage actively in areas of prime ministerial interest. Policy coordination itself is not 
devoid of substantive policy implications; that the PCO primarily serves the prime 
minister in coordinating and managing the flow of information and cabinet business gives 
it much more than a simply defensive role. This is to say that the Privy Council Office 
plays an active, robust role in projecting prime ministerial power within the core 
executive and the broader machinery of government.        
  The PCO is the only one of the four prime ministerial branches to be in 
continuous existence since the nation’s ‘founding’ in 1867. As mentioned earlier, the first 
Clerk of the Privy Council was also Clerk of the Executive Council in pre-Confederation 
Canada (Dutil 2017, 53). However, to repeat a common theme in these case studies, the 
Privy Council Office’s duties from Confederation until the ensconcement of a Cabinet 
Secretariat in 1940 were “formal and legalistic” (Robertson 1971, 488). Dutil describes 
the work of the small PCO staff as tracking ministerial requests, drafting Orders in 
Council, arranging meetings of Cabinet, recording Cabinet deliberations, and following 
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up with line departments (2017, 269). While undoubtedly crucial to effective functioning 
of government, these are prototypically administrative functions. Indeed, as Peters and 
Savoie (2000) note, the shift to more robust centralized coordination machinery was 
resisted much longer in Canada than in the United Kingdom; the latter’s cabinet 
secretariat was created in 1916 as a response to wartime pressures (48).  
 Arnold Heeney became the first titled Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to 
the Cabinet in 1940. Still, compared to the Prime Minister’s Department in Australia, for 
example, the Privy Council Office was, and remained, a rudimentary unit. It grew 
somewhat with the greater institutionalization of cabinet committees under Prime 
Minister Pearson (1963-68), but the signal change is the onset of Pierre Trudeau’s prime 
ministership in 1968 (Savoie 1999). As was demonstrated in earlier chapters, the path of 
growth in institutional resources at the centre of government in Canada is marked from 
this point. The organizational structure of the PCO accords with these other institutional 
trends.  
 Robertson (1971) includes in his exegesis of the PCO’s work an organization 
chart showing the structure of the office in 1971, arguably at the height of Prime Minister 
Trudeau’s organizational restructuring (494). This chart shows that the lines of the 
modern PCO had already been established at this time. There are three branch-level units, 
each headed by a Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet: Operations, Plans, and Federal-
Provincial Affairs. Each of these branches has a significant number of secretariats and 
divisions within it, covering a broad range of areas. Peters and Savoie’s (2000) 
observation that the PCO is “organized to cover virtually every area of government 
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activities” is already apparent (50).117 There is also an Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet 
(Security) and an Administration & Personnel section.  
 Notwithstanding a few significant changes, such as the establishment of a separate 
Federal-Provincial Relations Office in 1974/75 and an expanded foreign policy and 
national security apparatus, a key finding is that the organizational core of the Privy 
Council Office has remained largely the same. As Savoie argues, the PCO’s 
organizational structure has changed only “at the margins”, the core of planning, 
operations, and machinery of government branches remaining in place (1999, 122). In 
addition, the PCO has carved out a large role in two particular policy areas: foreign 
policy and intergovernmental relations (Savoie 1999; Peters and Savoie 2000). This is not 
surprising, since the first is traditionally seen as a core prime ministerial prerogative 
while the second reflects the omnipresence of federalism in policymaking in Canada, and 
the particular variant of executive federalism so prominent from the 1960s to the 2000s. 
7.3.1 Unit Proliferation and Specialization in the Privy Council Office   
 The previous section described, in broad strokes, the historical origins and context 
within which the Privy Council Office has changed. The rest of this case study examines 
and analyzes, in further detail, change in the office’s institutional complexity, particularly 
since 1984-1985. I first make note, however, of two issues with the data underlying the 
case study. First, synthesizing information on the Privy Council Office’s organizational 
structure is somewhat complicated by how it is reported in some of the documents, 
                                                 
117 Within Operations: Government Operations, Economic Policy, External Policy and Defence, Science, 
Culture and Information, and Social Policy. The Plans branch is actually further subdivided into a Planning 
section, consisting of the Priorities and Planning and Legislative and House Planning Secretariats, and the 
Machinery of Government section, consisting of the Communications, Government Organization, and 
Senior Personnel units. There is also an Assistant Clerk in charge of Orders in Council and legal units. 
The Federal-Provincial Affairs branch consists of a Federal-Provincial Relations Secretariat, a Director of 
constitutional review, and a research and policy development section.   
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particularly in the expenditure plans section of the budget estimates. The PCO itself is 
only one “business line” presented under the umbrella of the ‘Privy Council program’, 
which includes the Prime Minister’s Office, offices of ministers who report to the Clerk 
of the Privy Council, the Federal-Provincial Relations Office (from 1975 to 1995, when it 
was re-incorporated into the PCO), commissions of inquiry and task forces, and 
administration.  
 While these are undoubtedly important to the overall scope of the Canadian prime 
ministerial branch, I do not consider these elements to be part of the core organizational 
structure of the PCO, though they all have certain reporting relationships to the Clerk and 
the prime minister. For instance, among the “commissions of inquiry and task forces” 
business line are several royal commissions, such as the Krever inquiry into tainted blood 
and the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. These are listed under the Privy 
Council program because the PCO provided administrative support to them, but they are 
not recognized by the PCO itself as institutionally part of the office.118 In other words, 
they do not appear on PCO organizational charts. Thus, I consider only the organizational 
elements that are directly and explicitly a part of the PCO itself.   
 A second data issue concerns the fact that, for some periods, information was only 
available for ‘branch-level’ PCO units, not the subdivisions within them. Branch-level 
units are those whose heads report directly to the Clerk of the Privy Council and who are 
typically Deputy Secretaries to the Cabinet. Listings of subunits of these branches, 
typically headed by Assistant Secretaries to the Cabinet, were not directly available for 
1984 to 1994 and from 2001 to 2004. This means, of course, that any units which existed 
                                                 
118 This is in contrast to the Australian case, for example, where the DPMC has explicitly recognized units 
whose mandates are associated with temporary projects such as White Papers or commissions.   
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solely between 2001 and 2004 are not captured, nor can we directly account in many 
cases for when units existing in 2005, but not in 2000, were established, and vice versa. 
Instead of inferring the existence of units in this period, I simply treat them as missing 
data. This is unfortunate but not too problematic, as the branch-level change in this period 
elucidates important changes in the PCO’s organizational structure reasonably well. 
Thus, the analysis of institutional complexity in the PCO relies much more heavily on 
examining change in the top-level branch units than on change within these units.   
 The overall trend in the branch-level units in the Canadian Privy Council Office 
has been one of increasing proliferation, at least through 2012. However, the trend is not 
strictly linear: there seems to be a cycle of growth in units followed by periods of 
retrenchment and consolidation. The PCO consistently housed five branches until 1993: 
Plans, Operations, Security and Intelligence, Machinery of Government and Senior 
Personnel, and Corporate Services. This increased to nine by 1998, with new branches for 
Foreign and Defence Policy, Intergovernmental Affairs, and Millennium Planning. After 
declining for a number of years, the number of branches rises and falls dramatically in, 
and after, 2005, under Paul Martin. It recovers somewhat, but then decreases quite 
substantially after 2012.  Figure 7.3, below, plots the trend line in the number of branch-
level units in the Privy Council Office from 1985 to 2015, with prime ministerial tenures 
indicated.  
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Figure 7.3 
Unit Proliferation in the Privy Council Office, Canada, 1985-2015 
  
Sources: Canada, Main Estimates, Part III. Privy Council Office Departmental Reports. Kim Campbell’s 
prime ministership is not represented because of its extremely short duration.  
 The figure makes clear that, to a significant extent, changes in the trend line have 
much to do with changes in prime ministers. The number of branches in the PCO is stable 
during Brian Mulroney’s tenure (1984-1993), but begins to increase under his successor, 
Jean Chrétien (1993-2003). After a decline in the latter half of the Chrétien prime 
ministership, the number of branches spikes under Liberal prime minister Paul Martin 
(2003-2006), reaching a peak of eleven in 2005. In Stephen Harper’s first year as prime 
minister, 2006, the PCO undertook a reorganization “aimed at placing a stronger 
emphasis on the traditional responsibilities” of the office (Privy Council Office 2006, 35). 
However, in the remainder of Harper’s first term, 2006 to 2008, the number of PCO 
branches rises again, and remains at ten through most of his second term. After 2012, 
there is a decline in the number of branches, a function of reorganization – branches 
being subsumed and a new reporting arrangement.   
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 The pattern observed here paints a somewhat different picture than the trends in 
PCO budget and staff resources observed in earlier chapters. While those trends 
demonstrated a high degree of continuity and incremental growth, the more volatile 
character of the PCO’s institutional structure, per figure 7.3, suggests that change along 
this dimension of institutionalization is more responsive to short-term factors, and less 
institutionally path dependent than other dimensions. One explanation for this may be 
that concrete resources such as budgets and staff are normally more entrenched; it is 
arguably more disruptive to radically expand or cut budgets and staff than it is to 
rearrange the structure within which those resources operate. Prime ministers may also 
view alterations in organizational structure to be a more flexible, effective way of 
furthering their priorities than other means.119         
 A second indicator of change in institutional complexity is specialization and 
differentiation of units, particularly in terms of the establishment of more specialized 
policy units, advisory units, implementation units, and units dedicated to 
communications. Growth in these kinds of units speaks to a greater role for prime 
ministerial branches in policy coordination and support, and prime ministers’ need for 
enhanced advisory and control structures. Table 7.3, below, lists and categorizes all units 
by type in the PCO at the “branch” level from 1985 to 2015.  
Table 7.3 
Units (Branches) in the Privy Council Office, Canada, 1985-2015 
Unit Years Type 
Plans    1984-
present 
Administrative / Policy-
Specific# 
Operations 1984-
present 
Administrative / Policy-
Specific# 
                                                 
119 For example, it seems a much clearer signal to establish a separate Intergovernmental Affairs branch, as 
the current prime minister, Justin Trudeau has, than to simply increase funding ostensibly for that purpose 
within existing structures. Formal demarcation can be a powerful tool.   
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Security and Intelligence  1984-2003 Policy-Specific 
Senior Personnel  1984-
present 
Administrative 
Communications and Consultation 1993-94 Communications 
Government Renewal 1995 Ad-Hoc Limited 
Office of Federal Economic Development 
(Ontario) 
1995 Policy-Specific 
Intergovernmental Affairs 1996-2012 Policy-Specific 
Foreign and Defence Policy 1997-2012 Policy-Specific 
Corporate Services* 1997-
present 
Administrative 
Deputy Clerk of the PC & Counsel 1998-2001 Administrative 
Millennium Planning 1998 Ad-Hoc Limited 
Machinery of Government 2002-05 Administrative 
National Security Advisor 2004-
present 
Policy-Specific 
National Science Advisor 2004-05 Policy-Specific 
Counsel 2005 Administrative 
Expenditure Review Secretariat 2005 Ad-Hoc Limited 
Legislation & House Planning, Machinery of 
Government 
2006-
present 
Administrative 
Public Service Renewal 2007-08 Ad-Hoc Limited 
Afghanistan Task Force 2008-12 Ad-Hoc Limited 
Office of the Coordinator for 2010 Olympics 
and G8 Security 
2008-10 Ad-Hoc Limited 
Administrative Services Review 2012 Ad-Hoc Limited 
Business Transformation & Renewal 
Secretariat 
2013 Ad-Hoc Limited 
Counsel 2015 Administrative 
Note: Years refer to fiscal years, e.g., 1996 means that the unit was started or existed in fiscal year 1995/96. 
Several units have undergone minor name changes; the names listed are the original forms.  
# As described in the text, the Plans and Operations Branches can be described as “catch-all” units which 
encompass many functionally different subunits.  
*Corporate Services branch is not listed prior to 1997 but is a part of the PCO. It is found on Lalonde’s 
(1971) organizational chart showing the PCO in 1971. It is therefore included in the unit counts for 
analysis.    
 This information reveals that Donald Savoie’s observation about the unchanging 
organizational core of the PCO largely is borne out. While the administrative branches of 
Plans, Operations, Senior Personnel, and Corporate Services have been essentially stable, 
the creation of new policy-specific branches has been sporadic and minimal. The Security 
& Intelligence secretariat existed from 1985 to 2003, when it was folded into the National 
Security Advisor’s responsibilities. In 1996, after the dissolution of the separate Federal-
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Provincial Relations Office, an intergovernmental affairs unit was established in the PCO; 
this unit was shuttered in 2012, with its attendant policy areas subsumed into the Plans 
division. In 1997, a Foreign & Defence Policy branch was created, also remaining as a 
unit until 2012. 
 The Privy Council Office arguably reached its peak in unit specialization under 
Prime Minister Paul Martin (2003-2006). Figure 7.4, below, shows PCO structure as it 
was in 2005. The aforementioned National Security Advisor unit was established in 2004 
and a National Science Advisor unit was established in the same year. The former 
remains a key policy-specific branch of the PCO while the latter lasted only two years, 
being disbanded in Stephen Harper’s first year as prime minister. Neither has there been a 
significant degree of specialization within the branches; the Plans and Operations 
branches, which have housed a small number of policy-specific subunits since the 1960s, 
look much the same internally in 2015 as they do in 1995.  
 Similarly, specialization of units in the PCO has not been evident in terms of 
communications, advisory, or implementation functions. Until Prime Minister Justin 
Trudeau established a Results and Delivery Unit within the PCO in 2016 (after the period 
of this case study), there were no specialized implementation units in the office. The PCO 
has also not witnessed growth in communications units, nor has it established any kind of 
distinct advisory group within the office. There have been a limited number of ad-hoc 
units set up, such as the Expenditure Review Secretariat (2005), the Afghanistan 
Taskforce (2008-2012) and Office of the Coordinator for 2010 Olympics and G8 Security 
(2008-2010), but the number of ad-hoc units created within the core PCO organization is 
comparatively small. Thus, in comparison to other prime ministerial branches, the extent 
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of institutional specialization in the Canadian Privy Council Office is low, although 
greater than in the New Zealand case.     
Figure 7.4 
Organizational Structure of the PCO, 2005 
 
Source: PCO Departmental Performance Report 2004-05, 55.  
        These findings are somewhat surprising, given the distinctive incremental 
institutionalization in the Canadian case evident in budget appropriations and staff 
resources, and the general view of the Canadian prime ministerial branch as among the 
most robust. Certainly, the Privy Council Office has increased in size and specialization 
to some extent; it houses much more institutional capacity than it did in 1867 or 1940. 
The modern PCO is a sprawling bureaucratic organization in its own right. This is evident 
in Figure 7.5, below, which depicts the organizational structure of the PCO as of August 
2015.  
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Figure 7.5 
Organizational Structure of the PCO, 2015 
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 However, while the PCO of 2015 is more institutionally complex than it was in 
1985, its core structure has been altered very little: it retains the key Operations, Plans 
and Consultations, and Senior Personnel branches with minimal changes. In fact, 
comparison with the office in 1971 (see Robertson 1971, 494) suggests that the PCO at 
the end of Stephen Harper’s tenure as prime minister is less complex in some ways. Its 
policy subunits are less specialized and its coordination of intergovernmental affairs less 
prominent. Some of this is clearly explained by very different political contexts: Pierre 
Trudeau’s PCO prominently houses a Constitutional Conference Secretariat, something 
closely associated with the era of “mega-constitutionalism” in the 1960s and 1970s, . 
Where the PCO in 2015 has become more complex, it reflects similar concerns to what 
we saw in the New Zealand case: the national security role of the PCO has noticeably 
become more institutionalized.  
 The narrative of complexity in the PCO may have been different if, 
counterfactually, Paul Martin had continued to serve as prime minister; his short tenure 
witnessed a number of innovations that may have been continued had he not been 
replaced. As discussed above, the PCO arguably reached its peak in both unit 
proliferation and specialization during Martin’s term. Although outside of the scope of 
this study, the current prime minister, Justin Trudeau, has also taken steps towards 
increasing the institutional complexity of the Privy Council Office. As of 2017, he has re-
established Intergovernmental Affairs as a separate branch, created a secretariat devoted 
to youth issues, and as mentioned, established a Results and Delivery unit, with a focus 
on policy implementation. 
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 To conclude, the Privy Council Office has not exhibited a level of specialization 
comparable to its other institutional resource trends. In part, this may be due to focusing 
only on the core PCO’s organizational structure; doing so may underplay change in other 
parts of the prime ministerial branch. Certainly, in the Canadian PMO there has been a 
degree of specialization with regard to communications and policy to some extent. This 
suggests that while the PCO is obviously an active, robust organization, the two-headed 
nature of prime ministerial power is stronger in Canada than is perhaps the case 
elsewhere. Still, although there has certainly been specialization in the PCO, the 
“fascination with central coordination” in Canada does not match the kind of restless 
institutional rearrangement we observe in other cases. Specialization of units in the 
Canadian Privy Council Office has been muted. 
7.3.2 Explanations for Change in Institutional Complexity 
 In the previous section, I elucidated the extent to which the Canadian Privy 
Council Office has become more institutionally complex. Overall, the totality of the 
evidence points to only a moderate level of institutional change, and it has been sporadic 
and halting rather than consistent over time. While we observed proliferation in Jean 
Chrétien’s first two terms, his shortened third term (2000-2003) saw no change. Under 
Paul Martin, there was a large spike in the number of PCO units and some movement in 
the direction of specialization, but under his successor, Stephen Harper, there was a 
reversion, and indeed, after 2011, a significant decline in the number of branches through 
consolidation. In this section, I assess evidence for the hypotheses relating three factors – 
public expectations, economic trends, and political conditions – to change in the 
institutional complexity of the PCO.            
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 The Theory of Public Expectations is captured in the hypothesis of a 
correspondence between periods of change in the assertiveness of Canadians and change 
in institutional complexity. These trends should co-vary in a positive way over time. 
Figure 7.6, below, shows the number of PCO branches over time along with an averaged 
assertiveness trend, from 1985 to 2015. The correspondence between the two trends is 
evident when considered over the whole period. Assertiveness generally increases until 
the mid-2000s and declines thereafter; the unit proliferation trend is roughly similar, also 
peaking in the mid-2000s. The correlation between the two trends is 0.58 (p = 0.00), 
which indicates a relatively strong positive correlation: higher assertiveness is associated 
with higher unit proliferation.   
Figure 7.6 
Unit Proliferation and Assertiveness, Canada, 1985-2015 
  
Note: Assertiveness is the yearly average of political interest, party identification (reversed), and the 
assertive index.  
 On shorter time scales, the relationship between assertiveness and institutional 
complexity encounters both controverting and supporting evidence. Canadians became 
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dramatically more assertive in the 1980s while the branch structure in the PCO was static. 
Another increase in assertiveness from 2000 to 2005 is not accompanied by a parallel 
increase in PCO units, although the distinctive proliferation and specialization under Paul 
Martin follows thereafter, perhaps suggesting a lagged effect. On the other hand, the 
build-up under Jean Chrétien in the 1990s and the reversals under Stephen Harper are 
reflected in the assertiveness trend. The latter, in particular, proves an interesting case in 
point. Canadians have evidently become less assertive from 2005 onwards, and have 
remained at relatively low levels of assertiveness since 2010. As I discussed in the New 
Zealand case study earlier, while this does not necessarily speak to the core thrust of the 
Theory of Public Expectations, it does suggest that in the absence of increasingly 
assertive citizenship, prime ministers may be less driven to pursue institutionalization.  
 The second set of explanations for changes in institutional complexity involves 
the impact of economic trends. I examine two major structural changes that have been 
observed in Canada and other industrialized countries in the post-war period: 
globalization and growth in government activity. The empirical expectation is that both of 
these trends are positively associated with institutional complexity. I hypothesize that 
when globalization and government activity are higher relative to their time trends, 
institutional complexity in prime ministerial branches will tend to increase. Conversely, 
when these economic trends are not increasing, I expect that the PCO will tend not to 
become more complex. 
 It does not appear that these economic trends are related to institutional 
complexity in any significant way. Globalization, as measured by the KOF Index, rises 
sharply in the 1990s, and declines slowly thereafter. Government activity, i.e., social 
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spending by the central government as a proportion of GDP, declines dramatically in the 
1990s, in part because of the Liberal project of deficit elimination, and does not really 
recover. These trends are not reflected in the PCO’s proliferation trends. Moreover, to the 
extent that there has been specialization in the PCO, it has not seemingly been focused on 
goals that concern responses to changing economic trends. Overall, then, I conclude that 
the economic hypotheses are not supported.  
 Finally, I examine three hypotheses about the impact of political conditions on 
institutional complexity. The first hypothesis is that there is a “term effect”: a correlation 
between years of a prime ministerial term and change in institutional complexity. The 
second hypothesis concerns legislative support. The claim here is that prime ministers 
with greater legislative support are more likely to increase institutional complexity than 
prime ministers with less support. The third political hypothesis is that party or ideology 
matters: liberal prime ministers are more likely to increase institutional complexity than 
conservative prime ministers. 
 Is there a term effect in Canada for institutional complexity? It does not appear as 
though there is a consistent pattern over prime ministerial term years. On average, 
proliferation is greater in the first two years as compared to the third: in the first and 
second years, the mean changes in branches are 3.1 and 1.1 percent, respectively, 
dropping to -3.4 percent in the third year. In the fourth year the mean change increases to 
8.3 percent. However, the number of observations is small and the variance is very large, 
rendering the differences not statistically significant. 
 It is also not apparent that legislative support has a significant effect on 
institutional complexity. Under the Mulroney majority governments, the PCO’s top-level 
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organizational structure was essentially static, while in the first two Chrétien majorities 
the PCO does become more institutionally complex. The majority government that 
Stephen Harper finally achieved in 2011 marks a period of decreasing institutional 
complexity. A similar lack of consistency is evident with regard to minorities. The notable 
proliferation and specialization that Paul Martin undertook was in the context of a 
minority government, while the minority governments of Harper from 2006 to 2011 
evince institutional retrenchment and consolidation rather than growth. Statistically, the 
difference of means in branch proliferation (change in units) is not significant; again, the 
variation within majority and minority governments swamps any variation between the 
two.  
 Finally, the foregoing discussion heavily implies that there is a partisan, 
ideological component to change in institutional complexity. The significant periods of 
unit proliferation and specialization correspond mostly to Liberal governments, while 
under Stephen Harper the evidence points generally to intentional downsizing and 
consolidation. Moreover, arguably the qualitative character of change is linked to 
ideological positions. While under Liberal prime ministers the Privy Council Office 
emphasized the prime minister’s role in managing the Canadian federation and in such 
‘liberal’ priorities as science policy and regional economic development, the emphasis 
under Stephen Harper was on national security. Although not listed in table 7.3, above, 
because they were not formally constituted PCO units, Harper also brought into the PCO 
several special advisors on such things as human smuggling and border security (these 
positions are shown in figure 7.5). And again, though outside of this study’s scope, the 
incumbent prime minister, Justin Trudeau, appears to be following in the footsteps of his 
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Liberal predecessors rather than Harper in terms of increasing the institutional 
complexity of the Privy Council Office. Although no general conclusions can be drawn 
because of the limited sample size, there does appear to be some role for ideology in 
explaining increasing and decreasing institutional complexity.         
7.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
 This chapter is the first of two that examine institutional complexity in the prime 
ministerial branches. I introduced the concept of complexity and described how the 
concept is operationalized in the four case studies that follow. In this chapter, I explicated 
the New Zealand and Canadian cases: two cases that have developed low to moderate 
degrees of institutional complexity. The New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet case exhibits a kind of institutional stasis. From its establishment in 1990 until 
very recently, there has been minimal proliferation of units and little in the way of unit 
specialization. Since the New Zealand case is characterized by very high continuity in 
organizational structure and a relatively low level of institutionalization, it is categorized 
as a case of “drift” in our typology of incremental institutional change. However, it may 
be more accurate to describe it as a case in which institutional change has essentially 
been absent altogether. Part of what has militated against change may be the lack of 
external forces, such as an increasingly assertive public, in New Zealand.  
 In the case of the Canadian Privy Council Office, the observations of Donald 
Savoie and others that the office’s core organizational structure has been quite stable is 
borne out. While certainly the PCO has become more institutionally complex in the last 
thirty years, what is surprising is the relatively low level of unit proliferation and, 
especially, specialization. As with the New Zealand case, the Canadian case is somewhat 
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at odds with the typology of institutional change that I have posited. As far as the 
dimensions of continuity and institutionalization, the Privy Council Office falls into the 
“layering” mode of incremental change: comparably high continuity and moderate 
institutionalization. However, the layering of new institutional rules, norms and functions 
onto existing ones in the PCO has been more sporadic and less robust than was expected 
theoretically. Finally, in examining potential explanatory factors, I found that there is 
some evidence pointing to the strength of assertiveness and of party ideology in driving 
change in institutional complexity. There was minimal evidence for other explanations.  
 In both of the New Zealand and Canada cases, determining the robustness of these 
explanations is somewhat hindered by the relative lack of institutional change to begin 
with. While the Privy Council Office in Canada has certainly grown in the direction of 
institutionalization more than was the case in the New Zealand Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, both cases contrast starkly with the cases in the next chapter, the 
United Kingdom and Australia. As the next chapters depict, in both these cases the prime 
ministerial branches have become incredibly complex, though in very different ways. 
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Chapter 8  
Institutional Complexity in the UK and Australia 
 This chapter continues my assessment of change in institutional complexity 
within the prime ministerial branches. In theory, increasing institutional complexity is a 
key response to the pressures that modern politics places on prime ministerial leadership. 
However, the cases of New Zealand and Canada presented above, in chapter seven, 
demonstrated empirically that the process of change is more complex than theory 
predicts. Both cases exhibited less institutional change in this regard than was expected. 
In New Zealand, there has been minimal change in institutional complexity. Canada’s 
prime ministerial branch is certainly more internally complex than it was fifty years ago, 
but institutional change has been sporadic and tied to particular prime ministers. The 
Canadian Privy Council Office has become more complex over time, but not markedly 
more specialized.   
 In contrast to those cases, the British and Australian prime ministerial branches 
examined in this chapter exhibit significantly more robust change in institutional 
complexity. They also offer illustrative, contrasting patterns of institutional change. The 
story of the British Cabinet Office centres on its abrupt, dramatic conversion under Tony 
Blair into a robust, institutionally complex, policy-oriented office. In the Australian 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, however, successive prime ministers have 
periodically reoriented the office by layering new and enhanced functions onto existing 
ones. While taking different paths, both offices demonstrate significant and enduring 
growth in institutional complexity, which differentiates them from the New Zealand and 
Canadian cases. 
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  The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I reiterate the main conceptual and 
operational discussion in chapter seven. I then continue the series of case studies, 
focusing now on the United Kingdom’s Cabinet Office and Australia’s Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet. The final section of the chapter summarizes the chapter’s 
findings, and concludes this set of studies. 
8.1 Concepts and Methodology 
 This section reiterates, briefly, the conceptual and methodological discussion in 
section 7.1, above (pgs. 246-263). Institutional complexity is a key dimension of 
institutionalization. Along with institutional autonomy, complexity is important to an 
institution’s ability to adjust and adapt to changing contexts. An institution gains value by 
growing and expanding its functional ambit. As discussed there, my empirical analysis of 
institutional complexity is based on identifying units found in prime ministerial branches, 
and tracing change in unit structures over time. I examine two measures of complexity: 
first, the proliferation of units, and second, specialization of units. The first simply refers 
to counting the number of units, while the second indicates the extent to which 
institutional functions are differentiated and narrowed.  
 In order to classify units, I identified six types of units: administrative; advisory; 
policy-specific; policy implementation; ad-hoc limited; and communications. 
Administrative units perform logistical and bureaucratic coordination and oversight 
functions, and general support to operations. In Australia, the Government division, 
which has been a permanent institutional feature, is one such unit.120 Advisory units 
provide broad policy advice and support, akin to ‘in-house’ think tanks. The Central 
                                                 
120 The Government Division, within the ‘Governance’ Group, houses four internal branches: Honours, 
Symbols and Legal Policy; Parliamentary & Government; Parliamentary Liaison Officer (House of 
Representatives); and Parliamentary Liaison Officer (Senate).  
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Policy Review Staff in the UK Cabinet Office, one of the earliest innovations in unit 
specialization when it was created in 1971, was a unit of this sort. In contrast, policy-
specific units are organized around a specific, more or less exclusive policy area. Within 
this area, these units perform various policy-related functions. A recent new example of 
this is the Cities division in the DPMC, transferred from Environment in early 2016 after 
Prime Minister Turnbull deemed municipal affairs a priority.  
 The fourth type of prime ministerial branch unit is implementation: units with 
generally broad mandates to monitor and evaluate government performance. These units 
reflect a general ideational shift in public administration towards measuring results within 
a framework of strategic policy objectives. The prototype and paradigmatic example is 
the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit, established in the Cabinet Office by Tony Blair. Ad-
hoc limited units are the fifth type of unit. These are units set up to manage particularly 
urgent issues, often in response to external events or significant policy reforms. 
Taskforces, which have been especially prevalent in the Australian case, are a typical 
example. By definition, such units are temporary; if they become institutionalized, they 
would be considered policy-specific or administrative units. Ad-hoc limited units respond 
to or support specific projects or policy initiatives and then are disbanded. Examples from 
the Australian DPMC and the UK Cabinet Office include the “White Paper on 
Federalism” unit in the former and the Olympic and Paralympic Legacy Unit (2012) in 
the latter.    
 Finally, communications units perform media and public relations, as well as 
internal government communications functions. While both the Cabinet Office and 
Australian DPMC have housed units dealing with government information for decades, 
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such units have not proliferated consistently compared to other types of units. Their 
presence is more evident in the political offices of prime ministers than in the 
bureaucratic offices. Still, change in this regard does reflect innovation in these offices, 
shifting from the traditionally insular Whitehall mould towards more modern concerns 
with public engagement. A revealing example is the build-up of communications 
operations in Tony Blair’s first term, discussed further in the case study below.       
 As in the previous chapter, the empirical approach in this chapter is 
predominantly qualitative and descriptive. In each case study, I narrate changes in 
institutional complexity over time and assess the extent to which our theoretical factors 
correspond to these changes. The analysis is thus more impressionistic and less precise 
than in the earlier quantitative chapters, but more grounded in details and case-oriented. 
The hypotheses, however, are the same. As discussed in-depth in chapter seven, these two 
case studies elucidate the robustness of three types of explanations for explaining change 
in institutional complexity: Public Expectations; economic trends; and political 
conditions. 
 The Public Expectations explanation is empirically supported if we observe that 
units within prime ministerial branches proliferate and functions become more 
differentiated and specialized during periods of increased assertive citizenship, as 
indicated by political interest, party identification, and an assertive attitudes index. This is 
the primary theory of interest in this study. However, I also assess the impact of two long-
term economic trends, globalization and change in central government activity. I test the 
hypothesis that when globalization and government activity are higher relative to their 
trends over time, institutional complexity in prime ministerial branches will tend to 
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increase correspondingly. Finally, I assess the impact of political conditions, namely, term 
effects (when during a term change occurs), legislative support, and ideology. I expect 
that greater legislative support will be associated with greater institutional complexity 
and that prime ministers of more liberal orientations will be more likely to increase 
institutional complexity, and conservatives less likely. We now move on to the two case 
studies of the chapter, beginning with the Cabinet Office in the United Kingdom. 
8.2 United Kingdom: the Cabinet Office, 1978-2015 
 The British Cabinet Office, our third case study of institutional complexity, is 
very well documented compared to the other Westminster prime ministerial branches. 
Many aspects of the office have been assessed thoroughly (for example, Blackstone and 
Plowden 1988; Blick and Jones 2010; Burch and Holliday 1996, 2004; Burnham and 
Jones 1993; Fleischer 2009; Lee et al. 1998; Richards and Smith 2006; Seldon 1990). 
Vigorous debates about prime ministerial versus collective cabinet government since the 
1960s were renewed in part by the extensive changes made by Prime Minister Blair in his 
first two terms. In addition to academic work, the Cabinet Office was the subject of a 
2010 inquiry by the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution. Indeed, the 
question of centralization of power because of the creation of the cabinet secretariat was 
the subject of parliamentary debate as early as 1922 (Burch and Holliday 1996, 17). This 
attests to the level of public and political concern about the distribution of power in the 
centre of government in the UK, and the continuing strength of the ideal of collective 
cabinet government and the ‘Whitehall’ model of administration.  
 More than in any other case, the role of the Cabinet Office and its relationship 
with the prime minister vis-à-vis cabinet has been contested. The question of whether the 
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Cabinet Office is a “prime minister’s department”, and whether it should be, is 
comparatively unsettled (Blick and Jones 2010, 138-142). Colin Campbell reports that as 
of the early 1980s, the senior officials’ view was that the office, unlike the Australian 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, serviced the prime minister but not 
exclusively (1983, 58). Blick and Jones (2010, 147) conclude that the Blair prime 
ministership, in particular, heralded the definitive move in this direction. They argue that 
Prime Minister Blair “enlisted the CO more extensively and explicitly for prime-
ministerial purposes” (2013, 290). This was reflected in both organizational change 
within the Cabinet Office and a reform strategy that emphasized “joined-up government”, 
accountability for policy delivery, and the centre’s predominant role in driving cross-
cutting policy change (Select Committee on the Constitution 2010, 64; Blick and Jones 
2013). Something close to a scholarly consensus exists that Blair’s tenure marks a crucial 
period in the institutional development of the Cabinet Office. However, as Graham 
Thomas argues, the general if uneven trend of institutional change in the Cabinet Office, 
especially since the 1960s, has been growth in both size and specialization, while its 
head, the Cabinet Secretary, has become “the Prime Minister’s Chief adviser” (1998, 
165). As will become clear below, the UK Cabinet Office is an exemplary case of 
institutional ‘conversion’ that has succeeded, in some ways, in institutionalizing prime 
ministerial leadership, but has also seen a degree of reversion. In order to understand this 
conversion, an exegesis of the Cabinet Office’s origins and development is necessary.    
8.2.1 The Cabinet Office: Origins and Development   
 The proximate cause of the Cabinet Office’s creation in 1916 was the installation 
of David Lloyd George as prime minister and the exigencies of war. The British prime 
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ministerial branch originates in the wartime cabinet secretariat and the ‘garden suburb’ of 
close political advisors in Downing Street. The cabinet secretariat centralized policy 
coordination and information management: as Burch and Holliday (1996) report, prior to 
the secretariat’s establishment, cabinet processes were “comically inefficient” (13). 
However, this innovation was challenged by the Treasury, which in the interwar period 
was able to enshrine its permanent secretary as head of the civil service and incorporate 
the Cabinet Office into its operational purview (Burch and Holliday 1996, 17).  
 The office was recognized as a standalone part of the central government 
machinery only in 1968, when it was split from the Treasury and given its own 
expenditure line (Helms 2005, 67). In the interceding years, its development was 
piecemeal. Burch and Holliday (1996) note that there was some expansion of policy 
functions under Harold Wilson (1964-70, 1974-76), particularly in foreign and defence 
policy (22). Ted Heath’s prime ministership (1970-1974) saw a further trend in this 
direction. As Thomas (1998) reports, Heath was “one of the most managerially-minded 
Prime Ministers” of the century, as a former civil servant (166). His creation of the 
Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) in the Cabinet Office, a small ‘think-tank’ of both 
civil service officials and outside experts, reflects his “planning-and-priorities” style 
(Campbell 1983, 72).  
 However, the CPRS’s role in strengthening the prime minister’s position is 
contested. Helms (2005) argues that it worked primarily for the prime minister (66), 
while Clifford (2000) suggests that the CPRS was a source for collective policy advice 
(36). Burch and Holliday (1996) report that the abolition of the CPRS in 1983 actually 
strengthened the prime minister’s hand (36). In any case, the Cabinet Office in the mid to 
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late 1970s was still relatively small. It contained the Cabinet Secretariat itself, with 
subunits devoted to Economic, Home, Overseas and Defence, and European policy areas, 
along with intelligence assessment staff (Seldon 1990, 107). It also housed an array of 
administrative units (Central Statistical Office, Establishment Division, and Historical 
Section), the CPRS, and a Chief Scientific Advisor. 
 The Cabinet Office under Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) has received particular 
attention from scholars. However, the prevailing argument is that while Thatcher made 
extensive use of personal power resources, the prime minister’s institutional capacity did 
not significantly expand during her tenure (Helms 2005). Anthony Seldon (1990) argues 
that the Thatcher period is mostly an “unexceptional period during which the machine 
operated along lines already established” (120). Relative to her efforts in economic and 
social policy, Thatcher’s restructuring of the core executive is much less radical (Clifford 
2000, 38). Thomas attributes this in part to contrasting leadership styles. Heath was 
“managerial”, while Thatcher’s style was “eclectic” and personal (1998, 167). Helm 
(2005) characterizes this style as the prime minister believing that she was “by far the 
most able person in her government to deal with any major political problem” (80). The 
combination of personal competence and strong ideology suggests that institutional 
sources of policy advice and support were less important for Thatcher’s pursuit of her 
agenda than for other prime ministers. 
 Nonetheless, two major changes occurred between 1979 and 1990. The first was 
the abolition of the Civil Service Department in 1981, with its functions transferred to the 
Cabinet Office and the Treasury (Seldon 1990; Burnham and Jones 1993). This change 
strengthened the Cabinet Office’s position and put the prime minister and the Cabinet 
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Secretary more directly in control of the civil service. The second major change, as 
mentioned earlier, was the demise of the Central Policy Review Staff, the Cabinet 
Office’s in-house “think tank” (Seldon 1990, 107). Burnham and Jones (1993) argue that 
this event, in fact, strengthened the prime ministerial position: the CPRS, they argue, had 
a collective purpose and was “less driven by the PM’s priorities and immediate 
concerns”, and thus could no longer serve as a source of information for other cabinet 
ministers or cabinet collectively (302).121 Under John Major (1990-1997) and his 
successors, particularly Tony Blair (1997-2007), further changes in organizational 
structure of the Cabinet Office took place, as discussed in detail in the rest of this case 
study. We now turn to tracing these changes in institutional complexity. 
8.2.2 Institutional Complexity in the Cabinet Office since 1978  
 This section describes changes in the institutional structure of the Cabinet Office 
since the 1980s. Tracing these changes is somewhat more difficult than in the other cases. 
Reporting arrangements are more complex and structural hierarchies more fluid and more 
convoluted. While there is arguably less overall complexity in the UK’s Cabinet Office 
than in some other cases, there has certainly been more change in the overall structural 
framing. In the Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, for example, the 
division-branch structure has been relatively consistent through time, and reporting 
relationships kept relatively simple: all division-level officials report to the Secretary of 
the DPMC. The UK Cabinet Office structure introduces many more complications. For 
example, in the 1990s, the Office of Public Service and Science (OPSS) grouped many 
                                                 
121 Smaller changes during the period included the creation of a Chief Scientific Advisor, heading a Science 
and Technology Secretariat in the Cabinet Office (Seldon 1990, 107; Burnham and Jones 1993, 301). As 
part of broader civil service reforms, an efficiency unit was established in the Cabinet Office in 1979 
(Clifford 2000, 26). Security and intelligence information became more highly coordinated in 1983 (Burch 
and Holliday 1996). 
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units together that had been separate Cabinet Office units previously. The OPSS was 
eventually reintegrated into the Cabinet Office, but subsequent prime ministers pursued a 
strategy of organizing units into ‘groups’. In addition, at times there have been 
Parliamentary Secretaries and Deputy Prime Ministers to whom certain CO units report 
directly, bypassing the Cabinet Secretary. Tony Blair instituted the position of Minister 
for the Cabinet Office. In general, the Cabinet Office structure has been more flexible and 
its institutional boundaries less well defined than in other cases.  
 Moreover, “agencification” in the 1980s and 1990s was pursued further in the 
British civil service than in the other Westminster cases (Moynihan 2006, 1035). This 
New Public Management trend involved disaggregating executive functions and hiving 
them off to quasi-autonomous agencies, based on performance-based contracting and 
management deregulation and decentralization (1029). This affected not only ministerial 
departments but also the core executive and the Cabinet Office, in particular.122 The 
inconsistency and amorphousness of the Office’s unit structure means that there is more 
uncertainty and discretion when counting and classifying units here than in the other 
cases. In order to account for these complications, the discussion in this section is more 
descriptive and narrative than in previous cases, and its analysis less granular in terms of 
examining trends over time.  
 My examination of the units in the Cabinet Office in the 1980s supports the 
characterization of other scholars. I find minimal growth in the complexity of the Cabinet 
Office during the Thatcher prime ministership. In 1979, when Thatcher took office, there 
                                                 
122 The available information is somewhat inconsistent in terms of how executive agencies are depicted in 
the Cabinet Office’s organizational structure; for the most part, I consider such agencies to be outside of the 
office’s ambit.   
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were four administrative units and one advisory unit. The four administrative units were 
the Cabinet Secretariat (with subunits servicing cabinet committees), the Central 
Statistical Office, the Historical Section, and the Establishment Division; the advisory 
unit was the Central Policy Review Staff, discussed earlier. This administrative 
framework remained the same through the next decade.  
 Thatcher also brought in an efficiency advisor, and a small Efficiency Unit arose 
subsequently. This unit was intended to target waste and mismanagement in the civil 
service. Its work culminated in the Next Steps report (1988), which laid the groundwork 
for ‘agencification’ and adoption of New Public Management practices (Haddon 2012). 
The Cabinet Office was also involved in the rearrangement of civil service management 
in the 1980s, with the Management and Personnel Office added to the office in 1983, 
morphing into the Office of the Minister for the Civil Service in 1988. Notwithstanding 
these changes, the 1980s were a period of relative institutional stasis in the UK Cabinet 
Office; neither proliferation nor specialization of units is especially evident. Institutional 
change was largely limited to administrative change in the service of broader civil service 
reform. The organization of the Cabinet Office in 1991, at the end of Thatcher’s prime 
ministership and the beginning of John Major’s tenure, is shown in figure 8.1, below. 
This demonstrates that the predominant function of the office was public administration 
and reform. Other than the Women’s National Commission, which was an external 
organization to which the Cabinet Office provided support, all of the office’s units serve 
administrative and civil service functions.    
 The Major prime ministership (1990-1997) was a continuation of Thatcher’s in 
focus. It emphasized broader civil service reform and exhibited a relative absence of 
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interest in increasing the institutional complexity of the Cabinet Office itself. Most of the 
structural changes in the Cabinet Office during this time involved reorganization of civil 
service management functions and the creation of units dedicated to efficiency-seeking 
reform in public service delivery. One such change was the Citizen’s Charter Unit in 
1992. The Citizen’s Charter was meant to be a signature prime ministerial initiative 
aimed at generating a more efficient and responsive public service, through the 
establishment of customized service guidelines in all public service agencies (Pollitt 
1994, 9). The unit was charged with approving each agency’s “charter”.  
Figure 8.1  
Organizational Structure of UK Cabinet Office, 1991 
 
Source: Government Expenditure Plan, 1991-92 to 1993-94. “Cabinet Office, Privy Council Office, and 
Parliament”. 1991. 
  In 1993, the Office of the Minister for the Civil Service became the Office 
of Public Service and Science (OPSS). The OPSS, in addition to its machinery of 
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government, appointments, management, and administrative units, also housed an Office 
of Science and Technology (OST). Although a Chief Scientific Advisor in the Cabinet 
Office had existed since the 1970s, the new office was institutionally robust, with its own 
secretariats and internal structure. Outside of the policy coordination functions of the 
subunits in the Cabinet Secretariat, this change marks an increasing role for the Cabinet 
Office in overseeing substantive policy areas. In 1996, however, another restructuring of 
the civil service management structure resulted in the disbandment of the OST and a slate 
of new units within the renamed Office of Public Service.123 
 The secretariats within the Cabinet Office structure included the Overseas and 
Defence, Economic and Domestic, Telecommunications, and European Secretariats, and 
the Joint Intelligence Organisation. All but the telecommunications unit existed in the 
mid to late 1970s (Seldon 1990, 107). Thus, the subsequent two decades saw minimal 
proliferation of policy-specific units, nor further specialization of secretariats. The 
overarching thrust of institutional change in the Cabinet Office during the 1980s and 
1990s, under Margaret Thatcher and John Major, was a focus on civil service reform and 
finding the optimal role for the office in driving such reform. This preoccupation with 
reforming Whitehall continued in subsequent Labour prime ministerships. However, it is 
overshadowed by a dramatic shift in both structures and norms concerning the Cabinet 
Office’s role in making and implementing substantive public policy change.     
 Tony Blair’s prime ministership (1997-2007) marks a clear turning point in the 
institutional apparatus of the Cabinet Office, the core executive, and the underlying 
philosophy of political leadership and the role of the centre, so much so that it constitutes 
                                                 
123 The Competitiveness and Information Divisions, a Deregulation Unit, and an Efficiency and 
Effectiveness Group. 
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a paradigmatic example of institutional ‘conversion’. The intention was explicit. Blair 
stated even before becoming prime minister that a Labour government would “govern 
from the centre”. Labour leaders saw the Conservative pursuit of deregulation, 
decentralization, and agencification as significantly undermining government’s ability to 
pursue directed, strategic, and coordinated policy change (House of Lords 2010, 64). 
 Blair’s desire to strengthen the capacity of the centre to drive policy change was 
not immediately implemented, however. It required both time in office and the 
establishment of the underlying ideational arguments. In particular, the new Labour 
government published two reports explicating the broad approach and introducing 
concepts such as “joined-up government” and “cross-cutting” policies, meant to evoke 
the idea that policy needed to be considered more strategically and coherently.124 In 
Blair’s first year as prime minister, unit change in the Cabinet Office was not dramatic, 
although still notable. A new secretariat, the Constitution Secretariat, was established to 
provide advice and support for the devolution processes in Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland. The Social Exclusion Unit, focusing on the issue of anti-social behaviour, was 
also formed, the first of a number of formally recognized “cross-cutting issues” units set 
up in the Cabinet Office throughout Blair’s tenure.   
 Changes in the institutional complexity of the Cabinet Office continued more 
robustly in the remainder of Blair’s first term, to 2001. A snapshot of the office’s 
organizational structure is provided in figure 8.2, which shows the Cabinet Office in the 
1999-2000 year. The figure illustrates the dramatic changes in complexity that Blair 
instigated in his first term (as well as the byzantine reporting relationships among units). 
                                                 
124 These reports are Modernising Government (1999) and Wiring it Up: Whitehall’s Management of 
Cross-Cutting Policies and Services (2000).  
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Figure 8.2 
Organizational Structure of the UK Cabinet Office, 2000 
Source: Government’s Expenditure Plans 2000-01 to 2001-02.    
 These changes demonstrate growth in institutional complexity both in the types of 
units created and in the sheer number of units. In terms of administrative units, further 
change to the role of the Cabinet Office in civil service management was directly 
motivated by Blair’s policy reform agenda and the perception of a lack of strategic 
competence in the bureaucracy (Haddon 2012, 8). This manifested itself in three ways. 
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First, the Office of Public Service was merged into the Cabinet Office, bringing civil 
service management more directly within the ambit of the prime minister, as minister for 
the civil service, and senior Cabinet Office officials. Second, the Centre for Management 
and Policy Studies was established as an in-house “think tank” to increase the strategic 
capacity of the civil service. Third, a number of new coordination and implementation 
mechanisms were introduced. The Performance and Innovation Unit, set up in 1999, had 
a mandate “to improve the capacity of Government to address strategic, cross-cutting 
issues and promote innovation in the development of policy and in the delivery of the 
Government’s objectives” (Cabinet Office 2001, 32); it became the Prime Minister’s 
Strategy Unit in 2003. New and established units dedicated to public service delivery 
were collected into an eponymous group.125 These changes, while focused on civil 
service administration and management, are clearly in service of policy implementation 
and coordination, and thus indicate an important shift in the office’s institutional 
complexity.      
 Figure 8.2 also demonstrates significant expansion in policy-specific units within 
the Cabinet Office during Blair’s first term, particularly in areas of social policy and 
security. In 1999, two new social policy units, the UK Anti-Drugs Co-ordinating Unit and 
the Women’s Unit, were created, adding to the Social Exclusion Unit established earlier. 
The Joint Intelligence Organisation, the Cabinet Office’s intelligence agency, was 
bolstered in 2000 by a Co-ordination Unit and in 2001 by a Drugs Unit. The Cabinet 
Office also saw significant growth in terms of communications units and focus on digital 
technology. A new overarching Cabinet Office group, the Government Information and 
                                                 
125 These included the Better Regulation Unit, the Better Government Team, the Service First Unit, the 
Regulatory Impact Unit, and the Modernising Public Services Group and Secretariat. 
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Communications Service, was established in 1999. This group included a Media 
Monitoring Unit, in 2000 a formal secretariat, and in 2001, a News Co-ordination Centre. 
The drive to digitize government services and information was also co-ordinated in the 
Cabinet Office, through a New Media Unit and the Office of the E-Envoy, which became 
the E-Government Unit in 2004.  
 Thus, Prime Minister Blair’s first term was a period of significant growth in the 
institutional complexity of the Cabinet Office. Although he continued the push for civil 
service reform, the focus was on modernization, equity and responsiveness rather than 
efficiency and deregulation. The modernization agenda was intended to improve 
Whitehall’s strategic coherence and policy implementation capacities and was driven by 
units at the centre of government, especially in the Cabinet Office. Implementation and 
strategy units were created, and specialized policy and communications units were 
established. This shift in the types of units constitutes a signal disruption in the Cabinet 
Office’s basic institutional orientation, a conversion of the office from a predominantly 
administrative, inward-looking organization to a policy-oriented, activist, and outward-
looking one.  
 This focus on reorienting the Cabinet Office to drive strategic policy-making and 
policy implementation continued into Blair’s second term. While Blair’s first term 
introduced many new, specialized units into the prime ministerial branch, his second term 
is characterized as much by the reconfiguration of existing structures as by the creation of 
entirely new units. Administratively, the ongoing task of public service modernization 
was centralized in the Office of Public Services Reform. On the strategy and policy 
implementation front, a new Strategy Unit was created in 2002 as a merger of existing 
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units.126 Modernization driven from the centre was also evident in the establishment of a 
Government Communication unit, the Office of Public Sector Information, and the E-
Government Unit. These units served two purposes: to modernize the interfaces between 
the public service and the public, and to ensure a whole-of-government strategic 
approach to government communication. This emphasis on how government relates to 
the public is also reflected in the establishment of the Office of the Third Sector in 2006, 
which aimed to foster civil society efforts and encourage social enterprise (renamed the 
Office for Civil Society in 2010).      
 The most consequential of the new units in this period, however, is the Prime 
Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU), an implementation unit. The establishment of the 
PMDU in 2002 reflected a perception that Blair’s first term had made significant social 
policy changes legislatively, but had not seen desired results “on the ground” (Richards 
and Smith 2006, 333). The PMDU institutionalized the emphasis on measurable 
outcomes, setting targets, and accountability for results, ideas that had precursors in the 
efficiency exercises of the 1980s but which reached its zenith here. The 
institutionalization of centralized control over policy implementation represented by the 
PMDU has been adapted in other Westminster countries and subnational jurisdictions, as 
Lindquist (2006) shows.127  
 Rearrangement in the policy-specific functions of the Cabinet Office continued on 
a number of fronts. As in other cases, the post-9/11 context provided an impetus to 
                                                 
126 The Performance and Innovation Unit and the Prime Minister’s Forward Strategy Unit within the Prime 
Minister’s Office. 
127 As we will see, Australia’s DPMC began strengthening its implementation capacity with the Cabinet 
Implementation Unit in 2003 and the building of the Strategy & Delivery Division under the subsequent 
Rudd and Gillard governments. The Australian states of Queensland and New South Wales and the 
Canadian province of Ontario have also adapted the model originated by the PMDU.127                  
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strengthen the capacity to coordinate national security policy and decision-making at the 
centre. This took the form of additional Intelligence & Security and Civil Contingencies 
Secretariats. On the social policy front, the Women’s Unit became the Women and 
Equality Unit. Two other units provided support for policy coordination: a Regional Co-
ordination Unit and a Central Policy Group, attached to the Deputy Prime Minister’s 
Office (Cabinet Office Departmental Report 2002, 14).  
 However, soon after these policy units were established, a further rearrangement 
transferred many of these units to other departments: the Deputy Prime Minister’s Office 
was made a separate department and the units dealing with women and equality were 
transferred to Trade and Industry. These kinds of rearrangements are a core feature of 
Blair’s second term. Arguably, they demonstrate a lack of institutional coherence, 
attesting to a prime minister who wanted transformative institutional change but 
struggled against the normative context of changing roles in the centre of government and 
a lack of clarity in implementation. Despite the constant innovation and restructuring 
within the Cabinet Office during Blair’s first two terms, Helms’ (2005) argument that it is 
“difficult to identify a clear direction of institutional reform” is essentially correct (69). 
Nonetheless, Blair can be credited with creating the institutional precedents and 
normative bases for much of the subsequent argument for centre-driven approaches to 
strategic policymaking and implementation; its reflections are evident cross-nationally. 
Thus, the Blair ‘revolution’ in the centre of government is clearly a case of institutional 
conversion. The Cabinet Office in 2003, at the height of institutional change, was a much 
larger, more specialized organization than it had been just five years prior, and it became 
the “prime minister’s department” in all but name. This transformation in institutional 
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norms was permanent, though Blair’s enthusiasm for change declined as foreign policy 
struggles mounted.        
 Blair’s successor, Gordon Brown, did not pursue centralization or civil service 
reform with the ardour of his predecessor. His prime ministership (2007-10) was 
dominated by the response to the financial crisis of 2007-08 and the uncertainty of the 
government’s electoral prospects.128 To the extent that changes in the Cabinet Office took 
place, the most notable are the establishment of the National Economic Council and a 
taskforce to tackle the issue of social exclusion (National Audit Office 2009, 8-9). The 
first was a cabinet committee that served as an ‘economic war council’ in direct response 
to the financial crisis in 2008, with a secretariat housed in the Cabinet Office. Both of 
these units were ad-hoc and limited in nature, responses to pressing policy problems 
rather than decided efforts to grow the institutional complexity of the Cabinet Office. 
Brown also transferred the Delivery Unit to the Treasury because he thought it too closely 
associated with Blair’s prime ministership; without proximity to the prime minister, it 
was weakened considerably (Harris and Rutter 2014, 65). Overall, much like his prime 
ministerial tenure more generally, Brown’s use of the institutional resources at his 
disposal was relatively unsuccessful and lacked a coherent sense of direction.  
 Brown’s successor, David Cameron, was a more active institutional engineer, but 
the coalition government of his first prime ministerial term was a period of restructuring 
and consolidation rather than growth per se in the Cabinet Office’s institutional 
complexity. Cameron’s initial goal was to ‘undo’ much of the perceived centralization of 
                                                 
128 Arguably, Brown also had a less sure-footed and more mercurial prime ministerial leadership style that 
militated against active institutional change. Observers, opponents, and some colleagues viewed Brown as 
an indecisive micromanager who, having spent ten years trying to replace Blair, did not have a clear vision 
of what to do with power once achieved (for a lucid account of Brown’s leadership style and personality, 
see Rawnsley 2010, 520-527).  
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power in the core executive that Blair instigated, attesting to Blick and Jones’ (2010) 
notion of ‘zigzag’ – the idea that change in prime ministers tends to encourage reversions 
of operational tendencies (121). An important factor in this shift was necessity: the 
coalition between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats meant a greater formal role 
for the deputy prime minister, Nick Clegg, leader of the junior coalition partner. To this 
end, the Deputy Prime Minister’s Office was re-established as a unit of the Cabinet 
Office in 2010, with significant responsibilities for constitutional issues and a range of 
responsibilities in other policy areas (see Harris and Rutter 2014, 26).  
 Additionally, the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit, having been moved to the 
Treasury under Gordon Brown, was completely disbanded. Cameron also responded to 
the perception of an overly powerful Cabinet Secretary by splitting its functions among 
three officials.129 However, many of these decisions were short-lived, suggesting that 
political goals had to succumb to exigencies of governance. Cameron re-created the 
PMDU in the form of an Implementation Unit in the Cabinet Office in 2012, and the 
positions of Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service were quickly recombined. 
The organizational structure of the Cabinet Office at the height of Cameron’s prime 
ministership, in 2013-14, is shown in figure 8.3, below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
129 The Cabinet Secretary’s duties were split between the Cabinet Secretary, a Head of the Civil Service, 
and the Permanent Secretary of the Cabinet Office. Thus, the Cabinet Secretary’s responsibilities for the 
day-to-day management of the Cabinet Office and the civil service were reduced. 
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Figure 8.3 
Organizational Structure of UK Cabinet Office, 2014 
 
 Figure 8.3 shows three other areas of notable restructuring under Cameron. First, 
the security coordination capacity of the Cabinet Office was strengthened through the 
establishment of the National Security Secretariat, which collected much of the national 
security apparatus within the Cabinet Office unit. Second, several units were grouped 
under the banner of Government Innovation in 2012, including units focused on Civil 
Society, Analysis and Insight, Open Policy Making, and Transparency. The Behavioural 
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Insights Team, a unit dedicated to the application of “behavioural science” to public 
policy, is also a part of this group.130 Third, the structure of units dealing with civil 
service management was streamlined in 2013: two overarching groups, Civil Service 
Reform and Efficiency and Reform, were created. The latter, in particular, involved 
reducing twenty-three separate reporting lines to four ‘clusters’: major projects, 
transformation, efficiency, and corporate. Overall, then, the Cabinet Office under David 
Cameron was characterized mostly by restructuring and streamlining rather than 
institutional growth. It did not seriously reverse or undermine the office’s enhanced 
institutional complexity as it had grown since Blair’s reforms, but it did not noticeably 
increase it.   
8.2.3 Unit Proliferation and Specialization in the Cabinet Office 
 The foregoing account of changes in institutional structure within the UK Cabinet 
Office suggests several conclusions about the extent of unit proliferation and 
specialization. First, the unit proliferation trend agrees with the discontinuous pattern of 
institutional change observed in chapter five: abrupt, transformative change in a short 
period of time. Tony Blair’s prime ministership, especially the first and second terms, 
marks a signal change in the unit structure of the office. The disruption is pronounced. 
During Margaret Thatcher and John Major’s tenures, there was minimal proliferation. 
Despite some rearrangement and creation of units dedicated to civil service reform, the 
Cabinet Office in 1996 is essentially the same size as the office in 1979. However, Prime 
Minister Blair’s first term saw a dramatic expansion in the size of the Cabinet Office’s 
                                                 
130 This unit is part of a larger movement applying behavioural economics to politics, specifically, the 
notion of “nudge”, that people can be induced to make better choices by changing their “choice 
architecture”, rather than by coercion or banning. This was popularized by Thaler and Sunstein (2008); 
Cass Sunstein, a legal scholar, headed the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs under 
Barack Obama.     
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unit structure, and the beginning of his second term saw additional, if not as dramatic, 
expansion. Both of his successors, Gordon Brown and David Cameron, reshaped the 
office in small ways, but largely kept the office’s footprint as it was established under 
Blair. So, the Cabinet Office has become significantly more institutionally complex, in 
terms of proliferation, since 1978, but the process has been highly discontinuous. 
 Specialization in the Cabinet Office follows a similar pattern of change over time. 
Before 1998, the office consisted of a relatively stable mix of traditional administrative 
units and policy-specific secretariats. Many of the policy-specific units themselves had 
quite broad mandates: in 1996, for example, there were “Overseas and Defence” and 
“Economic and Domestic” secretariats. Other types of units are minimally present; in 
fact, there are no implementation units and, as far as I could gather, no ad-hoc limited or 
communications units.131 The Central Policy Review Staff, established in 1971, was 
disbanded early in Margaret Thatcher’s term, and no similar advisory unit replaced it. 
Thus, there was very little specialization in the Cabinet Office prior to Tony Blair’s first 
term. 
 Prime Minister Blair’s first term constituted an ambitious reorientation in the 
ambit of the Cabinet Office. This reorientation was both ideational and material, 
demonstrated in the increasing normative acceptability of the Cabinet Office as an 
extension of prime ministerial authority, and its reflection in the significant build-up of 
more specialized units. This period witnesses increasing specialization on all fronts, as 
discussed in detail above. Many policy-specific units dealing with areas of prime 
ministerial priority were set up. An implementation unit, the Prime Minister’s Delivery 
                                                 
131 The Central Office of Information was an agency that produced public information campaigns. It 
reported to the Minister for the Cabinet Office but was somewhat at arms-length from the Cabinet Office 
itself. 
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Unit, was established. The Cabinet Office’s communications apparatus, which had been 
minimal, became a much more robust operation, with media monitoring and ‘whole-of-
government’ coordination of public relations more evident. The rest of Blair’s prime 
ministership and the terms of his successors, Gordon Brown and David Cameron, do not, 
and could not, match the extent of institutional change that took place between 1998 and 
2002. In small ways, both Brown and Cameron undertook degrees of consolidation and 
restructuring rather than institutional growth, but the core functional complexity of the 
modern Cabinet Office has been thoroughly institutionalized. Because of the innovations 
undertaken during Blair’s prime ministership, the relatively small, administratively 
oriented Cabinet Office has become a sprawling, ‘all-purpose’ centre of government 
institution, with significant and specialized policy capacities and enhanced roles in 
driving policy coordination and implementation.            
8.2.4 Explaining Change in Institutional Complexity in the Cabinet Office 
 What explains this transformative change in institutional complexity? To recall, 
the study posits three sets of explanations for changes in institutional complexity: 
increasingly assertive citizenship; economic trends; and political conditions. Under the 
Theory of Public Expectations, the assertive citizenship hypotheses predict that the shift 
towards assertive attitudes and values, and away from allegiant attitudes and values, 
drives increasing institutional complexity. This means that proliferation and 
specialization in the Cabinet Office should tend to trend along with changes in 
assertiveness in the British public. 
 The big takeaway from the narrative of complexity in the UK Cabinet Office is 
that the office was relatively small and undifferentiated until Prime Minister Blair 
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instituted a dramatic shift in its roles and responsibilities. In short, there is a “pre-Blair” 
Cabinet Office and a “post-Blair” Cabinet Office; the evidence gathered here confirms 
the scholarly consensus around the importance of Blair as an institutional innovator. This 
discontinuity, however, is not really reflected in the assertive citizenship trends, so it is 
difficult to make the case that assertive citizenship is a causal factor.  
 While the British public has become more assertive in the last fifty years, this 
shift has been more incremental than has change in institutional complexity. None of the 
assertive citizenship trends align with the pattern of discontinuous change observed here. 
Britons became significantly more assertive concurrent with and after these changes, in 
the early to mid-2000s, and have remained so since. Therefore, there is little to suggest 
that changes in assertive orientations have produced corresponding changes in the 
Cabinet Office’s institutional complexity. While there is a parallel between the increase in 
assertive citizens and institutional growth during Blair’s second term, it is difficult to 
make the case that the former caused the latter. The change in values is contemporaneous 
with institutional change and the latter is clearly a continuation of the innovations and 
reforms that marked Blair’s first term.  
 However, arguably many of the Cabinet Office changes pursued by Blair in both 
his first and second terms were transparent responses to, or anticipations of, heightened 
public expectations of government to deliver policy change. This is evident in the 
mandates of units that were created during this time. Units such as Social Exclusion, the 
Women’s Unit, the Office of the Third Sector, the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit and the 
PMDU, and the media relations and e-government units, speak directly to the perceptions 
of Blair and his government that the Cabinet Office needed to be reoriented towards 
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servicing an increasingly assertive public. While this is not necessarily borne out in the 
quantitative indicators of assertiveness, my reading of the evidence gathered above is that 
heightened public expectations of leaders was clearly one of the factors that drove change 
during Blair’s prime ministership.                       
 An alternative to the public expectations explanation looks to the significance of 
economic trends, namely, the rise of globalization and levels of central government 
activity. Globalization of the British economy has increased steadily and incrementally 
since the 1970s, plateauing after 2000. Thus, the stark discontinuity of the institutional 
complexity trend is not evident here, suggesting that globalization cannot be considered a 
direct, proximate cause of change. However, there is some suggestive evidence for the 
association between government activity and institutional complexity. In terms of trend, 
central government activity, that is, government social spending as a proportion of GDP, 
declines precipitously from 1980 to the late-1990s under Thatcher and John Major, but 
increases rapidly under Blair and Gordon Brown. As with assertive citizenship, this could 
suggest a contemporaneous effect whereby increased government spending is 
accompanied by new centre of government units that enable the prime minister to engage 
more robustly in coordination and implementation of policy. Certainly, the kinds of units 
that were created could also be read as directed towards these ends. The totality of the 
evidence suggests that a significant driver of the rapid proliferation and specialization in 
the Cabinet Office was the perceived need for enhanced institutional capacity in 
anticipation of dramatic growth in social spending.         
 Finally, throughout the study I consider whether political conditions have impacts 
on the direction of institutionalization. First, I hypothesize that there is a ‘term effect’ at 
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play. If this effect were evident, there would be systematic differences in the extent of 
institutional change over the duration of prime ministerial terms. Again, because of the 
discontinuous nature of the changes in the complexity of the Cabinet Office, it is difficult 
to assess the evidence. In John Major’s case, his first two years, playing out the 
remainder of the 1987 mandate, saw no major change, but upon being re-elected, the 
introduction of the Citizen’s Charter and the creation of the Office of Public Service and 
Science followed shortly thereafter. Thus, this is some evidence of a ‘new government 
mandate’ effect: the idea that new governments will want to undertake change as quickly 
as possible after an electoral victory.  
 Blair’s reforms also began in earnest in the year following his election in 1997. In 
Blair’s case, change continued throughout the first term and continued with renewed 
intensity after the 2001 election. While tapering off somewhat towards the end of the 
second term and into his third term, institutional change was a relatively consistent 
feature of the Blair prime ministership. Finally, Prime Minister Cameron implemented 
some reorganization of the Cabinet Office upon entering office and for his first two years 
or so. Thus, while based on only three cases, the general trend is of British prime 
ministers capitalizing on electoral victories to undertake restructuring of their offices in 
the first few years of their mandates, with noticeable declines in such efforts as the 
mandate goes on.  
 The second and third political conditions that are hypothesized to have an impact 
on institutional complexity are legislative support and ideology. Because the indicators of 
these factors are constant throughout prime ministerial terms, it is difficult to draw any 
broad conclusions about their effects. The radical changes that took place under Blair 
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occurred in the context of a huge Labour majority in Parliament, which may have eased 
the way for institutional change, but may have been irrelevant given Blair’s clear 
intentions and enthusiasms about enhancing the centre of government. Thatcher’s 
majorities resulted in minimal institutional restructuring within the Cabinet Office, while 
David Cameron’s reorganization had much to do with the necessities of coalition 
government. What seems clear is that individual prime ministerial leadership style and 
goals override these political conditions in the British case. Change in the Cabinet 
Office’s institutional complexity seems to be highly dependent on the idiosyncrasies of 
the particular prime ministers who have inhabited the British prime ministership.                 
 As a case of institutional change, the UK Cabinet Office is almost prototypically 
one of conversion. The office has undergone significant institutionalization with regard to 
its internal unit structure, but the process has been highly discontinuous. The conversion 
period and the institutional entrepreneurs who generated this change are transparently 
evident: Tony Blair’s first, and to some extent second, terms, roughly from 1998 to 2002. 
Before this period, the Cabinet Office remained roughly in the mould of a traditional 
cabinet secretariat: the changes that did take place in the 1980s and 1990s were mostly 
concerned with altering the office’s role in civil service management. The Blair prime 
ministership converted the Cabinet Office into a fully formed arm of the prime ministerial 
branch, with a much more active role in driving policy change and implementation from 
the centre of government. While there had been some indications of increasing 
complexity before Blair’s prime ministership, and the office has continued to evolve 
since, this turning point is clear. As discussed earlier, the normative attachment to 
traditional cabinet government and the power of the Whitehall model of bureaucracy has 
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been stronger in the United Kingdom than it has been in other Westminster systems. This 
may be part of the explanation for why, if institutional change happened, it was likely to 
look like institutional conversion in the British case. In Australia, these forces have 
arguably not been as salient, allowing prime ministers over time to shape the prime 
ministerial branch in more gradual ways. We turn now to this final Westminster case.  
8.3 Australia: The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 1978-2015  
 The Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) constitutes 
the final case of institutional complexity in prime ministerial branches. The case study 
examines institutional change since 1978, in particular, when the first departmental report 
was produced. I introduce the case by providing a historical and scholarly summary of 
the institution. Then, changes in the institutional complexity of the DPMC are described. 
The third section of this case study assesses the evidence for the hypotheses concerning 
public expectations, economic trends, and political conditions. Finally, I discuss the 
characterization of the Australian case as a process of ‘periodic’ institutional layering. 
8.3.1 The Australian DPMC prior to 1978 
 In this section, I provide a brief history of the DPMC and the relevant literature. 
The department was established only in 1971, but it was preceded by the Prime 
Minister’s Department (PMD), established in 1911. The PMD’s role for its first thirty 
years, according to Mediansky and Nockles (1975, 205), was largely administrative: the 
small PMD staff administered the prime minister’s business and acted as an 
intergovernmental liaison with state governments (Australia’s subnational jurisdictions) 
and foreign governments (the British in particular). Its role is described as a “postbox” 
(Weller et al. 2011). However, although it had no serious policy coordination or 
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development functions, it was given an array of diverse, relatively specific, and often ad-
hoc responsibilities.132  
Two small but telling developments during World War II and the post-war period 
signalled an expanded role for the PMD in policy coordination. In 1940, the secretary of 
the department was first invited to attend and record minutes of cabinet meetings 
(Mediansky and Nockles 1975, 205). In 1950, PMD inherited an Economic Policy 
division from the shuttered department of Post-war Reconstruction, which gave it 
substantive policy capacity for the first time (Yeend 1979, 134). However, under Prime 
Minister Robert Menzies (1949-1966), this burgeoning role for the PMD did not develop 
further, attributable to the personalities of both the prime minister and his Secretary to the 
Cabinet, which favoured informal consultation and process rather than active policy 
formulation and intervention (Mediansky and Nockles 1975, 206).  
A pivotal period in the early development of institutional complexity was the 
prime ministerships of John Gorton (1968-1971), Gough Whitlam (1972-1975), and 
Malcolm Fraser (1975-1983). All three prime ministers are characterized as policy 
activists by scholars, in contrast to Menzies. Gorton depended more on the PMD because 
he did not have the same level of authority over the party as his predecessor and he had a 
“centralist and urban orientation” which put him at odds with many in his party and in the 
Country party (Mediansky and Nockles 1975, 207).133 The scope of departmental activity 
grew accordingly. In 1970, then, the PMD contained four substantive units: Economic, 
                                                 
132 A chart summarizing the responsibilities of the PMD / DPMC since 1911 was included in the first 
departmental report, in 1978. This shows that in addition to its administrative and liaison functions, the 
PMD was responsible for such entities as a Historic Memorials Committee (1912), the Commonwealth 
Government Line of Steamers (1918-1927), and the Commonwealth Literary Fund (1938) (DPMC 1979, 
42-43).  
133 The Country Party, now the National Party, are a small, rurally-based party that has traditionally been 
the junior coalition partner during Liberal governments. 
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External Relations and Defence, Parliamentary and Government, and Social Welfare and 
Education, as well as administrative and ceremonial units (209). This structure 
demonstrates already relatively well-developed and broad-reaching institutional 
capacities in the prime ministerial branch. Under Gorton, the PMD was also reconstituted 
as the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.   
Prime Minister Whitlam maintained and expanded these institutional capacities. 
Whereas Gorton’s chief difficulty was in party relations, Whitlam’s was with a 
bureaucracy that had been under Liberal governments since 1949. Whitlam and the Labor 
party intended to “assail the virtual monopoly” of the bureaucracy on the policy process, 
restoring control to ministers (Mediansky and Nockles 1975, 210). This meant bringing 
in to the bureaucracy many outside experts, increasing the number and importance of 
political ministerial advisors, and expanding the DPMC. By 1973, the department had 
grown to seven substantive policy divisions in addition to its ceremonial and 
administrative divisions (215).134 Subsequent additions under Whitlam, such as a Policy 
Coordination Unit and an Information and State Relations Division, reflect concerns that, 
in the scope of prime ministerial branch development, are surprisingly modern.       
These trends continued under Whitlam’s successor, Malcolm Fraser. Hamburger 
et al. (2011) argue that the DPMC, under Fraser and subsequent prime ministers, pushed 
further into policy initiation and development, not simply passive policy coordination. 
The department became a “primary policy player”, actively pushing prime ministerial 
priorities, not just their prerogatives (380-381). Finally, Anne Tiernan (2006) argues that 
John Howard’s prime ministership (1996-2007) saw the further development of a “large, 
                                                 
134 Economic, Protection Policy, Development, Welfare, External Relations and Defence, Cabinet and 
Legislative Programming, and Government 
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active, interventionist and personalized” support system for Australian prime ministers 
(322).  
This summary of the development of the PMD and DPMC in Australia reveals 
that the Australian prime ministership had already developed relatively robust 
institutional capacities by the 1970s, which have only continued since. The Australian 
prime minister, by the end of that decade, had a supporting organization in the DPMC 
encompassing a broad scope of policy coordination and other responsibilities. The 
department had also established a unique role as an “incubator” of new government 
activity. This refers to a process whereby new organizations and policy interventions 
would enter the public service as a part of the DPMC, often subsequently being hived off 
to other portfolios (Hamburger et al. 2011, 384; Mediansky and Nockles 1975, 204). 
These new entities would thus have to prove their value at the centre of government 
before transferring their experience outward to line departments. Finally, the robust 
development of the Australian DPMC suggests that norms constraining 
institutionalization of support for the prime minister are less salient compared to the 
Canadian and, especially, UK cases. This relative lack of constraint might be a partial 
explanation for the ‘layering’ pattern of institutional change that is evident in the next 
section, which traces unit proliferation and specialization within the Australian DPMC.      
8.3.2 Unit Proliferation and Specialization in the DPMC 
Having outlined the early development of the DPMC, this section closely 
describes changes in institutional complexity in the Australian department since 1979. 
Figure 8.4, below, provides an overview of the number of “divisions” and “branches” in 
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the Australian DPMC, from 1979 to 2013.135 Divisions in the DPMC context are top-
level units, headed by officials at the rank of First Assistant Secretary (FAS). Divisions 
themselves are usually groupings of more specialized units, called branches, typically 
headed by Assistant Secretaries.  
Figure 8.4 
Units in the Australian DPMC, 1979-2013 
 
Source: Australian DPMC Annual Reports, 1978-79 to 2012-13, and organizational charts on DPMC 
website. Compiled by author.    
 In terms of proliferation, the graph suggests two distinct trends. The number of 
divisions has been relatively stable, with some proliferation occurring in recent years. 
The absolute number of divisions in the department has until recently remained relatively 
stable, although not constant. The average number of divisions between 1979 and 2008 is 
less than ten, fluctuating slightly between seven (from 2001 and 2003) and thirteen 
                                                 
135 The most recent two years, 2014 and 2015, are excluded from the figure because they involve a dramatic 
increase in both divisions and branches in the DPMC, due to the addition of a slate of new units dealing 
with indigenous affairs. The number of divisions jumps from 14 in 2013 to 26 in 2014, while the number of 
branches jumps from 35 to 65. Including these years thus visually obscures some of the temporal variation 
in the rest of the period.   
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(during Paul Keating’s tenure in the early to mid-1990s). As well, the breadth of the 
divisions in the DPMC has not changed significantly. In 1979, there were nine divisions, 
encompassing a range of administrative and policy functions.136 Figure 8.5, below, shows 
this organizational structure. 
Figure 8.5 
Organizational Structure of the Australian DPMC, 1979 
 
  In 2008, three decades later, the DPMC also had nine divisions, and its structure is 
not markedly different.137 There is also no consistent over-time trend: the number of 
divisions is greater in the first half of the 1990s, under Paul Keating’s prime ministership 
(1991-1996) but lower under Keating’s successor, John Howard. However, since 2008 
there has been a marked increase in the number of divisions. Indeed, as of 2015, there are 
more than twenty-five identifiable divisions in the Australian DPMC. A key period of 
change is 2008 to 2009, when the number of divisions increases by fifty-six percent. This 
                                                 
136 Parliamentary and Government, Cabinet, Operations, International, Ceremonial and Hospitality, 
Welfare, Economic, Resources & Development, and Trade & Industries. 
137 : Industry, Infrastructure & Environment, Economic, Social Policy, Office of Work and Family, People, 
Resources & Communications, Government, Cabinet, International, and the Office of National Security. 
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increase involved a significant proliferation of national security units and a new Strategy 
and Delivery division which enfolded the Cabinet Implementation Unit, previously a 
branch in the Cabinet division. As referenced earlier but not shown in figure 8.4, 2014 
also saw a dramatic increase in the number of units in the department, almost entirely due 
to the addition of a plethora of new units dealing with indigenous affairs.   
Turning now to the ‘branch’ subunits within the DPMC, proliferation is both more 
extensive and more variable, with a particular increase in the last decade. In the 1979 
organizational structure of the Australian DPMC, per figure 8.5, there were only eighteen 
branches. Through the 1980s, under the Labor prime minister Bob Hawke (1983-1991) 
especially, proliferation is incremental but steady. By 1992, the DPMC was fifty percent 
larger than it was in 1979, and it stabilized in this range during John Howard’s tenure. 
This branch proliferation involved both branches in new divisions and growth in existing 
divisions. A revealing example of trends was the Hawke and Keating (1991-1996) 
governments’ creation of a plethora of “offices” in specific policy areas, such as Youth 
and Multicultural Affairs.138 Existing divisions also exhibited internal branch 
proliferation.139 This proliferation of more specialized branches within existing divisions 
is evident across the various divisions.   
As per figure 8.4, the Labor governments of Kevin Rudd (2007-10) and Julia 
Gillard are a further period of branch proliferation, especially during Rudd’s tenure. The 
number of branches reaches a peak of forty in 2010, a more than two-fold increase over 
                                                 
138 In full: the Office of the Status of Women (1984), the Office of Youth Affairs (1986), the Office of 
Multicultural Affairs (1988), the Office of the Chief Scientist (1991), and the Office of Indigenous Affairs 
(1994). 
139 For example, the Welfare division in 1979 consisted of three branches: Community Affairs, Welfare 
Services, and Social Security. By 1992, the renamed Social Policy division consisted of five branches: 
Income Support & Community Services, Employment, Education & Culture, Social Justice, Aboriginal 
Reconciliation, and a branch responding to a Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. 
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the number of branches in 1979 and a greater than fifty percent increase since 1992. 
Proliferation here mostly involved adding branches within new divisions, since many 
branches within established divisions were ‘upgraded’ to divisions in their own right.140 
Finally, there has been a dramatic shift in the numbers of both divisions and branches in 
the DPMC in the most recent two years (which are not shown in figure 8.4). This is 
almost entirely because of the addition of eight new divisions under the umbrella of 
indigenous affairs, covering many aspects of indigenous policy, from health and safety to 
reconciliation to economic development. As of 2015, the DPMC consists of twenty-six 
divisions and sixty-five branches: in terms of absolute units, the DPMC of 2015 is 
roughly three times larger than it was in 1979. 
Overall, the proliferation of divisions and branches between 1979 and 2013 
exhibits periods of steady, incremental growth in institutional complexity, particularly 
with regard to branch proliferation, along with periods where growth has retreated. There 
has been a fair degree of incremental but noticeable layering of new and adaptive 
institutional functions onto the core of the department’s administrative work. Since 
divisions are high-level units which tend to cover broad areas of activity and which in 
1979 already had wide-ranging scope across the areas of government activity, it is not 
surprising that there has been less evident proliferation of divisions. The fact that there 
has been more pronounced proliferation of branches is a consequence of this initial 
robustness in divisions, and suggests, on the face of it, increasing differentiation and 
specialization. Within these broader divisions, units have become more differentiated and 
                                                 
140 For example, the Social Policy division of 2010 has been reduced to three branches - Health Programs, 
Health Systems & Governance, and Indigenous Policy & Citizenship – but arts, culture, and work and 
family have been organized into their own divisions.  
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specialized in the work they do, and new divisions with specialized branches have 
consistently sprung up from within.  
This implied specialization is supported in closely examining the types of units in 
the Australian DPMC. To recall, each prime ministerial branch unit is classified into one 
of six types: administrative, policy-specific, advisory, implementation, ad-hoc limited, 
and communications. Growth in institutional complexity is demonstrated in terms of not 
only proliferation of units but also increasing differentiation and specialization of units. 
In the case of prime ministerial branches, I argue that differentiation and specialization 
are particularly indicated by change over time in policy-specific, implementation, 
advisory, and communication types of units. To explore this question, I categorized and 
tallied each division and branch in the Australian DPMC from 1979 to 2015. The results 
of this are shown in figure 8.6, for divisions, and figure 8.7, below, for branches. Each 
figure shows the count over time for each type of unit.  
Figure 8.6 
Types of Divisions in the Australian DPMC, 1979-2015 
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 Figure 8.6 demonstrates three notable patterns of unit specialization in divisions. 
First, the department has for the most part been constituted almost exclusively by 
administrative and policy-specific units. Other types of units collectively never constitute 
more than around twenty percent of the departmental divisions. However, administrative 
divisions underwent relatively little change until a decline and subsequent increase, 
beginning in the mid-1990s. The core Government and Cabinet Divisions remain 
unchanged.  
 Second, increasing specialization, hence complexity, has been driven by growth in 
policy-specific units rather than implementation or communications units. However, 
when the latter types have been created underlines the importance of the Labor period in 
government from 2007 to 2013. Implementation divisions, for instance, are not present at 
all until 2008, when the Strategy and Delivery Division is established; a separate 
Implementation Division is also created in 2012. These developments correspond to a 
rise in policy-specific divisions, showing that the period, particularly the first three years, 
is a significant period of increasing divisional specialization. Interestingly, under Gillard 
and her Liberal successor, Tony Abbott, there is also a dramatic rise in the use of ad-hoc 
limited divisions on a range of pressing policy areas, as figure 8.6 shows.141 This use of 
ad-hoc limited divisions is reminiscent of the kind of ‘clearing house’ roles that the Prime 
Minister’s Department had often played in its earlier history, but with a more activist, 
interventionist bent. The continued, robust use of such divisions by successive Australian 
prime ministers is an institutional innovation in the Australian core executive.          
 The third pattern of unit specialization in the Australian DPMC is the periodicity 
                                                 
141 Specifically, three dedicated to White Papers on Northern Australia, Agriculture, and Federalism, and 
others on industrial competitiveness and renewable energy. 
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of the policy-specific trend in particular. Instead of consistent, incremental specialization, 
there have been distinct periods of growth and retrenchment. I identify three distinct 
periods of growth in institutional complexity in the trend in figure 8.6, above. First, from 
1983 to the early 1990s we see increasing specialization, both in new policy divisions and 
in separate offices dealing with more targeted policy constituencies. The second period is 
from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, corresponding with John Howard’s tenure. Here, 
the number of policy-specific divisions declines, mostly due to shuttering or 
consolidation of all of the special offices into subunits of other divisions, mainly Social 
Policy. The 2005 DPMC is noticeably more streamlined than its earlier iterations. 
However, this decline should not obscure one important institutional addition to the 
DPMC in the period: the National Security Division, assembled in 2004 from several pre-
existing units. The third distinct period of specialization is the dramatic increase in 
policy-specific divisions after 2007, more than doubling by 2010. In part, this exhibited a 
return to the earlier proliferation of targeted, specialized units.142  
 Examining unit specialization in the DPMC branches reveals similar patterns of 
institutional change to those for divisions, discussed above. The number of branches of 
each type from 1979 to 2015 is shown in figure 8.7, below. Unsurprisingly, the vast 
majority of branches in the Australian DPMC have been administrative and policy-
specific units, with the latter constituting the bulk of units. Commensurate with the 
growth in divisions, the number of policy-specific branches increases through the 1980s, 
peaking in the early 1990s. After declining through the early years of the Howard prime 
                                                 
142 Examples include the Office of Work & Family (2008), offices for Arts & Sport (2011), the G20 (2012), 
and as mentioned earlier, Indigenous Affairs (2014). There is also a bolstering of the DPMC’s national 
security coordination role established under Howard, with the creation of separate Defence & Intelligence 
and Homeland & Border Security divisions, and a deputy National Security Advisor, in 2009.  
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ministership, the number of policy-specific branches begins to increase in the latter part 
of the decade and continues to do so in the 2000s, particularly after 2005.143 As 
mentioned, the large spike in both administrative and policy-specific branches in 2014 is 
due to the creation of the Indigenous Affairs division within the DPMC, which contained 
a plethora of new subunits.  
Figure 8.7 
Types of Branches in the Australian DPMC, 1979-2015 
 
 Branch specialization in the Australian DPMC has occurred not only through the 
creation of new divisions but in specialization within established policy-specific divisions 
such as Social Policy and Trade & Industries. For instance, the Social Policy Division had 
only two branches originally: Income Security and Taxation, and Education and 
Employment. Subsequently, the division has housed an array of units dedicated to areas 
                                                 
143 Branch data is missing from 1993 to 1997, but in 1992, the number of policy-specific branches was 20; 
in 1998, the number was 12.  
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like health, ageing, aboriginal reconciliation, immigration, and social inclusion. Another 
example is the Trade & Industries division consisting of, fittingly, a Trade branch and an 
Industries branch. In the late 1980s, units dealing with infrastructure and transport 
emerged, while resource management, water policy, and climate change and energy 
policy emerged as policy coordination priorities in the 2000s. While some of the 
individual branches have been short-lived, this general pattern of branch specialization is 
evident within all of the longstanding DPMC policy divisions.    
 Overall, then, these indicators of unit proliferation and specialization suggest that 
the Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet has become more 
institutionally complex since 1978. This is so even considering that the DPMC had 
already developed a relatively complex internal structure. In terms of proliferation of 
units, the number of divisions has increased, though not dramatically, while the increase 
in the number of branches within these divisions has been more marked. This suggests a 
degree of specialization within divisions, which was indeed found in examining changes 
in the types of units within the DPMC. The number of divisions and branches dedicated 
to specialized areas of public policy has grown, although not linearly but in distinct 
periods. Having examined the extent of change in institutional complexity in the 
Australian DPMC, I turn now to the potential explanations for the observed change. 
8.3.3 Explanations for Change in Institutional Complexity  
 The foregoing discussion shows that the Australian Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet has incrementally become more institutionally complex since the late 1970s; 
the contemporary DPMC houses a structure of robust and wide-ranging units. In this 
section, I assess the validity of several hypotheses about the drivers of this change, which 
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are explained fully in chapter three. The first set of hypotheses derives from my primary 
theory of institutional change, the Theory of Public Expectations. The expectation is that 
we observe a correspondence between periods of higher assertive citizenship and periods 
of growth in complexity; that is, periods in which units proliferate and become more 
specialized.  
 Overall, the claim that assertiveness is associated with change in institutional 
complexity is reasonably well supported. In figure 8.8, below, I plot the unit proliferation 
measures over time, relative to a base year of 1979, along with an aggregated measure of 
assertiveness (the average of the three measures).144 This demonstrates that the branch 
proliferation trend tracks assertiveness over time quite well, not only in general direction 
of change but in the correspondence of particular periods in which change is most 
prominent. The correspondence between division proliferation and assertiveness is less 
evident.    
Figure 8.8 
DPMC Units and Assertiveness, Australia, 1979-2013      
 
                                                 
144 In more detail: the assertiveness measure is the average of political interest, the assertive index, and 
party identification, the latter reversed because in the original measure negative values of party ID (i.e., 
weaker party identification) indicate greater assertiveness. 
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 The correspondence between the assertiveness trend and branches trend is 
pronounced. The proliferation of branches in the first Hawke government (1983-1987) is 
mirrored in a rise in assertiveness through the 1980s, and the proliferation of branches in 
the 2000s is accompanied by an attendant increase in assertiveness. Aside from the fact 
that assertiveness is somewhat more volatile, the two trends mirror each other very 
closely. Moreover, the branch trend seems, at important points, to follow rather than lag 
behind the assertiveness trend. This is evident, in particular, in the period of increasing 
branch proliferation from the mid-2000s forward. Disregarding the temporal dimension 
for a moment, the bivariate correlation between the trends is also very high. The branch-
assertiveness correlation is 0.57, where zero indicates no association between variables 
and one, perfect association. The very close correspondence of these trends is strong 
evidence that the two trends are associated. At both short and long time scales, the 
relationship between assertive citizenship orientations and one measure of institutional 
complexity, proliferation, is demonstrable.     
Earlier, I identified three distinct periods of institutional specialization in the 
Australian DPMC. From 1983 to the early 1990s, there was significant growth in the 
number of policy-specific units within the institution. Assertiveness during this period 
broadly increases as well, although not consistently: it declines slightly in the middle of 
the period before increasing again. Subsequently, from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, 
corresponding with the bulk of John Howard’s tenure, there was both consolidation and 
disbandment of many of the social policy units set up by earlier Labor governments. In 
this decade, public assertiveness declines and then remains low. It begins to increase 
again after the mid-2000s, and especially after 2007, which parallels the third period of 
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specialization. Since 2007, the DPMC has undertaken renewed specialization both in 
policy units and in units focused on strategy and implementation. Thus, the existence of a 
relationship between assertiveness and unit specialization is indicated.     
While the individual disaggregated indicators of assertive citizenship do not track 
changes in the institutional complexity of the Australian DPMC closely, both political 
interest and the Assertive Index are broadly in line with the complexity trend. Political 
interest in Australia increases throughout the 1980s until the mid-1990s, then plateaus, 
increasing somewhat in the mid-2000s. According to the Assertive Index, Australians 
were more assertive in the mid-1980s than they were in 1990; assertiveness begins to 
increase consistently from the early-1990s to 2010. Broadly speaking, this pattern of 
change over time is what the division and branch trends also show. Indeed, the linear 
association between political interest and the proliferation measure, and between the 
assertive values generally and proliferation, is relatively strong and statistically 
significant. The correlations between political interest and the division and branch counts 
are 0.42 (p = 0.01) and 0.60 (p = 0.00), respectively, and for the Assertive Index, 0.42 (p 
= 0.01) and 0.63 (p = 0.00). If there were no correlation, the values would be nearer to 
zero, as they are with party identification, and the p-values would be larger.145 Again, this 
is suggestive, if not dispositive, evidence for the Public Expectations hypotheses.  
 Thus, the hypotheses relating assertiveness to institutional complexity receive 
broad, consistent support in the Australian case. Considered over the whole time period, 
the Australian DPMC has become increasingly institutionally complex at the same time 
as Australians have become more politically interested, less tied to parties, and more 
                                                 
145 For party identification, the Pearson’s R values are 0.19 (p = 0.25) for divisions and -0.14 (p = 0.44) for 
branches. 
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assertive in their values and attitudes. As well, although the assertiveness and 
institutionalization trends do not precisely align, contemporaneously they move in similar 
directions; in fact, changes in assertiveness precede institutional change at many crucial 
points. Therefore, I argue that the hypothesized relationship clearly is supported in this 
case. 
 As alternative explanations of change in the institutional complexity of prime 
ministerial branches, the impact of economic trends, specifically the rise of globalization 
and changes in the size of government activity, and short-term political conditions, are 
examined. In terms of economic trends, I hypothesize that when the level of globalization 
and the level of government activity are higher relative to other periods, institutional 
complexity in prime ministerial branches will increase. However, compared to growth in 
DPMC units, especially in branches, both the overall level of globalization and overall 
government activity have changed little in the relevant period. Australia’s most recent 
score on the globalization index, for 2014, is twenty percent higher than in 1979, versus 
an increase of 94 percent in the number of branch-level units. Government activity is 
only seventeen percent higher in 2012 (the most recent data point) than in 1979. Both of 
these measures increase consistently over time, but very slowly and incrementally, and 
both peak around 2000. Thus, it does not appear that the economic trends correspond to 
changes in institutional complexity, either overall or with reference to specific periods of 
institutionalization.  
 As well, I examine the extent to which short-term political conditions play a role 
in change in institutional complexity in the Australian DPMC. It is quite plain in the 
above discussion that political factors play a crucial role in determining the extent of 
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change. Changes in government consistently delineate periods of change in unit 
proliferation and specialization. The two periods of Labor government, from 1983 to 
1996 under Prime Ministers Hawke and Keating and from 2007 to 2013 under Rudd and 
Gillard, were periods of growth in the DPMC, with new units being created, the 
institutional scope broadened, and the unit structure more specialized. The Howard 
government from 1996 to 2007 and the partial evidence from the earlier Fraser 
government to 1983 demonstrate that, under Liberal government, institutional change has 
been low, characterized more by consolidation and retrenchment than by growth and 
innovation. Although only a partial term, the Abbott prime ministership of 2013-2015 
followed the same pattern. Thus, the hypothesis that party and ideology of Australian 
prime ministers has an impact on change in institutional complexity is supported.  
 Another political condition that I hypothesize to have an impact is legislative 
support. The hypothesis is that the greater legislative support a prime minister has, the 
more likely institutional complexity is to increase. The only minority government in 
Australia since 1979 was the 2010-2013 Julia Gillard term (Labor held 48 percent of the 
seats in the House of Representatives). Moreover, the variation in majority government 
seat share is quite narrow, ranging from 53 percent to 63 percent; thus, whatever impact 
legislative support has, its real-world import is perhaps not that large. The evidence 
indicates that this is true. The association between legislative support and change in 
institutional complexity is absent. Prime ministers with a greater proportion of seat share 
do not appear to be more likely to increase the complexity of their offices than those with 
less legislative support.   
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 Finally, I examine whether there is a “term effect” on institutional complexity. 
This is the idea that there is a systematic effect of time itself during prime ministerial 
terms: that change is more likely at the beginning of terms than at the end of terms, or 
vice versa. There is no evidence for a simple term year effect in the Australian case, at 
least in terms of proliferation of units. Comparing average change by year demonstrates 
that there is no clear linear trend but that the final years of prime ministerial terms do 
seem to show a marked increase in unit proliferation. However, a statistical test for the 
significance of differences in means across groups, ANOVA, does not find that the 
difference between years is significant. Thus, while there is some descriptive evidence to 
suggest an effect, there is no statistical support. 
 In this section, I examined the veracity of hypotheses relating various explanatory 
factors to unit proliferation and specialization, i.e., institutional complexity. I found that 
the assertiveness measures were quite clearly associated with changes in institutional 
complexity, both on average and for individual indicators of political interest and 
assertive values. The evidence suggests both broad over time parallels – the long-term 
trends in assertiveness and institutional complexity track each other closely – and 
correspondence of particular periods where complexity is specifically increasing or 
decreasing. Notwithstanding the obvious concern that “correlation is not causation”, I 
argue that there is a good case for the assertiveness hypotheses in relation to institutional 
complexity, at least as far as associations between the trends. 
 In terms of alternative explanations, there was far less evidence to substantiate the 
hypotheses about economic trends in globalization and government activity. None of 
these trends appeared to co-vary with changes in institutional complexity over time to a 
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significant degree. However, the impact of party as a political condition is clearly 
manifest. The story of change in the Australian DPMC’s internal organizational structure 
since 1978 is in large part tied to changes in government. Under Labor prime ministers, 
proliferation and unit specialization are much more evident than under Liberal prime 
ministers. Given the small sample size, this is only a tentative claim, but the connection 
between which party governs and when institutional change occurs is quite striking in the 
Australian case.  
8.3.4 Institutional Complexity and Change in the Australian DPMC 
 How does this case study of institutional complexity in the Australian Department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet fit into our broader investigation of institutional change? 
As has been suggested throughout, I argue that the Australian case exhibits a “layering” 
mode of incremental change. Compared to the other case study in this chapter, the UK’s 
Cabinet Office, the structure of the Australian DPMC has been relatively continuous, and 
it has undergone a high degree of institutionalization. The unit structure of the Australian 
DPMC is arguably the most robust and wide-ranging of the four cases. However, when 
compared to the institutional layering we examined in the Canadian case, the process in 
the Australian DPMC has, in my view, been more distinctly periodic in nature. To a 
greater degree than in the Privy Council Office case, one can clearly identify periods of 
intense layering, where many new institutional roles and functions were added to existing 
ones, along with periods of relative stasis and consolidation. Overall, then, I characterize 
the Australian case as a case of “periodic layering”: incremental institutionalization that 
occurs mostly within distinct periods, rather than gradually and consistently over longer 
periods.    
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8.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
 This chapter elucidated two case studies of institutional complexity in prime 
ministerial branches, the United Kingdom Cabinet Office and Australia’s Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet. I characterized and explained patterns of change, examining 
both proliferation of organizational units and differentiation and specialization in the 
types of units created. In addition to revealing how the structures of these institutions 
have changed in recent decades, I assessed evidence for the study’s theories about prime 
ministerial branch institutionalization. 
 I found that the Cabinet Office is a paradigmatic case of institutional ‘conversion’. 
Under Prime Minister Blair, the Cabinet Office increased in complexity dramatically and 
abruptly. It was converted from a relatively small, administratively oriented organization 
into a sprawling policy oversight, coordination, and implementation centre. Its focus also 
changed to serve more explicitly and more clearly prime ministerial priorities. By 
contrast, the Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet is a case of 
institutional layering. This process of change, however, has not been consistent and 
gradual across time but has mostly occurred in periods of intense, sustained change, such 
as under the Hawke government (1983-1991) and the Rudd and Gillard governments 
(2007-2013).  
 The chapter also suggests several conclusions about the causes of change in the 
institutional complexity of the prime ministerial branches. First, in both case studies there 
was some evidence for the hypothesis that assertive citizenship and institutional 
complexity are associated. In Australia, the trends generally were observed to co-vary 
over time and in specific periods where institutionalization was most pronounced, while 
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in the UK, the qualitative character of the units created under Tony Blair, especially, 
testify to a concern with responding to public expectations. Contrastingly, there was 
minimal evidence that the economic trends of globalization and government activity are 
related to change in institutional complexity. There is some evidence that suggests that 
ideology matters to institutional change, particularly in Australia. Finally, in both cases, I 
consider the ‘null hypothesis’ to have a great deal of validity with regard to institutional 
complexity. In every case study, the idiosyncratic leadership styles, goals, and skills of 
individual prime ministers seem to have a determinative effect on whether they choose to 
engage in institution building.     
 The value of the preceding case studies is in explicating a certain dimension of 
institutional change, institutional complexity, over time. This analysis complements the 
austere quantitative analysis in chapters five and six by providing a more grounded, 
detailed picture of the prime ministerial branches in these countries, and by offering an 
alternative approach with which to ‘triangulate’ the study’s overall conclusions. The 
preceding discussion of institutional complexity in the prime ministerial branches 
concludes the empirical portion of the study. In the following concluding chapter, I take 
account of the study as a whole, summarize its findings, and reiterate its contributions.  
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Chapter 9  
Public Expectations and Institutional Change in the Prime Ministerial Branches 
It is a feature of modern politics that nothing gets done if not driven from the top. This 
was never popular with the traditionalists. There was a lot of talk of centralising 
government; wanting to be a president; overweening (even manic) desire to have absolute 
power. It was complete tosh, of course. The fact was you couldn’t get the job done unless 
there were clear procedures and mechanisms in place to implement the programme. 
             Tony Blair (2010, 337-38) 
 This study began with the purpose of empirically assessing Prime Minister Blair’s 
claim: that modern prime ministerial leadership, driven by modern politics, requires 
centralization of power. Have prime ministers sought to centralize power in the prime 
ministerial branches? How have these institutions changed to serve prime ministers in 
‘getting the job done’? And what is it about modern politics that drives these changes? In 
addressing these questions, the study offers an innovative, systematic comparative 
analysis of institutional change in the prime ministerial branches of Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom. This concluding chapter takes stock of what we 
have learned. It summarizes the study’s approach and findings, and discusses its 
contributions and limits. The last part of the chapter suggests directions for future 
research.   
9.1 Summary of the Study 
 After introducing the study’s main themes and questions in chapter one, chapter 
two described the study’s historical, institutional, and scholarly context. First, I 
summarized the historical development of the Westminster prime ministership. Here I 
argued that at many key points in its evolution the prime ministership has become more 
powerful precisely because of democratizing processes. I then elaborated the central roles 
that prime ministers play in Westminster systems and, more broadly, in modern politics. 
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These roles have only become more significant as prime ministers have seemingly 
become “presidentialized” in many parliamentary democracies. Finally, I described the 
literature on sociocultural change within the assertive citizenship framework, since it 
plays a central role in the study’s primary theory of institutional change. The thesis of this 
framework is that there has been a shift, evident worldwide, from predominantly 
“allegiant” values, beliefs, and expectations to a more “assertive” set of public values and 
attitudes.   
 Chapters three and four built on chapter two’s context-setting to explicate the 
theoretical approach of the study and the substantive empirical theories of institutional 
change. I situate the study within historical institutionalism. It is predicated on the 
assumption that institutions are central to understanding prime ministerial power and it 
emphasizes processes of change over time in the Westminster prime ministerships. It also 
adapts a typology of institutional change proposed by Streeck and Thelen (2005), which 
suggests four ways in which institutions can change because of gradual processes: 
displacement, drift, layering, and conversion. In addition to these patterns of change, I 
introduced and explicated a theory about what drives institutional change in the real 
world: the Theory of Public Expectations. This theory locates the source of institutional 
change in changes within the political cultures of democracies. The theory is rooted in the 
idea that citizen orientations in advanced democracies have gradually shifted from 
materialist to postmaterialist concerns (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) and 
from predominantly “allegiant” to predominantly “assertive” attitudes towards politics 
and politicians (Dalton and Welzel 2014). These changes have the consequence of 
incentivizing prime ministers to institutionalize their offices.  
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 Chapter four described the overall research design and methodological choices 
and how they serve the purpose of theory testing. I reviewed the literature with regard to 
methodology in order to show that an opportunity exists for more rigorous, systematic 
work in the study of prime ministerships. I then articulated the overall causal model of 
prime ministerial branch institutionalization. The model depicts the outcome of 
institutionalization as dependent on a combination of changes over time in political 
culture and economic trends and periodic changes in political conditions. I also described 
the overall structure of the study’s parallel mixed methods design and its usefulness in 
testing the causal model. After discussing case selection, I identified certain limitations 
that the research design imposes on the study.        
 The second part of this study, chapters five through eight, constitutes the 
empirical analysis of the theories discussed earlier. It utilized a variety of quantitative and 
qualitative tools to test hypotheses derived from these theories. In chapters five and six, I 
examined two indicators of institutional autonomy of the prime ministerial branches: 
budget resources in chapter five and staff resources in chapter six. These chapters 
employed primarily quantitative methodology, including descriptive statistics and 
regression techniques for time series data. In chapters seven and eight, I traced change 
over time in the internal structures of the prime ministerial branches, conceived as a 
measure of institutional complexity. The chapters analyzed data on the number and types 
of organizational units within the branches in a series of short case studies of each 
country. These investigations produced a plethora of findings, many surprising and 
unexpected. The next two sections provide summary assessments of what these chapters 
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found: first, in terms of empirical theory, and second, in terms of observed patterns of 
institutional change. 
9.2 Theoretical Assessment 
 An important goal of this study was to articulate and empirically assess a theory 
of institutional change in prime ministerial branches, namely, the Theory of Public 
Expectations. The theory represents an original effort to connect changes in political 
culture and citizen orientations to institutional change. In doing so, it addresses 
significant gaps in both the behavioural and institutional literatures. In political behaviour 
research, there is a relative lack of theory and analysis about how public values and 
attitudes cause change in political institutions.146 Conversely, in the institutional 
literature, behavioural change is not generally emphasized in theory building, which 
instead emphasizes specific actors, interests, and interactions among them. Where it does 
identify sociocultural change as important, it is associated more with institutional creation 
and stability than change. In short, the Theory of Public Expectations is both an 
institutional theory and a theory of political behaviour, in some sense, and thus bridges 
two approaches to understanding politics that have been relatively disconnected.            
 To summarize the theory briefly, it begins with the baseline assertion of a shift in 
values and attitudes among democratic citizens, from “allegiant” to “assertive” 
orientations. Allegiant citizens were traditionalist, materialist, deferential to authority, 
satisfied democrats; assertive citizens are secular, post-materialist, critical of and 
antagonistic to authority, dissatisfied with democratic performance. As citizens become 
more assertive, they have higher expectations of government performance while 
                                                 
146 This is particularly true with regard to incremental change over time, rather than abrupt institutional 
restructuring. As well, political culture and values are most often associated with explanations for stable, 
enduring patterns of institutional interaction rather than change.  
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expecting political power to be dispersed more broadly. This generates a basic tension: 
governments are increasingly accountable and responsible for more and more, but are not 
trusted with the tools or political space to deliver. To use Schumpeter’s phrase, it is 
difficult for political leaders to get anything done when the public is constantly 
“knocking at the door”. To resolve this tension, some power will have to be delegated to 
actors who have the legitimacy to claim it, and who are most burdened with heightened 
public expectations. The theory claims that these actors are generally prime ministers in 
parliamentary democracies.147 If prime ministers are rational actors, as I argue they 
should be, they should respond to these incentives. One such response is to accrue 
institutional capacity within their offices, the better with which to manage, coordinate, 
and drive policy change.    
 Overall, the Theory of Public Expectations was most often supported where 
theoretical assumptions about how the key variables changed over time were met. Where 
gradual centralization of power is evident in the institutional resources and structures of 
the prime ministerial branches, it is often driven by an increasingly assertive public, on 
some measure. Where such centralization is not evident or is more erratic than expected a 
priori, the theory does not produce significant results. For example, one of the most 
startling results just in the raw data is that Canada is the only case of a prime ministerial 
branch showing a gradual over-time increase in both budget and staff resources. Equally 
surprising was the lack of institutional growth in the New Zealand prime ministerial 
branch. In Canada, centralization of power is evident; in New Zealand, it is not. 
Correspondingly, the Theory of Public Expectations fits the first case very well, while its 
                                                 
147 I would argue that the theory is as applicable in presidential democracies, notwithstanding the structural 
constitutional differences. As discussed in chapter three, an important theoretical source for the Theory of 
Public Expectations is Theodore Lowi’s diagnosis of the “plebiscitary presidency” in the United States. 
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application to the second case is less appropriate. This lack of theoretical congruence 
with empirical observation is, in the end, not all that surprising. It is worth appreciating 
that the theory crafts an entirely new framework for conceptualizing, measuring, and 
assessing institutional change in prime ministerships, and thus inherently is much more 
uncertain and challenging than a theory making an incremental contribution to well-
established arguments.   
 This pattern also emerges in the case studies of institutional complexity in 
chapters seven and eight. Unlike in its budget and staff resources, the Canadian Privy 
Council Office has not undergone a sustained, incremental process of institutional 
specialization. Its basic organizational structure has not undergone significant 
transformation towards being more policy and implementation oriented, although this has 
evidently started to change somewhat under the current prime minister, Justin Trudeau. In 
New Zealand, again we see little evidence of centralization in the form of growing 
robustness in prime ministerial branch structure. Thus, in both cases, to differing extents, 
the basic assumptions about institutional change of the Theory of Public Expectations are 
not satisfied.  
 By contrast, both case studies in chapter eight, of the United Kingdom and 
Australian prime ministerial branches, generally support the theory because they both 
exhibit a much greater degree of internal structural remaking and transformation, which 
is crucial to the theory. In the case of the UK Cabinet Office, much of the apparatus built 
during Prime Minister Blair’s first and second terms, a critical period in the office’s 
development, was responsive to heightened public expectations of leaders and 
government. In Australia, the periodic increases in institutional complexity of the 
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Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet tracked quite closely with changes in assertive 
citizenship, both over long and shorter time periods. Overall, then, in the cases where the 
prime ministerial branches have become comparably more internally complex, the 
association of change with assertive shifts is discernible.    
 In conclusion, then, the Theory of Public Expectations succeeds best when 
centralization of power through institution-building in the prime ministerial branch is 
observed. It clearly does not succeed everywhere in these cases; as acknowledged earlier, 
the theory’s exploratory nature and a priori selection of cases accounts for some of this 
lack of fit between theory and empirics. However, that it does not succeed everywhere is 
an important finding in itself, because it shows that the steadily creeping centralization of 
power in centres of government is not, in fact, a consistent, universal phenomenon across 
all parliamentary democracies. Even within this subset called the Westminster systems, 
the extent of centralization in prime ministerial branches varies markedly across cases 
and over time. Empirical assessment of the Theory of Public Expectations also suggests 
that the effects of modern politics on prime ministerial leadership and power are not, 
contra Prime Minister Blair’s claims and my own preconceptions, pervasive and uniform. 
In fact, there is a great deal of contingency and space for actor’s agency in the story, in 
addition to the broader macro-level processes of cultural and institutional change.  
 In my view, then, the study’s articulation and assessment of the Theory of Public 
Expectations successfully and compellingly synthesizes two opposing views of what the 
modern prime ministership represents. On the one hand, the modern prime ministership is 
seen as a transformational break from the past. Advocates of the centralization and 
presidentialization arguments see the modern office as fundamentally different from that 
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of earlier periods. The alternative view sees the modern prime ministership as being in a 
contingent phase, gradually established and reversible, subject to political agency. Within 
its analytical scope, the study supports the latter view in several areas, many surprising. 
We discovered that the centralization of power in the prime ministers of Westminster 
systems is not uniform, consistent or inevitable. Indeed, in cases like New Zealand, there 
is little indication that centralization has occurred at all. Even in Canada, where Donald 
Savoie’s (1999) concentration of power argument has been widely accepted, the study 
showed that institutionalization of authority in the prime ministerial branch is incomplete. 
 Still, the study also shows that the Westminster prime ministerships, to varying 
degrees, have been reshaped: not so much in its roles and functions but in the way that it 
performs these roles and the ways in which political leadership is exercised. In its 
institutional aspects, this change is not easily reversible, even if incremental, because of 
path dependence and learning: institutional resources and processes, once entrenched, are 
difficult to dismantle, and prime ministers learn that they are very useful. Modern prime 
ministers have come to rely on the institutional support of the organizations, political and 
bureaucratic, that serve them; this is indeed a significant change in the long sweep of 
institutional development. This reliance, though, is as much a matter of ‘keeping the 
show on the road’ as it is a plain assertion of dominance over other political actors. 
 The study also confirms the argument, given in the introductory chapter, that the 
actual exercise of prime ministerial power is a combination of personal and institutional 
factors, encountering an external reality of political circumstance. While institutional 
capacity is a reasonable indicator of the ability of prime ministers to project power within 
the core executive and broader political system, it is not the be-all and end-all of such 
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power. A prime ministership with a more robust, institutionalized base of support is a 
stronger office than a prime ministership without such support, all else equal, but this 
does not mean that prime ministers with robust branches serving them are always more 
powerful, or that power to ‘get what they want’ cannot be effectuated by other means.   
 Finally, more broadly the place of the prime ministership in modern politics is not 
a fundamental ‘break’ from the past but the most recent iteration of a familiar story. This 
story is the one told in chapter two: the role of democratization in driving institutional 
change in the Westminster prime ministership. The passage of power from British 
monarchs to parliaments led to the rise of cabinet government and the prominence of 
prime ministers as cabinet-makers and as ultimate arbiters of collective cabinet decisions. 
Mass enfranchisement in Britain in the 19th century expanded the scope of prime 
ministerial leadership from the parliamentary arena to the public at large, and centralized 
political party operations. The decline in the power of the House of Lords and other upper 
chambers cemented the notion that the democratically elected popular assemblies, with 
prime ministers at their head, should be the predominant locus of power. The imperatives 
of wartime leadership also contributed to the institutionalization of prime ministerial 
branches, and new communications technologies such as radio and television generated a 
more direct, immediate relationship between citizens and the prime minister. The 
direction of institutional development has thus generally been to strengthen prime 
ministerial authority and enshrine the pre-eminence of the prime ministership in the 
Westminster constitutional structure. This constitutes what could be called a ‘paradox’ of 
democratization. The Theory of Public Expectations is only the most recent iteration of 
this paradox. In modern politics, it is often the force of heightened public expectations, 
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generated by assertive, critical citizens and an aggressive media, which continues the 
centripetal, though uneven, development of the Westminster prime ministership.148     
 In addition to the Theory of Public Expectations, the study posited two other 
explanations for institutional change: economic trends and political conditions. Overall, 
the economic hypotheses were not supported by the empirical analysis in the study. In 
neither chapter five nor chapter six did we find substantial, consistent evidence that 
globalization or government activity has positive effects on prime ministers’ institutional 
resources. The case studies in chapter seven and eight also did not produce strong 
evidence of economic effects, except that institutional specialization in Australia and the 
UK is attributed in part to governments taking on significantly more economic 
responsibility in modern politics.  
 My analysis suggests that political conditions are not significant moderators of 
prime ministerial branch institutionalization. However, the case studies point to an 
important role for ideology in determining whether prime ministers engage in unit-
building. In both Australia and Canada, “centre-right” prime ministers (Liberals and 
Conservatives, respectively) consistently were associated with retrenchment and 
reversion, to some extent, in the complexity of their civil service offices. “Centre-left” 
prime ministers (Labor and Liberals) were consistently the leaders under which notable 
unit proliferation and specialization occurred. In the UK, as well, Prime Minister Blair is 
the crucial institution builder in the Cabinet Office, while Prime Ministers Thatcher, 
Major and Cameron, all Conservatives, were not especially enthusiastic about building 
                                                 
148 This is not to say that there have not been “centrifugal” forces impinging on prime ministerships also. 
The rise of local nationalisms, small parties and populist movements, and networked governance and 
societies have also affected the development of prime ministerial leadership. 
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the office’s institutional capacity. While based on a small sample, this finding of a role 
for ideology in institutional change is intriguing and merits further attention.  
9.3 Institutional Change in the Westminster Democracies 
 The preceding discussion summarized the study’s findings in terms of empirical 
theory. A second set of findings relates to the broad patterns of institutional change in the 
prime ministerial branches. To recall, the study adopts a historical-institutionalist 
framework for studying institutional change developed by Streeck and Thelen (2005) and 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010). In this framework, there are four typical patterns of gradual, 
endogenous change over time in institutions: displacement, layering, drift, and 
conversion. I constructed a typology whose dimensions are institutional continuity and 
the extent of institutionalization, and located the four patterns of change within the 
typology. Here, I provide concluding assessments about the patterns of institutional 
change observed in the four Westminster cases. These assessments are summarized in 
table 9.1, below. 
 My initial theoretical expectation was that ‘layering’ would be the predominant 
pattern of institutional change in the cases, with ‘conversion’ being a secondary 
phenomenon. There are several reasons for this. First, as traced in chapter two, the 
“Westminster prime ministership” as a historical concept, transplanted to the settler 
colonies, has a long, entrenched institutional history. This history means that the rules and 
expectations of behaviour are also well entrenched, and the basic institutional logic 
highly constrained. Moreover, substantively there is also reason to expect that 
institutional change would be layered. My primary theory of change in the prime 
ministerial branches, the Theory of Public Expectations, strongly suggests that layering 
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should be the dominant mode of institutional change. This is because it posits that a 
strong determinant of institutional change is the gradual shift in democratic publics from 
allegiant orientations to assertive orientations: a gradual shift cannot easily explain 
abrupt, convulsive change. For these reasons, it seemed likely that institutional change 
would involve gradual accumulation of new institutional roles, that is, layering, rather 
than the more dramatic change involved in other patterns in the typology.  
 Just as in the testing of the Theory of Public Expectations, the study’s empirical 
analysis found that processes of institutional change in the Westminster cases are more 
complex and more varied than initially expected; this is a key finding of the study. The 
cases exhibited quite contrasting patterns of institutional change, though the patterns are 
generally consistent within the cases across the different measures of institutionalization. 
In Australia, the dominant pattern of institutional change is layering. The Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet is relatively institutionalized in terms of resources and 
organizational structure and the process has been marked by relative continuity rather 
than disruption. I qualified these processes in different ways. With regard to both 
appropriations and unit structure, the process of layering has been periodic, proceeding in 
distinct periods of growth and decline along an overall upward trajectory. In terms of 
staff, the layering has been less periodic throughout its institutional history and more 
confined to the period since the mid-2000s. Overall, patterns of institutional change in 
Australia indicate that the department is moderately responsive to external changes such 
as changes in public values and attitudes. However, this responsiveness is constrained by 
the fact that its expansive role in enabling prime ministerial authority across a wide range 
of government activity was already well institutionalized, even at the point of creation of 
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the department in 1971. Thus, individual prime ministers have layered new institutional 
roles and functions onto an already existing, robust institutional structure. 
Table 9.1  
Summary of Institutional Change in the Westminster Cases 
 Appropriations Staff  Institutional 
Structure 
Australia Periodic Layering Compressed 
Layering 
Periodic Layering 
Canada Incremental 
Layering 
Incremental 
Layering 
Sporadic Layering 
New Zealand Drift Drift Drift 
United Kingdom Conversion Displacement 
/Conversion 
Conversion 
 
 In Canada, the narrative of institutional change also is characterized by 
institutional layering. Indeed, the Canadian case, with regard to budgets and staff 
resources in particular, is a paradigmatic case of gradual, incremental layering. The 
contemporary Privy Council Office is much more well-resourced than it was in the mid-
1960s, but this change has proceeded slowly and consistently over time, rather than in 
waves as was more evident in Australia. In terms of institutional complexity, this pattern 
was less evident; instead, we observed isolated moments of unit proliferation and 
specialization rather than continuous change. I argue that this pattern shows that the Privy 
Council Office is, relative to the Australian case, more responsive to the gradual, 
cumulative force of external changes, and somewhat less responsive to the intervention of 
particular prime ministers, at least since Pierre Trudeau instituted the modern office in the 
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late 1960s. Moreover, both the incremental layering and the ‘sporadic’ change in 
institutional complexity suggest several unique institutional characteristics.  
 One potential explanation for these differences is that, arguably, the Whitehall 
model and the institutional stability of the civil service operate more strongly in Canada 
than in Australia. Whereas Australian prime ministers have routinely been able to expand 
and contract the resources and complexity of their offices as they see fit, within the 
constraint of already being well institutionalized, Canadian prime ministers seem to be 
more constrained by traditions of neutrality and non-politicization. In other words, the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in Australia seems much more to be an 
explicit, malleable tool for prime ministers to pursue particular changes, while Canadian 
prime ministers, since the late 1960s, have tended to operate within existing institutional 
arrangements, modifying their offices incrementally and on the margins. Perhaps because 
of the strength of this norm, it seems to be the case that the personal, political office of 
the Canadian prime minister, the Prime Minister’s Office, is much more present in the 
policy roles that in Australia are played by the DPMC to some extent. Whatever the case, 
although both Australia and Canada are characterized by institutional layering, the 
particular patterns of institutional change are different in interesting ways.  
 Both the New Zealand and British cases also exhibit a good degree of consistency 
across dimensions of institutionalization, and contrasts with other cases. The New 
Zealand case is repeatedly shown to be a case of institutional drift. I characterize drift in 
terms of a relative lack of change in the direction of institutionalization and a high degree 
of continuity. Simply put, its pattern of institutional change is that of a lack of 
institutional change. After a period of initial institutional growth subsequent to the 
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formation of the New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in 1990, the 
department existed in relative stasis for two decades. Appropriations and staff resources 
were essentially constant, varying little from year to year and not trending in any 
particular direction, and there were very few significant organizational changes. There are 
several explanations for this pattern.  
 First, the New Zealand DPMC is a relatively new institution, although it was 
predated by a similar department. It may be the case that it simply has not reached a point 
in its institutional development where growth in resources and complexity becomes 
imperative. However, a more trenchant explanation is that the prime ministership in New 
Zealand is simply not the centre of the political system in the way that it is in other 
Westminster systems. As was mentioned earlier, New Zealand scholars often suggest that 
politics in New Zealand is more consultative, more collegial, and more dispersed than the 
more centralized politics elsewhere. This is partly cultural and partly institutional. For 
example, the New Zealand prime ministership does not face the same intergovernmental 
pressures that exist in federal systems such as Australia and Canada, or, perhaps, the 
national security pressures that operate in all three of the other cases more acutely. 
Moreover, empirics showed clearly that public expectations, as measured by indicators of 
assertive citizenship, are not operative in New Zealand in the same directions as in other 
countries: assertiveness has not increased, which theoretically is a factor that drives 
institutionalization. Overall, then, the New Zealand prime ministership is shown to be a 
distinct, atypical case relative to the other Westminster countries.  
 Finally, the Cabinet Office in the British system is also a contrasting case, in that 
it most clearly exhibits a pattern of institutional conversion. Conversion is a pattern of 
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institutional change whereby the roles, functions, and purposes of an institution are re-
oriented to the point of transformation, in a relatively abrupt manner. This is often 
brought about by institutional ‘entrepreneurs’ who take advantage of the gap between 
institutional rules and their operation to convert an institution towards their goals. In this 
case, the evidence is clear that Tony Blair is this entrepreneur. During Blair’s prime 
ministership, especially his first term and beginning of his second term, the Cabinet 
Office was transformed from a still largely traditional, administratively oriented office 
into a policy-oriented office. This post-conversion office more explicitly and robustly 
served the political and priority policies of the prime minister. Since this period, the 
Cabinet Office has continued to operate largely in this mould, although under both 
Gordon Brown and David Cameron it has withdrawn from some activities somewhat.  
 In the British case, then, institutional change is largely driven by an individual 
political actor who perceived that his institutional capacity was inadequate to his political 
needs, and who saw in the Cabinet Office an institution that could be made to operate 
much more like a ‘prime minister’s department’ than it had been. In cases like Australia 
and, to a lesser extent, Canada, the normative resistance against a ‘prime minister’s 
department’ had long been undermined by practice. This resistance against institutional 
change was arguably far more salient in Britain; the power of the ‘permanent 
government’, the British civil service, is much vaunted and well entrenched. This makes 
the conversion pattern of institutional change much more likely than more incremental 
change: the strength of norms holds until the dam breaks, so to speak. Thus, the British 
case offers another distinctive pattern of institutional change: not incremental or periodic 
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layering, not drift, but a period of wholesale conversion from one set of institutional rules 
and norms to another.                  
9.4 Contributions and Limits 
 This study’s comparative analysis of the prime ministerial branches in Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom elucidates the extent and causes of 
institutional change therein. Its contributions are substantial and surprising. Overall, the 
study demonstrates that institutional change in the prime ministerial branches has been 
far from certain: not all prime ministerships have developed consistently in the same 
direction of growing institutional capacity and centralization of power. Where 
institutionalization is evident, empirical evidence for the Theory of Public Expectations is 
certainly present but modestly so. Both the extent of increasing assertive citizenship and 
the institutional responses of prime ministers to the pressures of modern politics have 
varied considerably more than the theory assumed.    
 The study contributes to scholarship and broader public discourse in four specific 
areas. First, it advances the study of prime ministerships conceptually by treating 
institutional change in prime ministerships as a general phenomenon with general causes. 
In service of this conceptual ambition, I originate the concept of the “prime ministerial 
branch” to create an analogy between presidents, prime ministers, and the institutions that 
support them. There is just as much an apparatus of policy and political support and 
advice serving prime ministers in parliamentary systems as there is the expansive 
institutional support for, say, the American or French presidents. These prime ministerial 
branches can be studied in the same way that the executive branches in different kinds of 
constitutional systems are. Conceptualizing prime ministerships in this way also draws 
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attention to the fact that prime ministerships in Westminster systems are much more than 
just individual prime ministers; they are sprawling, living institutional organisms that 
constitute a central feature of modern democratic politics.  
      Second, the study introduces and tests specific theories about change in prime 
ministerial institutions and characterizes observed patterns of institutional change from a 
historical institutionalist perspective. It brings theoretical depth to a somewhat 
atheoretical, descriptive literature. This depth can be found in the Theory of Public 
Expectations, which is an original and innovative effort to bring together the behavioural 
and institutional literatures. As discussed earlier, the empirical evidence for the Theory of 
Public Expectations is sufficiently clear, where its assumptions  are met, to demonstrate 
that the enterprise has merit. Future research can build on this theoretical advancement to 
generate new and innovative theories of institutional change in the prime ministerial 
branches. As well, the specific relationships examined in this study provide benchmarks 
for elaboration, refutation and replication in future. The field lacks a coherent research 
agenda with a clear set of research questions, so the identification and assessment of 
clearly testable hypotheses is ideal fodder for building such an agenda. In this way, it 
builds a theoretical foundation for tying together the disparate literatures on executives.      
 Third, the study adds to the methodological toolkit used in the study of the prime 
ministerships in these countries and studies of political executives and leadership 
generally. Compared to many areas of political science, these literatures have not yet built 
robust theories and have not tested their claims in empirically rigorous ways. In 
particular, the literature on prime ministers and prime ministerial leadership is almost 
universally qualitative, historical, or single case-based, and lacks interest in specifying 
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concrete, testable empirical theories with systematic data analysis. In contrast to its 
cousin, the voluminous literature on the US presidency and executive branch 
development, it has yet to embrace, and even actively rejects, quantitative approaches to 
the subject. This is not a virtue. My study addresses this methodological deficiency in the 
prime ministerial literature by subjecting the development of prime ministerial branches 
over time to quantitative and mixed-method approaches.  
  Finally, this study is rooted in an interest in how political leadership has evolved 
to cope with the demands of modern politics and societal transformations. I began the 
study with Prime Minister Blair’s observation that modern politics demands a different 
form of prime ministerial leadership. The study then assesses how this has played out 
concretely in the institutions that support them. Although this thesis is empirical, its 
normative implications are clear. My goal was to identify, and test, reasons for the 
‘growth’ of prime ministerial authority that emphasize its reactive, responsive nature. It is 
an act of statecraft for prime ministers to enable their offices to lead in an increasingly 
‘unleadable’ environment. As with any institutional change, there are trade-offs to be 
made and constraints not to be bypassed carelessly. But the study urges consideration of 
the role that citizens play in conditioning how leaders behave: the kinds of demands and 
expectations we place upon leaders and what kinds of political leadership these pressures 
produce. It also suggests a closer examination of the thesis that centralization of power is 
a universal, robust phenomenon in parliamentary systems; the study shows that 
centralization, while certainly present, is also uneven and contingent on context and on 
leaders themselves.    
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 As with any study, there are limits. Because of the theoretical and empirical 
originality of the study, its limits are arguably more apparent. Three limits, in particular, 
deserve mention. First, the study’s empirical design constrains the extent to which deep 
contextual evidence and interpretation are considered. This is particularly true of the 
quantitative chapters, but is also evident in the tight focus of the case studies on counting 
and classifying prime ministerial branch units. This relatively austere approach 
underplays the impact of norms, values, and internal understandings of salient actors in 
shaping prime ministerial power.  
 Second, practical data and resource limitations constrain the study’s ability to 
assess comprehensively its theories of prime ministerial branch institutionalization. These 
theories are general in nature and thus the universe of cases extends beyond Westminster; 
indeed, they are really theories about change in political executives generally. 
Comparisons to other parliamentary democracies with different constitutional and 
historical traditions, as well as to presidential and semi-presidential systems, would 
provide richer and more robust conclusions about empirical support for these theories. It 
would also increase the number of cases, which has statistical benefits, and allow for 
interesting cross-sectional, multilevel analysis. In short, the study is limited in how well it 
captures all of the variation in both outcomes and in explanatory factors.        
 The third limit is the narrowness of the study’s conceptual and empirical scope. 
The goal of the study is to examine institutional change in the “prime ministerial 
branches”. However, many ways in which these have changed are not addressed in the 
study. For example, to what extent has politicization of the civil service occurred within 
prime ministerial branches specifically? Scholars have argued recently that bureaucracies 
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have undergone politicization: that the traditional role of prime ministers’ civil service 
office in providing “politically-sensitive policy advice” has become more “promiscuously 
partisan” (Aucoin 2012, 179). The offices are increasingly pressured to subordinate their 
distinctive views of the public interest to the political interests of the government of the 
day. From the perspective of political leadership, we could ask an equivalent question: to 
what extent have prime ministers’ civil service offices become an extension of prime 
ministerial power, rather than the kind of ‘check’ on prime ministers by the “permanent 
government” exemplified by Sir Humphrey Appleby in Yes Prime Minister? The study 
does not address this and other kinds of important changes in the prime ministerial 
branches.   
9.5 Directions for Future Research 
 These limits point to several directions for future research extending the study. 
First, in-depth qualitative case studies would enhance our understanding of the 
complexities of institutional change I observed. The purpose of this approach would be to 
capture as much contextual evidence as possible, which would help to elucidate the 
norms and values operating at the prime ministerial level. Such work would also 
elaborate the specific causal mechanisms operating in these cases. Furthermore, case 
studies could assess how subjective perceptions and beliefs of key actors reflect and 
modify the observational analysis in this study through interviews of these actors.  
  Second, future research could directly address the second limit identified above 
by expanding the number of cases and re-analyzing the study’s hypotheses. This would 
introduce greater variation in the data and allow the testing of certain factors that could 
not be included here. More importantly, from a theoretical perspective it would allow us 
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to assess the generalizability of the study’s theories of prime ministerial branch 
institutionalization. Westminster systems are characterized by a greater degree of 
executive dominance than other parliamentary systems, so testing these theories in non-
Westminster systems would provide a ‘harder’ test. Where prime ministers are more 
constrained, how do they respond to the pressures of public expectations and others?         
 Third, future research could consider the study’s findings in the context of closer 
examination of individual prime ministers and their leadership. In chapter three, I 
discussed the idea that prime ministerial branch institutionalization is driven primarily by 
personal and idiosyncratic attributes of each prime minister. Rather than being a primarily 
exogenous, contextual phenomenon, prime ministers decide whether to enhance the 
institutional resources of their offices or make them more complex based on 
psychologically-based factors such as leadership style, personality traits, and personal 
goals. An account of particular episodes of institutional change that focused on individual 
prime ministers is certainly warranted. Such an account might find that, although based 
on idiosyncrasies and personal traits, there are commonalities in prime ministers that 
generate common kinds of institutional changes.  For instance, some prime ministers are 
more activist than other prime ministers. Some are content just to “keep the show on the 
road” (King 2015, 225).  This “active” versus “reactive” dimension might partially 
depend on context – there may be periods in which policy or institutional change is 
simply more pressing and politically salient – but it is also temperamental. Another 
promising application of political psychology pertains to prime ministers’ “operational 
code”. Operational code analysis is a classic characterization of the philosophical and 
instrumental beliefs that guides leaders’ decision-making, and would illuminate certain 
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episodes of institutional change considerably (Leites 1951; George 1969). A prime 
minister who believes that they have a great ability to control events is more likely to 
engage in institutional change than one who does not. Similarly, it could be hypothesized 
that a prime minister who has an acceptance of risk will induce change more than one 
who is risk-averse. A rigorous study of how prime ministers’ personalistic traits 
contribute to institutional change is waiting to be written.      
 To conclude, this study presents a comparative institutional analysis of prime 
ministerships in the Westminster systems of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the 
United Kingdom. It develops and tests an original theory explaining institutional change 
in these prime ministerships since the 1960s, the Theory of Public Expectations. The 
theory argues that institutionalization in the prime ministerial branches occurs when 
prime ministers choose to expand their institutional capacities in response to heightened 
expectations from citizens. Empirical analysis provided some support to the theory when 
its assumptions of institutional centralization and increasing assertiveness were met. 
Equally importantly, the study found that centralization of power in prime ministers, at 
least in terms of institutional support, is not a universal, consistent phenomenon; instead, 
it varies significantly across cases and over time in interesting and surprising ways. This 
study is a first effort of its kind but it should serve as a catalyst for further refinement and 
contestation. It advances the important goal of setting out robust theories of institutional 
change in prime ministerships and testing them empirically. The centrality of prime 
ministerial leadership to politics in modern democracies demands nothing less. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 - Prime Ministerial Terms from 1945 to 2015 
 Appendix 1 describes the study’s differentiation of prime ministerial terms. It also 
serves as a reference list for the various mentions of prime ministers throughout the 
study. Table A1 lists all prime ministerial terms since 1945 in Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the United Kingdom. For each term, the prime minister, the prime 
minister’s party, term years, majority status, seat share, and ideology are given. These 
variables are described in appendix 2, which discusses all of the explanatory variables 
used in the study.  
 Prime ministerial terms are differentiated in two ways. First, any general election 
begins a new term, whether the incumbent wins or not or whether the prime ministership 
changes parties. Second, any change in the prime ministership between elections begins a 
new term. This happens, typically, through voluntary resignation, successful leadership 
challenges (especially in Australia), or, rarely, death of the incumbent prime minister.  
When necessary, prime ministerial terms are specifically demarcated according to 
the outcome in question. For instance, in chapter five the outcome is appropriations to 
prime ministerial institutions. Thus, the commencement dates of the prime ministerial 
terms were checked against the budget timeline, particularly the dates of royal assent for 
the relevant appropriations bills, to determine which annual budgets “belong” to which 
prime ministers. Thus, the first Year in Term data point for each prime ministerial term is 
the first budget for which the particular prime minister was responsible, the last data 
point, the final budget. This means that the prime ministerial terms in our dataset do not 
always correspond exactly to actual prime ministerial tenures as they are usually known.  
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Table A1  
Prime Ministerial Terms since 1945 
 Prime Minister Party Term Status Seat 
Share 
Ideology 
Australia Ben Chifley ALP 1946-1949 Majority .581 -16.4 
 Robert Menzies Liberal 1949-1951 Majority .611 25 
 Robert Menzies Liberal 1951-1954 Majority .570 53.9 
 Robert Menzies Liberal 1954-1955 Majority .529 17.9 
 Robert Menzies Liberal 1955-1958 Majority .615 30.7 
 Robert Menzies Liberal 1959-1961 Majority .631 14.4 
 Robert Menzies Liberal 1961-1963 Majority .508 38.8 
 Robert Menzies Liberal 1963-1966 Majority .590 -10.7 
 Harold Holt Liberal 1966-1967 Majority .508 -20 
 (John McEwen) Country 1967-1968    
 John Gorton Liberal 1968-1971 Majority .528 0.2 
 William McMahon Liberal 1971-1972 Majority .528 6.8 
 Gough Whitlam ALP 1972-1974 Majority .536 -24.3 
 Gough Whitlam ALP 1974-1975 Majority .519 -34.8 
 Malcolm Fraser Liberal 1975-1977 Majority .709 31.1 
 Malcolm Fraser Liberal 1977-1980 Majority .685 18.9 
 Malcolm Fraser Liberal 1980-1983 Majority .584 27.5 
 Bob Hawke ALP 1983-1984 Majority .600 6.9 
 Bob Hawke ALP 1984-1987 Majority .554 8.6 
 Bob Hawke ALP 1987-1990 Majority .581 -4.5 
 Bob Hawke ALP 1990-1991 Majority .527 -14.9 
 Paul Keating ALP 1991-1993 Majority .527 -0.2 
 Paul Keating ALP 1993-1996 Majority .544 -0.2 
 John Howard Liberal 1996-1998 Majority .628 22.6 
 John Howard Liberal 1998-2001 Majority .540 48.5 
 John Howard Liberal 2001-2004 Majority .540 33.0 
 John Howard Liberal 2004-2007 Majority .573 31.9 
 Kevin Rudd ALP 2007-2010 Majority .553 5.7 
 (Julia Gillard) ALP 2010    
 Julia Gillard ALP 2010-2013 Minority .480 -34.1 
 (Kevin Rudd) ALP 2013    
 Tony Abbott Liberal 2013-2015 Majority .533 23.0 
 (Malcolm Turnbull) Liberal 2015-2016 Majority .533 n/a 
 (Malcolm Turnbull) Liberal 2016- Majority .507 n/a 
 Prime Minister Party Term Status Seat 
Share 
Ideology 
Canada W.L. Mackenzie 
King 
Liberal 1946-1948 Majority .510 7.1 
 Louis St. Laurent Liberal 1949-1953 Majority .725 8.0 
 Louis St. Laurent Liberal 1954-1957 Majority .645 -5.1 
 John Diefenbaker PC 1957-1958 Minority .423 1.5 
 John Diefenbaker PC 1958-1962 Majority .785 -2.9 
 (John Diefenbaker) PC 1962-1963    
 Lester Pearson Liberal 1963-1965 Minority .487 -3.8 
 Lester Pearson Liberal 1965-1968 Minority .494 -13.8 
 Pierre Trudeau Liberal 1968-1972 Majority .587 -6.5 
 Pierre Trudeau Liberal 1972-1974 Minority .413 -10.4 
 Pierre Trudeau  Liberal 1974-1979 Majority .534 3.4 
 Joe Clark PC 1979-1980 Minority .482 17.1 
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 Pierre Trudeau Liberal 1980-1984 Majority .521 -2.4 
 (John Turner) Liberal 1984    
 Brian Mulroney PC 1984-1988 Majority .748 12.3 
 Brian Mulroney PC 1988-1993 Majority .573 18.3 
 (Kim Campbell) PC 1993    
 Jean Chretien Liberal 1993-1997 Majority .600 4.0 
 Jean Chretien Liberal 1997-2000 Majority .515 6.3 
 Jean Chretien Liberal 2000-2003 Majority .571 -12.2 
 Paul Martin Liberal 2003-2006 Minority .438 -12.2 
 Stephen Harper CPC 2006-2008 Minority .403 16.2 
 Stephen Harper CPC 2008-2011 Minority .464 9.1 
 Stephen Harper CPC 2011-2015 Majority .539 26.3 
 (Justin Trudeau) Liberal 2015- Majority .544 n/a 
 Prime Minister Party Term Status Seat 
Share 
Ideology 
New 
Zealand 
(Peter Fraser) Labour 1945-1946 Majority .562 n/a 
Peter Fraser Labour 1946-1949 Majority .525 -32.2 
Sidney Holland National 1949-1951 Majority .575 5.6 
Sidney Holland National 1951-1954 Majority .625 38.5 
Sidney Holland National 1954-1957 Majority .562 -3.3 
(Keith Holyoake) National 1957    
Walter Nash Labour 1957-1960 Majority .512 -35.3 
Keith Holyoake National 1960-1963 Majority .575 1.0 
Keith Holyoake National 1963-1966 Majority .562 -2.4 
Keith Holyoake National 1966-1969 Majority .550 -2.1 
Keith Holyoake National 1969-1972 Majority .536 -2.5 
Jack Marshall National 1972 Majority .536 -8.4 
Norman Kirk Labour 1972-1974 Majority .632 -19.6 
Bill Rowling Labour 1974-1975 Majority .632 -17.2 
Robert Muldoon National 1975-1978 Majority .632 5.3 
Robert Muldoon National 1978-1981 Majority .554 -4.7 
Robert Muldoon National 1981-1984 Majority .511 3.5 
David Lange Labour 1984-1987 Majority .589 -9.8 
David Lange Labour 1987-1989 Majority .588 -22.0 
Geoffrey Palmer Labour 1989-1990 Majority .588 -22.0 
(Mike Moore) Labour 1990    
Jim Bolger National 1990-1993 Majority .691 -4.9 
Jim Bolger  National 1993-1996 Majority .505 -6.4 
Jim Bolger National 1996-1997 Coalition .367 -7.2 
Jenny Shipley National 1997-1999 Coalition .367 37.1 
Helen Clark Labour 1999-2002 Coalition .408 -23.3 
Helen Clark Labour 2002-2005 Coalition .433 -28.1 
Helen Clark Labour 2005-2008 Coalition .413 -29.7 
John Key National 2008-2011 Coalition .475 37.5 
John Key National 2011-2014 Coalition .488 25.0 
 (John Key) National 2014- Minority .496 n/a 
 Prime Minister Party Term Status Seat 
Share 
Ideology 
United 
Kingdom 
Clement Attlee Labour 1945-1950 Majority .614 -31.3 
Clement Attlee Labour 1950-1951 Majority 0.504 -28.1 
Winston Churchill Conservative 1951-1955 Majority 0.514 -1.4 
Anthony Eden Conservative 1955 Majority 0.514 -30.6 
Anthony Eden Conservative 1955-1957 Majority 0.546 -30.6 
Harold Macmillan Conservative 1957-1959 Majority 0.546 -23.3 
Harold Macmillan Conservative 1959-1963 Majority 0.579 -23.3 
Alec Douglas-Home Conservative 1963-1964 Majority 0.579 -7.8 
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Harold Wilson Labour 1964-1966 Majority 0.503 -23.8 
Harold Wilson Labour 1966-1970 Majority 0.576 -14.8 
Edward Heath Conservative 1970-1974 Majority 0.524 8.2 
Harold Wilson Labour 1974 Minority 0.474 -48.5 
Harold Wilson Labour 1974-1976 Majority 0.502 -48.5 
James Callaghan Labour 1976-1979 Majority 0.502 -26.6 
Margaret Thatcher Conservative 1979-1983 Majority 0.534 24.4 
Margaret Thatcher Conservative 1983-1987 Majority 0.611 29.0 
Margaret Thatcher Conservative 1987-1990 Majority 0.578 30.5 
John Major Conservative 1990-1992 Majority 0.578 27.9 
John Major Conservative 1992-1997 Majority 0.516 27.9 
Tony Blair Labour 1997-2001 Majority 0.636 8.1 
Tony Blair Labour 2001-2005 Majority .627 5.6 
Tony Blair Labour 2005-2007 Majority .549 -3.1 
Gordon Brown Labour 2007-2010 Majority .549 -1.5 
David Cameron Conservative 2010-2015 Coalition .471 17.5 
 (David Cameron) Conservative 2015-2016 Majority .508 -1.6 
 (Theresa May) Conservative 2016- Majority .508 n/a 
Note: Terms in parentheses are listed for completeness but are not included in analysis because of their 
short length or current status. PC: Progressive Conservative Party of Canada (1942-2003). CPC: 
Conservative Party of Canada (2003-present). ALP: Australian Labor Party.  
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Appendix 2 - Summary Statistics and Explanatory Variable Description 
 Appendix 2 provides the summary statistics for all explanatory variables used in 
the dissertation and briefly describes their construction and characteristics, except for the 
assertive citizenship measures, which are treated separately in both chapter four and 
appendix 3. Table A2 shows the summary statistics, with variable mean, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum values, number of observations, and time period 
given.    
Table A2  
Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables  
 
Variable Mean SD Range N Period 
Theory of Public Expectations      
Assertive Index      
Australia 0.40 0.05 (0.33,0.51) 38 1978-2015 
Canada 0.50 0.02 (0.42,0.63) 50 1966-2015 
New Zealand 0.46 0.03 (0.43,0.52) 25 1991-2015 
United Kingdom 0.35 0.05 (0.27,0.45) 52 1964-2015 
Political Interest      
Australia 0.70 0.03 (0.63,0.74) 38 1978-2015 
Canada 0.50 0.06 (0.40,0.61) 50 1966-2015 
New Zealand 0.63 0.03 (0.53,0.69) 40 1976-2015 
United Kingdom 0.50 0.03 (0.42,0.53) 52 1964-2015 
Strength of Party Identification      
Australia 0.56 0.03 (0.51,0.61) 38 1978-2015 
Canada 0.54 0.06 (0.42,0.63) 50 1966-2015 
New Zealand 0.44 0.08 (0.31,0.57) 40 1976-2015 
United Kingdom 0.60 0.08 (0.46,0.75) 52 1964-2015 
Economic Factors      
KOF Index of Globalization 
(0 low to 100 high) 
     
Australia 74.22 8.49 (53.34,83.80) 45 1971-2015 
Canada 81.84 5.60 (69.25,89.65) 45 1971-2015 
New Zealand 68.91 9.08 (52.59,79.98) 45 1971-2015 
United Kingdom 80.86 8.30 (63.13,90.03) 45 1971-2015 
Trade Openness      
Australia 0.32 0.12 (0.18,0.68) 65 1951-2015 
Canada 0.56 0.16 (0.34,0.86) 65 1951-2015 
New Zealand 0.49 0.12 (0.32,0.76) 65 1951-2015 
United Kingdom 0.44 0.14 (0.26,0.74) 65 1951-2015 
Central Government Consumption      
Australia 0.12 0.02 (0.08,0.16) 65 1951-2015 
Canada 0.14 0.02 (0.09,0.18) 65 1951-2015 
New Zealand 0.17 0.02 (0.14,0.21) 65 1951-2015 
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United Kingdom 0.18 0.02 (0.14,0.23) 65 1951-2015 
Political Conditions      
Term Year (mean term length indicated)      
Australia 1.80 0.81 (1,4) 70 1946-2015 
Canada 2.43 1.26 (1,5) 70 1946-2015 
New Zealand 1.97 0.93 (1,4) 70 1946-2015 
United Kingdom 2.31 1.26 (1,5) 70 1946-2015 
Legislative Support (Seat Share) 
(0 no seat share - 1 all seat share) 
     
Australia 0.57 0.05 (0.48,0.71) 70 1946-2015 
Canada 0.57 0.10 (0.40,0.78) 70 1946-2015 
New Zealand 0.54 0.08 (0.37,0.69) 70 1946-2015 
United Kingdom 0.55 0.05 (0.47,0.63) 70 1946-2015 
Legislative Support (Majority % obs)      
Australia 95.71   70 1946-2015 
Canada 77.14   70 1946-2015 
New Zealand 74.29   70 1946-2015 
United Kingdom 91.43   70 1946-2015 
Ideology (MARPOR) 
(-100 extreme left to +100 extreme right) 
     
Australia 10.27 23.72 (-34.8,53.9) 70 1946-2015 
Canada 3.69 10.73 (-13.8,26.3) 70 1946-2015 
New Zealand -4.51 21.71 (-35.3,38.5) 70 1946-2015 
United Kingdom -0.02 23.05 (-48.5,30.47)  70 1946-2015 
Ideology (Prime Ministerial Party) 
(0 centre-left, 1 centre-right: % centre-right) 
     
Australia 61.43   70 1946-2015 
Canada 34.29   70 1946-2015 
New Zealand 62.86   70 1946-2015 
United Kingdom 58.57   70 1946-2015 
      
Note: Years correspond to their coding in the datasets, which refer to fiscal years, e.g., “2015” refers to 
values for the 2014/15 fiscal year.  
 
Explanatory Variables: Descriptions and Measures  
Economic Trends 
Globalization. Globalization, defined as the growing interconnectedness of economies, 
societies, and political organizations across and above state borders, is measured in two 
ways: a comprehensive measure, the KOF Index of Globalization, and a minimal, direct 
measure, trade openness. The KOF index of globalization is an aggregative index 
measuring economic, social, and political globalization separately, compositing these 
scores into an overall measure which theoretically ranges from 0 to 100, where larger 
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values means more globalization.149 It has a coverage range of 207 countries annually 
from 1970-2015. As a secondary measure and a way to estimate the effect of 
globalization across a longer time period, I use a measure of Trade Openness from the 
Penn World Tables 8.1, which provides annual data from 1951-2015 (Feenstra et al. 
2015). Trade openness is measured as the ratio of merchandise exports plus imports to 
real GDP, in current PPPs. In other words, it indicates the proportion of total GDP 
constituted by international trade (exports and imports), thus ranging from 0 to 1.  
Government Consumption. Government consumption is a measure of total central 
government spending on administration, education, and health, as a share of total real 
GDP in current PPPs, from 1951-2015. It is extracted from the Penn World Tables 8.1. It 
measures the proportion of economic activity in a country taken up by these key 
government activities.  
Political Conditions 
Year in Term. This variable is the point in a prime ministerial term when the observation 
occurs. This variable ranges from 1, the first year of a term, to 5 (the fifth year of a term, 
but only observed in the British and Canadian cases). As discussed in appendix A1, the 
coding of this variable is tied to prime ministerial terms and their demarcation relative to 
elections and the budgetary process, not necessarily to ‘real-world’ time.    
Legislative Support. My primary measure of legislative support is seat share: simply the 
share of seats held by the governing party in the lower house of the legislature, according 
to the most recent general election (thus, it varies only between terms and not within-
                                                 
149 The overall index weighs each sub-indicator unequally: economic globalization is 36% of the index, 
social globalization 38%, political 26%. Within each category a similar unequal weighting aggregation 
scheme is used, with eight variables for economic globalization and eleven and four for social and political 
globalization, respectively (Dreher 2006). 
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term). Theoretically, the variable ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates that the party 
holds none of the legislative seats and 1 indicates that the party holds all of them. Of 
course, in order to be the governing party, the seat share will never be close to zero, and 
in practice the governing party’s seat share will tend to be close to or above the bare 
majority mark of half the seats plus one (> 0.5). There is thus not a lot of variance: seat 
share is highly clustered around means with ‘thin’ tails. Alternatively, in some cases I use 
a dichotomous majority status variable, which is coded 0 if the prime minister had 
minority or coalition support and 1 if the prime minister had majority legislative support 
(greater than fifty percent). Majority governments have been the norm in these countries, 
as indicated in the summary table above.   
Ideology. Ideology is measured in two ways. The first, Prime Ministerial Ideology, is 
given by the score for the governing party in the relevant general election, according to 
the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) data. The MARPOR 
dataset consists of manually coded scores of party election manifestos in 56 countries 
since 1945. The scores range from -100 (extreme left) to 100 (extreme right). The 
relevant general election is the one in which the incumbent prime minister was elected, 
unless there was a change of prime minister between elections. In this case, to reflect the 
idea that different prime ministers will have different ideological positions, the ideology 
score is the MARPOR score of the prime minister’s party in the general election that that 
prime minister contested, i.e., the next election.  
Alternatively, I compare the effects of different ideological orientations simply by 
coding the party of the prime minister in power: the variable Prime Ministerial Party. In 
all four Westminster countries only two parties have ever governed and are coded as 
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“centre-left” and “centre-right”. In Australia, the governing parties have been the 
Australian Labor Party (ALP), the “centre-left” party, and the Liberal Party, the “centre-
right” party. In Canada, the Liberal Party is the less conservative, essentially centrist 
party; the Progressive Conservative Party and its successor, the Conservative Party of 
Canada, are the “centre-right” party. In New Zealand, the Labour Party is the “centre-
left” party and the National Party the “centre-right” party. Finally, the UK Labour Party is 
“centre-left”, the Conservatives “centre-right”. Overall, between 1946 and 2015 there 
have been slightly more country-years under “centre-right” parties (54.5%) than “centre-
left” parties (45.5%); only in Canada is this pattern reversed, wherein the Liberals have 
governed for 65.7% of the period.  
Stationarity Tests 
 Our main test for stationarity in our variables is the KPSS test, in which the null 
hypothesis is the absence of a unit root, i.e., that the variable is stationary. Table A3 
provides the results of testing for stationarity in all of the ‘dynamic’ variables, i.e, those 
that are allowed to have short-run and long-run effects in the error correction models and 
that theoretically covary with time. 
Table A3  
Stationarity Tests for Dynamic Variables  
 KPSS Stat 
Australia  
Appropriations 0.288* 
Staff 0.146* 
  
Pol. Interest 0.459* 
Party ID 0.496* 
Assertive Index 0.671* 
  
Global. Index 0.668* 
Trade Openness 0.906* 
Govt Consumpt 0.490* 
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Canada  
Appropriations 0.278* 
Staff 0.313* 
Pol. Interest 0.364* 
Party ID 0434* 
Assertive Index 0.472* 
  
Global. Index 0.533* 
Trade Openness 0.728* 
Govt Consumpt 0.431* 
  
New Zealand  
Appropriations 0.528* 
Staff 0.107 
  
Pol. Interest 0.174* 
Party ID 0.270* 
Assertive Index 0.319* 
  
Global. Index 0.476* 
Trade Openness 0.620* 
Govt Consumpt 0.667* 
  
UK  
Appropriations 1.24* 
Staff 0.28* 
  
Pol. Interest 0.513* 
Party ID 0.227* 
Assertive Index 0.820* 
  
Global. Index 0.828* 
Trade Openness 0.676* 
Govt Consumpt 0.484* 
 Note: Entries are the calculated test statistics for the KPSS Test for stationarity. Asterisk indicates that the 
test statistic meets the critical value at the 5% level, suggesting rejection of the null hypothesis. The null 
hypothesis for the KPSS test is stationarity. Thus, a stationary variable should be indicated by a failure to 
reject the KPSS null hypothesis. 
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Appendix 3 - Measuring Assertive Citizenship 
 Appendix 3 describes the construction of the Assertive Index and the two other 
measures of assertive citizenship, political interest and strength of party identification, in 
more detail than was provided in chapter four. These indicators are used throughout the 
study to quantify the shift from “allegiant” to “assertive” citizenship that was adapted 
from the work of Dalton and Welzel (2014). These measures were constructed in a four- 
step process, as follows: 
1) Identify and extract data on assertive values from election study datasets. 
2) Aggregate data within each election study dataset and create overall scores for 
each election study year. 
3) Impute values for missing data (that is, between election study observations). 
4) Decompose the time series to differentiate the ‘true’ trends from irregular 
components. 
 Step one involves the identification and extraction of relevant survey items in all 
of the election studies in each case. Chapter four provided a table of all election studies 
used (pg. 125). For political interest and party identification, these were simply the 
traditional “general interest in politics” question and the two-question sequence asking 
about party identification, first, and strength of that identification, second. These 
questions have been relatively consistent in wording and application across the election 
studies. For reasons explained below, the marginal responses were coded dichotomously. 
For political interest, responses of “fairly” or “very” interested were coded as 1, and other 
responses coded as 0. For party identification, “not very strong” or no party identification 
(in response to the first question) were coded as 1, and “fairly” or “very strong” 
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identification coded as 0. This corresponds to theory, where high political interest and 
weak attachments to parties are symptoms of assertive behavioural orientations.       
 For the Assertive Index, I extracted all survey items that I considered probed 
attitudes related to assertive citizenship and postmaterialism, as these concepts are 
explicated in Dalton and Welzel (2014) and related work. Besides this substantive 
element, the most important criterion for inclusion is that the question was asked in more 
than one election survey, because of the way the algorithm in step (2) works. Appendix 
A4, below, lists every survey item identified and extracted for the four countries, along 
with exact question wording and response coding. The questions fell into one of seven 
categories: trust/cynicism, political efficacy and voice, equality attitudes, secular vs. 
traditional attitudes, law and order, environmental attitudes, and authority vs. 
individualism. I considered questions to be the same when they were identically worded 
and had identical response coding. In order to be input into the step (2) algorithm, the 
responses were dichotomized into assertive and non-assertive responses, as the rightmost 
column in table A4.1, below, indicates. Assertive responses were coded 1, non-assertive 
responses were coded 0. In total, the number of unique identical questions and the 
number of times the questions are asked in each country are, respectively: Australia, 44 
and 173, Canada, 37 and 175, New Zealand, 29 and 139, and the UK, 42 and 160.    
 The second step is to aggregate the data to give an overall score for each measure 
in each country for each election study year. For political interest and strength of party 
identification, the aggregated scores for each survey year are simply the mean response, 
i.e., a proportion between 0 and 1. Aggregation for the Assertive Index is more complex. 
The goal is to create an overall indicator that plausibly measures the underlying latent 
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concept: assertive values and attitudes. I adapt Stimson’s (1999, 2015) ‘dyad ratios’ 
approach to creating a smoothed time trend when aggregating partial data collected over 
time. Stimson’s method measures a latent aggregate characteristic of a population from a 
set of surveys across time. He describes the method in detail in chapter three and 
appendix one of his 1999 book, and in documentation for the algorithm’s software 
implementation Wcalc6.1 (1999, 37-66, 133-137; 2015). His purpose in creating the 
algorithm is to measure the “policy mood” in the United States over time, construed 
essentially as the amount of policy liberalism in the polity at any given time. Measuring 
policy liberalism over time is difficult because surveys, in this case specifically American 
National Election Study data, do not always ask the same questions in the same way, and 
only take place every two or four years. This incompleteness and inconsistency 
undermine the ability to generate a valid time series.  
 Stimson’s solution begins with the collected data in step (1): aggregate 
proportions of assertive responses on many survey questions over time. We can then 
compare these proportions for identical questions by taking their ratios, which gives us a 
relative indicator of the concept, to the extent that the question measures the concept. For 
instance, if at time t the proportion of assertive responses for item i is 0.50 and at t + 1 is 
0.60, then, if we fix assertiveness at 100 at time t, t + 1 has a score of 120: assertiveness 
is higher at t + 1 than t measured by i. For each time point, we can calculate such a ratio 
for any questions included at that time point and neighbouring time points.  
 We then need a systematic process to combine these ratios, which we do by both 
backward recursion and forward recursion. In backward recursion, we fix the last time 
point t at 100, then compute and average all ratios between t and t – 1. This gives us an 
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aggregate estimate of the underlying concept at t-1, relative to t. We repeat this process 
for t-1 and t-2, and so on, until the initial time point. Because the backward recursive 
process privileges later time points, the algorithm repeats the process in the forward 
direction. Instead of assuming that each item should be weighed equally in computing the 
estimate of the latent concept at each point in time, items are weighted according to their 
validity, i.e., the proportion of variance in the item that is shared with the concept 
(Stimson 2015, 13). Thus, we end up with two estimates, forward and backward, for the 
latent concept for each point in time.  
 Rather than simply averaging the two estimates, Stimson argues that sampling 
theory offers a better alternative. We should expect that even if change in assertive 
attitudes and values were relatively smooth, estimates of it would be more noisy, i.e., 
more “abrupt and jumpy”, because of sampling error (2015, 12). Thus, to more accurately 
represent the underlying time series, instead of simply averaging the algorithm applies an 
exponential smoother to the raw time series. The result is a time series that is an 
exponentially weighted moving average of forward and backward values at each time 
point. In software terms, the survey marginal proportions were input into Wcalc6.1, a 
software implementation of Stimson’s algorithm, available at Stimson’s website.150 
 The third step in the procedure is to impute (fill in) the missing data for the years 
between election studies. This is a particularly acute issue here because the election study 
surveys are conducted only periodically (corresponding to elections); there are more 
missing observations on country-years than not. Using only the years in which elections 
were held reduces the number of observations drastically and eliminates the possibility of 
testing some of the political conditions variables. In fact, considering the number of 
                                                 
150 http://stimson.web.unc.edu/software/ 
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parameters in the error correction models and the reduced periods because of estimating 
lagged effects, a degrees of freedom problem would exist for estimating regression 
models for only the time points with ‘real’ data. In order to make the analysis feasible, we 
need as complete a time series as possible, even if it means including imputed values.  
 I impute values for the missing observations using Honaker et al.’s (2012) 
software program Amelia II. Amelia II performs a “multiple imputation” procedure in 
which all variables that appear in the regression model are used to produce a posterior 
distribution for the complete data set via maximum likelihood. Multiple draws from this 
distribution are then taken to produce a specified number of complete data sets (10 in this 
case), which are then combined by averaging the estimates for the missing data. This 
produces a more data-driven approach to imputation of missing values, as compared to 
mean or linear imputation.  
 Finally, the data are transformed in order to better differentiate the trends in 
assertive citizenship from the irregular components of the time series. This is done 
through exponential smoothing of the time series. This variable construction procedure 
results in a time series of country-year observations for the three variables: political 
interest, strength of party identification, and an overall assertive values index. 
Index Validity 
 How valid is the assertive index as an overall measure of assertive citizenship 
orientations in these four countries across the time period? There is no simple answer to 
this question. Conceptually, I argue that aggregating as many potential indicators of 
assertive values and attitudes produces a more robust estimate of the concept of 
assertiveness than simply one or a few indicators. By aggregating we also create a 
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smoother, more stable measure because averaging across many values will even out 
aberrant fluctuations in particular items.  
 Empirically, the time series that are created generally correspond to our 
theoretically-derived expectations. In three countries, the assertive index exhibits a 
relatively smooth, incremental increase over time. In New Zealand, this pattern is not as 
evident, but as the study itself shows throughout, the case deviates in most ways from the 
other cases. The index also exhibits relatively high correlation, in the appropriate 
directions, with the simpler measures of political interest and party identification, as is 
shown in table A4, below. The index is positively correlated with political interest in 
every case but New Zealand, and is negatively correlated with strength of party 
identification in every case but, again, New Zealand. This provides some evidence that all 
of these indicators are measuring a similar latent concept, but are also distinct enough to 
merit using all three separately.  
Table A4 
Assertive Index Correlation with other Measures of Assertive Citizenship 
 Party ID Assertive Index 
Australia Pol Interest -0.56 0.46 
Party ID  -0.52 
Canada Pol Interest -0.69 0.82 
Party ID  -0.83 
New Zealand Pol Interest -0.39 -0.73 
Party ID  0.57 
United Kingdom Pol Interest -0.87 0.20 
Party ID  -0.39 
 
 Finally, the output of WCalc6.1 itself produces an estimate of the index’s validity 
in terms of how well the overall index accounts for all of the variation in the items with 
which it is constituted. We might also think of this as how much information is lost in 
aggregating all of the survey question data into a single index (instead, say, of a more 
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multi-dimensional approach). Since the dyad ratios algorithm is essentially a principal 
components analysis, the software output displays the eigenvalue estimates of the 
extracted factor (the total variance accounted for by the factor), the total variance, and the 
percent of total variance in the items explained by the factor (the first divided by the 
second). These figures are shown in table A5, below. They show that there are differences 
across cases in the adequacy of the index but that generally the index does a decent job of 
accounting for the variance in all of the assertive survey items. The percent of variance 
explained is highest in Australia, and lowest in New Zealand, which is not surprising.       
Table A5 
Assertive Index, Eigenvalue Estimates and Percent of Variance Explained 
 Eigenvalues % of Variance 
Explained 
Australia  2.80 / 3.66 76.52 
Canada 2.19/ 3.68 59.48 
New Zealand 3.18 / 5.56 57.13 
United Kingdom 1.67 / 2.91 57.51 
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Appendix 4 - Assertive Citizenship Index: Survey Items 
 This appendix is a list of the survey items used to construct the assertive 
citizenship index, as above. The items are given, by country, in appendix table A6, below. 
The number of unique questions and total item administrations are, respectively: 
Australia, 44 and 173, Canada, 37 and 175, New Zealand, 29 and 139, and the UK, 42 
and 160. The time period for the data is: Australia, 1967-2013, Canada, 1965-2011, New 
Zealand 1990-2014, and UK, 1963-2015. For each item, the following information is 
given: a short variable description, the exact question wording, the survey years in which 
it was asked, and the response categories. As the variables were dichotomized into 
assertive/non-assertive responses, the assertive responses are bolded.     
 
 
431 
 
Table A6  
Items used to construct the Assertive Citizenship Index 
Country Topic  Question Years Asked Response Coding 
(assertive in bold) 
Australia Censorship of 
Media 
Do you think that there 
should be some censorship 
of books and films, or do 
you think that people 
should be able to read and 
see what they like? 
1967, 1969, 1979 Some Censorship, 
Read what I Like 
 Censorship of 
Media 
Do you think that there 
should be some censorship 
of books and films, or do 
you think that people 
should be able to read and 
see what they like? 
1987, 1993 Some Censorship, It 
Depends, None 
 Nudity and Sex 
in Media 
Please say whether you 
think the change has gone 
too far, not gone far 
enough, or is it about 
right? The right to show 
nudity and sex in films and 
magazines. 
1990, 1993, 1996, 
1998, 2001, 2004, 
2007, 2010, 2013 
Much Too Far, Too Far, 
About Right, Not Far 
Enough, Not Nearly 
Far Enough 
 Traditional 
Right and 
Wrong 
How important is 
preserving traditional ideas 
of right and wrong? 
1998, 2001 Very important, 
somewhat important, 
not important  
 Death Penalty Do you want to see the 
death penalty kept or 
abolished? 
1967, 1969, 1979 Kept, Abolished 
 Death Penalty Please say whether you 
agree or disagree with the 
following statements: 
Bring back the death 
penalty. 
1987, 1990 Strongly Disagree – 
Strongly Agree 
 Death Penalty The death penalty should 
be reintroduced for murder 
1993, 1996, 1998, 
2001, 2004, 2007, 
2010, 2013 
Strongly Disagree – 
Strongly Agree 
 Stiffer Sentences People who break the law 
should be given stiffer 
sentences. 
1990, 1993, 1996, 
1998, 2001, 2004, 
2007, 2010, 2013 
Strongly Disagree – 
Strongly Agree 
 Abortion Do you think that women 
should be able to obtain an 
abortion easily when they 
want one, or do you think 
abortion should be allowed 
only in special 
circumstances? 
1979, 1987, 1990, 
1993, 1996, 1998, 
2001, 2004, 2007, 
2010, 2013 
Not Under any 
Circumstances, Special 
Circumstances, Obtain 
Easily 
 Homosexuality  There has been a lot of 
discussion in the last few 
years about homosexuality. 
Do you think that 
homosexual acts between 
consenting adults should 
be legal or should they be 
prohibited by law? 
1979, 1987 Should be Prohibited, It 
depends, Should be 
Legal 
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 Satisfaction with 
Govt, Politics 
On the whole, how do you 
feel about the state of 
government and politics in 
Australia? Would you say 
that you were very 
satisfied, fairly satisfied, or 
not satisfied? 
1969, 1979 Not, Fairly, Very 
Satisfied 
 Satisfaction with 
democracy 
On the whole, are you 
satisfied, fairly satisfied, 
not very satisfied or not at 
all satisfied with the way 
democracy works in 
Australia? 
1996, 1998, 2001, 
2004, 2007, 2010, 
2013 
Satisfied, Fairly 
Satisfied, Not very 
satisfied, Not at all 
satisfied 
 Confidence: 
Federal Govt 
How much confidence do 
you have in the following 
organisations? Federal 
government in Canberra. 
2001, 2010 Great deal, Quite a lot, 
Not very much, none 
at all 
 Confidence: 
Parties 
How much confidence do 
you have in the following 
organisations? 
Political Parties 
2001, 2010 Great deal, Quite a lot, 
Not very much, none 
at all 
 Confidence: 
Parliament 
How much confidence do 
you have in the following 
organisations? 
Parliament 
2001, 2010 Great deal, Quite a lot, 
Not very much, none 
at all 
 Confidence: 
Public Service 
How much confidence do 
you have in the following 
organisations? 
Public Service 
2001, 2010 Great deal, Quite a lot, 
Not very much, none 
at all 
 Confidence: 
Political System 
How much confidence do 
you have in the following 
organisations? 
Political System 
2001, 2010 Great deal, Quite a lot, 
Not very much, none 
at all 
 Trust to do 
Right Thing 
In general, do you feel that 
the people in government 
are too often interested in 
looking after themselves, 
or do you feel that they 
can be trusted to do the 
right thing nearly all the 
time? 
1969, 1979 Do Right Thing, Look 
after Self 
 Trust to do 
Right Thing 
In general, do you feel that 
the people in government 
are too often interested in 
looking after themselves, 
or do you feel that they 
can be trusted to do the 
right thing nearly all the 
time? 
1993, 1996, 1998, 
2001, 2004, 2007, 
2010, 2013 
Usually look after 
themselves, Sometimes 
look after themselves, 
Sometimes can be 
trusted to do the right 
thing, Usually can be 
trusted to do the right 
thing 
 Government 
benefits 
everyone / big 
interests 
Do you think that the 
people running the 
government in Canberra 
give everyone a fair go, 
whether they are important 
or just ordinary people, or 
do you think some of the 
1969, 1979, 1987 Give a Fair Go, Big 
Interests 
433 
 
people in the government 
pay more attention to what 
big interests want? 
 Government run 
by big interests 
or all 
Would you say the Federal 
government is run by a 
few big interests looking 
out for themselves or that 
it is run for the 
benefit of all the people? 
1993 For benefit of all, 
Depends, Run by Big 
Interests 
 Government run 
by big 
interests/all 
Would you say the 
government is run by a 
few big interests looking 
out for themselves, or that 
it is run for the benefit of 
all the people? 
1998, 2001, 2004, 
2007, 2010, 2013 
Entirely run for big 
interests, mostly run 
for big interests, half 
and half, mostly run for 
benefit of all, entirely 
run for benefit of all 
 Government 
knows what it’s 
Doing 
Do you feel that the people 
running the government 
are usually pretty 
intelligent people who 
know what they are doing, 
or do you feel that there 
are too many people who 
don't seem to know what 
they're doing? 
1969, 1979 Know what Doing, 
Don’t Know what 
Doing 
 Difference who 
in power 
Some people say it makes 
a big difference who is in 
power. Others say it 
doesn't make any 
difference who is in power. 
Using the scale below, 
where would you place 
yourself? 
2001, 2004, 2007, 
2010, 2013 
It makes a big 
difference who is in 
power – doesn’t make 
any difference 
 Parties care 
what people 
think 
Some people say that 
political parties in 
Australia care what 
ordinary people think. 
Others say that political 
parties in Australia don't 
care what ordinary people 
think. Where would you 
place your view on this 
scale from 1 to 5? 
1996, 1998, 2001, 
2004, 2007, 2010, 
2013 
Care what think – 
Don’t care what think 
 Parties make 
system work 
Where would you place 
your view on this scale 
from 1 to 5, where 1 
means that political parties 
are necessary to make our 
political system work, and 
5 means that political 
parties are not needed in 
Australia? 
1996, 1998 Make System work – 
not needed 
 Parties do good 
job 
In general, do you think 
political parties are doing a 
very good job, a good job, 
neither a good nor a bad 
job, a bad job or a very 
2001, 2004 Doing a very good job, 
doing a good job, 
neither good nor bad, 
doing a bad job, doing 
a very bad job 
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bad job for the people of 
Australia? 
 Politicians know 
what people 
think 
Some people say that 
Federal politicians know 
what ordinary people 
think. Others say that 
Federal politicians don't 
know much about what 
ordinary people think. 
Where would you place 
your view on this scale 
from 1 to 5? 
1996, 1998, 2001, 
2004, 2007, 2010, 
2013 
Know what people 
think – Don’t know 
what people think 
 Politicians 
Corrupt 
How widespread do you 
think corruption such as 
bribe taking is amongst 
politicians in Australia? 
2001, 2004 It hardly happens at all, 
not very widespread, 
quite widespread, 
very widespread 
 Public Servants 
Corrupt 
How widespread do you 
think corruption such as 
bribe taking is amongst 
public servants in 
Australia? 
2001, 2004 It hardly happens at all, 
not very widespread, 
quite widespread, 
very widespread 
 R could do good 
job in office 
I feel that I could do as 
good a job in public office 
as most other people. 
1993, 1998, 2001 Strongly Disagree – 
Strongly Agree 
 R good 
understanding of 
issues 
I feel that I have a pretty 
good understanding of the 
important political issues 
facing Australia. 
1993, 1998, 2001 Strongly Disagree – 
Strongly Agree 
 Government 
Trust 
How much of the time do 
you think you can trust the 
government in Canberra to 
do what is right? 
1987, 1993 Just about always, Most 
of the Time, Some of 
the Time, Not at all 
 Tax Money 
Wasted 
Do you think that people 
in the Federal Government 
waste a lot of money we 
pay in taxes, waste some 
of it, or don't waste very 
much of it? 
1987, 1993 Don’t Waste Much, 
Waste Some of It, 
Waste a Lot 
 Women: Job 
Opportunities 
How about job 
opportunities for women - 
do you think that they are, 
in general, better or worse 
than job opportunities for 
men with similar education 
and experience? 
1987 Much Better, Better, No 
Difference, Worse, 
Much Worse 
 Women: Equal 
Opportunity 
Please say whether you 
think the change has gone 
too far, not gone far 
enough, or is it about 
right? Equal opportunities 
for women. 
1990, 1993, 1996, 
1998, 2001, 2004, 
2007, 2010, 2013 
Much Too Far, Too Far, 
About Right, Not Far 
Enough, Not nearly 
far enough 
 Women: 
Preferential 
Treatment 
Women should be given 
preferential treatment 
when applying for jobs 
and promotions. 
1993, 1996, 1998, 
2001, 2004, 2007, 
2010, 2013 
Strongly Disagree – 
Strongly Agree 
 Women: The government should 1993, 1996, 1998, Strongly Disagree – 
435 
 
Increase 
Opportunities 
increase opportunities for 
women in business and 
industry. 
2001, 2004, 2007, 
2010, 2013 
Strongly Agree 
 Gender equality How important is it to 
guarantee equality 
between men and women 
in all aspects of life? 
1998, 2001 Not important, 
Somewhat important, 
Very important 
 Environment: 
Cherish Nature 
I cherish nature and 
preserve it as one of the 
most precious things in 
life. 
1990, 1993, 1998 Strongly Disagree – 
Strongly Agree 
 Environment: 
Increase 
Spending 
Increase government 
spending to protect the 
environment 
1993, 1996, 1998 Strongly Disagree – 
Strongly Agree 
 Global Warming How serious a threat do 
you think global warming 
will pose to you or your 
way of life in your 
lifetime? 
2010, 2013 Not at all serious, Not 
very serious, Fairly 
serious, Very serious 
 Respect 
Authority 
How important is it to 
strengthen respect and 
obedience for authority? 
1998, 2001 Very important, 
somewhat important, 
not important 
 Emphasize 
freedom or 
conformity 
In our society today, too 
much emphasis is placed 
on: freedom, conformity, 
neither/undecided 
1998, 2001 Freedom, 
neither/undecided, 
Conformity 
 Emphasize 
Institutions or 
Individuals 
In society today, too little 
emphasis is placed on: 
respect for established 
institutions, rights of the 
individual, 
neither/undecided 
1998, 2001 Institutions, Neither, 
Individuals 
Country Topic Question Years Asked Response Coding 
(assertive in bold) 
Canada Death Penalty Capital punishment is 
never justified, no matter 
what the crime.  
1993, 1997 Strongly Disagree, 
Somewhat Disagree, 
Somewhat Agree, 
Strongly Agree 
 Death Penalty Do you favour or oppose 
the death penalty for 
persons convicted of 
murder? 
2000, 2004, 2006, 
2008, 2011 
Favour, Oppose 
 Abortion Which is closest to your 
own opinion: abortion 
never permitted, permitted 
after need established, 
woman’s personal choice 
1988, 1993, 1997 abortion never 
permitted, permitted 
after need established, 
woman’s personal 
choice 
 Abortion And now a question on 
abortion: do you think it 
should be: very easy, quite 
easy, quite difficult, very 
difficult for women to get 
an abortion? 
2000, 2004, 2006, 
2008 
very difficult, quite 
difficult, quite easy, 
very easy 
 Satisfaction w/ 
Democracy 
On the whole, are you very 
satisfied, fairly satisfied, 
not very satisfied or not 
1993, 1997, 2004, 
2006, 2008, 2011 
Very satisfied, fairly 
satisfied, not very 
satisfied, not satisfied 
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satisfied at all with the 
way democracy works in 
Canada? 
at all 
 Confidence in 
Fed Govt 
For each of the following 
institutions, please tell us 
how much confidence you 
have in them: the federal 
government 
1993, 1997, 2000, 
2004, 2008, 2011 
A great deal, quite a lot, 
not very much, none 
at all 
 Crooks in Govt Do You Think That Quite 
A Few Of The People 
Running The Government 
Are A Little Crooked, Not 
Very Many Are Crooked, 
Or Do You Think Hardly 
Any Of Them Are 
Crooked? 
1965, 1968, 1988, 
1993, 1997, 2000, 
2004, 2008 
Hardly Any, Not Very 
Many, Quite a Few 
 Tax Money 
Wasted 
Do You Think That People 
In The Government Waste 
A Lot Of The Money We 
Pay In Taxes, Waste Some 
Of It, Or Don't Waste Very 
Much Of It? 
1965, 1968, 1988, 
1993, 1997, 2000, 
2004, 2008, 2011 
Not Much, Some, A 
Lot 
 Tax Money 
Wasted 
People in the federal 
government waste a lot of 
the money we pay in taxes. 
1984 Strongly Disagree, 
Disagree Somewhat, 
Somewhat agree, 
Strongly Agree 
 Trust Govt to do 
right 
How Much Of The Time 
Do You Think You Can 
Trust 
The Government In 
Ottawa To Do What Is 
Right: Just About Always, 
Most Of The Time, Or 
Only Some Of The Time? 
1965, 1968, 1988, 
1993 
Always, Most of the 
Time, Some of the 
Time 
 Trust Govt to do 
right 
Most of the time we can 
trust people in the Federal 
Government to do what is 
right. 
1984 Strongly Agree, 
Somewhat Agree, 
Disagree Somewhat, 
Strongly Disagree 
 Attention to 
Interests 
Do You Think That All 
People Who Are High In 
Government Give 
Everyone A Fair Break, 
Whether They Are Big 
Shots Or Just Ordinary 
People, Or Do You Think 
Some Of Them 
Pay More Attention To 
What The Big Interests 
Want? 
1965, 1968 Give Everyone a Fair 
Break, Pay Attention 
to Big Shots 
 Govt knows 
what it’s doing 
Do you feel that almost all 
of the people running the 
government are smart 
people who usually know 
what they are doing, or do 
you think that quite a few 
of them don’t seem to 
1965, 1968, 1988, 
1993 
All know, Quite a few 
of them don’t know 
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know what they are doing? 
 Govt knows 
what it’s doing 
Most of the people running 
the Fed Govt are smart 
people who usually know 
what they are doing. 
1984 Strongly Agree, 
Somewhat Agree, 
Disagree Somewhat, 
Strongly Disagree 
 Govt Doesn’t 
Care 
I don’t think that the 
government cares much 
what people like me think. 
1965, 1968 Disagree, Agree 
 Govt Doesn’t 
Care 
I don’t think that the 
government cares much 
what people like me think. 
1974, 1979, 1984, 
1993, 1997, 2000, 
2004, 2006, 2008, 
2011 
Strongly Disagree, 
Disagree, Agree, 
Strongly Agree 
 Parties Care Some people say that 
political parties in Canada 
care what ordinary people 
think. Others say that 
political parties in Canada 
don’t care what ordinary 
people think. Using the 
scale below, where would 
you place your own view? 
1997, 2000 1 Care to 5 Don’t Care 
4,5 
 No Say People like me don’t have 
any say about what the 
government does. 
1965, 1968 Disagree, Agree 
 No Say People like me don’t have 
any say about what the 
government does. 
1974, 1979, 1984, 
1993, 1997, 2000, 
2004, 2008, 2011 
Strongly Disagree, 
Disagree, Agree, 
Strongly Agree 
 MPs lose touch Generally those elected to 
Parliament soon lose touch 
with the people. 
1965, 1968 Disagree, Agree 
 MPs lose touch Generally those elected to 
Parliament soon lose touch 
with the people. 
1974, 1979, 1984, 
1993, 1997, 2000, 
2004, 2008, 2011 
Strongly Disagree, 
Disagree, Agree, 
Strongly Agree 
 Politics too 
Complicated 
Sometimes Politics And 
Government Seem So 
Complicated That A 
Person Like Me Can't 
Really Understand What's 
Going On. 
1965, 1968 Agree, Disagree 
 Politics too 
complicated 
Sometimes Politics And 
Government Seem So 
Complicated That A 
Person Like Me Can't 
Really Understand What's 
Going On. 
1974, 1979, 1984, 
1993, 1997, 2000, 
2004, 2008, 2011 
Strongly Agree, Agree, 
Disagree, Strongly 
Disagree 
 Difference who 
is in Power 
In your opinion, do you 
think it makes a great deal 
of difference, some 
difference, or no 
difference, which political 
party runs this country? 
1965, 1968 Great Deal, Some 
Difference, No 
Difference 
 Women stay w/ 
Children 
Society would be better off 
if more women stayed 
home with their children. 
1993, 2000, 2004, 
2006, 2008 
Strongly agree, 
somewhat agree, 
somewhat disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Job Gender Discrimination makes it 1993, 1997, 2000, Strongly Disagree, 
438 
 
Discrimination extremely difficult for 
women to get jobs equal to 
their abilities. 
2004, 2008, 2011 Disagree, Agree, 
Strongly Agree 
 Equal Rights We have gone too far in 
pushing equal rights in this 
country. 
1993, 1997, 2000, 
2004, 2008, 2011 
Strongly agree, 
somewhat agree, 
somewhat disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Homosexual 
Couples Marry 
Homosexual couples 
should be allowed to get 
legally married. 
1993, 1997, 2000 Strongly Disagree, 
Somewhat Disagree, 
Somewhat Agree, 
Strongly Agree 
 Same-sex 
marriage 
Do you favour or oppose 
same-sex marriage, or do 
you have no opinion on 
this? 
2004, 2006, 2008, 
2011 
Oppose, favour 
 Protect 
Environment 
over Jobs 
Protecting the environment 
is more important than 
creating jobs. 
1993, 1997, 2000, 
2004, 2008, 2011 
Strongly Disagree, 
Disagree, Agree, 
Strongly Agree 
 Duty to Vote It is the duty of every 
citizen to vote. 
2000, 2004, 2006, 
2008 
Strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, strongly 
disagree 
 Respect for 
Authority 
Respect for authority is 
one of the most important 
things that children should 
learn. 
1993, 1997 Strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, strongly 
disagree 
 Children Learn Here are some qualities 
that children can be 
encouraged to learn. 
Which one do you think is 
more important? 
Independence, or respect 
for authority. 
2008, 2011 Respect for authority, 
Independence 
 Children Learn Here are some qualities 
that children can be 
encouraged to learn. 
Which one do you think is 
more important? 
Obedience or self-reliance. 
2008, 2011 Obedience, Self-
Reliance 
 Lifestyles  Newer lifestyles are 
contributing to the 
breakdown of our society. 
1997, 2000, 2004, 
2008, 2011 
Strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, strongly 
disagree 
 Adapt Morals to 
Change 
The world is always 
changing and we should 
adapt our view of moral 
behaviour to these 
changes. 
1997, 2000, 2004, 
2008, 2011 
Strongly Disagree, 
Disagree, Agree, 
Strongly Agree 
 Emphasize 
traditional 
values 
This country would have 
many fewer problems if 
there were more emphasis 
on traditional family 
values. 
1997, 2000, 2004, 
2008, 2011 
Strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, strongly 
disagree 
 Down to Earth 
vs. Experts 
I'd rather put my trust in 
the down-to-earth thinking 
of ordinary people than in 
experts 
1993, 1997, 2008, 
2011 
Strongly Disagree, 
Disagree, Agree, 
Strongly Agree 
 People have Most people have enough 1993, 1997, 2000, Strongly Disagree, 
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sense sense to tell whether the 
government is doing a 
good job. 
2004, 2008, 2011 Disagree, Agree, 
Strongly Agree 
 Grassroots We could probably solve 
most of our big national 
problems if decisions 
could be brought back to 
the people at the grass 
roots. 
1993, 1997, 2000, 
2008, 2011 
Strongly Disagree, 
Disagree, Agree, 
Strongly Agree 
Country Topic Question Years Asked Response Coding 
(assertive in bold) 
New 
Zealand 
Death penalty The death penalty for 
murder should be 
reintroduced. 
1996, 1999, 2002, 
2005, 2008 
Strongly agree, agree, 
neutral, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Stiffer Sentences People who break the law 
should be given stiffer 
sentences. 
1996, 2005, 2008 Strongly agree, agree, 
neutral, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Satisfaction w/ 
Democracy 
On the whole, are you 
satisfied, fairly satisfied, 
not very satisfied, or not at 
all satisfied with the way 
democracy works in New 
Zealand? 
1996, 1999, 2002, 
2005, 2008, 2011, 
2014 
Satisfied, Fairly 
Satisfied, Not very 
satisfied, not at all 
satisfied 
 Confidence in 
Parliament 
How much trust and 
confidence would you say 
you have in Parliament? 
2002, 2005, 2008 0-8 (0-3) 
 Big Interests The New Zealand 
government is largely run 
by a few big interests. 
1993, 1996, 1999, 
2002, 2005, 2008, 
2011, 2014 
Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Trust Govt to do 
Right 
You can trust the 
government to do what is 
right most of the time. 
1993, 1996, 1999, 
2002, 2005, 2008, 
2011 
Strongly agree, agree, 
neutral, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 No difference 
who in power 
If 1 means that it makes a 
difference who is in power, 
and 5 means that it doesn’t 
make a difference who is 
in power, where would 
you place your view? 
1996, 2002, 2005, 
2008, 2011, 2014 
1-5 (4-5) 
 MPs lose touch Most Members of 
Parliament are out of touch 
with the rest of the 
country. 
1993, 1996, 1999, 
2002, 2005, 2008, 
2011, 2014 
Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree 
 No Say People like me don’t have 
any say about what the 
government does. 
1993, 1996, 1999, 
2002, 2005, 2008, 
2011, 2014 
Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Politicians Care I don’t think politicians 
and public servants care 
much about what people 
like me think.  
1993, 1996, 1999, 
2002, 2005, 2008, 
2011, 2014 
Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Understand 
Issues 
I feel I have a pretty good 
understanding of the issues 
facing New Zealand. 
1993, 1996, 1999, 
2002, 2005, 2008 
Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Could do as 
good a job 
I feel that I could do as 
good a job in public office 
as most other people. 
1993, 1996, 1999, 
2002, 2005, 2008 
Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Politics Sometimes Politics And 1993, 1996, 1999, Strongly agree, agree, 
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Complicated Government Seem So 
Complicated That A 
Person Like Me Can't 
Really Understand What's 
Going On. 
2002, 2005, 2008 neutral, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Referendum Be able to make 
government hold a binding 
referendum if enough 
people want one on a 
particular issue? 
1990, 1993, 1996 Definitely No, Probably 
No, Can’t Say, 
Probably Yes, 
Definitely Yes 
 Referendum Referendums are too 
complicated for the 
average voter. 
1999, 2002 Strongly agree, agree, 
neutral, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Referendum Citizens-initiated 
referendums enable 
citizens to get politicians’ 
attention. 
1999, 2002 Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Referendum Results of citizens- 
initiated referendums 
should automatically 
become law. 
1999, 2002 Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Parliament final 
say 
Parliament, not voters, 
should make final 
decisions on law and 
policy. 
1999, 2002 Strongly agree, agree, 
neutral, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Environment  Some people say we 
should concentrate more 
on protecting the 
environment, even if it 
leads to considerable lower 
living standards for 
everyone. Others think that 
we should safeguard our 
living standards before we 
seek to protect the 
environment. 
1990, 1993 Protection of the 
environment should not 
be increased if it leads 
to lower living 
standards – Increase 
protection of the 
environment (1-7, 1-3) 
 Environment On this scale, ONE means 
that we should concentrate 
more on protecting the 
environment, even if it 
leads to considerably 
lower incomes, and 
SEVEN means that we 
should safeguard our 
income levels before we 
seek to protect the 
environment. 
1996, 1999, 2002, 
2005, 2008 
Should not protect 
environment if it leads 
to lower in comes to 
Should protect 
environment even if it 
leads to lower incomes 
(1-7, 1-3) 
 Workers more 
say 
Workers should have more 
say in running the places 
they work. 
1990, 1993 Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Abortion Abortion is always wrong. 2008, 2014 Strongly agree, agree, 
neutral, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Homosexuality Homosexual relationships 
are always wrong. 
1993, 1996, 2005, 
2008 
Strongly agree, agree, 
neutral, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
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 Homosexuality It should be illegal to 
refuse to employ someone 
because they are 
homosexual. 
1993, 1996 Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Strong leaders A few strong leaders could 
make this country better 
than all the laws and talk. 
1993, 1996, 1999, 
2002, 2005, 2008, 
2011, 2014 
Strongly agree, agree, 
neutral, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Young need 
discipline 
What young people need 
most of all is strict 
discipline by their parents. 
1993, 1999, 2002, 
2005, 2008, 2011, 
2014 
Strongly agree, agree, 
neutral, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Duty to Vote It is a citizen’s duty to 
vote. 
1993, 1996, 1999, 
2002, 2005, 2008, 
2011, 2014 
Strongly agree, agree, 
neutral, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Gender pay 
difference 
There should be a law to 
further reduce pay 
differences between 
women and men. 
1996, 1999, 2002, 
2005, 2008 
Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Women stay 
home w/ 
children 
Society would be better off 
if more women stayed 
home with their children. 
1999, 2002 Strongly agree, agree, 
neutral, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
Country Topic Question Years Asked Response Coding 
(assertive in bold) 
United 
Kingdom 
Death Penalty Would you like to see the 
death penalty kept or 
abolished? 
1963, 1966, 1970 Kept, abolished 
 Death Penalty Britain should bring back 
the death penalty? 
1992, 1997 Strongly agree, agree, 
not sure either way, 
disagree, strongly 
disagree 
 Death Penalty The death penalty, even for 
very serious crimes, is 
never justified. 
2001, 2005, 2010 Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Sentences People who break the law 
should be given stiffer 
sentences. 
1983, 1987, 1992, 
1997, 2001, 2005, 
2010 
Agree, not sure, 
disagree 
 Elections 
Responsiveness 
How much do you think 
that having elections 
makes the government pay 
attention to what the 
people think? 
1963, 1964, 1966 Good deal, some, not 
much 
 Parties 
Responsiveness 
How much do you feel that 
having political parties 
makes the government pay 
attention to what the 
people think? 
1963,1964,1966 Good deal, some, not 
much 
 Satisfaction w/ 
democracy 
On the whole, how 
satisfied are you with the 
way democracy works in 
Britain?  
1997, 2001, 2005, 
2010, 2015 
Satisfied, fairly 
satisfied, not very 
satisfied, not at all 
satisfied 
 Trust Parliament How much do you trust 
the Parliament at 
Westminster? 
2005, 2010 0 no trust – 10 great 
deal of trust (0-4) 
 Trust Politicians How much do you trust 
British politicians 
generally? 
2005, 2010, 2015 0 no trust – 10 great 
deal of trust (0-4) 
 Trust Civil How much do you trust 2005 0 no trust – 10 great 
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Service the civil service? deal of trust (0-4) 
 Respect 
Parliament 
How much respect you 
have for each of the 
following: the Parliament 
at Westminster. 
2001 0 no respect – 10 great 
deal of respect (0-4) 
 Respect 
Politicians 
How much respect you 
have for each of the 
following: Politicians 
generally. 
2001 0 no respect – 10 great 
deal of respect (0-4) 
 Respect Civil 
Service 
How much respect you 
have for each of the 
following: the Civil 
Service. 
2001 0 no respect – 10 great 
deal of respect (0-4) 
 Duty to Vote It is every citizen’s duty to 
vote in an election. 
2001, 2005, 2010, 
2015 
Strongly agree, agree, 
neither, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Elections Elections help to keep 
politicians accountable for 
the promises they make. 
2001, 2005, 2010 Strongly agree, agree, 
neither, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Elections Elections allow voters to 
express their opinions but 
don’t really change 
anything. 
2001, 2005, 2010 Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neither, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Elections Elections give voters an 
opportunity to tell 
politicians what they think 
is really important. 
2001, 2005, 2010 Strongly agree, agree, 
neither, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Elections All things considered, 
most elections are just a 
big waste of time and 
money. 
2001, 2005, 2010 Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neither, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Govt treats 
people 
The government generally 
treats people like me fairly. 
2001, 2005, 2010 Strongly agree, agree, 
neither, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Active Benefits Being active in politics is a 
good way to get benefits 
for me and my family.  
2001, 2005, 2010 Strongly agree, agree, 
neither, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Active Effort It takes too much time and 
effort to be active in 
politics and public affairs. 
2001, 2005, 2010 Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neither, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Voting waste of 
time 
Most of my family and 
friends think that voting is 
a waste of time. 
2001, 2005, 2010, 
2015 
Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neither, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Homosexuality Homosexual relations are 
always wrong. 
1992, 1997 Strongly agree, agree, 
neither, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Tolerance of 
Lifestyles 
People in Britain should be 
more tolerant of those who 
lead unconventional lives. 
1992, 1997, 2001, 
2005, 2010, 2015 
Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neither, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Too far: gender 
equality 
How do you feel about the 
attempts to ensure equality 
for women? 
1974,1979,1983, 
1987, 1992, 1997, 
2015 
Gone much too far, 
gone a little too far, is 
about right, not gone 
quite far enough, not 
gone nearly far 
enough 
 Wife’s job home A husband’s job is to earn 2001, 2005, 2010 Strongly agree, agree, 
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the money; a wife’s job is 
to look after the home and 
family. 
neither, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Too far: 
homosexual 
equality 
Attempts to give equal 
opportunities to 
homosexuals – that is, 
gays and lesbians. 
1987,1992, 1997 Gone much too far, 
gone too far, is about 
right, not gone far 
enough, not gone 
nearly far enough 
 Too far: 
nudity/sex in 
media 
How do you feel about the 
right to show nudity and 
sex in films and 
magazines? 
1974,1979,1983, 
1987,1992 
Gone much too far, 
gone a little too far, is 
about right, not gone 
quite far enough, not 
gone nearly far 
enough 
 Censorship Censorship of films and 
magazines is necessary to 
uphold moral standards.  
1987, 1992, 1997, 
2001, 2005, 2010, 
2015 
agree strongly, agree, 
neither, disagree, 
disagree strongly 
 Too far: Show 
respect for 
authority 
How do you feel about 
people showing less 
respect for authority? 
1974,1979,1983 Gone much too far, 
gone a little too far, is 
about right, not gone 
quite far enough, not 
gone nearly far 
enough 
 Too far: 
availability of 
abortion 
How do you feel about the 
availability of abortion on 
the NHS? 
1974,1979,1983, 
1987,1992, 1997 
Gone much too far, 
gone a little too far, is 
about right, not gone 
quite far enough, not 
gone nearly far 
enough 
 Too far: right to 
protest / 
demonstrate 
The right to have protest 
marches and 
demonstrations. 
1983,1987 Gone too far, about 
right, not gone far 
enough 
 Organise protest People should be allowed 
to organise public 
meetings to protest against 
the government. 
1992, 1997, 2001, 
2005, 2010, 2015 
Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neither, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Workers more 
say 
Giving workers more say 
in the running of the place 
where they work? 
1974,1979,1983 Very important that it 
should not be done, 
fairly important not 
done, doesn’t matter, 
fairly important 
should, very 
important should  
 Workers more 
say 
Government should or 
should not give workers 
more say. 
1983,1987, 1992, 
1997 
Should not, doesn’t 
matter, should 
 No say People like me have no say 
in what the government 
does. 
1987,1992, 1997, 
2001, 2015 
Disagree strongly, 
disagree, neither agree 
nor disagree, agree, 
agree strongly 
 Govt doesn’t 
care 
Government does not care 
much what people like me 
think. 
1992, 2001, 2015 Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neither, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Lose Touch Those elected to 
Parliament soon lose touch 
with the people. 
2001 Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neither, agree, 
strongly agree 
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 Politics 
complicated 
Sometimes politics and 
government seem so 
complicated that a person 
like me cannot really 
understand what is going 
on. 
1987,1992, 2001, 
2015 
Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neither, 
agree, strongly agree 
 Could do job I feel I could do as good a 
job as an MP or Councillor 
as most other people. 
1992 Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neither, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Parties are same It doesn’t really matter 
which party is in power, in 
the end things go on much 
the same. 
1987, 1997 Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neither, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Parties are same The main political parties 
in Britain don’t offer 
voters real choices in 
elections because their 
policies are pretty much all 
the same. 
2001, 2005, 2010, 
2015 
Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neither, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Parties vs. 
Groups 
Being involved in a 
group… is a better way of 
influencing government 
than being active in a 
political party. 
2001, 2005, 2010 Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neither, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Parties interest 
in votes 
Parties are only interested 
in people’s votes, not in 
their opinions. 
1987, 1997, 2001, 
2005 
Strongly disagree, 
disagree, neither, agree, 
strongly agree 
 Environment Industry should be 
prevented from causing 
damage to the countryside, 
even if this sometimes 
leads to higher prices OR 
industry should keep 
prices down, even if this 
sometimes causes damage 
to the countryside 
1987,1992  
 Environment The countryside should be 
protected from 
development, even if this 
sometimes leads to fewer 
new jobs OR new jobs 
should be created, even if 
this sometimes causes 
damage to the countryside 
1987,1992  
 Environment We worry too much about 
the environment today and 
not enough about people’s 
jobs 
2001, 2005, 2010 Strongly agree, agree, 
neither, disagree, 
strongly disagree 
 Traditional 
Values 
Young people today don’t 
have enough respect for 
traditional British values. 
1987,1992, 1997, 
2001, 2005, 2010, 
2015 
agree strongly, agree, 
neither, disagree, 
disagree strongly 
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